THE STORY OF CANADA IN THE GREAT WAR

EDITED AND COMPILED
BY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A. COOPER
Late Commander of the 198th Battalion, Canadian Buffs

INTRODUCTION

By LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A. COOPER
Late Commander of the 198th Battalion, Canadian Buffs

When the dark cloud broke on August 4, 1914, Canada was not wholly unprepared. While not a militaristic people, Canadians had always recognized that it was the duty of every able-bodied citizen to be prepared to defend his country in case of need. That principle had underlain the military policy of the nineteenth century both before and after Confederation. Every citizen of fighting age was theoretically a soldier, more or less prepared to take his share in national defense.

To this was added, in later years, a feeling that some day Canadians might be called upon to take a part in the defense of the British Empire should it become engaged in a supreme struggle. This feeling developed during the South African War when Canada took over the last garrison duties from the Imperial forces as well as the naval stations at Halifax and Esquimalt. The obligation of contributing men to Imperial defense was admitted and discussed at the various Imperial Conferences between 1900 and 1914. Assisted by British experts, certain military and naval preparations had been made with the intention of meeting any national emergency and any imperial necessity which might arise.

While these grave obligations may have rested lightly on the majority of the people engaged in agriculture, commerce, and railway building, the country was not mentally unprepared for the great call of August, 1914. This explains in part why the recruiting of her early battalions and the prompt dispatch of her first contingent of 33,000 men was so enthusiastically accomplished. Division followed division until in about fifteen months Canada had a fighting army corps in France. This accomplishment surprised herself not more than it surprised the Allies and the enemy. Canada's enlistment during the five years of activity totaled one-thirteenth of her population. Over four hundred thousand men, out of a population of about eight millions, actually crossed the ocean. Four divisions fought as such in France. Railway troops worked with every British Army, and forestry battalions did almost all the work of that nature required to supply the needs of both French and British forces on the western front. The casualties among Canadian troops were quite equal to those sustained by the more numerous armies of the United States, because of the greater duration of Canadian service.

Such success as the Canadians had in fighting was due largely to inheritance and environment. Many of those who fought were of British birth or were English, Scotch, Irish, or Welsh once or twice removed. The military instincts of the British and French races had been preserved to a remarkable degree in the Dominion. Added to this was the energy, adaptability, and initiative developed in a people living in small communities scattered through the vast open spaces of a country almost equal in area to the whole of Europe. The pluck of the pioneer, the tenacity of the settler, the self-reliance of the rider of the plains, the initiative of the woodsman, the skill of the shantyman and the prospector—all these combined to give the Canadian army a quality second to none among those engaged in the Great World War.

Remarkable also was the development of officer ability. The Canadian army, after the first two years, was officered entirely by Canadians. The business man, with his experience in organization and executive, became a military administrator in a wonderfully short space of time. The corps commander had never been in any military school except the Canadian militia. Of the seven or eight men who served as divisional commanders, not more than three could qualify as professional soldiers before the war. Of the brigadiers and battalion commanders probably 90 per cent had never attended a military school for more than a month. Canada's army was a citizen army, commanded and administered by men without business training. Such professional soldiers as Canada had before the war became administrators rather than leaders in battle. The war developed so much that was new in tactics and technique that the militia officer had almost an equal chance with the so-called military expert.

If the individual soldier ranked high in initiative and valor, he also must be credited with a loyalty to discipline and to his national traditions. He quickly acquired steadiness and obedience to his officers. He respected himself and his superiors. While never servile nor obsequious, he rendered such service as made the fighting units effective because of their cohesion and compactness. That was remarkably exhibited in the first great engagement in which Canadians took part, the Second Battle of Ypres. It was equally in evidence at Amiens, Arras, Cambrai, and Mons during the final period of the war. The Canadian never forgot he was a Canadian. He had such a sublime faith in himself and in his army as a whole, that his ambition was only fully realized when he was asked to do more than was usually asked of a soldier in this titanic struggle. He never despised the enemy, but he never lost the feeling that he was physically and mentally the enemy's superior. Excepting, perhaps, the Guards Division, the Fifty-first Division, and the Australians, the Canadian army yielded the palm to no portion of the British fighting forces.

Finally, Canadian success in the field of war was but a reflection of the determination of those who remained at home and who with wonderful fortitude, self-sacrifice, and determination backed the army to the limit. There were few tears and less mawkishness when the battalions moved out from their home towns on the long trail. The sentiment of the time was stern because of the prevailing spirit of duty and responsibility. But no nation has paid more honor to those who served nor has done more toward reestablishing the warrior in citizen life than have the Canadian people. If the pay of the soldier was good and the allowance to his dependents adequate, the effort and money expended on his reestablishment have been most generous. In raising Red Cross gratuities and other patriotic funds, the motto of Canadians was "Give till it hurts." In the production of food and of war material, the nation accomplished the seemingly impossible. In subscriptions to the national loans, patriotism reached heights undreamed of by bankers and financial experts. Nearly seventy million shells, made and exported by a country that never before made an explosive instrument of this kind; the purchase of over two thousand million dollars worth of Dominion Government bonds by a people who had never bought a million of such in their history—these are the tangible results by which one may measure the depth of Canadian loyalty and determination.

When the war broke out, the Hon. (afterward Sir) Sam Hughes was Minister of Militia and Defense. He possessed militia experience extending over many years and had seen active service in South Africa. The possibility of war in Europe in which the Empire troops would be engaged had long been in his mind, and he had studied in advance the possibilities of such a situation. Consequently when the first contingent was authorized he proceeded to discharge both the civil duties of Minister of Militia and the military duties of Chief of Staff. He it was who recruited, organized, administered, and commanded this first Canadian army. He was the driving power which brought success in the speedy dispatch of the first contingent and the raising and the training of subsequent divisions.

This very success in the end brought a change. General Hughes centralized too much power in himself to please all those with whom he was associated. The purchasing of supplies for the army was taken from his department and put in charge of a purchasing board. A Shell Committee was formed at his suggestion and this later grew into the Imperial Munitions Board. The administration of the troops in England was gradually organized and eventually placed under General (afterward Sir Richard) Turner at Argyll House, London. The control of the army in the field passed as a matter of course to the British authorities, who were responsible for food, clothing, transport, and administration from the moment the troops crossed the Channel.

Sir Sam Hughes resigned his post as Minister of Militia in the autumn of 1916. He was succeeded by Sir Edward Kemp, who later went to England as Minister of the Overseas Forces of Canada. His place in Canada was taken by General The Hon. S. C. Mewburn, who remained Minister for some time after the war closed.

In the field the first commanding officer of the little Canadian army was General Alderson, an English officer of experience. He was in charge when the First Division made its unique reputation at the Second Battle of Ypres. Later on General Byng, a younger English officer, was selected to command the corps, which he did with complete success. In process of time a Canadian was selected in the person of General (afterward Sir) Arthur W. Currie. He took over in 1917 and commanded with general satisfaction for the remainder of the war. On his return to Canada he was made Inspector General, the highest purely military office in the Canadian army next to that of the Governor General who is Commander in Chief.

After the Fifth Division was filled up, the unsystematic practice of sending reenforcements overseas by battalions and batteries was discontinued. In January, 1917, a new method of furnishing drafts was outlined. This necessitated the reorganizing of the whole army on a territorial basis. There was created in each military district in Canada a home battalion, with corresponding battalions in England and in France. The scheme was as follows:

M. D. No. 1—Western Ontario Regiment (one depot battalion in Canada, two reserve battalions in England, and 1st, 18th, 160th, 161st, and 2d Pioneers in the field).

M. D. No. 2—1st Central Ontario Regiment (3d, 4th, 5th, 15th, 20th, 75th, 123d, 124th, 134th, 198th, and 208th Bus.).—2d Central Ontario Regiment (4th C. M. R., 54th, 58th, 102d, 116th, 119th, 125th, and 164th).

M. D. No. 3—Eastern Ontario Regiment (P. P. C. L. I., 2d, 21st, 38th, 156th).

M. D. No. 4—1st Quebec Regiment (5th C. M. R., 13th, 14th, 24th, 42d, 87th).

M. D. No. 5—2d Quebec Regiment (22d and 159th).

M. D. No. 6—Nova Scotia Regiment (R. C. R., 25th, 85th, 185th).

M. D. No. 7—New Brunswick Regiment (26th, 100th).

M. D. No. 10—Manitoba Regiment (8th, 16th, 27th, 43d, 52d, 78th, and 107th Regt).

M. D. No. 11—British Columbia Regiment (2d C. M. R., 7th, 29th, 47th, and 72d).

M. D. No. 12—Saskatchewan Regiment (3d C. M. R., 5th, 28th. and 46th).

M. D. No. 13—Alberta Regiment (10th, 31st, 49th, and 50th).

The idea behind this scheme was to effect a closer connection between the military patriotism and pride of the home distinct with the battalions serving overseas. The hope was distinctly expressed that "the Canadian militia should inherit the honors and distinctions won in battle by the Canadian Expeditionary Force."

There is no question that this measure was founded in wisdom and that it worked tolerably well. It was not always possible to maintain it exactly, since the smaller provinces had too many battalions for their resources in men. Consequently Ontario, which produced most men proportionately, was called upon to reenforce units credited to other provinces. For example, the 2d C. M. R. ceased to be a British Columbian unit early in 1918, although its commanding officer was a British Columbian who continued to give British Columbia officers the preference. This, however, was quite on a par with the selection of generals in France; for, when the war closed, Ontario which contributed half the men in the ranks, did not have a single brigadier or divisional commander on active duty.

It is also interesting to note that the hope of the originators of the scheme with regard to the old militia inheriting the "Honors and distinctions" of the C. E. F. has been negatived by the action of the militia authorities of 1919 in disbanding all militia units which existed previous to the war. This action seems to have been based on a mistaken conception of the important part played by the Canadian militia from 1860 to 1914.

Early in 1918 came one of the greatest discussions of policy that ever engaged the Canadian army leaders. The British had decided to reduce their brigades from four battalions to three to conform to the German changes and for other good and sufficient reasons. The Canadians were requested to conform to the new organization, and the chiefs of Argyll House decided that this should be done by creating two corps of three divisions each instead of one corps of four divisions. Thus, instead of five divisions with 12 battalions of infantry each, there would be six divisions of 9 battalions each, and the number of infantry battalions would be reduced from 60 to 54. This was to be accomplished by breaking up four battalions of the Fifth Division, the infantry of which was still in Witley Camp, England, and turning the other two into pioneer battalions for the Fifth and Sixth Divisions.

The scheme was so far planned and executed that the two battalions of the Fifth, chosen to be pioneers, had already commenced their training as such, and the four battalions to be eliminated had already been decided upon. Argyll House had even chosen, unofficially, the new staffs required.

The proposal was negatived eventually by the influence of the corps commander. Quite naturally, he did not take kindly to the reduction of his corps from four to three divisions. His four divisional commanders did not relish having their commands reduced from twelve battalions of infantry to nine. A protest was lodged with Sir Edward Kemp, who had recently arrived in England as Minister of Militia Overseas. After consultation with Ottawa, Sir Edward Kemp decided that General Currie was right and the request of the British authorities was refused. The logical consequence of that refusal was the break-up of the infantry of the Fifth Division, since four divisions were sufficient for the one corps which it was decided to maintain. Its artillery and engineers were already in France, and its machine-gun companies also passed over intact. The artillery retained its identity until the end of the war.

After the break-up of the Fifth Division, and because reenforcements for some months had exceeded casualties, the corps commander found himself with an abundance of troops. He therefore decided to enlarge his establishment, increasing the number of men in each infantry battalion, to change his pioneer battalions into engineer brigades with greatly increased strength, and to create machine-gun battalions instead of machine-gun companies. Even these changes left him with surplus men, and so came the creation of The Hughes Brigade (4,234), The McPhail Brigade (4,776), and Brutinel's Brigade, afterward known as the "Independent Force." The latter was composed largely of motor machine-gun units, cyclists, and cavalry, and was used as emergency corps troops. There was also an engineer motor-transport company, a tramway company, a field-survey company, several searchlight companies and various other corps accessories.

Here is seen one of the difficulties of coordinating the military forces of the Empire, a problem which tried the patience of the higher command. The overseas troops were magnificent in their fighting qualities, but the overseas officers were not always as sympathetic with the higher military control as might have been expected. The overseas business man makes a good soldier and a good general, but in either case he is prone to exhibit those elemental qualities which make him a trenchant and resourceful warrior.

Another of the outstanding problems which faced the Canadian army was the question of the supply of officers. Canada had an oversupply of officers from the start, and the army never quite recovered from the malady. This surplus was continually seeking to be absorbed while the officers in the field were quite as assiduous in trying to keep it from fulfilling its desires. Most officers who went over with the First and Second Divisions had friends of equal civilian rank with themselves in their commands and they desired to see these men rewarded with commissions earned in the field. As all four divisions were controlled largely by those who arrived in France in 1915, the surplus officer in the Canadian camps in England was usually forced to return home without fighting; to seek imperial service as town major—the lowliest employment in the army; or to serve as supernumerary without recognition. When the infantry of the Fifth Division was broken up, the surplus officer question became even more acute. As an example of the injustice which necessarily resulted, it may be cited that one former commanding officer from the Fifth Division was killed when acting as platoon commander in a battalion in the Second Division.

Another unfortunate result of the surplus officer was the creation of new posts for those who had to be absorbed. Many young officers were given unnecessary jobs in brigade, divisional and corps staffs who but made extra work for those who had already enough to do. In other words, the heads of the staff were overburdened with a multiplicity of juniors. The Canadian corps had, it is said, nearly as many staff officers as any other two corps in France. The primary causes, it must be remembered, were the free creation of officers in Canada and the lack of coordination between those in control of this function in the field and at home.

After the United States came into the war a British Canadian Recruiting Commission was established in that country to enable Britishers of military age to join either the British or Canadian armies. This was done with the approval and consent of the United States Congress. Twenty-seven recruiting depots and three divisional headquarters were established and by the end of the war 60,000 volunteers had been dealt with, of whom 42,000 were accepted. Of these about 30,000 went to the Canadian army.

The official report (Memo. No. 5) regarding the later phases of this work says: "Effective stimulus was given to the recruiting operations of the Mission by the announcement and conclusion of negotiations for satisfactory conventions between the United States and Great Britain and Canada, providing for mutual compulsory military service, whereby those of military age were compelled within a limited period to elect between military service in their country of residence or of origin."

When the war was concluded and the work of disbanding and repatriating the army was begun, there was again some conflict of opinion between the authorities at home and those in the field. The plan proposed by the officials in Canada provided for sending home the men in the order of enlistment. The corps authorities opposed this and asked that the units be sent home intact, disregarding the date of enlistment. Either scheme had its difficulties, but as usual the corps authorities had their way. The Third Division units came home first, followed by those of the First, Second, Fourth, and details. The various units returned to their territorial headquarters in Canada practically intact.

Thus ended Canada's greatest war achievement—a chapter full of conflicting theories and methods, redolent of minor errors and clash of ambitions, but on the whole creditable and glorious. Above everything else the patriotism, courage, gallantry, and self-sacrifice of all classes of people in the greatest of the British dominions overseas shines conspicuously and brilliantly.

The deeds of the Canadian army in this World War will vitalize the pages of the nation's history in all the years-to-be. The monuments in France and Canada, the sacred colors in cathedrals and public buildings, the bronze tablets which will be erected everywhere, will gather up and preserve the memories of those who died that others might live. Meantime those who served know that in all that was done they but followed the simple path of duty.

PART I—PREPARATION FOR WAR

CHAPTER I

CANADA BEFORE THE WAR

Canada was no more prepared than any other nation for the outbreak of the Great War. Because of their geographical isolation from the turmoil of international politics the Canadians were even more incredulous of war, in their mental attitude, than their kin across the waters. It is against this important fact as a background that one must consider the achievements of the Canadians during the war—and marvel.

Theodore Roosevelt once suggested that to maintain a "fighting edge" men should do continuous battle, but the Canadians have demonstrated the fallacy of this precept, in a military sense at least.

For over a hundred years Canada had known only an atmosphere of peace and almost continuous prosperity. Truly, during that period the mother country had frequently waged warfare along the outskirts of the Empire, and had even engaged in one or two wars of considerable magnitude, but never had she felt the danger so pressing as to send a call for help across the Atlantic.

Canadian help was, indeed, offered during the Crimean campaign, but before this impulse could materialize on the field of battle the need had ceased to exist. Again, during the South African struggle, the same impulse had been manifested, and nearly eight thousand Canadian volunteers did eventually reach the fighting front against the Boers. But these had been inspired by a spirit of adventure, rather than by any sense of patriotic duty.

There was everything in their environment to develop peaceful instincts in the Canadians. To the east and west were limitless expanses of sea; northward was the frozen Arctic; and to the southward was another people who, though thirteen times greater in population, was equally isolated from the political jealousies and rivalries of Europe, and their kinsmen in speech, customs, and, to a large extent, in blood also. From this direction no danger had threatened during the century, and danger from across the seas had been of too intangible a quality to reach the imagination.

Under these conditions the Canadians had devoted themselves exclusively to the labors and arts of peace: of agriculture, manufacturing, and trade and commerce. Vast natural resources lay before them awaiting exploitation and development. The psychology of the Canadian was entirely constructive.

There remained, of course, the sense of responsibility involved in the ties binding the people to the British Empire, a subconscious realization that when Great Britain was at war, Canada, too, would be at war. Yet here again environment and local conditions tended to reduce this consciousness to the quality of abstract theory, a mere convention. The native Canadian, though of British ancestry, knew England only through hearsay or the written word. And a considerable portion of Canada's population felt not even the tie of a common speech and literature. In so far as they recognized this bond, the temperamental self-reliance of the Canadian people was inclined to reduce it to a sentiment, rather than any deep feeling of dependence on the power of the British navy. A keen sense of economic independence and strength served still further to intensify this feeling. Whatever allegiance the average Canadian owed to the Empire must have been, and undoubtedly was, of the nature of an ideal—something far more abstract than the ordinary sentiment of patriotism—love of country.

In a people in this state of mind the first threat of a great war involving themselves could only have roused varying degrees of skepticism—while the first actual confirmation must have struck them with the impact of a thunderbolt.

Canadians were shocked—unutterably, outrageously shocked.

Casual observers, basing their judgment on the mental attitude of the people, as briefly outlined above, might reasonably have expected a quick return to the previous state of mind, at most a strong sympathy for the mother country, which might manifest itself in substantial contributions of funds, supplies, and perhaps a few battalions of enthusiastic adventurers. For, whatever might have been said at the time as a recruiting argument, Canadians felt no danger of immediate, or even future, invasion by European armies. When it came to that they had every reason to believe that the hundred million population of the United States would stand solidly with them, quite aside from the Monroe Doctrine. There was, of course, the possibility that Canada's trade with Great Britain, totaling half a billion dollars a year, would be destroyed in case of naval disaster to the British navy, but that would be only temporary. Whoever conquered would be willing to pay a stiff price for a portion of Canada's tremendous wheat crops, nearly 140,000,000 bushels in 1913. Economically Canada was in no way dependent on European countries.

But such a chain of deductions would have ignored the chief premise—the spirit of the people who made up the Canadian nation. For a hundred years, indeed, the people of Canada had pursued the paths of peace; for three generations they had known no stronger passion than that involved in ordinary political partisan strife.

Vice and idleness, not the pursuits of peace, render men soft and flabby in spirit. A pioneer stock does not require the continuous excitement of military warfare to maintain its combativeness; it needs only a just cause to rouse it to furnace heat. And that just cause the Canadians found in the attitude of England that Germany and Austria should not dominate the political destinies of peoples outside their frontiers. Within twenty-four hours all Canada was aflame with the war passion, but it was a passion thoroughly controlled by the reason behind it.

"When Great Britain is at war, Canada is at war!" became a popular slogan. Intermingling with that supreme indignation, with the fervent loyalty to the empire, was the sinking dread of the tremendous sacrifices, not only in material interests, but in blood, which would have to be made, and that dread was terrible because of the profound sincerity and determination of the people to enter into the struggle, to stay until the bitter end. There was nothing jubilant in the wave of enthusiasm which swept over Canada in favor of the war during that first week in August; that note would have been out of harmony with the grim determination which was the dominating element in the popular emotion which swept over the land. It was not the sort of emotion which would naturally manifest itself in noisy street demonstrations, especially among people of Anglo-Saxon blood.

Such demonstrations did, indeed, occur, especially in those districts where the population was predominantly of Latin blood. In Montreal and Quebec vast throngs paraded the streets during the first few days of August, 1914, carrying Belgian, French, and British flags, singing the "Marseillaise" and "Rule Britannia," and cheering the orators who addressed the crowds. But in Toronto and in other cities in the English-speaking districts the crowds, though they filled the streets before the bulletin boards of the principal newspapers, maintained a silence which was even more impressive.

Whatever undercurrents of opinion there might have been against a whole-hearted support of the Empire in the struggle, such as manifested itself openly in practically all the belligerent European countries, found little expression in Canada. Political party issue sank for the time being out of sight, and the popular voice, as expressed through the newspapers of diverse shades of opinion, and through the popular political leaders, was practically unanimous. And that voice demanded that Canada should strain every resource, should offer every available man, in Britain's support.

The Toronto "Globe," chief organ of the Liberals, was one of the first to enunciate the main issue of the great struggle impending—that it was a gigantic contest between the forces of autocracy and democracy, and that, in supporting England, Canada was not alone fulfilling her obligations to the mother country, but she was championing the cause of human liberty the world over.

"Because it is the world's fight for freedom," spoke that journal on August 4, 1914, "Britain, reluctantly but resolutely, speaks the word, and Canada also answers aye."

"There can be no question as to Canada's duty if the European War goes on," said the Toronto "Star" on August 4, 1914. "This country must do all it can to support the arms of Britain."

The Toronto "World," representing the Conservatives, urged the immediate organization of a fighting force of 50,000 men, to be sent across as soon as they could be trained. The Montreal "Star," having invited expressions of opinion from some hundreds of prominent political and industrial leaders and municipal officials, published them in full. Of the many pages of telegrams printed, only two failed to emphasize the need of an immediate contribution of money and men. The mayor of Quebec, the center of French Canada, was in favor of "all we can do to help the Empire in money, arms, and men." Alphonse Verville, representing French-Canadian labor elements in Parliament, believed that "we should be prepared to give Great Britain all the assistance she needs." Turning to his fellow citizens, the French-Canadian mayor of Montreal said: "The war is as much in defense of Canada as of Great Britain."

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, representing the opposition in Parliament, made a statement on August 4, 1914, of which the following is a part:

"I have often declared that if the mother country were ever in danger, or if danger ever threatened, Canada should render assistance to the fullest extent in her power. In view of the critical nature of the situation I have canceled all my meetings. Pending such great questions there should be a truce to party strife."

Even in the French provinces demonstrations of enthusiasm soon passed, giving place to intense energy in preparation. With a silent determination the people faced the gigantic task before them, unappalled. And a gigantic task it was, apparently, to a people so unprepared materially for the prosecution of warfare on so tremendous a scale as was now demanded of them, if their aid was to count. But if the spirit was there, so were the material resources, the raw material—and the men.

CHAPTER II

BUILDING A WAR MACHINE

Some few words should be devoted to the personnel of the Government which immediately took supreme charge of the almost superhuman preparations which Canada undertook as her share in the gigantic struggle, and which were so successfully carried to a conclusion. Not only was this task which the Government faced a tremendous one, but it was of a nature extremely foreign to its supposed qualifications. To practically all of these men the science of waging war, or preparing for war, was as strange as it was to the majority of Canada's peaceful citizens.

Sir Robert Borden and his ministers had only been in office three years, and of their number only one had ever had previous experience as a Cabinet minister. It was essentially a Government for the handling of peace problems, so that there is little to be wondered at if minor mistakes were committed and occasional criticism did manifest itself.

The premier and his colleagues met the crisis and assumed their new responsibilities with a calm efficiency. There was nothing in the personality of the premier to make him a popular or a picturesque figure, but the fact remains that he so far fulfilled his responsibilities that at the end of the war he was one of the two premiers of the belligerent governments who had not passed from power—who still held the confidence of their people.

Associated with Sir Robert Borden was Thomas White (later Sir Thomas), Minister of Finance, whose experience in big-scale finance had been gained in Toronto business circles. To no small degree was the financial equilibrium which Canada maintained during the first few months of the war due to his ability.

Lieutenant General Sir Sam Hughes, as Minister of Militia, assumed an order importance in the Cabinet which his position had not warranted in times of peace. Bluff, frank, independent of public opinion almost to an unpleasant degree where his own convictions were concerned, he was the object of more criticism and censure than any of his colleagues. As an advocate of extensive military preparedness he had not been popular before the war and had often been denounced as a militarist and a jingo. Under his direction came the preparation for and the organization of the military forces which Canada was to send across seas to fight in France. In the main, what he accomplished speaks for him.

On the shoulders of these three men fell the main responsibilities of preparing Canada for assuming her share in the Great War.

The work of the other members of the Government brought them less into the public eye. These were Sir George E. Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce, the one member who had experience in a previous administration; Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works; J. Douglas Hazen, Minister of Marine, Fisheries, and Naval Affairs, under whose jurisdiction came the defense of the coast and harbors; Martin Burrel, Minister of Agriculture, who popularized the slogan "Patriotism and Production"; the Hon. C. J. Doherty, Minister of Justice; the Hon. Frank Cochrane, Minister of Railways; the Hon. W. J. Roche, Minister of the Interior; the Hon. T. W. Crothers, Minister of Labor; the Hon. J. D. Reid, Minister of Customs; and the Hon. A. E. Kemp and the Hon. J. A. Lougheed, ministers without portfolios. The interests of the two million French-speaking population of the Dominion were indirectly represented in the Government by the Hon. L. P. Pelletier, Postmaster General; the Hon. W. B. Nantel, Minister of Inland Revenue, and the Hon. Louis Coderre, Secretary of State.

Many and varied were the special war problems which the Government had to handle, but first and foremost was that of organizing and equipping a military force. With characteristic energy General Hughes hurried to this, his special task. On the last day of July, 1914, he had already hurried to Ottawa and there called an emergency meeting of the Militia Council, comprising Colonel E. Fiset, D. S. O., Deputy Minister; Colonel W. G. Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff; Colonel V. A. S. Williams, A. D. C, Adjutant General; and Major General D. A. Macdonald, C. M. G., I. S. O., Quartermaster General. At this conference it was decided, subject to the approval of the governor general and the premier, that an initial force of 20,000 should be organized, equipped, and sent across if war was declared.

By the time that all doubt on that point was past General Hughes and his staff of assistants had already formulated their plan of action. From all parts of the country came offers of aid from men who had had military training.

Practically there was very little to build upon; Canada had barely a nucleus around which to create that big and efficient military organization which afterward became so powerful a factor in the military situation in France. The Royal Military College at Kingston had, indeed, turned out hundreds of young military officers, but most of them had accepted commissions in the British army and were now scattered all over the world in the British possessions as officers in British regiments.

Everything must be created anew. But the crude material, the man power, was there. According to the census taken in 1911 there were a little over a million and a half men between the ages of twenty and forty-four, of which a trifle over half were married, with families dependent on them. Allowing for a normal increase in the population, and for the fact that the military age was from eighteen to forty-five, and eliminating the physically unfit, Canada had available about a million and a half for active military service.

On August 6, 1914, the Government issued a call for volunteers for the formation of the First Army Division, to number about 21,000 men. The responses came immediately and in a volume greater than could be handled. To this first quota Ontario and the West contributed most generously. No more men were needed for the time being, though probably a hundred thousand men could have been obtained within those first few weeks, had they been needed. It was not till this first contingent had gone through its preliminary training and had been equipped and sent to training camp in England that the second call was issued, for another 21,000 men, in November, 1914.

CHAPTER III

DEPARTURE OF FIRST CONTINGENT

The calling together of the men, during the earlier period of the war at least, was the easiest part of the work in hand. The training and equipment of these first two contingents required all of the rest of the first war year. Eight thousand horses had to be purchased and shipped from all parts of the country to the training camps. Provisions to feed men and horses had also to be gathered in from all the Provinces and shipped across after the first contingent had sailed. Over a hundred special trains were needed to accomplish this before the end of the year, after which, as the Canadian forces on the other side increased, they were augmented in proportion. With the first contingent there was shipped a consignment of war material including seventy field guns alone. The total value of this first shipment approached close to $14,000,000.

Nor were these supplies confined to the use of Canadian troops exclusively. On August 6, 1914, when war had become a definite certainty, the governor general sent the following message to the British colonial secretary:

"My advisers request me to inform you that the people of Canada, through their Government, desire to offer one million bags of flour, of ninety-eight pounds each, as a gift to the people of the United Kingdom, to be placed at the disposal of his Majesty's Government, and to be used for such purposes as they may deem expedient."

This munificent gift was accepted with deepest expressions of gratitude, and with the assurance that "we can never forget the generosity and promptitude of this gift and the patriotism from which it springs." Two hundred trains, of thirty cars each, were required to transport this flour, valued at $3,000,000, to the port whence it was shipped.

Meanwhile, during the first few weeks after the call for men had been issued, hurried preparations were made to establish the training camps in which they were to be received and trained. Most notable of these mobilization centers was Valcartier Camp, ideally situated outside of Quebec. Under the direction of Captain William Price, Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Burstall, and Lieutenant Colonel W. McBain, extensive housing accommodations were erected, roads constructed, and all the improvements of a modern city were installed. One prominent feature was three miles of rifle butts for rifle practice. Here 33,000 recruits were gathered and housed before three months had passed.

The training of the recruits in the Canadian mobilization camps was, for obvious reasons, only of the most elementary sort. First of all there was a dearth of competent instructors, which could be more plentifully supplied in England. And then there was the psychological factor; it was difficult to make the men realize the seriousness of military discipline on native soil, so distant as it was from the seat of war. Therefore the men were taught little more than how to march in proper formation before they were shipped to England, where they were to be more fully "licked into shape" in the Canadian training camps established there.

Once on the other side, immersed in the tense war feeling which permeated the English people, almost within sound of the big guns which were already thundering close to the gates of Paris, the Canadian recruit came to a profound realization of the full significance of the situation and his responsibilities. Under these conditions he quickly relinquished the last vestige of that intense individualism so characteristic of the sons of pioneers, an excellent quality in a guerrilla fighter, but not so desirable in the units of a large fighting organization.

During the last week of September, 1914, the first contingent of recruits at Valcartier Camp began embarking for its overseas journey. On the 21st the premier and several of his Cabinet members formally delivered a farewell address to these men about to leave their native country for war service. At Quebec a great fleet of transports, thirty-two in number, were anchored in readiness, and as each received its assignment of troops, it lifted anchor and sailed quietly and secretly down the river, toward the open sea, there to meet a convoy of warships, under the command of Rear Admiral Rosslyn E. Wemyss, C. M. G., D. S. Q. As each regiment embarked there was read to it the farewell message of the governor general:

"On the eve of your departure from Canada I wish to congratulate you on having the privilege of taking part, with the other forces of the crown, in fighting for the honor of the king and the Empire. You have nobly responded to the call of duty, and Canada will know how to appreciate the patriotic spirit that animates you. I have complete confidence that you will do your duty, and that Canada will have every reason to be proud of you. You leave these shores with the knowledge that all Canadian hearts beat for you, and that our prayers and best wishes will ever attend you. May God bless you and bring you back victorious."

CHAPTER IV

THE STEADY STREAM OF RECRUITS

The departure of the first contingent, which became known to the public through an announcement made to the press by General (then Colonel) Hughes on September 24, brought all Canada to a first profound realization of the tragic aspects of the war. The first big sacrifice had been made.

Meanwhile recruiting continued at a steady pace. But it was now becoming more obvious that a sense of patriotic duty, rather than enthusiasm, was to be the impelling motive henceforward. The youth of the country came forward more deliberately, thoughtfully.

During 1915 180,000 men responded to this call of duty, or at the average rate of 3,400 a week. A large proportion of these, especially in the second half of the year, undoubtedly had been moved by the campaign of education which was carried on by the newspapers. "The country requires," said the Toronto "Globe," in its issue of January 23, 1915, "information as to the causes of the war, the issues involved, and the pressing need for men."

The difference between the first volunteers and those who only came forward during the later periods was one which certainly reflected no discredit on the latter. If they came more slowly it was only that they were, on the whole, older men, more inclined to be guided by reason than by youthful enthusiasm. These were the men who had given the issues of the war close study, and by the process of deliberate judgment came to the conclusion that their duty, not to Canada, or to the Empire, alone, required them to offer themselves, but a duty to the cause of world democracy and civilization itself. From these came some of the best soldiers who later distinguished themselves and won promotion on the bloody fields of battle in France.

At the end of the year 212,000 Canadians were in uniform. At that time the Government called for a total contribution of half a million men. In the middle of February a mere handful short of a quarter of a million men had enlisted. Of these 30 per cent were native-born Canadians, 62 per cent were British-born settlers, and 8 per cent were foreign born.

On November 2, 1915, an official announcement indicated in what proportion the various provinces had contributed to the total number of enlistments. The figures were as follows:

Ontario, 42,300; Quebec, 14,000; the Maritime Provinces, 15,000; Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 28,000; British Columbia and the Yukon, 17,000; Alberta, 14,200.

At this time recruiting was now averaging 2,000 a day.

The call for half a million men which the premier issued at the first of the year, 1916, stimulated recruiting perceptibly. During the month of January 30,000 men responded from all parts of Canada; in February almost 27,000 enlisted; and in March nearly 33,000 presented themselves. The grand total during these three months was not far short of 90,000. By the following June 335,000 of the half million men called for had been obtained.

During the summer and the fall of 1916 the stream of recruits began to diminish very perceptibly. During this period the daily average dropped down to three hundred.

By this time the volunteer system was beginning to reach its limits. But the record was, nevertheless, a splendid one, especially when it is remembered how abstract the issues of the war must have been to the minds of a large portion of the masses. At the end of 1916 434,529 men from Canada were on war duty of some kind, not counting over 70,000 casualties at the front.

During 1917 the slackening of recruiting became so apparent that the Government had now to consider extraordinary means to stimulating it, if Canada was to raise her full quota of half a million men. Chief of these means was the creation of the National Service Board, by an Order in Council, on October 5, 1916. This body was empowered to order a registration of the remaining man power of the nation, for the purpose of bringing about a coordination of the various industries with a view to army requirements.

The census taken by the board during the following few months showed a total enumeration of 1,549,360 able-bodied workers, 286,976 of which were engaged in nonessential occupations, and 183,727 in agriculture. Included there were 4,660 skilled workers in the mining industry, shipbuilding, and the manufacture of munitions. The work of the board brought this information, but no increase in enlistments.

Splendid as had been the response of Canada's youth, the fact had now to be faced, in the beginning of the fourth year of the war, that the need for men at the front exceeded the supply available through the volunteer system. Needs considered, there remained only the last resort—conscription.

This was a decision which the Government faced with extreme reluctance. Already conscription had become the subject of a great deal of heated discussion, in legislative halls as well as in the daily press. Temperamentally the Canadian people could accept the idea only with the greatest of reluctance. It was contrary to the individualistic sentiment of the nation. But it was the only remaining alternative to a still greater evil—a German victory.

CHAPTER V

THE CONSCRIPTION ACT

The question of conscription came to a final issue on May 18, 1917, when the premier returned from England, where he had been in conference with his colleagues on the Imperial War Board. It was then that he announced that it would be necessary to introduce a conscription measure in the near future.

"A great struggle lies before us," he said, "and I cannot put that before you more forcibly than by stating that at the commencement of this spring's campaign Germany put in the field one million more men than she put in the field last spring.... Hitherto we have depended on voluntary enlistment. I, myself, stated to Parliament that nothing but voluntary enlistment was proposed by the Government. But I return to Canada impressed at once with the extreme gravity of the situation and with a sense of responsibility for our further effort at the most critical period of the war. It is apparent to me that the voluntary system will not yield further substantial results."

Only a little over fifty thousand men more were needed to supply the need at the front, and to complete Canada's full quota, but they were needed most imperatively. That this need was strongly impressed on the public mind became apparent during the month which intervened between these utterances by the premier and the first presentation of the Conscription Bill in Parliament. As a matter of fact, Australia and South Africa were the only belligerent countries besides Canada, at this time, which had not been compelled to adopt the principle of forcible enlistment.

On June 11 the bill was presented to Parliament, with a speech by the premier explaining all its provisions. Administration was placed under the Department of Justice, and the term was for the duration of the war, including demobilization. All male British subjects in Canada were included, from the ages of twenty to forty-five. Those eligible were divided into six classes, according to their marital conditions and ages, and each class was to be called in succession. An amendment presented by the leader of the opposition would have submitted the bill to a referendum vote of the electorate, but this was rejected by a vote of 111 against 62. The bill finally passed the third reading by a vote of 102 against 44.

At the end of the year 404,395 eligible men had registered. The number of men eventually drafted under this law amounted to 83,000, making the total number of enlistments up to the end of the war 611,741.

The army thus raised was eventually represented in infantry and cavalry battalions, exclusive of engineers, forestry, railway construction, pioneer, and cyclist corps, or the Siberian expeditionary force of 4,000 men. The following list was issued by the Government at the close of the war:

ORIGINAL OFFICERS OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS