The resolution having been read, Mr. B. said: As it is extremely possible, Mr. Speaker, that it is designed that this resolution shall share the same fate with that which the resolution of the gentleman from New York experienced this morning, I shall be allowed at least by publicly stating, to justify to the world, the motive which induced me to bring it forward. [Mr. B. alluded to a resolution offered by Mr. T. Morris, the object of which was, to direct the Secretary of the Treasury to state to the House the amount of stamp duties collected in each State, distinguishing what part was paid by the commercial cities. When the resolution was taken up there was a call for the question. Nothing was said against the propriety of it. It being merely a call for information, and considered so much a matter of course to agree to such resolutions when no opposition was made to them, it was not supposed necessary to say any thing on the propriety and reasonableness of the resolution. Yet, to the astonishment of its friends, when the question was put, there were for it 34, against it 54.]

Gentlemen are infinitely deceived, said Mr. B., if they think our object is, by any particular mode of proceeding, to gain an unfair advantage of public opinion. If such a suspicion be entertained, our conduct has been viewed with a jaundiced eye. It is a motive which never has, and I hope never will direct our measures. If popularity is to be gained only by a prostitution of principle to ignorant and unthinking prejudice, we are content to forego it. I am far from being indifferent to public opinion; the approbation of our fellow-citizens is the only reward we can expect for our services; but it is a reward no honest man will seek, if it is to be acquired only by artifice and deception.

I have avowed and avowed sincerely, that I am disposed to go hand and hand with gentlemen in the reduction of public burdens. When it was necessary I assisted in imposing them—now that circumstances permit I more cheerfully co-operate in taking them off. My true object is to make the most of our situation; not to be deluded by empty theories, or speculative systems, but, by an enlarged view of the various interests of the country, to discover by the reduction of what taxes the society would be the most substantially benefited.

The reduction of the Military Establishment creates considerable savings; other retrenchments are contemplated in the Navy and civil administration. These savings enable us to dispense with certain taxes; but is it not wise to examine diligently the operation of the several taxes which exist, and, after being informed by the various views which belong to the subject, to exonerate the community from those which, with the least benefit, are the most burdensome?

One great objection to the internal taxes is the expense of collection. I wish to know the particulars of this expense in order to see whether it may not be curtailed. I wish also to be informed of the expenses attending each branch of the revenue, for the purpose of judging whether it may not be expedient to retain some branches, while it may be wise to part with others. These are my objects; do they not entitle us to the information asked?

We know in one instance, that the expense in collecting the stamp duty is less than five per cent. This appears by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury; but we are not informed of the particular expenses belonging to the other branches of the revenue.

Sir, said Mr. B., I must rely that the resolution will be agreed to; there is not a precedent in our annals or opposition to such a resolution; if, however, one is now to be introduced, I think it proper that the names of those gentlemen should hereafter appear by whom it was resisted, and by whom it was established. He therefore hoped the question would be taken by yeas and nays.

The Clerk, at the request of Mr. Randolph, read an extract from the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, as follows:

Mr. T. Morris.—If the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) thinks that the extract of the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, the reading of which he has called for, furnishes the information demanded by my honorable friend from Delaware, he is mistaken. The Secretary's report gives you a general estimate of the expense of collecting the aggregate of the internal taxes, but does not specify the charge falling on each separate tax. From the statement exhibited by the Secretary, it appears that it costs twenty per cent. to collect the whole of the internal taxes; but if the detailed statement asked for by the gentleman from Delaware is furnished, it will appear that the collection of some of those taxes does not cost more than five or six per cent. To show how unfair it is to connect together the expense attending the collection of all the internal taxes, I need only refer gentlemen to an authority which I believe they will not dispute. If my memory, sir, is not very incorrect, it will appear by a publication of the present Secretary of the Treasury, written in the year 1796, that the tax on country distilleries cost in its collection near thirty per cent.; that on city distilleries about nineteen. These, sir, and other reasons, may evince the propriety of repealing the tax on country distilleries; but because this tax is expensive in its collection, because it may be liable to objections, does it follow that other taxes, such as the tax on carriages, on refined sugars, &c., which fall on the rich, and which are not expensive in the collection, does it follow, I say, that because it may be proper to repeal the first, that these are to fall too? It is, sir, in order to be enabled to make proper discrimination, to be enabled to know which of these taxes ought to be repealed, and which retained, that the gentleman from Delaware has moved his resolution. And here, sir, let me be permitted to express a hope, that the resolution now before you may not meet with the silent negative which was the fate of one intended also to procure information, and which I had the honor of laying on your table. I did and do still believe, sir, that the majority of this House could not have been actuated by proper motives in refusing that information. [Here Mr. Randolph called Mr. Morris to order, saying that he had no right to impeach the motives of members. Mr. M. observed that for his part he was at a loss to know what was considered disorderly in that House, but that he would submit to the correction of the Chair. The Speaker determined him to be in order, and Mr. M. proceeded.] With regard, sir, to the course of proceeding which gentlemen have lately adopted, persevering in an inflexible silence, rejecting every proposition made by a member in the minority, without deigning to show its fallacy, refusing public documents for our information and that of our fellow-citizens, without showing, or even pretending to show, that they are unnecessary, I can only say that it militates against all my ideas of propriety. I have always hitherto supposed that every Representative on this floor had a right to be heard; that he had a right to call on the majority for their reasons both when they supported and opposed public measures. Gentlemen may, if they please, meet in what they have denominated caucuses when power was in other hands; they may then confer together about the measures in which they may think proper to unite; but, sir, if their debates are to take place there, and there alone, if we are not to be furnished here by them with the reasons which induce them to adopt public measures, they ought at least to open their doors to the minority, in order that, if they cannot hear their arguments in the proper place, they may not close them altogether. I trust, sir, that gentlemen themselves will see the impropriety of persevering in this line of conduct, and that they will consent to pay, if not to gentlemen in the minority, at least to their propositions, the attention and respect which they may deserve.

Mr. Griswold said, that he presumed the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) had requested that the extract from the report of the Secretary of the Treasury might be read, and which the House had just heard, for the purpose of proving that the resolution under consideration ought to pass. Indeed that report, and the statement to which it referred, evinced in the most satisfactory manner that the information required by the resolution was absolutely necessary for the purpose of enabling the House to decide understandingly on the proposition, which it was expected would soon be brought forward, for abolishing the internal taxes. The Secretary in his report had declared that the expense of collecting the internal taxes amounted nearly to twenty per cent. on the amount collected. It appeared, however, from the statements to which the Secretary had alluded, that the tax on stills, the carriage tax, the tax on licenses, on sales at auction, and the tax on refined sugar, had been included in one class, and the expense of collecting all those taxes, without distinguishing the charges on each branch, had been stated to be nearly twenty per cent., whilst the expense of collecting the stamp duty, another branch of the internal taxes, was short of five per cent., varying only a fraction from the charges on the revenue from impost and tonnage. These statements might be satisfactory as far as they went, but it was obvious that in examining the branches of a revenue, with a view to the expense of collection, it became necessary to ascertain the precise charge which had fallen on each branch, and to obtain this necessary information, and which the report and statements had left defective, the resolution had been principally brought forward. And what had rendered this information peculiarly necessary at this time was the ground which had been taken in opposition to the internal taxes. The only argument which he had heard against those taxes, and which did not equally apply to the impost, was drawn from the great expense which had arisen in the collection. To enable the House, therefore, to decide whether the fact existed on which that argument had been founded, it became necessary to inquire in the manner proposed by the resolution whether the extraordinary expense with which those taxes had been charged might not be diminished, and whether the expense really existed in relation to each description of them.

Mr. G. said that he presumed no gentleman was prepared to say that the general expense of collection might not be diminished, and so far was he from believing that every branch of the internal taxes was subjected to the charge of nineteen or twenty per cent., he was perfectly confident that if gentlemen would agree to the resolution, the detailed statements, which the Secretary would furnish in obedience to it, would prove that the expense of collecting certain branches of those taxes would fall much short of the sum at which the same has been estimated.

The consent of the House, said Mr. G., to every call for information, had formerly been so much a matter of course, that he should not have troubled the House with any remarks upon so plain a question as the present, had not the experience of this day proved, that gentlemen were not always to be indulged by the House with the information which they required; and the profound silence which had at this time been observed by those gentlemen who could either admit or reject the resolution, appeared to indicate a determination on their part to refuse the important and necessary information required by the resolution. He did presume, however, that upon this occasion the House would consent to the resolution, and more particularly, as the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, which had been read at the request of the gentleman from Virginia, proved so clearly the necessity of passing it.

Mr. Huger could not reconcile it with his sense of duty, to give a silent vote on the present occasion, nor could he but lament the strange and novel course of proceeding which gentlemen had thought proper to adopt. The intention, it would seem, was to repeal the internal taxes, right or wrong, and at all events; and so determined were gentlemen on carrying this favorite project into execution, that every thing like previous investigation, or even a wish to gain information on the subject, was hooted at and treated with the most sovereign contempt. Every, the smallest, reduction on taxes of any other description, was avowedly to be excluded, nor was any proposition to this effect deemed worthy of even a moment's consideration. The measure proposed, however, interested in a very particular manner that part of the community he had the honor to represent. They paid, it was true, a small portion of the internal taxes, but the various other taxes upon salt, brown sugar, coffee, &c., and the duties on imposts generally, fell more immediately and far more heavily on them. Was it not natural, therefore, that he should have some hesitation on the subject; that he should feel anxious to see this project thoroughly and completely investigated; that he should wish to receive every possible information which might either tend to satisfy his mind as to the expediency of repealing the internal taxes only, to the total exclusion of all others, or enable him to propose some other project, equally beneficial perhaps to the public at large, and which might at the same time accord better with the immediate interests of his constituents?

His constituents, he was proud to say it, had ever contributed with alacrity and cheerfulness to the wants and exigencies of the Union. They were prepared and willing, he was confident, to do so still; and he made not the least doubt but that they would readily subscribe to the exclusive repeal of the internal taxes, and submit, without a murmur, to the continuation of all the other taxes, however burdensome to themselves, provided they are convinced and well satisfied that this measure was fairly and impartially adopted for the welfare of the whole, and not for the benefit of the one at the expense of the other division of the country. It was for this purpose, therefore, that he wished the present motion to be adopted, and that he had desired the attention of the Committee of Ways and Means to be directed, particularly, to those articles of importation and of general use and necessity, such as salt, sugar, coffee, common teas, &c. He was desirous that these and similar items should be compared with the carriage tax, the tax on licenses to retail spirituous liquors, and various other similar items of the internal taxes, and that the House might be furnished with such information with respect to both, as might enable him to judge, whether there might not be a partial repeal as well of some of the external as internal taxes, and not a total and exclusive reduction of the latter, as was contemplated; whilst all the former, however grievous and inconvenient, were to be retained. Did he then ask any thing which was unreasonable or improper? Could any possible inconvenience accrue from allowing him to obtain the information he desired? If not, why refuse to indulge him in what he deemed useful, and what (at the worst) could only be regarded by gentlemen themselves as superfluous information? Was it fair; was it becoming; did it comport with that civility and politeness which was due from the one to the other, by citizens of a common country, assembled together for the express purpose of consulting upon their common interests, to treat thus cavalierly what must at least be allowed to be a respectable minority?

With respect to the two only reasons which had ever been offered in favor of the exclusive repeal of the internal tax, viz: the expense and number of officers required to collect it, was it not the immediate and precise object of the resolution under debate to inquire whether it was not possible to devise some means by which these inconveniences might be obviated, or at least greatly lessened? And what objection could there be to the inquiry? Were gentlemen perfectly and entirely convinced that nothing of the kind could be done, or were they apprehensive that the thing was in itself so feasible, that an inquiry of this kind would throw a stumbling-block in the way of the project already determined on, which although he would freely acknowledge, that as an abstract proposition it was expedient as much as possible, and to collect your taxes at as small an expense, and by means of as few agents as conveniently could be done, yet there was another still more important maxim which ought never to be lost sight of: this was, that the burdens of the Government, as well as the advantages which flowed from it, should be fairly, equally, impartially, and equitably distributed among every description of the citizens, in whatever part of the country they resided. If, therefore, it did happen, that a few more officers and a somewhat greater percentage were required to collect the taxes in one than in another part of the country, this alone would most certainly and indubitably not be a sufficient reason to do away all the taxes in the one, and throw the whole burden of the Government on the inhabitants of the other.

Mr. Rutledge confessed himself much puzzled by the new forms of proceeding this day adopted. Ever since he had had the honor of a seat in Congress, it had been invariably the practice, when measures were proposed not agreeable to the majority, for them to offer their objections to them. This had ever been the practice, and the experience of its convenience offered strong reasons for its continuance. When the majority stated their objections to any measure, the minority in sustaining it answered them fully; thus, both sides acted understandingly, and when the proceedings of the National Legislature went out to the people, they were at the same time informed of the reasons under which their Representatives had legislated. This had not only been the usage in Congress, but the form of proceeding in all representative bodies with whose history we are acquainted. Even in the British House of Commons, which gentlemen had often and emphatically styled a mockery of representation, so great is the respect paid to public opinion, that the majority deem it their duty to assign in debate the reasons of their conduct. Although the Minister in England has quite as much confidence in the strength of his majority as gentlemen here can have in theirs, yet, in feeling power, he does not forget right, and his regard for public opinion is so great, that he never secures his measures by a silent vote. In these days of innovation, we, it seems, are to pursue a different course. When the resolution offered this morning by his honorable friend from New York (Mr. Morris) was taken into consideration, not a voice was raised against it. This profound silence made us expect a unanimous vote; but, in consequence, he supposed, of some outdoor arrangements, it was rejected by this silent majority. He had seen many deliberative assemblies, but never before witnessed such a procedure. He would not say whether this was respectful towards the minority, who, we have been told from high authority, have their equal rights—he would not say whether it was dignified as it regarded the majority, but, without pretending to any spirit of prophecy, he would venture to say it could not be deemed politic or wise by the people of this country.

When the doors of Congress were open, and persons admitted to take the debates, the people expected to be fully informed of the views and motives which governed the votes of their Representatives. But it seems our constituents are not to be treated with this heretofore common civility. In proposing measures we are obliged to guess at what gentlemen feel against them, (for they say nothing,) and to defend them, without knowing in what they are objectionable to those who govern in this House. This kind of governing is but ill calculated to produce harmony, to restore social intercourse, and to heal the wounds inflicted on society by the spirit of party.

The question was taken, and it passed in the negative—yeas 37, nays 57.

Duties on Imports.

Mr. Rutledge called up for consideration the resolution which he moved on Friday, on which the previous question was then taken, viz:

Mr. Griswold hoped the resolution would be decided upon.

Mr. Rutledge hoped the reference would obtain. These articles paid the highest rate of duties and were of the first necessity. In looking over the rates of duties on imports, he saw many articles that were taxed enormously high. Those in the resolution were of the first necessity, the duty high, and laid when they were at war prices; while the people received war prices for their produce, they could with convenience pay for these articles, though high. The object of the resolution was merely to inquire, and he did not see how it could interfere with any object gentlemen have in view.

Mr. Dana.—I beg liberty to tender the homage of my profound respects, for the dignified situation in which gentlemen have now placed themselves, and congratulate them on their silence. There is something peculiarly impressive in this mode of opposing every thing that is urged. It is seldom that gentlemen have exhibited such a remarkable appearance of a philosophical assembly.

"That dumb Legislature will immortalize your name"—is said to have been the language of a certain distinguished General to a certain nominal Abbé, who has been represented as having pigeon-holes full of constitutions of his own making. During the memorable night at St. Cloud, when the French Council of Ancients, and Council of Five Hundred, were adjourned—to meet no more—it may be recollected, the powers of executive government were provisionally committed to three persons, styled Consuls, and two of them were the General and the Abbé. From each of the Councils, twenty-five members were selected, to compose a commission, and assist the provisional Consuls in preparing a constitution for France. Of the numerous projects of constitutions presented by the Abbé, it is said no part was finally adopted except the plan of a dumb Legislature. This, the General instantly seized with apparent enthusiasm, exclaiming to the Abbé, "that dumb Legislature will immortalize your name!" And it was determined to have a corps legislatif that should vote, but not debate.

It was scarcely to be expected that any thing like this would soon take place in our own country. But it is the prerogative of great geniuses, when in similar circumstances, to arrive at the same great results, although with some difference in the process. Nor can I forbear offering my tribute of admiration, for the genius who has projected a mode of proceeding among us, that so nearly rivals the plan adopted in France. I know not to whom is due the honor of this luminous discovery. After ascribing to him, however, all merited glory, permit me to examine the force of the argument relied on by gentlemen in opposition to the proposed resolution.

Their argument is silence. I hope to be excused if I do not discuss this subject in the most satisfactory manner; as silence is a new species of logic, about which no directions have been found in any treatise on logic that I have ever seen. It will be my endeavor to reply to gentlemen by examining some points which may be considered as involved in their dumb arguments.

One of these points is—that certain members of this House have pledged themselves to their constituents, for repealing all the internal taxes. They may have declared their opinions to this effect, before the election; and, being chosen under such circumstances, may now deem themselves bound in honor not to vary. The terms assented to between their constituents and themselves may, therefore, be viewed by them as the particular rule of their own conduct. But is this House to be regarded in the same light with the English House of Commons, during the early period of their history, when the knights of shires, and the representatives of cities and boroughs, were instructed on what terms they should bargain with the Crown for special privileges, and were limited to the price agreed on by their constituents? The situation of gentlemen who have thus pledged themselves to vote for repealing the internal taxes, must be irksome, indeed, if on mature consideration they should believe it more proper and more beneficial for the country to have other taxes reduced. Those who have entered into a stipulation of this sort, so as to feel it as a point of honor, are so peculiarly circumstanced that they might think it too assuming in me, were I so much as to express a desire that they would vote for reducing some of the duties on imports, instead of repealing all the internal taxes. It is to be hoped, the number of members who have pledged themselves in this manner, does not exceed twenty-five or thirty.

Another point involved in this argument of silence is, that other gentlemen may have pledged themselves to these, and given them a promise of support on this subject. It must be acknowledged that this was more than was required on account of their seat in this House. If any gentlemen have absolutely so pledged themselves to their constituents, it must indeed be difficult to convince them. On this point, their minds must be so differently constituted from mine, that there does not seem to be any common principle between us that can be assumed as the basis of argumentation.

Another point is, the Executive has recommended a repeal of all the internal taxes, and not any reduction of the impost. And will gentlemen act upon this as a sufficient reason for their conduct? Is it now to become a principle, that the Executive is to deliberate, and the Legislature to act, and that no measure is to be adopted unless proposed by the Executive? Would it not be better for the country to abolish this House, and to avoid useless expense, if it is to be nothing more than one of the ancient Parliaments of France, employed to register the edicts of a master?

The silence of the gentlemen may also be considered as having relation to their great desire for the harmony of social intercourse. To prevent its being disturbed in the House by debating, they may have come to a determination that all the great questions shall be settled by gentlemen of a certain description, when met in nocturnal conclave, and be only voted upon in this place. If such be the fact, it seems but reasonable that any of the members of this House should be admitted in meetings of the conclave, as delegates from the territorial districts are admitted into Congress, with a right to debate, although not to vote. If, however, this is thought too much, gentlemen should at least have galleries provided, so that other members of the Legislature might be admitted as spectators, and have the opportunity of knowing the reasons for public measures.

The question was called for, when Mr. Eustis begged the Speaker would state it, as, in listening to the arguments of the gentleman from Connecticut, he had forgotten it.

Mr. Rutledge said he was much pleased by the question of the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts. When gentlemen ask, What is the question? it is to be hoped that they will respect its merits; but, from the scene this day acted, he had learned that the only inquiry with gentlemen would be, from what side does this come?

The question was then taken by yeas and nays, and lost—yeas 35, nays 58.

Tuesday, January 26.

Territorial Government for the District of Columbia.

Mr. Sprigg reported a bill for the government of the Territory of Columbia.

[The bill establishes a Legislature, chosen by the taxable citizens of the United States one year resident in the Territory, composed of a House of Representatives, to consist of twenty-five members, seven whereof to be chosen by the district of Rock Creek, seven from the part west of Rock Creek, and eleven by the county of Alexandria. The Governor to be appointed by the President of the United States. The Territory to pay the Legislature, and the United States the Governor. The judges to hold their offices during life, unless removed by the President on the application of two successive Legislatures.]

Referred to the Committee of the whole House on Tuesday next.

A memorial and remonstrances of sundry inhabitants of the county and town of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, was presented to the House and read, praying that Congress will not agree to any plan, or pass any bill respecting the government of the said District, which shall, by the establishment of a subordinate Legislative or subordinate Executive, or otherwise, tend to unite under its power, the two parts of the district, as separated by the river Potomac.—Referred to the Committee of the whole House last appointed.

Thursday, January 28.

Lieutenant Sterret, his Officers and Crew.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of a select committee of the nineteenth instant, on the resolutions of the Senate, in the form of joint resolutions of the two Houses, "in respect to Lieutenant Sterret, the officers, and crew of the United States' schooner Enterprise;" to which Committee of the whole House were also referred the said resolutions of the Senate; and, after some time spent therein, the Speaker resumed the chair, and Mr. Davis reported that the committee had had the said report and resolutions under consideration, and directed him to repeat to the House their disagreement to the said resolutions of the Senate, and their agreement to two resolutions contained in the report of the select committee thereupon, in the form of joint resolutions of the two Houses; which he delivered in at the Clerk's table.

The House then proceeded to consider the said report and resolutions: Whereupon, the resolutions of the Senate, to which the Committee of the whole House reported their disagreement, being twice read at the Clerk's table, in the words following, to wit:

The question was taken that the House do concur with the Committee of the whole House in their disagreement to the same, and resolved in the affirmative.

The resolutions contained in the report of the select committee, to which the Committee of the whole House reported their agreement, being twice read, in the words following, to wit:

The question was taken that the House do concur with the Committee of the whole House in their agreement to the same, and resolved in the affirmative.

Ordered, That the said resolutions be engrossed, and read the third time to-morrow.

Monday, February 8.

Imprisonment for Debt.

Mr. Smilie called up his resolution that a committee be appointed to revise the laws respecting imprisonment for debts due the United States. His objects, he said, were two; to secure the debtor's property, and to inflict some penalty or provide some remedy instead of imprisonment for life.

Mr. Rutledge was opposed to imprisonment for life, where the debtor gave up his whole property, and was unable to pay all. He had known, in South Carolina, revenue officers imprisoned for debts due the United States, who had been many years confined; men of good character, men of honesty, but who, through ignorance of transacting certain business, or their misfortunes, were unable to pay. He knew an individual of that State who had applied to that House for relief; his petition was referred to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary felt a delicacy in interfering in the case; the petition was not granted; and the person had now been in jail five years, though his inability to pay did not arise from having wasted the public money, or from aught but misfortune; for he was acknowledged to be a man of good character. He was averse to such cruelty. Hence the necessity of making some provision that the innocent, when distinctions can, as in most instances, be made, may not be subjected to cruel punishments, that were of no benefit to the United States. Why send him to jail? Why lock him up there? Why prevent his being able to support his family?

Mr. Smilie.—It is the case that when you exceed in making your laws what is reasonable, those laws, as the present concerning debtors to the United States, will not be executed. The present law cannot be put in execution. He wished some sufficient penalty. This was not the proper stage to give his sentiments; were it, he should say, he thought the defaulter ought to give up the property, and perhaps be imprisoned a period. But the Legislature are not the proper judges, and ought not to interfere; the Legislative and Judicial Departments should be kept separate. We want some uniform law, operating on all according to their demerit.

The subject was postponed till to-morrow.

Friday, February 12.

State Balances.

Mr. Thomas called up his motion respecting State Balances, which is as follows:

Mr. Bayard hoped the resolution would prevail. The debtor States, not satisfied with the settlement made by the Board of Commissioners, had asked for information respecting the grounds on which it had been made. The information had been imperiously refused. In his opinion it was but right, if the debtor States did not dispute the validity of the debts due to the creditor States, that they should agree to expunge the claims against the debtor States. Indeed, he had been assured that the commission was not instituted with a view of sustaining any charges against the debtor States, but for ascertaining the amount due to the creditor States, and funding them; and he believed it had been so understood at the time. This was an affair not determinable by the ordinary rules applied to individual cases. Many of the States, not expecting a settlement, had kept no accounts or vouchers; and however great the supplies they contributed under such circumstances, they received no credits for them; while those States which had been most careful in the preservation of vouchers, shared a different and a better fate.

Mr. B. believed it was the true policy of the creditor States to agree to the extinguishment of these balances. He believed they never could be paid, because no State allowed them to be due. They would not, therefore, be paid voluntarily; and he knew of no force in the United States to compel payment. Why, then, keep up a source of irritation, which could do no possible good, and which could only tend to repel some States from that constitution, which we all ought to endeavor to make the object of general affection?

Mr. Southard said, he had yet heard no reason that convinced him that the resolution offered was just or proper. It would be recollected that this contract was made under the confederation. In the establishment of our independence, great and various exertions had been made. In the contributions made, great inequalities took place, which were unavoidable. Generally, where the war existed, the States became creditor States. It was just that those States which had contributed more than their share should be repaid, and that those who had paid less should make up the deficiency. If the debtor States were not to pay their balances, why settle the accounts? To relinquish the payment would be, in his opinion, not only unjust but unconstitutional. The constitution says, "All debts contracted, and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this constitution, shall be as valid against the United States, under this constitution as under the Confederation;" and the present Government had recognized those debts as just. The gentleman from Delaware says, the settlement is not just. But this was barely the suggestion of his own mind. To sustain it, he ought to have shown its defects; but this he had not done.

Mr. Mitchill was in favor of the resolution, as he believed a refusal to adopt it would be attended with unpleasant sensations. He judged so from an historical review of the business. The several States had associated together for their common defence, and, in the eye of equity, whatever that defence required, should constitute a common charge. The accounts of expenses thus incurred were not settled till the new Government was established. That Government fixed the mode of settlement; it appointed a board of referees, to report the debts and credits of the respective States. In this report, it was the fortune of certain States, notwithstanding the greatness of their contributions, to be reported debtor States. These States became debtors from the independent spirit with which they asserted their sovereign rights. Not relying on the general contributions, they furnished great supplies without making any charge to the Union; by exerting all their strength, they paid as they went, and preserved no vouchers of what they paid. This, he averred, was the case as to the State which he had the honor in part to represent; a State as willing as able to contribute, and which did contribute to a great extent; but which had neglected to preserve her vouchers, the preservation of which would have made her a creditor State. He believed, therefore, that in equity, the States were not bound to pay these balances. But to this it is replied, the award is final. He would not agree to that; he denied it. Besides, there was a want of coercive power in the United States to enforce those demands. From this consideration alone, we ought to proceed with lenity, and endeavor to make the settlement a peaceable one. As in other circumstances, we ought to make a virtue of necessity.

Mr. S. Smith said, he did not rise to take any part in the debate, but in order to bring the subject directly before the committee. To do which, he moved so to amend the resolution as to make it read, "Resolved, That it is expedient to extinguish the claims," &c.

Mr. Lowndes hoped the amendment would not be agreed to. He did not see the expediency of volunteering a relinquishment of the claims established against several of the States. The amendment was calculated to take the committee by surprise. The original resolution went merely to consider the expediency of a relinquishment; the amendment involved the principle itself.

Mr. Hill was desirous the amendment should not be made, not from any indisposition himself to agree to it, but from a regard to the sentiments of other gentlemen. Even if it was ascertained that these debts had arisen on a just consideration, yet, in his opinion, they ought to be extinguished, from the principle that, in our Government, whatever hazarded the harmony of the Union, ought to be avoided. Precedents were not wanting in which sacrifices were made to this principle. He alluded to the quieting the claims under Connecticut rights. But, whatever might be the general ideas on this subject elsewhere, he knew not a man in North Carolina, who did not believe the adjustment iniquitous. To show the committee how the citizens of that State felt, he would state a case that had occurred before the Board of Commissioners. Two claims had been made, both for the same amount and the same description of supplies, one on one side and one on the other side, of Pedee River; one in North, and the other in South Carolina; and, in one case, seven shillings had been allowed, and in the other, only sixpence for the bushel of wheat. The business generally was entitled to the attention of Congress. It had, in fact, already been attended to at different times. New York had extinguished eight hundred thousand dollars of her balance under certain provisions applied to her case.

Mr. Bacon said, if the object of the motion was to go into a new liquidation of the old accounts between the United States and the several States, it would not only take up every day of the present session, but the work would be left unfinished for our successors. These debts had been incurred in a common cause, in which each State was equally interested, and towards which each State was bound equally to contribute. When Congress made requisitions on this principle, they were accompanied by a promise that there should be a final liquidation. This liquidation was made; the settlement was complete. But this settlement is now objected to, and what is to be done? Why we must annul the contract. This might satisfy some of the States, but he was sure it would dissatisfy others. He saw, therefore, no end to be answered by the motion. We must either set aside all that had been done, and begin de novo, to which this body is incompetent, or rest satisfied with what is already done.

Mr. R. Williams observed, that since he had held a seat in the House, this subject had been almost every session called up. The more he had heard it discussed, the more he became convinced of the necessity of getting it out of the way. He found that whenever it was brought up, all was imagination. One State contended that it had contributed largely, and another, that its exertions had not been surpassed.

We are asked, why relinquish these balances before we are solicited by the States? He would reply that North Carolina never had recognized the debt, and, in his opinion, never would apply for its extinguishment. He was in favor of the amendment, because the principle ought to be decided here, and not in a select committee. What, indeed, could such committee report? There were no vouchers or books whereon the settlement had been made to be got at. All they could do, then, would be to report the balances alleged to be due, which any member could at any time learn.

It seemed almost useless to go into arguments to show the injustice of the claim, and of consequence, the justice of the resolution. It had been justly said, that those States which had contributed the most, had, by the report of the Commissioners, the most to pay; and this was peculiarly so with the State of North Carolina.

Mr. W. had forborne to dwell on the injustice of these demands. But were he to enter on that branch of the discussion, he should say that the very act of destroying all the vouchers was of itself sufficient to justify any suspicion. He should say, that for what, in some States, there had been an allowance of one hundred pounds, North Carolina had not been allowed twenty shillings. Could, then, gentlemen talk of moral obligation, and say that this was a just debt?

Mr. T. Morris said, it was contended that the accounts should be opened anew and re-examined. The fears, therefore, of the gentleman from Massachusetts, were entirely visionary. The resolution was a simple one. It proposes to inquire into the expediency of doing away these debts. The amendment goes to determine the principle here. He thought it proper the principle should be settled here. But gentlemen say they want information. If so, after the amendment is agreed to, they may move for a postponement. If the amendment were carried, he would himself move a postponement.

It had been said that New York had had eight hundred thousand dollars of her debt remitted by the United States. But how did the case really stand? New York had availed herself of the act of Congress, not because she acknowledged the debt to be just, but because she preferred doing something to remaining in the situation towards the United States in which she stood. It was strange, then, to hear gentlemen say that New York had been favored. What was the fact? North Carolina, according to the gentleman, had not, and would not, pay one cent; and New York had discharged a greater sum than was due by all the other debtor States, with the exception of Delaware. She was, therefore, instead of being favored, placed in a worse situation than any other State. It was from the existence of this state of things that he wished a final decision to be made this session. New York having agreed to make certain payments to the United States, it was important to her to know whether the United States meant to enforce payment by the other States. Her situation would be truly unfortunate, if after agreeing to pay, the United States suffered her claims against the other States to sleep. She would not only have to pay her quota of the debts, but would see no prospect of deriving her share of benefit from the payments of the other debtor States.

Mr. Macon said the subject was a very old one, which had occupied much time every session for many years, and he thought it would be as well to try the question now as at any other time. No information of a select committee could throw any new light upon it.

There was a fact which ought to have great weight with the committee. One of the Commissioners who made the settlement, who was a member of this House, had, after the settlement, proposed a resolution to extinguish the balances of the debtor States; and he had stated, as a reason for this measure, that the principle adopted by the board had operated very harshly upon particular States. Mr. M. had it from authority not to be questioned, that in the settlement by the Commissioners, teams, with the usual number of horses, had not produced twenty shillings.

This subject had hung over our heads for eight years, and no scheme was yet devised for collecting the balances. How could they be collected? Congress had, it is true, authorized expenditures by the States in the erection of fortifications; but this very act was a tacit confession of the impracticability of getting the money into the public Treasury. As to a settlement with North Carolina, it was involved in great difficulty. In the act of cession of lands by that State to the United States, it was provided that the territory ceded should be pledged to pay a proportional share of the balance due the United States. How could that share be estimated?

Mr. M. regretted that this subject had been brought up. He should not himself have been for bringing it up, for he thought the claims of the United States not worth a rush. The truth was, the States had all exerted themselves in one great and common cause; they had done their best; they had acted with great glory. As to the State which he represented, he would ask if the first blood that had been spilled after that shed at Boston was not in North Carolina? and that was the blood of brother against brother. He desired not, however, to make comparisons, which were always unpleasant, but to show that North Carolina had no reason to shrink from an inquiry which would demonstrate that she had fully contributed her share in the common cause, without meaning to assert that she had done more than other States. Let, then, Congress decide at once, and abandon the claims altogether, or devise some plan for collecting them, that we may know how we stand.

Mr. Dana said, I hope the amendment will not be agreed to. However gentlemen may be possessed of a wholesale intellect, that enables them to decide on interesting questions without a moment's reflection, I confess I am not blessed with so happy an intuition. I do not know that I have ever been called upon to form an opinion on this subject. As to a reference of it to a committee, I think their investigation may be useful, and after we get that, we may take time to decide. But now the plan is changed, and we are called upon to decide at once the principle. This mode of transacting business may be called an economy of time. You may give it the name, but it is not the substance. For my part, I desire to proceed according to our old plan, and go through the slow process of investigation. This is my way, and gentlemen may rest assured that this mode of hurrying business is not the way to save time, but to lose it.

Mr. Bayard declared himself in favor of the amendment, and he could not think, notwithstanding the remarks of his honorable friend from Connecticut, that any gentleman in the House was unprepared to vote upon it. The subject had been frequently discussed, and he believed that the House was then as well prepared for a decision as they would be for a century to come. It involved but a single principle; and, as to information, he could scarcely tell what information was wanted. He felt much of the indifference of the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Macon.) He was sure the United States had neither the right, nor the power to recover these balances; and he repeated it as his opinion, that it had not been the original intention that the debtor States should pay them. Will gentlemen recollect that the commission was instituted under the old Confederation. Had Congress, then, a right to do any thing to bind the sovereignties of the independent States? All they could do was to pass resolutions making requisitions, which the States might or might not comply with. They could appoint Commissioners to settle the accounts, but could they impose the debts upon the States? No, they could not. It, therefore, never could have been contemplated that they would establish those debts. The only effect that could have been contemplated, was, that the creditor States might rely that, on a settlement, Congress would assume their balances.

On the question being put, the amendment was lost—yeas 41, nays 46.

When the original resolution for referring to a select committee the consideration of the expediency of extinguishing the balances was carried.

Ordered, That Mr. Thomas, Mr. Bayard, Mr. Dana, Mr. Hill, and Mr. Butler, be appointed a committee, pursuant to the said resolution.

And the House adjourned.

Tuesday, February 16.

Judiciary System.

The House then went into Committee of the Whole on the Judiciary bill from the Senate.[66]

Mr. Henderson.—I should not rise to offer my opinion on the great question before the committee, were I not placed in a situation different from that in which I have been since I have had the honor of a seat in this House. The Legislature of the State of North Carolina, one of whose representatives I am on this floor, have seen proper to instruct their Senators and to recommend to their Representatives in Congress, to use their exertions to procure a repeal of the law passed the last session of Congress, for the more convenient organization of the Courts of the United States, and the bill on your table has for its object the repeal of this law, and as I shall probably vote against its passage, a decent respect for the opinions of those who have framed and sent forward those resolutions, demands that I should give the reasons which influence my conduct.

The people of America have obtained and established that the powers of Government shall be vested in three great departments; the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial. They have said that there shall be a House of Representatives, the members of which shall be chosen by the people of the several States every second year. Though this House is composed of members chosen by the people immediately; though they can have no other interest than the great community from which they were sent; though they must return to the common mass in the short period of two years; yet enlightened America did not see proper to intrust the power of making laws to this body alone; they knew that the history of man, and the experience of ages, bore testimony against the safety of committing this high power to any one Assembly not checked by any other body. They have therefore erected another branch of the Legislature, called the Senate, the members of which are not to be elected by the people immediately, but by the sovereignties of the several States; they are to be chosen for six years, and not for two; and the qualifications requisite to entitle those to a seat is different from that of a member of this House. To these bodies are given the power of initiating all laws; but after a bill has passed both of these Houses, before it becomes of binding obligation on the nation, it must be approved of by the President; it is a dead letter until life is given by the Executive. The President is elected not by the people, not by the Legislatures of the several States, not by either House of Congress, but by Electors chosen by the people. He is to hold his office during four years. This is the second great department of the Government. It will be easily discovered from this cursory view of our constitution, the caution and jealousy with which the people have conferred the power of making laws, of commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong. But, sir, after this law was made, after its authoritative mandate was acknowledged by the nation, it became necessary to establish some tribunal to judge of the extent and obligation of this law. The people did not see proper to intrust this power of judging of the meaning of their laws, either to the Legislative or to the Executive, because they participated in the making of these laws; and experience had shown that it is essential for the preservation of liberty that the Judicial and Legislative authorities should be kept separate and distinct. They therefore enacted a third department, called the Judicial, and said that "the Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges both of the Supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."

It is admitted, I understand, by all parties, by every description of persons, that these words, "shall hold their offices during good behavior," are intended as a limitation of power. The question is, what power is thus to be limited and checked? I answer, that all and every power which would have had the authority of impairing the tenure by which the judges hold their offices, (if these words were not inserted,) is checked and limited by these words; whether that power should be found to reside in Congress, or in the Executive. These words are broad and extensive in their signification, and can only be satisfied by being construed to control the Legislative as well as the Executive power. But gentlemen contend that they must be confined to limiting the power of the President. I ask gentlemen, what is there in the constitution to prove their signification to this end alone? When you erect a court and fill it with a judge, and tell him in plain, simple language, that he shall hold his office during good behavior, or as long as he shall behave well; what, I beseech you, sir, will any man, whose mind is not bewildered in the mazes of modern metaphysics, infer from the declaration? Certainly that the office will not be taken from him until he misbehaves; nor that he will be taken from the office during his good behavior. Under this impression he enters upon his duty, performing it with the most perfect satisfaction to all persons who have business before him; and the Legislature, without whispering a complaint, abolishes the office and thereby turns out the judge. The judge is told this is no violation of the compact; although you have behaved well, although we have promised that as long as you did behave well you should continue in office, yet, there is now no further necessity for your services, and you may retire. These words, "during good behavior," are intended to prevent the President from dismissing you from office, and not the Legislature from destroying your office. Do you suppose, sir, that there is a man of common understanding in the nation, whose mind is not alive to the influence of party spirit, that would yield his assent to this reasoning? I hope and believe there is not. But, sir, how is it proved that the President would have had the power of removing the judges from their office, if these words, "during good behavior," had not been inserted in the constitution? Are there any words in that instrument which give the President expressly the power of removing any officer at pleasure? If there are, I call upon gentlemen to point them out; it does not result from the fashionable axiom, that the power which can create can destroy. The President can nominate, but he can appoint to office only by the advice and consent of the Senate. Therefore, it would follow, if the power of displacing results from that of creating, that the Senate should participate in displacing as well as creating officers. But however this may be, it is certainly a mere constructive power which he has exercised, because the Legislature have, from motives of expediency, acknowledged that he had it. If the constitution does not necessarily give the President the right of removing officers at pleasure, and if that right depend upon Legislative acts or constructions, where would have been the necessity for inserting these emphatic words as a check and limitation of Executive power, where without them the President has no such power? You are taking great pains to control a power which does not exist. The persons who framed our constitution knew that a power of removal in ordinary cases must exist somewhere. They took care, therefore, that in whatever hands it might fall, the language of the constitution respecting the tenure of the office of a judge should be co-extensive with the whole power of removal, whether it should reside in one or in more hands.

But it has been said that the powers of each Congress are equal, and that a subsequent Legislature can repeal the acts of a former; and as this law was passed by the last Congress, we have the same power to repeal it which they had to enact it. This objection is more plausible than solid. It is not contended by us that legislatures who are not limited in their powers have not the same authority. The question is not what omnipotent Assemblies can do, but what we can do under a constitution defining and limiting with accuracy the extent and boundaries of our authority. The very section in the constitution (sec. third, art. first) which I have read, is a proof against the power of every Congress to repeal the acts of their predecessors. In the latter part of the eighth section it is proposed that the judges shall receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office; and yet the salary was ascertained and fixed by a former Congress. The same observations may be made with respect to compensation for the President, which can neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected. It is not competent for this Congress to vary the compensation to him which has been fixed by a prior Legislature. It is clearly seen, upon a little investigation, that the position which gentlemen take is too extensive, and leads immediately to a destruction of the constitution. It does away all check, and makes the Legislature omnipotent. It has been asked, that if a corrupt and unprincipled Congress should make an army of judges, have not a subsequent Congress the right of repealing the law establishing this monstrous judicial system? I answer that they have not; the same mode of reasoning which attempts to prove this right from an abuse of power will also prove that you may lessen the compensation of your judges. May not equal oppression be imposed upon the people by giving your judges exorbitant salaries as by increasing their numbers? May not the same corrupt and unprincipled motive which would lead men to the raising of an army of judges lead them to squander the public money? And may they not, instead of giving their judges two thousand dollars a year, give them two hundred thousand? And yet, sir, if it were to take place, I know of no authority under the constitution to lessen that exorbitant compensation. The Government of our country is predicated upon a reasonable confidence in those who administer our public affairs. They must have the power of acting for the public welfare, and this would never have been given them if the possible abuse of this power were a sufficient reason for withholding it.

Again, sir, the construction which gentlemen on the other side of the House contend for, tends to the concentration of Legislative and Executive powers in the same hands. If Congress, who have the power of making laws, can also displace their judges by repealing that which creates the offices they fill, the irresistible consequence is, that whatever law is passed the judges must carry into execution, or they will be turned out of office. It is of little importance to the people of this country whether Congress sit in judgment upon their laws themselves, or whether they sit in judgment upon those who are appointed for that purpose. It amounts to the same despotism; they in fact judge the extent and obligations of their own statutes by having those in their power who are placed on the sacred seat of justice. Whatever the Legislature declares to be law must be obeyed. The constitutional check which the judges were to be on the Legislature is completely done away. They may pass ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, suspend the writ of habeas corpus in time of peace, and the judge who dares to question their authority is to be hurled from his seat. All the ramparts which the constitution has erected around the liberties of the people, are prostrated at one blow by the passage of this law. The monstrous and unheard of doctrine which has been lately advanced, that the judges have not the right of declaring unconstitutional laws void, will be put into practice by the adoption of this measure. New offences may be created by law. Associations and combinations may be declared treason, and the affrighted and appalled citizen may in vain seek refuge in the independence of your courts. In vain may he hold out the constitution and deny the authority of Congress to pass a law of such undefined signification, and call upon the judges to protect him; he will be told that the opinion of Congress now is, that we have no right to judge of their authority; this will be the consequence of concentrating Judicial and Legislative power in the same hands. It is the very definition of tyranny, and wherever you find it, the people are slaves, whether they call their Government a Monarchy, Republic, or Democracy.

Mr. Chairman, I see, or think I see, in this attempt, that spirit of innovation which has prostrated before it a great part of the old world—every institution which the wisdom and experience of ages had reared up for the benefit of man. A spirit which has rode in the whirlwind and directed the storm, to the destruction of the fairest portion of Europe; which has swept before it every vestige of law, religion, morality, and rational government; which has brought twenty millions of people at the feet of one, and compelled them to seek refuge from their complicated miseries in the calm of despotism. It is against the influence of this tremendous spirit that I wish to raise my voice, and exert my powers, weak and feeble as they are. I fear, sir, on the seventh of December, it made its appearance within these walls, clothed in a gigantic body, impatient for action. I fear it has already begun to exert its all-devouring energy. Have you a judiciary system extending over this immense country, matured by the wisdom of your ablest and best men? It must be destroyed. Have you taxes which have been laid since the commencement of the Government? And is the irritation consequent upon the laying of taxes worn off? Are they paid exclusively by the wealthy and the luxurious part of the community? And are they pledged for the payment of the public debt? They must be abolished. Have you a Mint establishment, which is not only essentially necessary to protect the country against the influx of base foreign metals, but is a splendid attribute of sovereignty? It must be abolished. Have you laws which require foreigners coming to your country to go through a probationary state, by which their habits, their morals, and propensities may be known, before they are admitted to all the rights of native Americans? They must be repealed, and our shores crowded with the outcasts of society, lest oppressed humanity then should find no asylum on this globe!

Thursday, February 18.

A message was received from the President of the United States, transmitting a letter from the Secretary of War on the subject of certain lands in the neighborhood of our military posts, on which it might be expedient for the Legislature to make some provisions. A letter was also received from the Governor of Indiana, on the same subject. The said Message and letter were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

The Judiciary Bill.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act to repeal certain acts respecting the organization of the Courts of the United States and for other purposes."

Mr. Stanley.—Mr. Chairman, every measure which is brought under the consideration of a Legislature must first be tested by its expediency. Unhappily, in the present instance, another question arises—its constitutionality. I will endeavor, concisely, to examine the subject on both those points. And, first, as to the expediency of the measure. In order to form a correct estimate between the present Judiciary system of the courts of the United States and that for which it was substituted, it is proper to take a comparative view of both.

Under the former system, there were six judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, who held two sessions of the Supreme Court in each year, at the seat of Government. Those judges also held in each State a circuit court, two terms in each year, in which the judge of the district was associated with the circuit judge. The organization of the district courts having jurisdiction, principally, of matters affecting the revenue and admiralty causes, not being connected with the present question, need not be examined. From the errors of this system resulted, first, a delay of justice. The judges bound to hold courts in succession at remote parts of the continent, were continually travelling; from the variety of accidents to which travellers are subjected in this country, from the condition of roads and overflowing of rivers, it frequently happened that the judges failed in their attempts to get to the courts, or arrived so late that little business was done. Suitors, jurors, and witnesses, were subjected to the trouble and expense of attending courts without the accomplishment of their business; hence resulted a delay of justice. In the State to which I belong, during the few years existence of the former system, this was the case frequently.

Another great evil resulting from that system was, its tendency to lessen the character and respectability of the Federal bench. Those best acquainted with the profession of the law will most readily admit, that even a life of patient study is unequal to the complete attainment of principles and rules; and that much labor and industry are necessary to preserve that which is gained. Consequently, that extent of legal knowledge, correctness of judgment, and respectability of character, which should designate the persons qualified for this important trust were seldom to be found, but in men far advanced in years. Men possessing these qualifications, not inured to labor, are seldom equal to the fatigue of their duty; or, if at the time of appointment, fast approaching to the infirmities of age, were not to be expected to relinquish the enjoyments of private life for an office, which, however honorable, subjected them to the fatigue of a day laborer. The office, with its incumbrances, was, as it were, offered to the lowest bidder. And men best qualified to honor the bench, were driven from it. True it is, men have been found eminently uniting virtue and talents, who have accepted the office under all its distressing circumstances, but we owe this rather to their patriotism than to the advantages of the situation. Let it also be remembered that, in some instances, gentlemen who would have adorned the seat of justice of any country, were compelled to relinquish their seats; and in others, refused to accept the appointment.

Another error of that system was, that the judges of the Supreme Court, the court in the last resort, before whom the errors of the inferior circuit courts were to be corrected, were the same men who presided in those circuit courts. With great deference for the opinions of gentlemen who prefer that system, I pronounce my opinion, that its errors were radical; that those who justly estimated the importance to our interest and national character, of a speedy and correct administration of justice, ought to have desired a change. The present system has happily obviated these errors. The States are divided into six circuits; in each State is appointed one judge, called a circuit judge; the judges of the States, composing one circuit, ride together into the States of their circuit, and together hold the court. The much smaller distance which those judges have to travel than the circuit judges, under the former system, secure their due attendance; a portion of their time is left them to study and reflection, and the same persons presiding at successive terms, a uniformity of decision is preserved. The six former judges hold the Supreme Court, with original constitutional jurisdiction in matters of the utmost national importance, and appellate jurisdiction, in certain cases, where the sum in dispute is two thousand dollars; they are also the court in which the errors of the circuit court are examined and corrected.