This statement was referred to the Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the former Message of the President on this subject.

Persons Imprisoned for Debt.

The following Message, with the papers to which they refer, was received from the President of the United States:

This Message, with the papers accompanying it, was referred to the same Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the report on the petition of William Bell.

Diplomatic Intercourse Bill.

Mr. Nicholas inquired with what sums the blanks in the bill were to be filled.

Mr. Harper said he proposed to fill the first with $40,000, and the last with $28,650.

Mr. Nicholas conceived this to be a good time for the House to attempt to bring back the establishment of the diplomatic corps to the footing on which it was settled at the commencement of the Government, and continued down till the year 1796; and to prevent in future the probable increase which he apprehended from the recent examples, he thought it necessary to take a view of this subject, not only from the increase of expense, but from a variety of other considerations. It is not the manner in which a Government is constituted which makes its operations easy and certain. But the execution of the powers of the Government itself is no more to be considered than the nature of its formation; for I do believe there is a tendency in all Governments like ours to produce a union and consolidation of all its parts into the Executive department; and that the limitation and connection of the parts with each other, as settled in the constitution, would be destroyed by the influence I have mentioned, unless there is a constant operation on the part of the Legislature to resist this overwhelming power. I think we have the most convincing proofs that a representative Government can be made most oppressive and burdensome, and yet preserve all the forms which are given to it by a constitution; and the Legislature shall appear to act upon its own discretion, whilst that discretion shall have ceased to exist. Where the Executive has an influence over the Legislature, and the Government is a representative one, the Executive is capable of carrying its views into effect in a manner superior to what can be accomplished even in the most despotic monarchy; the mischief will be carried farther in the former case than in the latter, because the people will be more inclined to submit to the decisions of a Government of its own choosing than to one which rules them by hereditary right; monarchs cannot carry their oppressions so far, without resistance, as republics. Under this general view of the subject, he conceived it to be the duty of the Legislature to guard cautiously its own independence, and to limit, as far as consistent with the general welfare, the influence of Executive patronage.

He conceived that this extension of influence of one branch of the Government over another was strictly guarded by the constitution, which was framed on the principle of checks and balances—of departments acting and controlling each other; but he was sorry to see the idea of patronage drawn into a closer compass than it had formerly been, as it increased the evil. He was sorry for it, because it tended to manifest a circumstance which had been sought to be concealed. Every insinuation that there was a division between the Government and the people had been repelled as an insidious and malignant design; but the Administration, by acting on a new principle, which he was too well assured was the fact, had established the idea that there was a division between it and a considerable portion of the people. The evidence of this fact had been long shown, and he feared the operation of circumstances of this nature on the public mind.

He gave it as his opinion on our foreign intercourse, that the United States would be benefited by having no Ministers at all. He did not think that we could be benefited by any sort of compact these foreign agents could form for us, for we only bound ourselves by any treaty we entered into, as we are totally incapable of enforcing the execution of the stipulations made by other nations by any offensive measures. It might be thought necessary to make commercial arrangements with some European powers; but, he asked, if they had the force to make a foreign country conform to its engagements? No gentleman would say that they had; therefore such regulations only tended to entangle ourselves, without rendering commerce any efficient aid. He would, therefore, leave our commerce to seek its own markets totally disembarrassed. All the protection we could furnish it with, consisted in officers of another grade than those mentioned in this bill: Consuls who should reside in the seaports, and not Ministers Plenipotentiary residing in the interior.

He did not intend by the motion he was about to make, that the whole diplomatic establishment should be destroyed at this time, but merely to reduce it to what it had been before the late increase. With this view he proposed to alter the bill so as to direct that there should be appropriated $9,000 for a Minister Plenipotentiary at London, and $9,000 more for another near the French Republic, and that the President be left at liberty to reduce the Ministers Plenipotentiary at Berlin, Madrid, and Lisbon, to Ministers resident, which would diminish their salaries one-half—a resident Minister being of a lower grade has only $4,500 per annum. He then went into a detail of the proceedings of the first Congress, in order to show that it was admitted on all sides by that body, that the constitution vested the power of specifying and limiting the salaries of foreign Ministers and Consuls; he read the speeches of Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Sherman, Mr. W. Smith, of South Carolina, Mr. Sedgwick, Mr. Huntington, and several others, from the Congressional Register, by which it appeared, that there was but one opinion on their powers under the Constitution; and showed from hence, that the only reason why the House did not undertake to enumerate and fix the salaries of foreign Ministers in detail, arose merely from the want of information as to the places where they should be fixed, and the sum necessary to cover their expenses. As his construction corresponded with that of the gentleman who fixed the principles upon which the Government was put in motion, he was encouraged to expect his motion would succeed, seeing that the House had now had sufficient experience to enable them to say what were the regulations proper to be made.

Mr. Harper supposed it would be remembered by all those gentlemen who had attended to the business of Congress for several years past, that the doctrine of the gentleman from Virginia was by no means new. The subject of foreign intercourse was never taken up, without that gentleman, or some other who agreed with him in sentiment, advancing these opinions; they never failed to speak of the danger to be apprehended from Executive influence, from its power to appoint foreign Ministers; that foreign intercourse was unnecessary; that our public affairs abroad were not to be attended to, and that commerce ought to be given up, or left to shift for itself. Nor was this a doctrine confined to this country, or this age. Whenever a set of gentlemen in any country found their views opposed by the measures of Government, they became vexed, and attributed the proceedings of those who differed from them in opinion to any motive rather than the public good. The desire of Executive favor, or Executive offices, was an usual charge, and it was at this day well understood. It would also be remembered, that whenever the subject of foreign intercourse had been discussed, though these objections had been constantly made to it, they had been as constantly disregarded by the Congress of the United States. The good sense of the country had weighed these objections in the balance, and declared them wanting; and he trusted the same fate would now meet them as heretofore.

In aid of the $40,000 per annum, originally granted for this purpose, Mr. H. said, various supplementary appropriations had been made. First, a sum of $20,000, then a sum of $23,000, and, in March last, $17,000, and, in addition to this, $14,000 for a particular appointment. The House had, therefore, not only deemed it expedient to continue the original act, but to make additional appropriations from year to year. He thought the good sense of the country had never been more firmly shown than on this subject. But now a new course was to be taken, and all former proceedings declared to have been wrong. But it was said this country had no need of foreign ministers, and that commerce might be left to itself. He did not believe the House would think so. Did not the United States trade with all the nations of the earth? How, then, was it possible to do without accredited agents to attend to our concerns in foreign countries? Were we to give up our commerce? There were gentlemen, he knew, who would answer, Yes. They would tell the House, commerce was a bad thing, and that it rather ought to be outlawed than protected. But was this the sense of the country? Was it the sense of that House? Would they discard the property of that class of citizens who depended upon it for their support and their wealth? Or would they be ready to forfeit the revenue arising from it? Mr. H. said he had often heard of the dangerous nature of foreign intercourse; but it was the discovery of a few men who believed that every thing which had been done by this Government had been radically wrong. He trusted, however, the House would adhere to what it had so frequently sanctioned, and that the proposed amendment would not be agreed to.

Mr. Gallatin believed that there were a number of people in the United States—people otherwise enlightened, and who, upon all common subjects, possessed sound understandings—who were fully convinced that there was a faction existing within the United States, and even within the walls of that House, who wished to demolish the Government; and he further believed that this opinion was supported by such declarations as had been made by the gentleman from Connecticut. He should be sorry that such a belief should be considered as dangerous to the safety of the community. Nor could he consider the determination of the Executive to employ only such persons as are of the same political opinions with themselves, as of such a nature as to produce fatal consequences, and that Government, on that account, was unworthy of confidence. He believed that such a line of conduct must flow from the present state of parties in America, divided as the people were upon many important occasions. To say, therefore, that the Executive employed persons of consonant political opinions to its own, was not to say the Government did not deserve confidence. But if the committee turned their attention to the amendment proposed, it only went to declare that ministers to London and Paris should not have a salary of more than $9,000 a year; and that ministers to other parts of Europe should not have more than $4,500. In support of this amendment, it was said that this was the ground upon which this Government first fixed the business of foreign intercourse. He believed this statement correct. Until the year 1796, there was no minister plenipotentiary except at Paris and London; at other places there were no higher grades than ministers resident. Hence the committee might be led to argue the propriety of bringing back our foreign political intercourse to what it was before that period. He said foreign political intercourse; because he thought the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Harper) had blended two subjects together, viz: foreign commercial intercourse, and foreign political intercourse. He did not believe it was the opinion of any gentleman in that House that commerce ought to be left to shift for itself, unattended to. He believed it was well understood that our commerce in foreign countries was attended to by our consuls and not by our ministers plenipotentiary; and consuls would exist if we had no ministers at all. Therefore, all that gentleman's arguments, which tended to show that the amendment would affect our commercial intercourse, had no foundation whatever.

Returning to the question of foreign political intercourse: Was it proper to bring it back to what it was eighteen months ago? And, before he proceeded further, he would observe that, though the gentleman from South Carolina had been tolerably correct in his statements of the business, he was mistaken in one point, in which he would set him right. He had stated that the first additional appropriation was $20,000; but this sum was not appropriated for foreign intercourse, but for defraying the expense of the suits of our merchants in London. On the first of January, 1796, there remained a balance of unexpended appropriation for this object, of $30,000. To that day no extraordinary appropriation had been made; the whole allowance was $40,000 a year, which was found to be more than sufficient. On the 28th of May, 1796, an estimate was sent by the President of the United States, stating the sums already appropriated for foreign intercourse, and that $23,500 were yet wanting, in order to change the establishment which had till that day existed, by sending Ministers Plenipotentiary to Madrid and Lisbon, instead of Ministers Resident. This estimate, he just stated, was received on the 28th of May, and the law received the signature of the President on the first of June, so that it could not have received a very full discussion (being passed just as the session was about to close) and he thought there was good reason for examining the thing again. The next appropriation was made in the second session of the fourth Congress. In that session, he allowed, the additional appropriation was passed after full discussion. It was made upon an estimate stating $17,900 wanted; and, during last session, an appropriation was made for a Minister to Berlin, of $13,500.

The committee had been told that it would evince great versatility if they were all at once to change what had already been done. But it must be recollected, than when the change in the system was first made, it underwent little discussion; and he would venture to say, that our business abroad was as well done from the year 1786 to 1796, as it had been done since. As the question was whether a larger or a smaller sum of money should be appropriated, he would call upon gentlemen in favor of the larger sum, to show what benefit was derived from Madrid and Lisbon by the change; what necessity there was for a Minister at Berlin, and what good was to be derived from giving a larger salary than $4,500. The gentleman from Connecticut had said, why send a Minister Plenipotentiary to London or Paris, any more than the other Courts? This was done at first, and the mover, he supposed, wished not to innovate upon the law as originally passed.

But they were told it was improper, upon this floor, to say any thing about patronage, and that all arguments of that kind are well understood, and are by no means novel in their nature; that such complaints are made under all forms of Government by discontented people out of office. To say that these complaints are well understood, was the same as to say that the ground upon which they complained was also well understood: it was to acknowledge, that persons who were in the favor of the Executive had some advantages which persons in the other party desired or envied. To admit of one position, was to admit of the other. But, if no particular advantage was to be derived from Governmental patronage, then the cause of jealousy, according to this doctrine, must cease.

Our Government, he said, was in its child-hood; and if this patronage had any existence, it could not of course be as yet alarming. But he desired gentlemen to look at all Governments where this power was placed in the Executive, and see if the greatest evil of the Government was not the excessive influence of that department. Did not this corruption exist in the Government which was constituted most similarly to ours, to such a degree as to have become a part of the system itself, and without which, it is said, the Government could not go on? Was it not, therefore, prudent to keep a watchful eye in this respect? He did not, however, speak against the power itself; it was necessary to be placed somewhere. The constitution had placed it in the Executive power. If the same power had been placed in the Legislature, he believed they would have been more corrupt than the Executive. He thought, therefore, the trust was wisely placed in the Executive; and though it was right to keep grants of money within proper bounds, in order to prevent the abuse of power, yet it was proper to grant all that was necessary.

Mr. G. concluded, by saying, that if he thought it was proper that our political intercourse should be extended, he should not support the amendment; but as the conviction was strong upon his mind that our foreign political intercourse had at least been as expensive as it ought to be; that it was owing, in a great degree, to our political intercourse with foreign nations, that our present critical situation was produced; that this intercourse produced more evil than good to us; that he wished to bring the business back to the state in which it stood in 1796. If the wisdom of future Legislatures shall think proper to abolish the establishment of foreign political intercourse altogether, it must be left to them to decide. He himself thought it would be going too far to do so at present. He believed, situated as we were, it was necessary to have some political intercourse; but he believed it would be best, by degrees, to decline it altogether.

Mr. Sitgreaves.—The constitution and laws of the country had made certain offices necessary, and left it to the Executive to fill them as he pleased; and was it for that House to attempt to control this discretion? If it were executed to the injury of the people, the constitution had pointed out the remedy to be by impeachment. But where was the crime, the offence, or the impropriety, of the conduct ascribed to the Executive, if it had been adopted? Would gentlemen say that the Executive ought to appoint persons to office who professed an opinion contrary to its own? Did gentlemen suppose that there was such a want of integrity in this department of Government, that it adopted a political opinion which it did not believe to be right? And, if it were believed to act from principle, would it be prudent or right to admit to a participation in the execution of the important duties of Government persons whose sentiments were not in unison with those of the Executive, and who could only create discord and confusion, where nothing but harmony and union ought to prevail? If the Executive acted upon just principles, it would endeavor to give singleness of design to its operations, and it could only do this by admitting persons into the Government who thought with it. This would be a right, prudent, and honorable conduct; and where it had been deviated from (as he had before observed), Government had received an awful lesson for its future conduct.

The question whether that House had the power to interfere with the Executive authority, by withholding appropriations, had been fully discussed in a former Congress, and the opinion of the country was not now to be fixed on this subject. For that part of the House who thought the constitution had not vested them with the authority of controlling the Executive, it was sufficient to say that the Executive had thought it necessary to introduce the change in the diplomatic department, which was complained of, and that they felt themselves bound to carry his determination into effect; but those who think that the House of Representatives may control the Executive in this respect, will of course act accordingly.

Mr. Baldwin said he perceived there was a real difference of opinion between the gentleman last up and himself. The gentleman supposed the diplomatic establishment was fixed by the Executive, and the Legislature had nothing to do with it but to provide the money. Every person must see, even from a cursory view of the constitution, that this was designed to be a Government of departments, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to be kept distinct as far as possible. It was the business of the Legislature to establish offices by law; it was the business of the Executive to fill those offices. It would appear, from tracing back the law, now proposed to be continued, that it originated in this manner. He had not been notified of the subject as being likely to be called up to-day, and was not prepared to be as particular as he could wish as to facts. He had endeavored to refresh his recollection since it had been under discussion, and he found that it originated from the Speech of the President, at the opening of the second session of the first Congress, in which he said, "that the interests of the United States required that our intercourse with other nations should be facilitated by such provisions as will enable me to fulfil my duty in that respect; and to this end, that the compensations to be made to the persons who may be employed, should, according to the nature of their appointments, be defined by law." This part of the Speech was referred to a committee, and from that originated this law. Want of information, at that early time in the Government, prevented their being as particular as they wished. They fixed a sum to each grade, and a sum beyond which the whole amount should not extend; limited the law to a short period, that it might be open to be corrected by experience. The present motion, if he had understood it, proposed now to be a little more particular in the establishment, by fixing the sum for particular places—to do the very thing then recommended by the President. The same has always been the intention of every succeeding Congress, which was the reason why they continued it only for short periods, leaving it open to such amendments as should be suggested by experience. These ideas of the offices being first to be established by law, appeared not only to be the sense of the former President, and of each succeeding Congress, as he had stated, but appeared also to be the opinion of the present President. At the last session he thought that a higher grade of office was necessary at Algiers: this he stated in a message to Congress—that as there were great expenditures of money on that coast, he thought it necessary that an establishment should be made which would enable him to appoint a very confidential person, on whom the other officers there should be dependent, and who should control their proceedings and expenditures. Congress concurred in this opinion, passed a law for the establishment of the office, and then the Executive appointed the officer. For these reasons he considered the question within their proper powers, and fairly open to their deliberation.

At the close of the revolutionary war, the disposition of forming many treaties, and having extensive diplomatic connections with European powers, was carried even further than it has been since. It was among their first national acts, and discovered marks of youth and inexperience; a few years convinced them that they had gone too far, that this country had little to expect from treaties, and much to lose, and that many diplomatic connections were more frequently the cause of perplexity and embarrassment, than of any national advantage. The Congress under the articles of confederation were extricating themselves from that policy as fast as possible; as these expired in course, they were careful not to renew them. For several of the last years of that Congress he well recollected that clusters of candidates for these appointments, supported by powerful interests and connections, were uniformly resisted; and, if he mistook not, when this Government came into operation, this country had but one Minister in Europe. The conviction on this subject was so strong, and experience had so fully settled it as the true policy, that it remained immoveable for some time after organizing the present Government. All appropriations for foreign Ministers were refused at the first session, as far as he recollected. At the second session it was urged, in the Speech of the President, as before stated, and enforced by more particular explanations to individuals, as designed to be for temporary purposes, respecting the Northern forts and the property that was withheld. Under these explanations a law passed, as before explained. It was true, this policy had been of late, in some measure, departed from. He thought experience had already been useful to them in this course also, and ought to administer caution to them in seeking to intermingle in European politics. Ambassadors and Ministers cannot be entirely indifferent to the characters and events with which they are constantly surrounded; the share they take is very apt to be exchanged between the countries to which they belong. He did not wish to be too particular on that point; he was persuaded facts enough presented themselves to the recollection of every member, to confirm his remark. It might be said that on this also we have an awful lesson. If evil had been experienced from this cause, he hoped it would operate as a reason to endeavor to diminish it. He thought it not unreasonable for the House to interpose their restraining power as to granting money, and the more particular establishment of the officers, and thus aid the other departments of the Government in bringing back, by degrees, this part of our policy to its former principles, so well sanctioned by experience. Whether the present motion was well timed, or whether it was best to give it another short limitation, before we went into a definite establishment, was another question, on which he was willing to hear more remarks. Informed as he was at present, he should vote for the motion, and thought they might make some amendments to the former bill, already suggested by experience, and which would be useful.

The committee rose, and had leave to sit again.

Friday, January 19.

Foreign Intercourse.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill providing the means of foreign intercourse, when

Mr. Pinckney rose. He understood the amendment was intended to confine our Ministers Plenipotentiary to London and Paris, and that no higher grade than Ministers Resident should be employed in any other country. He was opposed to this change at this time, and to the mode proposed of doing the business, if the time were seasonable. It was proper that at this juncture our Ministers should remain as they were, as it was prudent to derive all the influence and advantage we could from the situation of our agents in Europe, who would not only be enabled to communicate more correct information from thence, than could be derived from any other source, but who could also explain the motives and objects of this Government, and by that means remove any unfavorable impressions which may be attempted to be given with respect to this country; and thereby put our business in the best train for securing the neutral standing which we have taken. He was against it for another reason. To change the diplomatic intercourse in the way proposed, would be forcing upon the Executive a measure contrary to its wishes. It would also be affording testimony to the charge heretofore made, that there was a division in the Government and the people—a situation in which many wished to see us. He should be sorry to afford the appearance of one department of Government having forced upon another a change of measures of which they are the competent judges, and upon which they have acted. As it was well known that there was a very intimate connection between Spain and Holland, and the country with whom we have at present a misunderstanding, he should be unwilling to deprive this country of the advantages to be derived from having Ministers at those places; besides, if our Ministers were to be recalled from thence, it would be considered as an extraordinary proceeding; and might be construed as intended to be hostile to them. Whatever influence Spain or Holland may have in the councils of the country which he had alluded to, by continuing our Ministers there, it was probable that weight would operate in our favor. There was an additional reason with respect to Spain. It was well known that we had points yet to settle with that country. Our treaty with that power was not yet carried into effect, and negotiations might at this time be going on in relation to it, which might be frustrated by the recall of our Ministers.

Mr. Nicholas wished to explain his intentions in bringing forward this amendment. He believed the gentleman last up would find they nearly corresponded with his own. He had no idea of putting an immediate veto upon the Ministers at present employed. He considered this bill, though passed with a limitation, as a permanent system, and a subsequent clause of the bill would enable the committee to fix the time at which the salaries of Ministers should cease. His wish was to put a limit to this extension of Executive power. He reminded the gentleman from South Carolina that Holland was not concerned in this bill, as we had only a Minister Resident there. If the subject were further dilated upon, he should offer some further remarks upon it.

Mr. N. Smith was surprised to hear the gentleman last up considered that as a permanent provision which was limited to a duration of two years. This law was merely temporary in its nature, and if he only contemplated some future regulations in our foreign intercourse, his amendment was not now necessary. However competent it was for the Legislature to settle the salary of Ministers, it was clear the Legislature had no power, by the constitution either to determine the number of foreign Ministers to be employed, where they should be sent, or what should be their grade. Under the general power of making treaties, vested in the President, he had the power of sending Ministers where he pleased; also in the power intrusted to him of executing the law (not only the municipal, but the law of nations) it was necessary he should have this power.

In a word, all relations were in the hands of the Executive; all our foreign intercourse was to him, and from him. Of course, he was the only judge of what was proper in this business. This being the case, it should seem as if that House had nothing to do with respect to the propriety of sending a Minister to Berlin, or in relation to other grades of Ministers, though they had the power of fixing their salaries. But it was contended by the gentleman from Georgia and others, that, by regulating these salaries, the Legislature had the power of preventing the extension of their establishment. This brought up an old question; but it was a very important one, and he did not regret that it was frequently drawn into discussion. He thought the great landmarks of our constitution could not be too well understood. He did not mean, however, to extend his observations on this subject. It was said, this was a Government of departments and checks, and of course, that the Legislature ought to check the Executive in its operations. That this was a Government of departments and checks, to a certain extent, he should readily allow; but that it was so to the extent which had been represented, he did deny. Our Government was divided into three departments, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; each of these had checks and balances in its own department. The President was checked by the Senate; the Legislature was checked by the President and Senate; the Judiciary was checked by having certain appeals, writs of error, &c. So far from one department checking the other, it was necessary that all the parts should act in unison like a clock, and the moment one part declined to act, the Government could not proceed. It was not in the power of the Legislature to reverse the decision of the lowest court, and should it then be said that they could judge over the head of the Executive? This remark was applicable to all the departments. No one department was a favorite of the constitution. Every act of a department ought to be considered as well done. This being the case, whenever the President had appointed a Minister, and done it constitutionally, when he informed the Legislature thereof, they might do any thing and every thing but doubt the propriety of establishing the Minister.

Mr. Harper.—As to the general policy of the present motion, as connected with the foreign relations of this country, Mr. H. said that he would add two or three remarks on that subject, and then conclude.

The motion went, he said, to reduce the appointments and salaries of three ministers: those to Madrid, Lisbon, and Berlin; and in support of the motion, it was alleged that the last of these Ministers was entirely unnecessary, and that the other two had been improperly, because unnecessarily, raised from Ministers Resident to Ministers Plenipotentiary. To him it was a sufficient answer to these allegations to say, that the President had thought otherwise; because, the President, being charged by the constitution with the foreign relations of the country, must be invested with the means necessary for conducting them with effect; and was infinitely better qualified by this situation to judge what those means were, and how they ought to be used, than the House can pretend to be. One of these means was the appointment of foreign Ministers, which was expressly vested in the President by the constitution. When the President, therefore, had thought fit to appoint foreign Ministers, or to alter their grades, he had exercised a constitutional power, and it did not lie with the House of Representatives to object or judge. To him, therefore, Mr. H. said, it was a sufficient answer to all those objections to say that the President had thought otherwise. To others, who might hold different opinions from him on this subject, he thought it was a sufficient answer to be told that the House of Representatives, as well as the President, had thought differently, and had sanctioned the changes which he had thought proper to make in this respect, by voting money to carry them into effect. This the House had done expressly in all the three cases contemplated by the present motion.

Mr. Gallatin said the committee had been told, in the course of the debate, by some gentlemen, that this attempt to reduce the number of our Ministers was unconstitutional; by others, that it was inexpedient; and even some gentlemen, who agreed to the general expediency of the measure, believed it would be attended with inconvenience from our present foreign relations.

In relation to the constitutionality of the thing, he did not believe, whatever doctrine was supported with respect to treaties, that upon this occasion the committee should be told that they were interfering with the constitutional power vested in the President. It was true that he had the general power of appointing Ambassadors, but it was not less true that the Legislature had the sole and exclusive power to provide for all the expenses of the Union. Hence arose the idea of ours being a Government of departments, so formed as to be a check upon each other. But the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. N. Smith) said there was no such thing as a check of departments; that each was distinct; and, though each had checks within itself, none of them checked the other. And to illustrate his position, he introduced the simile of a clock, at the same time that he told them that the Executive Department was the main-spring which put the clock in motion, whilst Mr. G. supposed he meant that the other branches were merely the hands, which moved as they were directed. But if there was any act which could not be done but by all the branches, each had its share in deciding upon the propriety of it. When a treaty was made it had been argued that that House had nothing to do but carry it into effect; but here it was said that the House were bound to provide for every Ambassador appointed; and if, by withholding salaries, they obliged the President to send Ministers Resident where he wished to send Ministers Plenipotentiary, they would act inconsistently with the constitution. Though gentlemen might make speeches on this subject, they must know that where the Legislature had a right to act, it had a right to deliberate and to use its discretion.

It was true treaties had been made, but no treaty had been made since the adoption of the present Government, by Ministers Resident at any Court at the time. If any benefits were derived to the country from the British treaty, they must be attributed to the Envoy Extraordinary, and not to our Minister at that court. And when our treaty with Spain was concluded, it was necessary to send a Minister Resident to another Court to do the business. Since our treaties were always made by special Envoys, what advantage could it be to have numerous Ministers Plenipotentiary in Europe? In the present critical situation of the country, agitated as it was to the centre, was it not to be apprehended that our Ministers would participate, in some degree, in the party spirit which there abounded, and rank themselves on one side or the other, which would have a tendency to draw this country into a vortex from which we were so happily separated by the Atlantic? We were the only nation, he said, who possessed a Government on a firm foundation, in which civil and religious liberty was fully recognized; we, therefore, enjoyed what the people of Europe were seeking after. We have nothing to wish, except to remain in our present situation. Why, then, should we hazard the being involved in European broils? He had before stated that Consuls were equal to every commercial regulation, and he had heard nothing to change his opinion. Seeing, therefore, that these diplomatic agents were rather dangerous than useful, he thought it time to put a stop to their increase.

Mr. Bayard began his observations by remarking, that the gentleman from Virginia had said that it was not his design that his motion should have an immediate effect upon the Ministers at present employed. If the gentleman was sincere in his avowal, it was clear that he did not understand his own motion; for whatever amendment was introduced into the third section, which the gentleman had intimated might be so amended as to give the regulation a distant operation, as it only related to the sum of money to be appropriated, it would not enable the President to employ a Minister Plenipotentiary, besides those at London and Paris, at a higher salary than $4,500.

Some gentlemen have said, it was idle talk about this House having the power to appropriate, without having the power at the same time to use their discretion. He contended that the power of appointing Ministers was vested in the President, and the House had no right to believe he would abuse this power. It had been supposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that he might appoint an indefinite number of Ministers; and were the House, in that case, he asked, blindly to appropriate for them? This question was predicated upon an abuse of power, whilst the constitution supposed it would be executed with fidelity. Suppose he were to state the question in an opposite light. Let it be imagined that this country has a misunderstanding with some foreign power, and that the Executive should appoint a Minister, but the House, in the plenitude of its powers, should refuse an appropriation. What might be the consequence? Would not the House have contravened the constitution, by taking from the President the power which by it is placed in him? It certainly would. So that this supposition of the abuse of power would go to the destruction of all authority. The Legislature was bound to appropriate for the salary of the Chief Justice of the United States, and though the President might appoint a chimney-sweeper to that office, they would still be bound. The constitution had trusted the President, as well as it had trusted that House. Indeed it was not conceivable that the House could act upon the subject of foreign Ministers. Our interests with foreign countries came wholly under the jurisdiction of the Executive. The duties of that House related to the internal affairs of the country; but what related to foreign countries and foreign agents was vested in the Executive Department. The President was responsible for the manner in which this business was conducted. He was bound to communicate, from time to time, our situation with foreign powers; and if plans were carried on abroad for dividing or subjecting us, if he were not to make due communication of the design, he would be answerable for the neglect.

Tuesday, January 30.

Breach of Privilege.

Mr. Sewall then said, he believed the business which he had to lay before the House would require secrecy, as it was a subject which would considerably affect the feelings of the members of the House. He therefore moved that the galleries might be cleared; which was accordingly done, excepting the members and Clerk.

Mr. Sewall then said, that he had been informed, in a manner which left no doubt of the truth of the fact, that, in the presence of the House whilst sitting, Matthew Lyon, a member from the State of Vermont, did this day commit a violent attack and gross indecency upon the person of Roger Griswold, another member of this House; and in order to bring the subject before the House, that he had prepared a resolution, which he read in his place, and delivered in at the Clerk's table. A question was then taken in the following words: Does the matter so communicated require secrecy?

This motion passed unanimously in the negative, and the galleries were opened.

The House then proceeded to consider the motion made by the member from Massachusetts, which was read, as follows:

It was moved that this resolution be referred to a committee to be denominated a Committee of Privileges, with instruction to inquire into the whole matter of the said resolution, and to report the same with their opinion thereon to the House.

The question was taken by yeas and nays, and decided in the affirmative, 49 to 44.

Ordered, That Messrs. Pinckney, Venable, Kittera, Isaac Parker, R. Williams, Cochran, and Dent, be a committee for the purpose.

A motion was then made that the House come to the following resolution:

A motion was made to add the following words to the end thereof:

The yeas and nays were taken upon this question and decided in the negative—29 to 62.

Thursday, February 1.

Breach of Privilege.

The Speaker informed the House that he had received a letter from a member from Vermont, which he was requested to lay before them.

Mr. Rutledge thought, that in all cases, when letters were sent to the Speaker to be laid before the House, it would be proper for him to state the substance of such communications before they are read, otherwise improper matters might be brought before them.

The Speaker allowed that the suggestion was a proper one, and proceeded to state the contents of the letter in his hand; which having done, the reading of it was called for, and it was read as follow: