Let it not be said, postpone the repeal till the next session. No—let us restore those gentlemen to private life, who have accepted appointments under this law. This will be doing them greater justice, than by keeping them in office another year, till the professional business, which once attached to them, is gone into other channels.

Mr. Stone, of North Carolina.—Before entering into an examination of the expediency of the repeal, it may be proper to remark, that gentlemen who have spoken against the repeal, whose talents and eloquence I highly admire, have not correctly stated the question. The true question is, not whether we shall deprive the people of the United States of all their courts of justice, but whether we shall restore to them their former courts. Shall we, or shall we not, continue an experiment made, or attempted to be made, I will not say improperly, because my respect for this body and for my country, forbid the imputation; but I will say that the length of time we remained without this system, and the repeated ineffectual attempts made to establish it, present strong reasons for inferring that there are not those great apparent reasons in favor of it, that have been stated. A system somewhat similar to the present had been rejected by the Legislature, because they preferred the former system. Another evidence to the same purport is, that during the last session, when the subject was again revived, and the present plan adopted, an amendment was offered, to amend by extending and enlarging the former establishment.

[Here Mr. S. read the amendment proposed, which augmented the number of judges of the Supreme Court, and assigned their circuits.]

This amendment was rejected, and from the vote entered on the journal of that day, it appears that the difference of votes against the amendment was formed of those gentlemen who were nominated to appointments made vacant by the promotions under the new law. I do not state this circumstance as an evidence that these gentlemen were influenced by improper motives; but to show that the manner in which the new system was formed, was not calculated to establish, in the public mind, a decided preference of it over the old system. Having made these remarks on the great deliberation said to have been manifested in the adoption of this plan, I hope I may be permitted to express my perfect coincidence with the gentleman from Connecticut, that courts are necessary for the administration of justice, and that, without them, our laws would be a dead letter.

But it appears to me essential to the due administration of justice, that those who preside in our courts should be well acquainted with the laws which are to guide their decisions. And, I apprehend, that no way is so much calculated to impart this knowledge, as a practical acquaintance with them, by attending courts in the several States, and hearing gentlemen who are particularly acquainted with them, explain and discuss them. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary, in my mind, that the Judges of the Supreme Court, whose power controls all the other tribunals, and on whose decisions rest the property, the reputation, the liberty, and the lives of our citizens, should, by riding the circuit, render themselves practically acquainted with their duties. It is well known, that the knowledge of the laws of a State, is not to be suddenly acquired, and it is reasonable to conclude, that that knowledge is most correctly possessed by men whose whole lives have been devoted to the acquisition. It is also perfectly well known, that the knowledge of the modes and principles of practice in the different States, or of any State, is most effectually to be acquired in courts, where gentlemen of skill and experience apply those principles to use upon existing points.

This defect, then, of the present plan, is, in my opinion, so radical, that, of itself, it would decide, with me, the question of expediency.

To what source, then, shall we resort for a knowledge of what constitutes this thing, called misbehavior in office? The constitution, surely, did not intend that a circumstance so important as the tenure by which the judges hold their offices, should be incapable of being ascertained. Their misbehavior, certainly, is not an impeachable offence; still it is the ground upon which the judges are to be removed from office. The process of impeachment, therefore, cannot be the only one by which the judges may be removed from office, under, and according to the constitution. I take it, therefore, to be a thing undeniable, that there resides somewhere in the Government, a power to declare what shall amount to misbehavior in office, by the judges, and to remove them from office for the same, without impeachment. The constitution does not prohibit their removal by the Legislature, who have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States. But, says the gentleman from New York, the judges are officers instituted by the constitution, to save the people from their greatest enemies, themselves; and therefore, they should be entirely independent of, and beyond the control of the Legislature. If such was the design of the wise men who framed and adopted the constitution, can it be presumed they would have provided so ineffectual a barrier, as these judges can readily be shown to be? It is allowed, on all hands, the Legislature may modify the courts; they may add judges, they may fix the times at which the courts shall sit, &c. Suppose the Legislature to have interests distinct from the people, and the judges to stand in the way of executing any favorite measure—can any thing be more easy than for the Legislature to declare that the courts, instead of being held semi-annually, or oftener, shall be held only once in six, eight, ten, or twenty years? Or, in order to free themselves from the opposition of the present Supreme Court, to declare, that court shall hereafter be held by thirteen judges. An understanding between the President and the Senate, would make it practicable to fill the new offices with men of different views and opinions from those now in office. And what, in either case, would become of this boasted protection of the people against themselves? I cannot conceive the constitution intended so feeble a barrier; a barrier so easily evaded.

It is not alone the sixteen rank and file, which the gentleman from New York has so ludicrously depicted, that I apprehend immediate danger from, but it is the principle which converts the office of judge into a hospital of incurables, and declares, that an expiring faction, after having lost the public confidence, may add to those sixteen, until they become sixteen hundred or sixteen thousand; and that the restored good sense of the Legislature, the whole Government and constitution, retains no means of casting them off, but by destroying itself, and resorting to revolutionary principles. The Legislature may repeal unnecessary taxes, may disband useless and expensive armies, may declare they will no longer be bound by the stipulations of an oppressive treaty; and if war should follow, the constitution is still safe. But if the construction which gentlemen contend for, be correct, a band of drones, to any amount in number, under the denomination of judges, may prey upon the substance of the people, and the Government retains not the power to remove them but by destroying the constitution itself.

Thursday, January 14.

Judiciary System.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the motion made on the 6th instant, that the act of Congress passed on the 13th day of February, 1801, entitled "An act to provide for the more convenient organization of the Courts of the United States," ought to be repealed.

Mr. Olcott, of New Hampshire, said this subject was of the most important kind, and though many able arguments had been already offered, he could not pass it over with a silent vote.

It has been suggested that the act now proposed to be repealed, came in on the influx of passion, and that the influx of reason should sweep it away. He did not know that this was the case. Some gentlemen contend that it was adopted with great deliberation.

He thought the reasons for a repeal of this law insufficient. It is not said, that if the constitution vests a right to office in the judges, that we can affect them. He thought the constitution did vest the right, and he held it to be sacred.

The provisions of the constitution appeared to him so plain, that they scarcely admitted of illustration. He who undertakes to explain the text, must find more explicit terms than those contained in it. He could not find any.

After dwelling upon the different provisions of the constitution, Mr. O. went upon the question of expediency, at some length, and concluded that a repeal was as inexpedient as unconstitutional.

Mr. Cocke, of Tennessee, followed Mr. Olcott. He said he was sorry gentlemen attempted to make quack doctors of them, by saying we may give a wound, but cannot heal it. He wished the Senate to inquire whether the law now proposed to be repealed was constitutional or not. If it was not, we should act like honest men, acknowledge that we have violated the constitution, and restore it to its purity by repealing the law. Let us recur to the journals of 1799, and see what was the understanding of these champions of our liberties, and whether they have not since changed. The journals would prove that the judges were to mix with the Legislature, were to be locked up in a closet, and to declare who was to be our Executive Magistrate.

[Mr. Cocke here went into an examination of the arguments on the constitutional point.]

We have been told that the nation is to look up to these immaculate judges to protect their liberties; to protect the people against themselves. This was novel, and what result did it lead to? He shuddered to think of it. Were there none of these judges ready to plunge their swords in the American heart? He did not think it proper to be alarmed by the terrors held out. He wished to know no man; to take things as they are. But if gentlemen will attack, they must expect a reply.

Mr. Cocke then dilated upon the several points of the discussion, and concluded with the expression of the hope that the Legislature would repeal the law, and that they would not give way to the ideas of gentlemen, that the Government was made for a chosen few, for the judges, to whom we are to look up for every thing.

Mr. Morris.—Mr. President, I had fostered the hope that some gentleman, who thinks with me, would have taken upon himself the task of replying to the observations made yesterday and this morning, in favor of the motion on your table. But since no gentleman has gone so fully into the subject, as it seems to require, I am compelled to request your attention.

After these preliminary remarks, I hope I shall be indulged while I consider the subject in reference to the two points which have been taken, the expediency and the constitutionality of the repeal.

In considering the expediency, I hope I shall be pardoned for asking your attention to some parts of the constitution, which have not yet been dwelt upon, and which tend to elucidate this part of our inquiry. I agree fully with the gentleman, that every section, every sentence, and every word of the constitution, ought to be deliberately weighed and examined; nay, I am content to go along with him, and give its due value and importance to every stop and comma. In the beginning, we find a declaration of the motives which induced the American people to bind themselves by this compact. And in the fore-ground of that declaration, we find these objects specified, "to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, and to ensure domestic tranquillity." But how are these objects effected? The people intended to establish justice. What provision have they made to fulfil that intention? After pointing out the courts which should be established, the second section of the third article informs us:

Thus then we find that the judicial power shall extend to a great variety of cases, but that the Supreme Court shall have only appellate jurisdiction in all admiralty and maritime causes, in all controversies between the United States and private citizens, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming lands under different States, and between a citizen of the United States and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, who made the motion on your table, has told us that the constitution, in its judiciary provisions, contemplated only those cases which could not be tried in the State courts. But he will, I hope, pardon me when I contend that the constitution did not merely contemplate, but did, by express words, reserve to the national tribunals a right to decide, and did secure to the citizens of America, a right to demand their decision, in many cases evidently cognizable in the State courts. And what are these cases? They are those in respect to which it is by the constitution presumed that the State courts would not always make a cool and calm investigation, a fair and just decision. To form, therefore, a more perfect union, and to ensure domestic tranquillity, the constitution has said there shall be courts of the Union to try causes, by the wrongful decision of which the Union might be endangered or domestic tranquillity be disturbed. And what courts? Look again at the cases designated. The Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. The constitution has said that the judicial powers shall be vested in the supreme and inferior courts. It has declared that the judicial power so vested shall extend to the cases mentioned, and that the Supreme Court shall not have original jurisdiction in those cases. Evidently, therefore, it has declared that they shall (in the first instance) be tried by inferior courts, with appeal to the Supreme Court. This, therefore, amounts to a declaration, that the inferior courts shall exist. Since, without them, the citizen is deprived of those rights for which he stipulated, or rather those rights verbally granted, would be actually withheld; and that great security of our Union, that necessary guard of our tranquillity, be completely paralyzed, if not destroyed. In declaring, then, that these tribunals shall exist, it equally declares that the Congress shall ordain and establish them. I say they shall; this is the evident intention, if not the express words, of the constitution. The convention in framing, the American people in adopting, that compact, did not, could not presume, that the Congress would omit to do what they were thus bound to do. They could not presume, that the Legislature would hesitate one moment, in establishing the organs necessary to carry into effect those wholesome, those important provisions.

The honorable member from Virginia has given us a history of the judicial system, and in the course of it has told us, that the Judges of the Supreme Court knew, when they accepted their offices, the duties they had to perform, and the salaries they were to receive. He thence infers, that if again called on to do the same duties, they have no right to complain. Agreed: but that is not the question between us. Admitting that they have made a hard bargain, and that we may hold them to a strict performance, is it wise to exact their compliance to the injury of our constituents? We are urged to go back to the old system; but let us first examine the effects of that system. The Judges of the Supreme Court rode the circuits, and two of them, with the assistance of a district judge, held circuit courts and tried causes. As a Supreme Court, they have in most cases only appellate jurisdiction. In the first instance, therefore, they tried a cause, sitting as an inferior court, and then on appeal tried it over again, as a Supreme Court. Thus, then, the appeal was from the sentence of the judges to the judges themselves. But say, that to avoid this impropriety, you will incapacitate the two judges who sat on the circuit, from sitting in the Supreme Court to review their own decrees. Strike them off; and suppose either the same or a contrary decision to have been made on another circuit, by two of their brethren, in a similar case. For the same reason you strike them off, and then you have no court left. Is this wise? Is it safe? You place yourselves in the situation where your citizens must be deprived of the advantage given to them of a court of appeals, or else run the greatest risk that the decision of the first court will carry with it that of the other.

The same honorable member has given us a history of the law passed the last session, which he wishes now to repeal. That history is accurate, at least in one important part of it. I believe that all amendments were rejected, pertinaciously rejected; and I acknowledge that I joined heartily in that rejection. It was for the clearest reason on earth. We all perfectly understood, that to amend the bill was to destroy it; that if ever it got back to the other House, it would perish. Those, therefore, who approved of the general provisions of that bill, were determined to adopt it. We sought the practicable good, and would not, in pursuit of unattainable perfection, sacrifice that good to the pride of opinion. We took the bill, therefore, with its imperfections, convinced that when it was once passed into a law, it might be easily amended.

We are now told, that this procedure was improper; nay, that it was indecent. That public opinion had declared itself against us. That a majority (holding different opinions) was already chosen to the other House; and that a similar majority was expected from that in which we sit. Mr. President, are we then to understand that opposition to the majority in the two Houses of Congress, is improper, is indecent? If so, what are we to think of those gentlemen, who, not only with proper and decent, but with laudable motives, (for such is their claim,) so long, so perseveringly, so pertinaciously opposed that voice of the people, which had so repeatedly, and for so many years, declared itself against them, through the organ of their representatives? Was this indecent in them? If not, how could it be improper for us to seize the only moment which was left for the then majority to do what they deemed a necessary act? Let me again refer to those imperious demands of the constitution, which called on us to establish inferior courts. Let me remind gentlemen of their assertion on this floor, that centuries might elapse before any judicial system could be established with general consent. And then let me ask, being thus impressed with the sense of the duty and the difficulty of performing that arduous task, was it not wise to seize the auspicious moment?

Among the many stigmas affixed to this law, we have been told that the President, in selecting men to fill the offices which it created, made vacancies and filled them from the floor of this House; and that but for the influence of this circumstance, a majority in favor of it could not have been found. Let us examine this suggestion. It is grounded on a supposition of corrupt influence derived from a hope, founded on two remote and successive contingencies. First, the vacancy might or might not exist; for it depended as well on the acceptance of another, as on the President's grant; and secondly, the President might or might not fill it with a member of this House. Yet, on this vague conjecture, on this unstable ground, it is inferred that men in high confidence violated their duty. It is hard to determine the influence of self-interest on the heart of man. I shall not, therefore, make the attempt. In the present case, it is possible that the imputation may be just, but I hope not, I believe not. At any rate gentlemen will agree with me, that the calculation is uncertain, and the conjecture vague.

But let it now, for argument sake, be admitted, saving always the reputation of honorable men, who are not here to defend themselves. Let it, I say, for argument sake be admitted, that the gentlemen alluded to acted under the influence of improper motives. What then? Is a law that has received the varied assent required by the constitution, and is clothed with all the needful formalities, thereby invalidated? Can you impair its force by impeaching the motives of any member who voted for it? Does it follow, that a law is bad because all those who concurred in it cannot give good reasons for their votes? Is it not before us? Must we not judge of it by its intrinsic merit? Is it a fair argument, addressed to our understanding, to say, we must repeal a law, even a good one, if the enacting of it may have been effected in any degree by improper motives? Or is the judgment of this House so feeble, that it may not be trusted?

Let us, however, examine the clause objected to on the ground of the constitution. It is said, that by this law the district judges in Tennessee and Kentucky are removed from office, by making them circuit judges. And again, that you have by law appointed two new offices, those of circuit judges, and filled them by law, instead of pursuing the mode of appointment prescribed by the constitution. To prove all this, the gentleman from Virginia did us the favor to read those parts of the law which he condemns, and if I can trust to my memory, it is clear, from what he read, that the law does not remove these district judges, neither does it appoint them to the office of circuit judges. It does indeed put down the district courts; but it is so far from destroying the offices of district judge, that it declares the persons filling those offices shall perform the duty of holding the circuit courts. And so far is it from appointing circuit judges, that it declares the circuit courts shall be held by the district judges. But gentlemen contend, that to discontinue the district courts, was in effect to remove the district judge. This, sir, is so far from being a just inference from the law, that the direct contrary follows as a necessary result; for it is on the principle that these judges continue in office after their courts are discontinued, that the new duty of holding other courts is assigned to them. But, gentlemen say, this doctrine militates with the principles we contend for. Surely not. It must be recollected, sir, that we have repeatedly admitted the right of the Legislature to change, alter, modify, and amend the judiciary system, so as best to promote the interests of the people. We only contend that you shall not exceed or contravene the authority by which you act. But, say gentlemen, you forced this new office on the district judges, and this is in effect a new appointment. I answer, that the question can only arise on the refusal of those judges to act. But is it unconstitutional to assign new duties to officers already existing? I fear that if this construction be adopted, our labors will speedily end; for we shall be so shackled, that we cannot move. What is the practice? Do we not every day call upon particular officers to perform duties not previously assigned to, or required of them? And must the Executive in every such case make a new appointment?

But as a further reason to restore, by repealing this law, the old system, an honorable member from North Carolina has told us, the judges of the Supreme Court should attend in the States, to acquire a competent knowledge of local institutions, and for this purpose should continue to ride the circuits. I believe there is great use in sending young men to travel; it tends to enlarge their views and give them more liberal ideas than they might otherwise possess. Nay, if they reside long enough in foreign countries they may become acquainted with the manners of the people and acquire some knowledge of their civil institutions. But I am not quite convinced that riding rapidly from one end of this country to the other is the best way to study law. I am inclined to believe that knowledge may be more conveniently acquired in the closet than in the high road. It is moreover to be presumed that the first Magistrate would, in selecting persons to fill these offices, take the best characters from the different parts of the country, who already possess the needful acquirements. But admitting that the President should not duly exercise, in this respect, his discretionary powers, and admitting that the ideas of the gentleman are correct, how wretched must be our condition! These, our judges, when called on to exercise their functions, would but begin to learn their trade, and that too at a period of life when the intellectual powers with no great facility can acquire new ideas. We must, therefore, have a double set of judges. One set of apprentice-judges to ride circuits and learn; the other set of master-judges, to hold courts and decide controversies.

We are told, sir, that the repeal asked for is important, in that it may establish a precedent, for that it is not merely a question on the propriety of disbanding a corps of sixteen rank and file; but that provision may hereafter be made, not for sixteen but for sixteen hundred or sixteen thousand judges, and that it may become necessary to turn them to the right about. Mr. President, I will not, I cannot presume, that any such provision will ever be made, and therefore I cannot conceive any such necessity; I will not suppose, for I cannot suppose, that any party or faction will ever do any thing so wild, so extravagant. But I will ask, how does this strange supposition consist with the doctrine of gentlemen, that public opinion is a sufficient check on the Legislature, and a sufficient safeguard to the people? Put the case to its consequences, and what becomes of the check? Will gentlemen say it is to be found in the force of this wise precedent? Is this to control succeeding rulers in their wild, their mad career? But how? Is the creation of judicial officers the only thing committed to their discretion? Have they not, according to the doctrine contended for, our all at their disposition, with no other check than public opinion, which, according to the supposition, will not prevent them from committing the greatest follies and absurdities? Take then all the gentleman's ideas, and compare them together, it will result that here is an inestimable treasure put into the hands of drunkards, madmen, and fools.

But away with all these derogatory suppositions. The Legislature may be trusted. Our Government is a system of salutary checks: one Legislative branch is a check on the other. And should the violence of party spirit bear both of them away, the President, an officer high in honor, high in the public confidence, charged with weighty concerns, responsible to his own reputation and to the world, stands ready to arrest their too impetuous course. This is our system. It makes no mad appeal to every mob in the country. It appeals to the sober sense of men selected from their fellow-citizens for their talents, for their virtue; of men advanced in life, and of mature judgment. It appeals to their understanding, to their integrity, to their honor, to their love of fame, to their sense of shame. If all these checks should prove insufficient, and alas! such is the condition of human nature, that I fear they will not always be sufficient, the constitution has given us one more: it has given us an independent judiciary. We have been told that the Executive authority carries your laws into execution. But let us not be the dupes of sound. The Executive Magistrate commands indeed your fleets and armies; and duties, imposts, excises, and other taxes are collected, and all expenditures are made by officers whom he has appointed. So far indeed he executes your laws. But these, his acts, apply not often to individual concerns. In those cases so important to the peace and happiness of society, the execution of your laws is confided to your judges; and therefore are they rendered independent. Before then that you violate that independence, pause. There are State sovereignties, as well as the sovereignty of the General Government. There are cases, too many cases, in which the interest of one is not considered as the interest of the other. Should these conflict, if the Judiciary be gone, the question is no longer of law, but of force. This is a state of things which no honest and wise man can view without horror.

Suppose, in the omnipotence of your Legislative authority, you trench upon the rights of your fellow-citizens, by passing an unconstitutional law. If the Judiciary Department preserve its vigor, it will stop you short. Instead of a resort to arms, there will be a happier appeal to argument. Suppose a case still more impressive. The President is at the head of your armies. Let one of his generals, flushed with victory and proud in command, presume to trample on the rights of your most insignificant citizen: indignant of the wrong, he will demand the protection of your tribunals, and, safe in the shadow of their wings, will laugh his oppressor to scorn.

This, sir, leads me to the second object I had proposed. I shall therefore pray your indulgence, while I consider how far this measure is constitutional. I have not been able to discover the expediency, but will now, for argument's sake, admit it; and here, I cannot but express my deep regret for the situation of an honorable member from North Carolina. Tied fast, as he is, by his instructions, arguments, however forcible, can never be effectual. I ought, therefore, to wish, for his sake, that his mind may not be convinced by any thing I shall say; for hard indeed would be his condition, to be bound by the contrarient obligations of an order and an oath. I cannot, however, but express my profound respect for the talents of those who gave him his instructions, and who, sitting at a distance, without hearing the arguments, could better understand the subject than their Senator on this floor, after full discussion.

The honorable member from Virginia has repeated the distinction before taken between the supreme and the inferior tribunals; he has insisted on the distinction between the words shall and may; has inferred from that distinction, that the judges of the inferior courts are subjects of Legislative discretion; and has contended that the word may includes all power respecting the subject to which it is applied, consequently to raise up and to pull down, to create and to destroy. I must entreat your patience, sir, while I go more into this subject than ever I supposed would be necessary. By the articles so often quoted, it is declared, "that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time establish." I beg leave to call your attention to what I have already said of these inferior courts. That the original jurisdiction of various subjects being given exclusively to them, it became the bounden duty of Congress to establish such courts. I will not repeat the argument already used on that subject. But I will ask those who urged the distinction between the Supreme Court and the inferior tribunals, whether a law was not previously necessary before the Supreme Court could be organized. They reply, that the constitution says, there shall be a Supreme Court, and therefore the Congress are commanded to organize it, while the rest is left to their discretion. This, sir, is not the fact. The constitution says, the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in inferior courts. The Legislature can therefore only organize one Supreme Court, but they may establish as many inferior courts as they shall think proper. The designation made of them by the constitution is, such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. But why, say gentlemen, fix precisely one Supreme Court, and leave the rest to Legislative discretion? The answer is simple: it results from the nature of things from the existent and probable state of our country. There was no difficulty in deciding that one and only one Supreme Court would be proper or necessary, to which should lie appeals from inferior tribunals. Not so as to these. The United States were advancing in rapid progression. Their population of three millions was soon to become five, then ten, afterwards twenty millions. This was well known, as far as the future can become an object of human comprehension. In this increase of numbers, with a still greater increase of wealth, with the extension of our commerce and the progress of the arts, it was evident that although a great many tribunals would become necessary, it was impossible to determine either on the precise number or the most convenient form. The convention did not pretend to this prescience; but had they possessed it, would it have been proper to have established, then, all the tribunals necessary for all future times? Would it have been wise to have planted courts among the Chickasaws, the Choctaws, the Cherokees, the Tuscaroras, and God knows how many more, because at some future day the regions over which they roam might be cultivated by polished men! Was it not proper, wise and necessary, to leave in the discretion of Congress the number and the kind of courts which they might find it proper to establish for the purpose designated by the constitution? This simple statement of facts—facts of public notoriety—is alone a sufficient comment on, and explanation of, the word on which gentlemen have so much relied. The convention in framing, the people in adopting, this compact say the judicial power shall extend to many cases, the original cognizance whereof shall be by the inferior courts; but it is neither necessary, nor even possible now to determine their number or their form; that essential power, therefore, shall vest in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time, in the progression of time, and according to the indication of circumstances, establish; not provide, or determine, but establish. Not a mere temporary provision, but an establishment. If, after this, it had said in general terms, that judges should hold their offices during good behavior, could a doubt have existed on the interpretation of this act, under all its attending circumstances, that the judges of the inferior courts were intended as well as those of the Supreme Court? But did the framers of the constitution stop here? Is there then nothing more? Did they risk on these grammatical niceties the fate of America? Did they rest here the most important branch of our Government? Little important, indeed, as to foreign danger; but infinitely valuable to our domestic peace, and to personal protection against the oppression of our rulers. No; lest a doubt should be raised, they have carefully connected the judges of both courts in the same sentence; they have said, "the judges both of the supreme and inferior courts," thus coupling them inseparably together. You may cut the bands, but you can never untie them. With salutary caution they devised this clause to arrest the over-bearing temper which they knew belonged to Legislative bodies. They do not say the judges, simply, but the judges of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior. They say, therefore, to the Legislature, you may judge of the propriety, the utility, the necessity, of organizing these courts; but when established, you have done your duty. Anticipating the course of passion in future times, they say to the Legislature, you shall not disgrace yourselves by exhibiting the indecent spectacle of judges established by one Legislature removed by another. We will save you also from yourselves. We say these judges shall hold their offices; and surely, sir, to pretend that they can hold their office after the office is destroyed, is contemptible.

The framers of this constitution had seen much, read much, and deeply reflected. They knew by experience the violence of popular bodies, and let it be remembered, that since that day many of the States, taught by experience, have found it necessary to change their forms of government to avoid the effects of that violence. The convention contemplated the very act you now attempt. They knew also the jealousy and the power of the States; and they established for your and for their protection this most important department. I beg gentlemen to hear and remember what I say: it is this department alone, and it is the independence of this department, which can save you from civil war. Yes, sir, adopt the language of gentlemen, say with them, by the act to which you are urged, "if we cannot remove the judges we can destroy them." Establish thus the dependence of the Judiciary Department, who will resort to them for protection against you? Who will confide in, who will be bound by their decrees? Are we then to resort to the ultimate reason of kings? Are our arguments to fly from the mouths of our cannon?

Is there a member of this House, who can lay his hand on his heart, and say that, consistently with the plain words of our constitution, we have a right to repeal this law? I believe not. And if we undertake to construe this constitution to our purposes, and say that public opinion is to be our judge, there is an end to all constitutions. To what will not this dangerous doctrine lead? Should it to-day be the popular wish to destroy the First Magistrate, you can destroy him; and should he to-morrow be able to conciliate to him the popular will, and lead them to wish for your destruction, it is easily effected. Adopt this principle and the whim of the moment will not only be the law, but the constitution of our country.

The gentleman from Virginia has mentioned a great nation brought to the feet of one of her servants. But why is she in that situation? Is it not because popular opinion was called on to decide every thing, until those who wore bayonets decided for all the rest? Our situation is peculiar. At present our national compact can prevent a State from acting hostilely towards the general interest. But let this compact be destroyed, and each State becomes instantaneously vested with absolute sovereignty. Is there no instance of a similar situation to be found in history? Look at the States of Greece. They were once in a condition not unlike to that in which we should then stand. They treated the recommendations of their Amphictyonic Council (which was more a meeting of Ambassadors than a Legislative assembly) as we did the resolutions of the old Congress. Are we wise? So they were. Are we valiant? They also were brave. Have we one common language, and are we united under one head? In this, also, there was a strong resemblance. But, by their divisions, they became at first victims to the ambition of Philip, and were at length swallowed up in the Roman empire. Are we to form an exception to the general principles of nature, and to all the examples of history? And are the maxims of experience to become false, when applied to our fate?

Some, indeed, flatter themselves that our destiny will be like that of Rome. Such, indeed, it might be, if we had the same wise but vile aristocracy, under whose guidance they became the masters of the world. But we have not that strong aristocratic arm, which can seize a wretched citizen, scourged almost to death by a remorseless creditor, turn him into the ranks, and bid him, as a soldier bear our eagle in triumph round the globe! I hope to God we shall never have such an abominable institution. But what, I ask, will be the situation of these States (organized as they now are) if, by the dissolution of our national compact, they be left to themselves? What is the probable result? We shall either be the victims of foreign intrigue, and split into factions, fall under the domination of a foreign power, or else, after the misery and torment of civil war, become the subjects of a usurping military despot. What but this compact—what but this specific part of it, can save us from ruin? The judicial power, that fortress of the constitution, is now to be overturned. Yes, with honest Ajax, I would not only throw a shield before it, I would build around it a wall of brass. But I am too weak to defend the rampart against the host of assailants. I must call to my assistance their good sense, their patriotism and their virtue. Do not, gentlemen, suffer the rage of passion to drive reason from her seat. If this law be indeed bad, let us join to remedy the defects. Has it been passed in a manner which wounded your pride, or aroused your resentment? Have, I conjure you, the magnanimity to pardon that offence. I entreat, I implore you to sacrifice those angry passions to the interests of our country. Pour out this pride of opinion on the altar of patriotism. Let it be an expiatory libation for the weal of America. Do not, for God's sake, do not suffer that pride to plunge us all into the abyss of ruin. Indeed, indeed, it will be but of little, very little avail, whether one opinion or the other be right or wrong; it will heal no wounds, it will pay no debts, it will rebuild no ravaged towns. Do not rely on that popular will, which has brought us frail beings into political existence. That opinion is but a changeable thing. It will soon change. This very measure will change it. You will be deceived. Do not, I beseech you, in reliance on a foundation so frail, commit the dignity, the harmony, the existence of our nation to the wild wind. Trust not your treasure to the waves. Throw not your compass and your charts into the ocean. Do not believe that its billows will waft you into port. Indeed, indeed, you will be deceived. Cast not away this only anchor of our safety. I have seen its progress. I know the difficulties through which it was obtained. I stand in the presence of Almighty God, and of the world: and I declare to you, that if you lose this charter, never, no, never will you get another! We are now, perhaps, arrived at the parting point. Here, even here, we stand on the brink of fate. Pause—pause! For Heaven's sake, pause!

Wednesday, February 3.

The question was then taken on the final passage of the bill and determined in the affirmative—yeas 16, nays 15, as follows:

So it was Resolved, That this bill pass, that it be engrossed, and that the title thereof be "An act to repeal certain acts respecting the organization of the courts of the United States, and for other purposes."

Saturday, April 17.

The Vice President being absent, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President pro tempore, as the constitution so provides; and the honorable Abraham Baldwin was chosen.

Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives of this election.

On motion, it was

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States, and acquaint him that the Senate have, in the absence of the Vice President, elected the honorable Abraham Baldwin their President pro tempore.

Monday, April 26.

Relief to Widows and Orphans of Naval and Marine Officers.

The Senate resumed the third reading of the bill, entitled "An act for the relief of the widows and orphans of certain persons who have died, or may hereafter die, in the naval service of the United States."

On motion to strike out the second section of the bill, to wit:

It passed in the affirmative—yeas 16, nays 8, as follows:

Georgia Limits.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States: