Mr Dickinson moved to insert the words, "or Executive" after the words "application of its Legislature."–The occasion itself he remarked might hinder the Legislature from meeting.

On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md divd. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr L. Martin moved to subjoin to the last amendment the words "in the recess of the Legislature." On which question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On Question on the last clause as amended

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art: XIX taken up.

Mr Govr Morris suggested that the Legislature should be left at liberty to call a Convention, whenever they please.

The Art: was agreed to nem: con:

Art: XX. taken up.–"or affirmation" was added after "oath."

Mr Pinkney moved to add to the Art:–"but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the authority of the U. States."

Mr Sherman thought it unnecessary, the prevailing liberality being a sufficient security agst such tests.

Mr Govr Morris & Genl Pinkney approved the motion.

The motion was agreed to nem: con: and then the whole Article; N. C. only no–and Md divided.

Art: XXI. taken up, viz: "The ratifications of the Conventions of –— States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution."

Mr Wilson proposed to fill the blank with "seven" that being a majority of the whole number & sufficient for the commencement of the plan.

Mr Carrol moved to postpone the article in order to take up the Report of the Committee of Eleven (see Tuesday Augst 28)–and on the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr Govr Morris thought the blank ought to be filled in a twofold way, so as to provide for the event of the ratifying States being contiguous which would render a smaller number sufficient, and the event of their being dispersed, which wd require a greater number for the introduction of the Government.

Mr Sherman observed that the States being now confederated by articles which require unanimity in changes, he thought the ratification in this case of ten States at least ought to be made necessary.

Mr Randolph was for filling the blank with "nine" that being a respectable majority of the whole, and being a number made familiar by the constitution of the existing Congress.

Mr Wilson mentioned "eight" as preferable.

Mr Dickinson asked whether the concurrence of Congress is to be essential to the establishment of the system, whether the refusing States in the Confederacy could be deserted–and whether Congress could concur in contravening the system under which they acted?

Mr Madison, remarked that if the blank should be filled with "seven" "eight," or "nine," the Constitution as it stands might be put in force over the whole body of the people, tho' less than a majority of them should ratify it.

Mr Wilson. As the Constitution stands, the States only which ratify can be bound. We must he said in this case go to the original powers of Society. The House on fire must be extinguished, without a scrupulous regard to ordinary rights.

Mr Butler was in favor of "nine." He revolted at the idea, that one or two States should restrain the rest from consulting their safety.

Mr Carrol moved to fill the blank with "the thirteen," unanimity being necessary to dissolve the existing confederacy which had been unanimously established.

Mr King thought this amendt necessary, otherwise as the Constitution now stands it will operate on the whole though ratified by a part only. Adjourned.


Friday August 31st 1787. In Convention.

Mr King moved to add to the end of Art: XXI the words "between the said States" so as to confine the operation of the Govt to the States ratifying it.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Md no. Virga ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr Madison proposed to fill the blank in the article with "any seven or more States entitled to thirty three members at least in the House of Representatives according to the allotment made in the 3 Sect: of Art: 4." This he said would require the concurrence of a majority of both the States and the people.

Mr Sherman doubted the propriety of authorizing less than all the States to execute the Constitution, considering the nature of the existing Confederation. Perhaps all the States may concur, and on that supposition it is needless to hold out a breach of faith.

Mr Clymer and Mr Carrol moved to postpone the consideration of Art: XXI in order to take up the Reports of Committees not yet acted on. On this question, the States were equally divided.

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct divd. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. G. ay.

Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out "Conventions of the" after "ratifications" leaving the States to pursue their own modes of ratification.

Mr Carrol mentioned the mode of altering the Constitution of Maryland pointed out therein, and that no other mode could be pursued in that State.

Mr King thought that striking out "Conventions," as the requisite mode was equivalent to giving up the business altogether. Conventions alone, which will avoid all the obstacles from the complicated formation of the Legislatures, will succeed, and if not positively required by the plan its enemies will oppose that mode.

Mr Govr Morris said he meant to facilitate the adoption of the plan, by leaving the modes approved by the several State Constitutions to be followed.

Mr Madison considered it best to require Conventions; Among other reasons, for this, that the powers given to the Genl Govt being taken from the State Govts the Legislatures would be more disinclined than conventions composed in part at least of other men; and if disinclined, they could devise modes apparently promoting, but really thwarting the ratification. The difficulty in Maryland was no greater than in other States, where no mode of change was pointed out by the Constitution, and all officers were under oath to support it. The people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills of rights, that first principles might be resorted to.

Mr McHenry said that the officers of Govt in Maryland were under oath to support the mode of alteration prescribed by the Constitution.

Mr Ghorum urged the expediency of "Conventions" also Mr Pinkney, for reasons formerly urged on a discussion of this question.

Mr L. Martin insisted on a reference to the State Legislatures. He urged the danger of commotions from a resort to the people & to first principles, in which the Governments might be on one side and the people on the other. He was apprehensive of no such consequences however in Maryland, whether the Legislature or the people should be appealed to. Both of them would be generally against the Constitution. He repeated also the peculiarity in the Maryland Constitution.

Mr King observed that the Constitution of Massachusetts was made unalterable till the year 1790, yet this was no difficulty with him. The State must have contemplated a recurrence to first principles before they sent deputies to this Convention.

Mr Sherman moved to postpone art. XXI. & to take up art: XXII on which question,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On Mr Govr Morris's motion to strike out "Conventions of the," it was negatived.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On filling the blank in Art: XXI with "thirteen" moved by Mr. Carrol & Martin, N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no, all except Maryland.

Mr Sherman & Mr Dayton moved to fill the blank with "ten."

Mr Wilson supported the motion of Mr Madison, requiring a majority both of the people and of States. Mr Clymer was also in favor of it.

Col: Mason was for preserving ideas familiar to the people. Nine States had been required in all great cases under the Confederation & that number was on that account preferable.

On the question for "ten"

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On question for "nine"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

Art: XXI. as amended was then agreed to by all the States, Maryland excepted, & Mr Jenifer being ay.

Art. XXII taken up, to wit, "This Constitution shall be laid before the U. S. in Congs assembled for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this Convention that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention chosen, in each State under the recommendation of its Legislature, in order to receive the ratification of such Convention."

Mr Govr Morris & Mr Pinkney moved to strike out the words "for their approbation." On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. [47] Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

[47] In the printed Journal N. Jersey–no.–Madison's Note.

Mr Govr Morris & Mr Pinkney then moved to amend the art: so as to read

"This Constitution shall be laid before the U. S. in Congress assembled; and it is the opinion of this Convention that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention chosen in each State, in order to receive the ratification of such Convention; to which end the several Legislatures ought to provide for the calling Conventions within their respective States as speedily as circumstances will permit."

Mr Govr Morris said his object was to impress in stronger terms the necessity of calling Conventions in order to prevent enemies to the plan, from giving it the go by. When it first appears, with the sanction of this Convention, the people will be favorable to it. By degrees the State officers, & those interested in the State Govts will intrigue & turn the popular current against it.

Mr L. Martin believed Mr Morris to be right, that after a while the people would be agst it, but for a different reason from that alledged. He believed they would not ratify it unless hurried into it by surprize.

Mr Gerry enlarged on the idea of Mr L. Martin in which he concurred, represented the system as full of vices, and dwelt on the impropriety of destroying the existing Confederation, without the unanimous consent of the parties to it.

Question on Mr Govr Morris's & Mr Pinkney's motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr Gerry moved to postpone art: XXII.

Col: Mason 2ded the motion, declaring that he would sooner chop off his right hand than put it to the Constitution as it now stands. He wished to see some points not yet decided brought to a decision, before being compelled to give a final opinion on this article. Should these points be improperly settled, his wish would then be to bring the whole subject before another general Convention.

Mr Govr Morris was ready for a postponement. He had long wished for another Convention, that will have the firmness to provide a vigorous Government, which we are afraid to do.

Mr Randolph stated his idea to be, in case the final form of the Constitution should not permit him to accede to it, that the State Conventions should be at liberty to propose amendments to be submitted to another General Convention which may reject or incorporate them, as may be judged proper.

On the question for postponing

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the question on Art: XXII

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art: XXIII being taken up, as far as the words "assigned by Congress" inclusive, was agreed to nem: con: the blank having been first filled with the word "nine" as of course.

On a motion for postponing the residue of the clause, concerning the choice of the President &c.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr Govr Morris then moved to strike out the words "choose the President of the U. S. and"–this point, of choosing the President not being yet finally determined, & on this question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md divd. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. [48] Geo. ay.

[48] In printed Journal–S.–C.–no.–Madison's Note.

Art: XXIII as amended was then agreed to nem: con:

The Report of the Grand Committee of eleven made by Mr Sherman was then taken up (see Aug: 28).

On the question to agree to the following clause, to be inserted after sect. 4. art: VII. "nor shall any regulation of commerce or revenue give preference to the ports of one State over those of another." Agreed to nem: con:

On the clause "or oblige vessels bound to or from any State to enter clear or pay duties in another"

Mr Madison thought the restriction wd be inconvenient, as in the River Delaware, if a vessel cannot be required to make entry below the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania.

Mr Fitzimmons admitted that it might be inconvenient, but thought it would be a greater inconvenience to require vessels bound to Philada to enter below the jurisdiction of the State.

Mr Ghorum & Mr Langdon, contended that the Govt would be so fettered by this clause, as to defeat the good purpose of the plan. They mentioned the situation of the trade of Mas. & N. Hampshire, the case of Sandy Hook which is in the State of N. Jersey, but where precautions agst smuggling into N. York, ought to be established by the Genl Government.

Mr McHenry said the clause would not screen a vessel from being obliged to take an officer on board as a security for due entry &c.

Mr Carrol was anxious that the clause should be agreed to. He assured the House, that this was a tender point in Maryland.

Mr Jennifer urged the necessity of the clause in the same point of view.

On the question for agreeing to it

N. H. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

The word "tonnage" was struck out, nem: con: as comprehended in "duties."

On question On the clause of the Report "and all duties, imposts & excises, laid by the Legislature shall be uniform throughout the U. S." It was agreed to nem: con: [49]

[49] In printed Journal N. H. and S. C. entered as in the negative.–Madison's Note.

On motion of Mr Sherman it was agreed to refer such parts of the Constitution as have been postponed, and such parts of Reports as have not been acted on, to a Committee of a member from each State; the Committee appointed by ballot, being, Mr Gilman, Mr King, Mr Sherman, Mr Brearly, Mr Govr Morris, Mr Dickinson, Mr Carrol, Mr Madison, Mr Williamson, Mr Butler, & Mr Baldwin.

The House adjourned.


Saturday Sepr 1. 1787 In Convention.

Mr Brearley from the Comme of eleven to which were referred yesterday the postponed part of the Constitution, & parts of Reports not acted upon, made the following partial report.

That in lieu of the 9th Sect: of Art: 6. the words following be inserted viz "The members of each House shall be ineligible to any Civil office under the authority of the U. S. during the time for which they shall respectively be elected, and no person holding an office under the U. S. shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office."

Mr Rutlidge from the Committee to whom were referred sundry propositions (see Aug: 29), together with art: XVI reported that the following additions be made to the Report–viz.

After the word "States" in the last line on the Margin of the 3d page (see the printed Report),–add "to establish uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies."

And insert the following as Art: XVI viz

"Full faith and credit ought to be given in each State to the public acts, records, and Judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature shall, by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, Records, & proceedings shall be proved, and the effect which Judgments obtained in one State, shall have in another."

After receiving these reports

The House adjourned to 10OC on Monday next.


Monday Sepr 3 1787. In Convention

Mr Govr Morris moved to amend the Report concerning the respect to be paid to Acts Records &c. of one State, in other States (see Sepr 1.) by striking out "judgments obtained in one State shall have in another" and to insert the word "thereof" after the word "effect."

Col: Mason favored the motion, particularly if the "effect" was to be restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings.

Mr Wilson remarked, that if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place among all Independent Nations.

Docr Johnson thought the amendment as worded would authorize the Genl Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of one State in another State.

Mr Randolph considered it as strengthening the general objection agst the plan, that its definition of the powers of the Government was so loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers. He was for not going farther than the Report, which enables the Legislature to provide for the effect of Judgments.

On the amendment, as moved by Mr Govr Morris

Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On motion of Mr Madison, "ought to" were struck out, and "shall" inserted; and "shall" between "Legislature" & "by general laws" struck out, and "may" inserted, nem: con:

On the question to agree to the report as amended viz "Full faith & credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records & judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts records & proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." Agreed to witht a count of Sts.

The clause in the Report "To establish uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" being taken up.

Mr Sherman observed that Bankruptcies were in some cases punishable with death by the laws of England, & He did not chuse to grant a power by which that might be done here.

Mr Govr Morris said this was an extensive & delicate subject. He would agree to it because he saw no danger of abuse of the power by the Legislature of the U. S.

On the question to agree to the clause

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr Pinkney moved to postpone the Report of the Committee of Eleven (see Sepr 1.) in order to take up the following,

"The members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the U. S. for which they or any other for their benefit, receive any salary, fees or emoluments of any kind, and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively." He was strenuously opposed to an ineligibility of members to office, and therefore wished to restrain the proposition to a mere incompatibility. He considered the eligibility of members of the Legislature to the honourable offices of Government, as resembling the policy of the Romans, in making the temple of virtue the road to the temple of fame.

On this question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr King moved to insert the word "created" before the word "during" in the Report of the Committee. This he said would exclude the members of the first Legislature under the Constitution, as most of the offices wd then be created.

Mr Williamson 2ded the motion. He did not see why members of the Legislature should be ineligible to vacancies happening during the term of their election.

Mr Sherman was for entirely incapacitating members of the Legislature. He thought their eligibility to offices would give too much influence to the Executive. He said the incapacity ought at least to be extended to cases where salaries should be increased, as well as created, during the term of the member. He mentioned also the expedient by which the restriction could be evaded to wit: an existing officer might be translated to an office created, and a member of the Legislature be then put into the office vacated.

Mr Govr Morris contended that the eligibility of members to office wd lessen the influence of the Executive. If they cannot be appointed themselves, the Executive will appoint their relations & friends, retaining the service & votes of the members for his purposes in the Legislature. Whereas the appointment of the members deprives him of such an advantage.

Mr Gerry, thought the eligibility of members would have the effect of opening batteries agst good officers, in order to drive them out & make way for members of the Legislature.

Mr Gorham was in favor of the amendment. Without it we go further than has been done in any of the States, or indeed any other Country. The experience of the State Governments where there was no such ineligibility, proved that it was not necessary; on the contrary that the eligibility was among the inducements for fit men to enter into the Legislative service.

Mr Randolph was inflexibly fixed against inviting men into the Legislature by the prospect of being appointed to offices.

Mr Baldwin remarked that the example of the States was not applicable. The Legislatures there are so numerous that an exclusion of their members would not leave proper men for offices. The case would be otherwise in the General Government.

Col: Mason. Instead of excluding merit, the ineligibility will keep out corruption, by excluding office-hunters.

Mr Wilson considered the exclusion of members of the Legislature as increasing the influence of the Executive as observed by Mr Govr Morris at the same time that it would diminish, the general energy of the Government. He said that the legal disqualification for office would be odious to those who did not wish for office, but did not wish either to be marked by so degrading a distinction.

Mr Pinkney. The first Legislature will be composed of the ablest men to be found. The States will select such to put the Government into operation. Should the Report of the Committee or even the amendment be agreed to, The great offices, even those of the Judiciary Department which are to continue for life, must be filled while those most capable of filling them will be under a disqualification.

On the question on Mr King's motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The amendment being thus lost by the equal division of the States, Mr Williamson moved to insert the words "created or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased" before the word "during" in the Report of the Committee.

Mr King 2ded the motion, & on the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divided.

The last clause rendering a Seat in the Legislature & an office incompatible was agreed to nem. con:

The Report as amended & agreed to is as follows.

"The members of each House shall be ineligible to any Civil office under the authority of the U. States, created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during the time for which they shall respectively be elected–And no person holding any office under the U. S. shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office."

Adjourned.


Tuesday Sepr 4. 1787. In Convention

Mr Brearly from the Committee of Eleven made a further partial Report as follows

"The Committee of Eleven to whom sundry resolutions &c. were referred on the 31st of August, report that in their opinion the following additions and alterations should be made to the Report before the Convention, viz. [50]

[50] This is an exact copy. The variations in that in the printed Journal are occasioned by its incorporation of subsequent amendments. This remark is applicable to other cases.–Madison's Note. The report was copied by the Secretary of the Convention, William Jackson, into the Journal, after it had been read. Afterwards two sentences were altered by interlining with lead pencil. The alterations (indicated by italics) are as follows: Paragraph 4, "The person having the greatest number of votes ... if such number be a majority of the whole number of the electors appointed." Paragraph 7, "But no treaty, except treaties of peace, shall be made," etc. The changes in paragraph 4 are unimportant: the change in paragraph 7 was an amendment offered by Madison September 7th, and adopted.–Const. MSS.—Journal of Federal Convention, p. 323, et seq.

(1.) The first clause of sect: 1. art. 7. to read as follows–'The Legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes duties imposts & excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence & general welfare of the U. S.'

(2.) At the end of the 2d clause of sect. 1. art. 7. add 'and with the Indian tribes.'

(3.) In the place of the 9th art. Sect. 1. to be inserted 'The Senate of the U. S. shall have power to try all impeachments; but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.'

(4.) After the word 'Excellency' in sect. 1. art. 10. to be inserted. 'He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the following manner, viz. Each State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, to which the State may be entitled in the Legislature. The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; and they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Genl Government, directed to the President of the Senate–The President of the Senate shall in that House open all the certificates, and the votes shall be then & there counted. The Person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of that of the electors; and if there be more than one who have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the Senate shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President: but if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the Senate shall choose by ballot the President, and in every case after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes shall be vice-president: but if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them the Vice-President. The Legislature may determine the time of choosing and assembling the Electors, and the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes.'

(5) 'Sect. 2. No person except a natural born citizen or a Citizen of the U. S. at the time of the adoption of this Constitution shall be eligible to the office of President; nor shall any person be elected to that office, who shall be under the age of thirty five years, and who has not been in the whole, at least fourteen years a resident within the U. S.'

(6) 'Sect. 3. The vice-president shall be ex officio President of the Senate, except when they sit to try the impeachment of the President, in which case the Chief Justice shall preside, and excepting also when he shall exercise the powers and duties of President, in which case & in case of his absence, the Senate shall chuse a President pro tempore–The vice President when acting as President of the Senate shall not have a vote unless the House be equally divided.'

(7) 'Sect. 4. The President by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties; and he shall nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, and other public ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the U. S. whose appointments are not otherwise herein provided for. But no Treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the members present.'

(8) After the words–'into the service of the U. S.' in sect. 2. art: 10. add 'and may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.'

The latter part of Sect. 2. art: 10. to read as follows.

(9) 'He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for Treason, or bribery, and in case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his office, the vice-president shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.'"

The (1st) clause of the Report was agreed to, nem. con.

The (2) clause was also agreed to nem: con:

The (3) clause was postponed in order to decide previously on the mode of electing the President.

The (4) clause was accordingly taken up.

Mr Gorham disapproved of making the next highest after the President, the vice-President, without referring the decision to the Senate in case the next highest should have less than a majority of votes. As the regulation stands a very obscure man with very few votes may arrive at that appointment.

Mr Sherman said the object of this clause of the report of the Committee was to get rid of the ineligibility, which was attached to the mode of election by the Legislature, & to render the Executive independent of the Legislature. As the choice of the President was to be made out of the five highest, obscure characters were sufficiently guarded against in that case; and he had no objection to requiring the vice-President to be chosen in like manner, where the choice was not decided by a majority in the first instance.

Mr Madison was apprehensive that by requiring both the President & vice President to be chosen out of the five highest candidates, the attention of the electors would be turned too much to making candidates instead of giving their votes in order to a definitive choice. Should this turn be given to the business, The election would, in fact be consigned to the Senate altogether. It would have the effect at the same time, he observed, of giving the nomination of the candidates to the largest States.

Mr Govr Morris concurred in, & enforced the remarks of Mr Madison.

Mr Randolph & Mr Pinkney wished for a particular explanation & discussion of the reasons for changing the mode of electing the Executive.

Mr Govr Morris said he would give the reasons of the Committee and his own. The 1st was the danger of intrigue & faction if the appointmt should be made by the Legislature. 2. The inconveniency of an ineligibility required by that mode in order to lessen its evils. 3. The difficulty of establishing a Court of Impeachments, other than the Senate which would not be so proper for the trial nor the other branch for the impeachment of the President, if appointed by the Legislature. 4. Nobody had appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature. 5. Many were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people. 6. The indispensable necessity of making the Executive independent of the Legislature.–As the Electors would vote at the same time throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible also to corrupt them. A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after the trial of the impeachment.

Col: Mason confessed that the plan of the Committee had removed some capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal and corruption. It was liable however to this strong objection, that nineteen times in twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the purpose.

Mr Butler thought the mode not free from objections, but much more so than an election by the Legislature, where as in elective monarchies, cabal faction & violence would be sure to prevail.

Mr Pinkney stated as objections to the mode 1. that it threw the whole appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate. 2. The Electors will be strangers to the several candidates and of course unable to decide on their comparative merits. 3. It makes the Executive reeligible which will endanger the public liberty. 4. It makes the same body of men which will in fact elect the President his Judges in case of an impeachment.

Mr Williamson had great doubts whether the advantage of reeligibility would balance the objection to such a dependence of the President on the Senate for his reappointment. He thought at least the Senate ought to be restrained to the two highest on the list.

Mr Govr Morris said the principal advantage aimed at was that of taking away the opportunity for cabal. The President may be made if thought necessary ineligible on this as well as on any other mode of election. Other inconveniences may be no less redressed on this plan than any other.

Mr Baldwin thought the plan not so objectionable when well considered, as at first view: The increasing intercourse among the people of the States, would render important characters less & less unknown; and the Senate would consequently be less & less likely to have the eventual appointment thrown into their hands.

Mr Wilson. This subject has greatly divided the House, and will also divide the people out of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to decide. He had never made up an opinion on it entirely to his own satisfaction. He thought the plan on the whole a valuable improvement on the former. It gets rid of one great evil, that of cabal & corruption; & Continental Characters will multiply as we more & more coalesce, so as to enable the electors in every part of the Union to know & judge of them. It clears the way also for a discussion of the question of re-eligibility on its own merits which the former mode of election seemed to forbid. He thought it might be better however to refer the eventual appointment to the Legislature than to the Senate, and to confine it to a smaller number than five of the Candidates. The eventual election by the Legislature wd not open cabal anew, as it would be restrained to certain designated objects of choice, and as these must have had the previous sanction of a number of the States; and if the election be made as it ought as soon as the votes of the Electors are opened & it is known that no one has a majority of the whole there can be little danger of corruption. Another reason for preferring the Legislature to the Senate in this business was that the House of Reps will be so often changed as to be free from the influence & faction to which the permanence of the Senate may subject that branch.

Mr Randolph preferred the former mode of constituting the Executive, but if the change was to be made, he wished to know why the eventual election was referred to the Senate and not to the Legislature? He saw no necessity for this and many objections to it. He was apprehensive also that the advantage of the eventual appointment would fall into the hands of the States near the seat of Government.

Mr Govr Morris said the Senate was preferred because fewer could then say to the President, you owe your appointment to us. He thought the President would not depend so much on the Senate for his reappointment as on his general good conduct.

The further consideration of the Report was postponed that each member might take a copy of the remainder of it.

The following motion was referred to the Committee of Eleven–to wit,–"To prepare & report a plan for defraying the expences of the Convention."

[51]Mr Pinkney moved a clause declaring "that each House should be judge of the privilege of its own members." Mr Govr Morris 2ded the motion.