At 6 a. m. on the 6th of November, 1917, Canadian troops renewed their attack and captured the village of Passchendaele, together with the high ground immediately in the north and northwest. Sharp fighting took place for the possession of "pill boxes" in the northern end of the village, around Mosselmarkt, and on the Goudberg Spur. All objectives were gained at an early hour, and at 8.50 a. m. a hostile counterattack north of Passchendaele was beaten off.

Over 400 prisoners were captured in this most successful attack, by which, for the second time within the year, Canadian troops achieved a record of uninterrupted success. Four days later, in extremely unfavorable weather, British and Canadian troops attacked northward from Passchendaele and Goudberg, and captured further ground on the main ridge after heavy fighting.

CHAPTER XV

HOLDING THE VIMY SECTOR

During the last year of the war in France and Belgium there were about 160,000 Canadians at the front, including an army corps of four infantry divisions of 80,000 men under command of Sir Arthur Currie; a cavalry brigade, 3,000 strong, under General Seely, and, after the middle of the year, Brigadier General R. W. Paterson, D. S. O.; numerous and effectively organized lines of communication units, railway, forestry, engineer, medical, ambulance, sanitary, veterinary, dental, salvage, and other services. The divisional commanders of the infantry were as follows: Major General Sir A. C. Macdonell, K. C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O., First Division; Major General Sir H. E. Burstall, K. C. B., C. M. G., Second Division; Major General F. O. Loomis, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O., Third Division; Major General Sir David Watson, K. C. B., C. M. G., Fourth Division. Headquarters officials included Brigadier General R. J. L. Hayter, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General G. J. Farmer, and Major General W. B. Lindsay, C. M. G., D. S. O.; the artillery commander was Major General E. W. B. Morrison, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O., and his five divisional corps commanders were Brigadier Generals H. C. Thacker, C. M. G., D. S. O.; H. A. Panet, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.; J. S. Stewart, C. M. G., D. S. O.; W. B. M. King, C. M. G., D. S. O.; W. O. H. Dodds, C. M. G.; the Machine-Gun Corps was commanded by Brigadier General R. Brutinel, C. M. G., D. S. O., and the Canadian representative at General Headquarters was Brigadier General J. F. L. Embury, C. M. G., D. S. O.; the Railway Troops were led by Brigadier General J. W. Stewart, C. B., C. M. G., and the Army Medical Services by Brigadier General A. T. Ross, C. B., C. M. G.; the Siberian Expeditionary Force was commanded by Major General J. H. Elmsley, C. B., C. M. G., and Brigadier General H. C. Bickford, C. M. G. The Infantry Brigade commanders in France and Flanders were as follows: Brigadier General W. A. Griesbach, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General G. S. Tuxford, C. B., C. M. G.; Brigadier General George F. McCuaig, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General T. L. Tremblay, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General Alex. Ross, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General J. A. Clark, D. S. O.; Brigadier General D. C. Draper, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General D. M. Ormond, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General J. M. Ross, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General Victor W. Odlum, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General J. H. MacBrien, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.

After the Battle of Passchendaele the Canadian Corps was assigned to a part of the front where it had won immortal glory early in 1917—the Vimy sector. From January 1 to March 21, 1918, the corps held a front of some 13,000 yards from Hill 70 to Acheville, slightly east of a line drawn between Loos and Vimy.

This front was divided into five sections: Hill 70, St.-Emile, Lens, Avion, and Mericourt. The corps now settled down to the routine of trench warfare. Lieutenant General Sir A. W. Currie, of course, was in command. His dispositions provided that three of the divisions held the line while one was resting and training in reserve. Each of the divisions had approximately one month out of the line. This arrangement allowed the divisions to absorb more quickly the fresh drafts and to train rapidly the new officers and N. C. O's.

The Canadians were no strangers to this sector. Having wrested it from the enemy in April, 1917, in the Battle of Vimy and subsequent actions, they had held it practically ever since, except for the short interval late in 1917 when they fought the Battle of Passchendaele. It had been considerably improved by comprehensive defenses and complete systems of trench railways, roads, and water supply were in operation.

The great importance of this particular sector arose from the fact that behind Vimy Ridge lay the northern collieries of France and certain tactical features which covered the British lateral communication. "Here," as the British Commander in Chief said in one of his reports, "little or no ground could be given up."

A comparatively shallow advance beyond the Vimy Ridge would have stopped the operation of the collieries, paralyzing the production of war material in France, as well as inflicting very severe hardships on the already sorely tried population. In conjunction with the shortage of shipping, which practically forbade an increase in the importation of coal from England, the loss of the northern collieries might have definitely crippled France. On the other hand, a deep penetration at that point, by bringing the Amiens-Bethune railway and main road under fire, would have placed the British army in a critical position, by threatening to cut it in two and by depriving it of vital lateral communication.

The tactical and strategical results to be gained by a moderate success at that point were so far-reaching in effect that, notwithstanding the natural difficulties confronting an attack on that sector, it was fully expected that the German offensive would be directed against this the central part of the British front.

With the prospect of a German offensive now confronting the Canadians, it was decided that the defenses should be revised, to take advantage of the lessons recently learned and to embody the latest methods. Moreover, instructions had been issued by the First Army defining the policy of defense to be adopted and the methods to be followed.

The completion of the revised corps defenses and the execution of the new army program resulted in the organization of a very deep defended area, consisting of successive defensive systems, roughly parallel to the general line of the front and linked together by switch lines sited to protect both flanks.

As planned, the main framework of the defense in depth was based upon machine-gun positions, protected by belts of wire entanglements so placed, in relation to the field of fire of the machine guns, that they were enfiladed over their entire length. The whole area was compartmented in such a way that the loss of ground at any one point could be localized, and would not cause a forced retirement from adjoining areas.

Machine-gun emplacements of the Champagne type were constructed, and dugout accommodation for the machine-gun detachments was provided in the deep tunnels of these emplacements.

This framework was completed as rapidly as possible by trenches and by defended localities organized for all-round defense.

A great many dugouts were made to accommodate the garrisons of these localities, and for dressing stations and battle headquarters. Advantage was taken of the possibility of utilizing the subways tunneled in 1916-17 for the attack on Vimy Ridge, and in addition steps were taken to create an obstacle on the southern flank of Vimy Ridge by the construction of dams to enable the valley of the Scarpe to be flooded as required. Trial inundations were made to insure the smooth working of these arrangements.

A great deal of care was given to the distribution of the artillery in relation to the policy of defense. Three systems of battery positions were built so as to distribute the guns in depth and sited so as to cover the ground to the northeast, east, and south, in case the flanks of the corps should be turned. These batteries were protected with barbed-wire entanglements and machine-gun positions against a sudden penetration of the enemy, and they were designed to become the natural rallying points of infantry in this eventuality.

Successive lines of retirement were also prepared, battery positions were selected, organized, and marked, cross-country tracks were opened up, and observation posts, echeloned in depth, were located and wired in.

On Vimy Ridge alone seventy-two new battery positions were built and stacked with ammunition; these positions could be used either for the distribution of the corps artillery in depth, or as positions which reenforcing artillery could immediately take up in the event of a heavy attack.

The weather being much finer during the months of January, February, and March, 1918, than is generally the case, very good progress was made, and the following defensive works were completed in rear of the main front-line defensive system:

• 250 miles of trench;
• 300 miles of barbed-wire entanglements;
• 200 tunneled machine-gun emplacements.

In addition to the above, existing trench systems, dugouts, gun positions, and machine-gun emplacements were strengthened and repaired. Each trench system was plentifully marked with signboards and many open machine-gun positions were sited and marked.

Machine-gun positions, defended localities, and certain portions of trenches were stored with several days' supply of ammunition, food, and water for the use of the garrisons.

The front held remained comparatively quiet during January, 1918, and, except for minor patrolling encounters and occasional shoots, nothing beyond the usual activity ever prevailing on a front held by this corps occurred.

In the months of February and March, 1918, little or no work was being done by the enemy on his actual defenses, but roads and disused trench railways were being repaired. In the rear areas his ammunition and engineer supply dumps were increasing in number and in size, while fresh battery positions were appearing almost daily. Furthermore, hostile aircraft and anti-aircraft guns were very active in preventing reconnoissance by British aeroplanes.

Early in March, 1918, it was considered that the enemy's front was ready for offensive operations. No concentration of troops had been observed, but the numerous towns and villages in close proximity to the front provided extensive accommodation and made it possible for him to conceal such concentrations. Conditions so favorable to the Germans required relentless vigilance on the part of the Corps Intelligence Organization, as the Canadians were dependent on the efficiency of this branch of the service for timely warning against surprise attacks.

In addition to the preparation above mentioned the enemy assumed early in February, 1918, a very aggressive attitude, raiding the Canadian lines very frequently, using for the purpose specially trained storm troops. His destructive shoots and intense gas shelling were also of frequent occurrence. To quell this activity, numerous counter-raids, retaliation shoots, and gas projections were carried out, and especially in the Lens sector soon had the desired effect.

Prisoners captured in Canadian raids stated that all their divisions had been brought up to strength and were undergoing hard training in the tactics of semiopen warfare. They stated, or left it to be understood, that the forthcoming German attacks were based on a very deep initial penetration and the rapid exploitation of success. No indications were given as to the points at which attacks would be launched, but they stated that every one of their sectors was prepared and practically ready. It was also definitely established that the enemy reserve divisions were kept near railways, ready to be moved quickly to the parts of the front selected for the coming drive.

CHAPTER XVI

HOLDING LENS AND ARRAS

On March 21, 1918, the Germans launched a violent attack against the Fifth and Third British Armies. The battle resulting from this attack, known as the Battle of Amiens, did not involve directly the majority of the Canadian Corps. The latter on that date was disposed as follows: Third Canadian Division (Major General L. J. Lipsett), in the line, Mericourt-Avion sections; Fourth Canadian Division (Major General Sir D. Watson), in the line, Lens-St.-Emile sections; First Canadian Division (Major General Sir A. C. Macdonell), in the line, Hill 70 section; Second Canadian Division (Major General Sir H. E. Burstall), resting, Auchel area.

In the afternoon orders were received to take over the front of the Sixty-second Division (Thirteenth Corps) in the Acheville sector. The Second Canadian Division, then in reserve, was at first chosen to execute this order. But when, somewhat later, the Canadian Corps was instructed to keep one complete division in reserve, this order was canceled, and instead the Third Canadian Division was ordered to execute its frontage by relieving the Sixty-second Division in the Acheville-Arleux sector, making the total Canadian front 17,000 yards.

In the evening of March 22, 1918, the Hill 70 sector, then held by the First Canadian Division, was taken over by the Fourth, extending the latter's frontage, while the former was placed in reserve.

Late that night General Headquarters ordered the withdrawal of the First Canadian Motor Machine-Gun Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel W. K. Walker) from the Vimy sector. This unit, the next morning, moved south to the support of the Fifth Army, and by midnight of March 23, 1918, having traveled over 100 miles during the day, all batteries were in action on a thirty-five-mile front east of Amiens.

Under orders of the Fifth and later of the Fourth Army, it was ordered to fight a rear-guard action to delay the advance of the enemy and to fill dangerous gaps on the army fronts. For nineteen days this unit was continuously in action north and south of the Somme, fighting against overwhelming odds. Using to the utmost its great mobility, it fought over 200 square miles of territory. It is difficult to appraise in its correct extent the influence—material and moral—that the forty machine guns of this unit had in the events which were then taking place. The losses suffered amounted to about 75 per cent of the trench strength of the unit, and to keep it in being throughout that fighting, reenforcements by personnel of the infantry branch of the Canadian Machine-Gun Corps were authorized.

On the 23d, at 10.50 a. m., the Second Canadian Division was ordered to concentrate at once west of Arras in the Mont St.-Eloi area, and having carried this out, passed into General Headquarters reserve.

The First Canadian Division was moved by busses to Couturelle area, embussing at about midnight, March 27, 1918. At dawn, March 28, 1918, the enemy struck heavily astride the river Scarpe, and the First Canadian Division was ordered at 10.30 a. m. to retain the busses by which they had moved south and to move back to the Arras-Bainville area at once, coming there under orders of the Seventeenth Corps.

This move was very difficult, because some busses had already been sent back to the Park, many units were still en route to the Couturelle area, and the mounted units and transport were in column on the road Hauteville-Saulty-Couturelle. The division, however, extricated itself, and on the night of the 28th, under orders of the Seventeenth Corps, placed two battalions in the forward area in support of the Forty-sixth Infantry Brigade, Fifteenth Division. At daybreak on the 29th the Third Canadian Infantry Brigade moved to support the Fifteenth Division, and during the night of the 29th and 30th the First Canadian Brigade relieved the Forty-sixth Infantry Brigade in the Telegraph Hill sector, that brigade front being transferred from the Fifteenth Division to the First Canadian Division on March 30, 1918.

The Second Canadian Division passed under orders of the Sixth Corps on March 28, 1918, and moved forward in support of the Third British Division in the Neuville-Vitasse sector. On the night of March 29-30, 1918, it relieved the Third British Division in the line, and on the night of March 31-April 1, 1918, extended its front southward by relieving the left battalion of the Guards Division.

The front held by the Second Canadian Division extended from south of the Cojeul River, east of Boisleux St.-Marc, to the southern slopes of Telegraph Hill (where it joined with the First Canadian Division), a total length of about 6,000 yards. The Second Canadian Division held this front for an uninterrupted period of ninety-two days, during which time it repulsed a series of local attacks and carried out no less than 27 raids, capturing 3 officers, 101 other ranks, 22 machine guns, 2 trench mortars, and inflicting severe casualties on the enemy. The aggressive attitude adopted by this division at such a critical time and under adverse conditions had a most excellent effect and it certainly reduced to the lowest point the fighting value of two German divisions, namely, the Twenty-sixth Reserve Division and the One Hundred and Eighty-fifth Division. The Second Canadian Division returned under the orders of the Canadian corps on July 1, 1918.

The Third Canadian Division had been attached on March 27, 1918, to the Thirteenth Corps. Thus, under pressure of circumstances, the unity of command of the Canadian divisions had been destroyed. They were now attached to two different armies (First and Third) and under command of three different corps (Sixth, Seventeenth, and Thirteenth).

On March 28, 1918, the Germans launched a very heavy attack in the Arras sector from Gavrelle to Puisieux. The Third, Fifteenth, Fourth, and Fifty-sixth British Divisions successfully repulsed this offensive.

The attack was renewed in the afternoon, north of the Scarpe, on the front of the Fifty-sixth Division, but did not there meet with greater success. A certain amount of ground had, however, been captured by the enemy.

The renewed attack on the Fifty-sixth Division had considerably lowered its power of resistance. German prisoners captured in the morning were insistent that the attack would be renewed again on the 29th, by storm troops which had been held in reserve for the purpose of capturing the Vimy Ridge by attacking it from the south. It was most urgent that the Fifty-sixth Division should be supported without delay.

On March 28, 1918, the Fourth Canadian Division, then holding the Lens-St.-Emile-Hill 70 sector, was relieved by the Forty-sixth British Division, First Corps, and in turn relieved the Fifty-sixth British Division in the Oppy-Gavrelle sector.

On the completion of this relief the Canadian Corps was to relieve the Thirteenth Corps, and General Sir Currie again assumed command of the Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions.

In the meantime all the battalions which the Fourth Canadian Divisions could spare were to be sent at once by the quickest way to the support of the Fifty-sixth Division.

The Fourth Canadian Division, therefore, immediately organized a Composite Brigade, under Brigadier General V. W. Odlum, consisting of the three reserve battalions of the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Brigades, and the support battalions of the Eleventh and Twelfth Brigades. This Composite Brigade was moved in haste by light railway and lorry to the vicinity of Mont St.-Eloi, from whence it marched into reserve positions during daylight on the 28th.

On the night of the 28th-29th the units of the Fifty-sixth Division which had been most heavily engaged were relieved by these five Canadian battalions, which came under orders of the Third Canadian Division.

It was not until about 10.00 p. m., on the night of the 28th-29th, that the leading troops of the Forty-sixth Division arrived and began to relieve the Fourth Canadian Division.

In view of the seriousness of the situation, units of the Fourth Canadian Division were moved, as the relief progressed, by lorry and light railway to Neuville St.-Vaast, and marched quickly into the line to relieve the elements of the Fifty-sixth Division.

The situation of the Canadian divisions at noon, March 30, 1918, after some other readjustments had been carried into effect, was as follows:

Third Army. Under Sixth Corps—Second Canadian Division: Neuville-Vitasse sector. Under Seventeenth Corps—First Canadian Division: Telegraph Hill sector.

First Army. Under Canadian Corps—Third Canadian Division: Acheville-Mericourt-Avion sector. Under Canadian Corps—Fourth Canadian Division: Gavrelle-Oppy sector.

On April 7, 1918, the First Canadian Division relieved the Fourth British Division astride the Scarpe and came under orders of Canadian Corps; the army boundaries being altered so as to include the sector taken over by the First Canadian Division in the First Army front.

In the meantime, on the night of March 28th-29th, 1918, owing to operations astride the river Scarpe, the front-line system had been abandoned under orders of the Thirteenth Corps and the troops withdrawn to the Blue line in front of the Bailleul-Willer-val-Chaudière-Hirondelle line, as far north as the Mericourt sector.

This Blue line was originally sited and constructed as an intermediate position, and consisted in most parts of a single trench none too plentifully supplied with dugouts. This meant that until a support line was dug and made continuous the troops had to be kept in strength in the front line, subject to heavy casualties from hostile shelling and to probable annihilation in case of an organized attack.

Any advance beyond the Blue line on the Fourth Canadian Division front would have brought the Germans within assaulting distance of the weakest part of the Vimy Ridge, and the severity of the shelling seemed to indicate that a renewal of their attacks was probable.

Every effort was made to give more depth to the new front-line system by pushing forward a line of outposts and by digging a continuous support line, as well as by constructing reserve lines at certain points of greater tactical importance. Switch lines facing south were also sited and dug or improved.

To increase the depth of the defenses, machine-gun detachments were extemporized by borrowing men from the machine-gun battalions, who had then completed their organization on an eight-battery basis. Some fifty extra machine guns were secured from ordnance and other sources, and also a number of extra Lewis guns.

Personnel from the Canadian Light Horse and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion were organized in Lewis and Hotchkiss gun detachments and sent forward to man the defenses in Vimy and Willerval localities, under orders of the Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions.

The machine-gun companies of the Fifth Canadian Division had arrived in France on March 25, 1918, and in view of the extreme urgency of the situation the personnel and armament had been moved by lorries, sent specially by Canadian Corps, from Le Havre to Verdrel, where they were in corps reserve.

Their horse transport having now arrived, these machine-gun companies (Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth) were moved to the Vimy Ridge and allotted definite positions of defense on March 30, 1918.

The front held by the Canadian Corps on April 8, 1918, was approximately 16,000 yards in length. It will be remembered that the Second Canadian Division under the Sixth Corps (Third Army) was holding 6,000 yards of front, making a total of 22,000 yards of front held by Canadian troops.

On April 9, 1918, the Germans attacked on the Lys front between La Bassée and Armentières. Making rapid progress, they crossed the Lys River on the 10th, and on the following days advanced west of Merville-Bailleul. They were well held at Givenchy by the Fifty-fifth Division and their attack made no progress southward.

The Canadian Corps was not involved in this fighting, but it now found itself in a deep salient, following with anxiety the development of the Battle of the Lys.

The Battle of the Lys added a new burden to the already sorely tried British Army, and it was imperative that troops should at once be made available to stop the German advance.

On the 10th, the Canadian front was extended by taking over from the First Corps the line held by the Forty-sixth Division (Lens-St.-Emile-Hill 70 sector). This relief was commenced on April 11, 1918, and completed on the night of the 12th-13th by the Third Canadian Division; concurrently with it, the inter-divisional boundaries were readjusted and the artillery redistributed to meet as well as possible the new conditions.

The front held by the three divisions then in the Canadian Corps had a length of approximately 29,000 yards, and of necessity the line was held very thinly and without much depth.

To deceive the enemy regarding their dispositions and intentions, the Canadians adopted a very aggressive attitude. The artillery constantly harassed the enemy's forward and rear areas and the infantry penetrated his line at many points with strong fighting patrols and bold raiding parties. Gas was also projected on numerous occasions. This activity on the immediate flank of the Lys salient greatly perturbed the enemy, who gave many indications of nervous uncertainty.

The situation was critical, and extensive steps were taken at once to increase the ability of the Canadian Corps to withstand hostile attacks.

The success of the German offensive emphasized the need of greater depth for defensive dispositions, which depend very largely on the stopping power of the machine gun. Unfortunately the number of machine guns with a division was inadequate to give the required depth of defense on a front exceeding 4,000 yards in length. Each Canadian division was now holding a front approximately 10,000 yards in length, and the extemporized machine-gun detachments formed previously, added to the machine-gun companies of the Fifth Canadian Division, were far from sufficient for the task.

General Sir Currie therefore decided to add a third company of four batteries to each battalion of the Canadian Machine-Gun Corps, thus bringing up to ninety-six the number of machine guns in each Canadian division. This entailed an increase in personnel of approximately 50 per cent of the strength of each machine-gun battalion.

These companies were formed provisionally on April 12, 1918, by withdrawing fifty men from each infantry battalion. Of these men a portion was sent to the Machine-Gun Battalion to be combined with the trained personnel, so that each machine-gun crew would include at least four trained gunners. The remainder of the infantry personnel withdrawn as above stated was sent to a special machine-gun depot formed for the purpose, and there underwent an abridged but intensive course of training. Thus an immediate supply of reenforcements was insured. Twenty-three-ton lorries had been borrowed from General Headquarters to supply a modicum of transport to the new units, and on April 13, 1918, some of the new machine-gun batteries were already in the line at critical points.

Sufficient troops were not now available to garrison the local defenses of Vimy Ridge, or to reenforce parts of the front if the enemy was successful in effecting a deep penetration.

Two special brigades were therefore organized:

The Hughes Brigade—Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hughes. Approximate strength, officers, 184; other ranks, 4,050.

McPhail's Brigade—Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. McPhail. Approximate strength, officers, 148; other ranks, 4,628.

Two companies of the Eleventh Tank Battalion (twenty-four tanks) were placed at the disposal of the Canadian Corps on April 13, 1918. These tanks had officers, drivers, and armament, but no other personnel. A sufficient number of trained Lewis gunners were found from the First, Third, and Fourth Canadian Divisional wings and the Canadian Field Artillery supplied the required number of gunners.

The tanks were then distributed at the critical points in the corps area, namely: Behind the St. Catherine switch at intervals of about 300 yards, facing south—18 tanks. In the gap between the Souchez River and Bois-en-Hache, facing east—three tanks. On the ridge line behind Angres, facing east—three tanks.

It was intended that these tanks should form points of resistance to check any forward flow of hostile forces and so give time to the Canadian infantry to re-form in case they should be forced back. In any event the tanks were to remain in action for twelve hours after coming in contact with the enemy and thus gain the time so essential in a crisis.

The First Canadian Motor Machine-Gun Brigade, now returned from the Amiens Battle, was held as a mobile reserve at one hour's notice. Bridges, railways, roads, and pumping stations were prepared for demolition, to be blown up as a last resort.

Extended almost to the breaking point, in danger of being annihilated by overwhelming attacks, the corps confidently awaited the assault. All ranks of the corps were unanimous in their ardent resolve to hold to the last every inch of the ground intrusted to their keeping.

It was for them a matter of great pride that their front was substantially the only part of the British line which had not budged, and one and all felt that it could not budge so long as they were alive.

Eventually, the First, Third, and Fourth Canadian Divisions were relieved in their sectors by the Fifteenth, Fifty-first, Fifty-second, Twentieth, and Twenty-fourth British Divisions. The relief started on May 1 and was completed on May 7, 1918.

As the relief progressed, the Canadian Corps handed over command of the Avion-Lens-St.-Emile-Hill 70 sectors to the Eighteenth Corps and the balance of the front to the Seventeenth Corps.

The length of front held by the Canadian Corps at the various stages of the German offensive has been given previously, but it is here recalled that from April 10, 1918, until relieved the corps held a line exceeding 29,000 yards in length; the Second Canadian Division, then with the Sixth Corps, was holding 6,000 yards of front, making a total length of 35,000 yards of front held by the four Canadian divisions. The total length of the line held by the British army between the Oise and the sea was approximately 100 miles, therefore the Canadian troops were holding approximately one-fifth of the total front.

Thus, although the Canadian Corps did not, during this period, have to repulse any German attacks on its front, it nevertheless played a part worthy of its strength during that period.

On completion of the relief on May 7, 1918, with the exception of the Second Canadian Division, which was still in the line in the Third Army area, the Canadian Corps was placed in the General Headquarters reserve in the First Army area (Arras sector), and disposed as follows:

Headquarters—Pernes, and later Bryas. First Canadian Division—Le Cauroy area. Third Canadian Division—St. Hilaire area. Fourth Canadian Division—Monchy-Bréton area.

One infantry brigade and one machine-gun company from each Canadian division were billeted well forward in support of the corps in the line as follows:

(a) One infantry brigade, one machine-gun company—Anzin area. Support, Seventeenth Corps.

(b) One infantry brigade, one machine-gun company—Château de la Haie area. Support, Eighteenth Corps.

(c) One infantry brigade, one machine-gun company—Ham en Artois area. Support, Eleventh Corps.

These brigades were kept under one hour's notice from 5.00 a. m. to 7.00 a. m. daily and under four hours' notice during the remainder of the day. The remainder of the Canadian Corps was under four hours' notice.

Reconnoissances of the front which the corps would have to support in case of an attack were ordered and carried out by staff and regimental officers. The brigades billeted forward were relieved from time to time under divisional arrangements.

On May 23, 1918, the Seventy-fourth British Division, newly arrived in France from Palestine, came under Canadian Corps for administration and training. It was necessary to rearrange the areas among the divisions in the corps to make room for the Seventy-fourth Division and to equalize the training facilities. With the exception of these moves, the disposition of the Canadian Corps remained substantially the same until June 25, 1918.

On that date the Second Canadian Division, which had been in the line since March 30, 1918, was relieved by the Third Canadian Division, which came then under the Sixth Corps, Third Army area, with headquarters at Basseux. Readjustments were also made in the locations of all the Canadian troops then in reserve.

Though the principal reason for placing the Canadians into reserve, of course, was to give them a much-needed and well-deserved rest, their entire time was by no means devoted to this purpose. Throughout this period there went forward a steady process of reorganization and training. Reinforcements were received and gradually absorbed. The most intensive kind of tactical and individual training was carried on throughout May, June, and July, 1918. At the same time preparations were being made to recapture Merville and part of the Lys salient, operations which for purposes of maintaining secrecy were then known as the "Delta attack."

One memorable event of this period was the celebration of Dominion Day. Ever since the Canadians had arrived in France, July 1 had been set aside for this purpose, but never before had the "sports" been as brilliant as on July 1, 1918.

Finally, on July 6, 1918, the Canadian Corps was warned to be prepared to relieve the Seventeenth Corps in the line. This operation was begun on July 10 and completed on July 15, 1918, when Lieutenant General Sir A. W. Currie assumed command of the Seventeenth Corps front (Arras-Lens sector), disposing his forces as follows:

Headquarters Canadian Corps—Duisans (First Army area). Second Canadian Division, in the line—Telegraph Hill section. First Canadian Division, in the line—Feuchy-Fampoux section. Fourth Canadian Division, in the line—Gavrelle-Oppy section. Under Sixth Corps—Third Army area. Third Canadian Division, in the line—Neuville-Vitasse section.

CHAPTER XVII

THE AMIENS BATTLE OF AUGUST, 1918

The relief of the Seventeenth Corps by the Canadian Corps on July 15, 1918, after the corps' long period of rest and training, with the attendant movement and activity, made the enemy alert and anxious as to the British intentions on this front. He was successful in securing identifications at various points of the line, which he penetrated by raiding.

As it was desired to keep him fully occupied on this front, the artillery activity was increased and our infantry engaged in vigorous patrolling and raiding.

By the latter part of July, 1918, the Allied High Command had decided to enlarge the scope of the operations east of Amiens. Originally conceived as of a purely local character, they were now intended to reduce the entire salient of the Somme created by the successful German offensive of March 21, 1918, and the days following.

During the last few days of July, 1918, and the first few days of August, 1918, the Canadian Corps was relieved by the Seventeenth Corps and was transferred from the First to the Fourth Army area. On July 30, 1918, Canadian Headquarters moved to Molliens Vidarne, in the Amiens sector.

The attack against the Somme salient eventually was set for August 8, 1918.

The front of attack was to extend from Moreuil to Ville-sur-Ancre on a front of approximately 20,000 yards. The dispositions of the troops participating in the attack were as follows:

(a) On the right from Moreuil to Thennes (inclusive)—the First French Army under order of commander in chief British army.

(b) In the center from Thennes (exclusive) to the Amiens-Chaulnes Railway—the Canadian Corps.

(c) On the left from the Amiens-Chaulnes Railway to the Somme—the Australian Corps.

(d) The left flank of the Australian Corps was covered by the Third (British) Corps attacking in the direction of Merlancourt.

The object of the attack was to push forward in the direction of the line Roye-Chaulnes with the least possible delay, thrusting the enemy back in the general direction of Ham, and so facilitating the operations of the French on the front between Montdidier and Noyon.

The battle front of the Canadian Corps extended from a point about 800 yards south of Hourges to the Amiens-Chaulnes Railway. It crossed the river Luce about 800 yards northeast of Hourges, and remaining well west of Hangard passed through the western portion of Hangard Wood. The total length exceeded 8,500 yards in a straight line.

In addition to the four Canadian divisions, the following troops were placed under Canadian Corps for the operation: Fifth Squadron. R. A. F.; Fourth Tank Brigade; Third Cavalry Division.

A mobile force was organized consisting of the First and Second Canadian Motor Machine-Gun Brigades, the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion, and a section of 6-in. Newton Mortars mounted on motor lorries. This force was named the Canadian Independent Force, placed under the command of Brigadier General R. Brutinel, and given the task of cooperating with the cavalry in the neighborhood of the Amiens-Roye road, covering the right flank of the right division and maintaining liaison with the French.

Two British divisions were held in army reserve, and were available in the event of certain situations developing.

The total artillery amounted to seventeen brigades of field artillery and nine brigades of heavy artillery, plus four additional batteries of long-range guns.

At 10.00 a. m. on the morning of August 5, 1918, General Sir A. W. Currie took over command of the battle front, then held by the Fourth Australian Division. During the hours of darkness on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th the attacking Canadian troops relieved the Australian troops, with the exception of those holding the outpost line, who remained in position until the night of August 7-8, 1918.

The dispositions of the Canadian Corps on the morning of the 8th at zero hour were as follows: On the right, the Third Canadian Division, in liaison with the French; in the center, the First Canadian Division; on the left, the Second Canadian Division, in liaison with the Australians; in reserve, behind the Third Canadian Division, the Fourth Canadian Division.

Each of these divisions had their allotment of tanks. East of the Noye River, the Third Cavalry Division. Behind Gentelle Wood, the Canadian Independent Force.

At 4.20 a. m., August 8, 1918, the initial assault was delivered on the entire army front of attack, and the First French Army opened their bombardment.

The attack made satisfactory progress from the outset on the whole front.

East of Hourges, opposite the Third Canadian Division, the high ground which dominated the Canadian front and a portion of the French front had been seized quickly by the Ninth Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General D. M. Ormond), and the way was opened for the Canadian Independent Force and the Fourth Canadian Division.

By the afternoon the Canadian Corps had gained all its objectives, with the exception of a few hundred yards on the right in the vicinity of Le Quesnel, where stiff resistance was offered by unexpected reserves, but this was made good the following morning. The day's operations in which the four Canadian divisions took part represented a maximum penetration of the enemy's defenses of over eight miles, and included the capture of the following villages: Hangard, Demuin, Beaucourt, Aubercourt, Courcelles, Ignaucourt, Cayeux, Caix, Marcelcave, Wiencourt, l'Equipée, and Guillaucourt. In addition to these, the Canadian Independent Forces assisted the French in the capture of Mezières, which was holding up their advance.

On the following day, August 9, 1918, the advance was continued, with the Third, First, and Second Canadian Divisions in the line, the Fourth Canadian Division being held in corps reserve. Substantial progress was made, and by evening the average depth of advance was about four miles, with a maximum of six and one half miles at some points. The following additional villages were captured: Le Quesnel, Folies, Bouchoir, Beaufort, Warvillers, Rouvroy, Vrely, Meharicourt, and Rosières.

The infantry and tanks of the Third Canadian Division and the Canadian Independent Force cooperated with the French in the capture of Arvillers.

During the day the enemy's resistance stiffened considerably, and whatever gains were made resulted from heavy infantry fighting against fresh troops, with only a few tanks available for support.

The attack was continued on the morning of the 10th, with the Third Canadian Division on the right and the Fourth Canadian Division on the left, the First and Second Canadian Divisions being held in corps reserve. After the Third Canadian Division had taken the village of Le Quesnoy-en-Santerre, the Thirty-second Division, which had come under the Canadian Corps on the night of the 9th-10th, and had been ordered to relieve the Third Canadian Division, passed through it and advanced the line somewhat farther through the old British trenches west of Parvillers and Damery. The Fourth Canadian Division during the day succeeded, after very hard fighting, in occupying Fouquescourt, Maucourt, Chilly, and Hallu.

During the night 10th-11th a strong enemy counterattack developed against a part of the front of the Fourth Canadian Division east of Hallu. This counterattack was beaten off, but owing to general conditions the line at that point was slightly withdrawn to the railway embankment immediately to the west of Hallu. Subsequent upon this slight withdrawal, and with a view to reducing the existing salient forward of Chilly, the line was further withdrawn to the eastern outskirts of that village.

On August 11, 1918, at 9.30 a. m., the Thirty-second Division launched an attack against Damery, but was not successful. The Fourth Canadian Division improved their line by advancing it locally to reduce the Chilly salient, which was still very pronounced.

During the night of August 12, 1918, the Thirty-second Division and Fourth Canadian Division were relieved by the Third and Second Canadian Divisions respectively.

It now became increasingly apparent that strong enemy reserves had been sent forward to stem the Canadian advance. Six fresh divisions and a large number of light and heavy batteries had been brought in, and were fighting hard in a strongly intrenched defensive position.

August 12, 13, 14, 1918, were characterized chiefly by patrol encounters and local trench fighting. The Third Canadian Division cleared the network of trenches between Fouquescourt and Parvillers, and advanced the line as far as the northern and western edge of Parvillers and Damery. These two villages were captured in the evening of August 15, 1918, and were held in spite of heavy counterattacks. Bois de Damery was also taken, and this enabled the French to capture the important position known as Bois-en-Z.

On the nights of August 15, 16, and 17, 1918, the First Canadian Division relieved the Third Canadian Division, the latter being withdrawn to corps reserve.

Progress was made during August 16-17, 1918, the enemy being driven out of Fransart by the Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General R. Rennie) of the Second Canadian Division, and out of La Chavatte by the First Canadian Division, the Canadian line on the right being advanced in cooperation with the French.

The relief of the Second Canadian Division by the Fourth Canadian Division was carried out on the nights of August 15-16 and 16-17, 1918, the former being withdrawn to corps reserve on the 17th.

August 18, 1918, was quiet along the front, but on the 19th the Fourth Canadian Division carried out a minor operation near Chilly, which greatly improved the line in that neighborhood. Four hostile counterattacks to recover the newly won ground were beaten off during the night.

In the meantime it had been decided to transfer the Canadian Corps back to the First Army. On the 19th, the Second and Third Canadian Divisions started their move to the First Army, and on the night of the 19th-20th the relief of the First Canadian Division by the French commenced. This relief was completed on the 22d, and the First Canadian Division was placed in corps reserve.

On August 22, 1918, General Currie handed over command of the Canadian Corps front, and of the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions, Second Canadian Motor Machine-Gun Brigade, the Eighth Army Brigade, C. F. A., and the C. C. H. A., to the G. O. C. Australian Corps, and Canadian Headquarters moved north to Hautecloque (Arras-Lens sector).

Between August 8 and 22, 1918, the Canadian Corps fought against fifteen German divisions; of these, ten were directly engaged and thoroughly defeated, prisoners being captured from almost every one of their battalions; the five other divisions, fighting astride the Canadian flanks, were only partially engaged.

In the same period the Canadian Corps captured 9,131 prisoners, 190 guns of all calibers, and more than 1,000 machine guns and trench mortars.

The greatest depth penetrated approximated to fourteen miles, and an area of over sixty-seven square miles containing twenty-seven towns and villages had been liberated.

The casualties suffered by the Canadian Corps in the fourteen days' heavy fighting amounted to—

Considering the number of German divisions engaged, and the results achieved, the casualties were very light.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ATTACK AGAINST THE HINDENBURG LINE

Canadian Headquarters were moved from Hautecloque to Noyelle Vion on August 23, 1918, and at noon General Currie assumed command of the front then held by the Seventeenth (British) Corps, extending from Neuville-Vitasse to Gavrelle in the Arras-Lens sector. The First and Fourth Canadian Divisions returned to the corps from the Amiens front on August 25 and 28, 1918, respectively. The corps thus was again with the First Army.

The general military situation at this time on the Amiens-Arras front is described by General Currie in his official report of these operations as follows:

"In sympathy with the severe reverses suffered on the Marne, and consequent upon the actions now fully developed in the Somme salient, signs were not wanting that the enemy was preparing to evacuate the salient of the Lys. This evacuation began under pressure of the First Army on August 25, 1918.

"All these attacks and their results, direct or indirect, enabled the Allies to recover the ground they had lost in the course of the German offensive operations.

"The recapture of that ground was, however, of secondary importance as compared to the moral results of these successive victories.

"The German armies had been impressed in the course of these operations by the superiority of our generalship and of our organization, and by the great determination of our troops and subordinate commanders.

"The Hindenburg system, however, was intact, and the enemy Higher Command hoped and believed that behind this powerfully organized area the German armies might be collected and reorganized.

"Fighting the most determined rear-guard action in the Somme salient, they expected that our armies would be tired and depleted by the time they reached the forward area of the Hindenburg system.

"The Battle of Cambrai, now about to be begun, shattered their hopes. By breaking through the Drocourt-Queant line, itself but a part of the Hindenburg system, the Canadian Corps carried the operations forward to ground that had been in the hands of the Germans since 1914.

"This advance constituted a direct threat on the rear of the German armies north and south of Cambrai.

"Dominated at all times, paralyzed by the swift and bold strokes on vital points of their line and by the relentless pressure applied everywhere, the German Higher Command was unable to take adequate steps to localize and stop our advance. After the Drocourt-Queant line was broken, the retreat of the enemy became more accelerated, and our attacks met everywhere with less organized and determined resistance.

"The moral effect of the most bitter and relentless fighting which led to the capture of Cambrai was tremendous. The Germans had at last learned and understood that they were beaten."

The Canadian Corps, on the right of the First Army, was to attack eastward astride the Arras-Cambrai road, and by forcing its way through the Drocourt-Queant line south of the Scarpe to break the hinge of the Hindenburg system and prevent the possibility of the enemy rallying behind this powerfully organized defended area.

The ground to be attacked lent itself peculiarly to defense, being composed of a succession of ridges, rivers, and canals, which formed natural lines of defense of very great strength. These natural positions, often mutually supporting, had been abundantly fortified. Their organization was the last work in military engineering, and represented years of intensive and systematic labor. Barbed-wire entanglements were formidable, machine-gun positions innumerable, and large tunnels had been provided for the protection of the garrison.

The four main system of defense consisted of the following lines: The old German front system east of Monchy-le-Preux, the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, the Drocourt-Queant line, and the Canal du Nord line. These, with their subsidiary switches and strong points, as well as the less organized, but by no means weak intermediate lines of trenches, made the series of positions to be attacked without doubt one of the strongest defensively on the western front.

Broad glacis, studded with machine-gun nests, defended the immediate approaches to these lines, and this necessitated in each case heavy fighting to gain a suitable jumping-off line before assaulting the main position.

In addition to these systems, and as a preliminary to the attack on the old German system east of Monchy-le-Preux, it was necessary to capture the very well organized British defenses which had been lost in the fighting of March, 1918.

These defenses were intact to a depth of about 5,500 yards, and were dominated by the heights of Monchy-le-Preux, from which the Germans were enjoying superior observation.

Throughout these operations there could not be any element of surprise, other than that afforded by the selection of the actual hour of the assaults. The positions to be attacked formed the pivot of the movements of the German army to the south, and the security of the armies to the north depended also on these positions being retained. There was consequently little doubt that the enemy was alert, and had made every disposition to repulse the expected attacks. Therefore, the plans necessitated provision for very hard and continuous fighting, the main stress being laid on the continuity of the operations.

On August 26, 1918, at 3.00 a. m., the attack was launched under the usual artillery and machine-gun barrages. It made good progress, the village of Monchy-le-Preux being entered early in the day, after a very brilliant encircling attack carried out by the Eighth Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General D. C. Draper). The trenches immediately to the east of Monchy-le-Preux were found to be heavily held, and were not cleared until about 11 a. m. by the Seventh Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General H. Dyer).

Guemappe was captured by 4 p. m. and Wancourt Tower and the top of Heninel Ridge were in Canadian hands at 10.40 p. m. The defenders of the latter feature fought hard but eventually succumbed to a determined attack delivered by the Sixth Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General A. H. Bell), under cover of an extemporized barrage fired by the Second Canadian Divisional Artillery (Brigadier General H. A. Panet). During the night this brigade captured, in addition, Egret Trench, thus securing a good jumping-off place for the operations of the following day.

The attack was renewed at 4.55 a. m. on August 27, 1918, by the Second and Third Canadian Divisions, in the face of increased opposition, under a uniformly good initial barrage.

The Second Canadian Division pushed doggedly forward through the old German trench system, where very stiff hand-to-hand fighting took place, and crossed the Sensee River, after capturing the villages of Chérisy and Vis-en-Artois.

The Third Canadian Division encountered very heavy opposition, but succeeded in capturing Bois-du-Vert, Bois-du-Sart, and reaching the western outskirts of Haucourt, Remy, Boiry-Notre-Dame, and Pelves.

The enemy throughout the day pushed a large number of reenforcements forward, bringing up machine-gun units in motor lorries in the face of our accurate field and heavy artillery fire. Hostile field batteries in the open, firing over open sights, showed remarkable tenacity, several remaining in action until the personnel had been destroyed by our machine-gun fire.

At 9.00 a. m. on August 28, 1918, the Third Canadian Division resumed the attack, followed at 12.30 by the Second Canadian Division. The objective for the day was the capture of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, the possession of which was vital to the success of further operations.

On the left, the Third Canadian Division had pushed forward, captured the Fresnes-Rouvroy line from the Sensee River to north of Boiry-Notre-Dame, and had secured that village, Jigsaw Wood, and entered Pelves. They had, however, been unable to clear the village of Haucourt.

On the front of the Second Canadian Division the fighting was most severe. The wire in front of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line was found to be almost intact, and although at some points the Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General T. L. Tremblay) had succeeded in penetrating the line, the first objective could not be secured, except one short length on the extreme right. Subjected to heavy machine-gun fire from both flanks as well as frontally, the attacking troops had suffered heavy casualties, which they had borne with the utmost fortitude.

At nightfall the general line of the Second Canadian Division was little in advance of the line held the night before, although a few small parties of stubborn men were still as far forward as the wire of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line.

Enemy reenforcements were seen dribbling forward all day long.

The Second and Third Canadian Divisions were now exhausted, and during the night of August 28-29, 1918, they were relieved by the First Canadian Division on the right, the Fourth (British) Division on the left, and Brutinel's Brigade (formerly the Canadian Independent Force) on the extreme left flank.

The heavy artillery from now on concentrated on the cutting of the broad belts of wire in front of the Drocourt-Queant line, and the engineers prepared the bridging material required for the crossings of the Sensee River and the Canal du Nord.

During the day (August 29, 1918) the Canadian line had been considerably improved by minor operations.

On August 30, 1918, the First Canadian Division attacked the Vis-en-Artois Switch, Upton Wood, and the Fresnes-Rouvroy line south of the Vis-en-Artois Switch. The attack, a daring maneuver, organized and carried out by the First Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General W. A. Griesbach), under cover of very ingenious barrages arranged by the C. R. A., First Canadian Division (Brigadier General H. C. Thacker), was eminently successful, all objectives being captured and the entire garrison either killed or taken prisoner. Heavy counterattacks by fresh troops were repulsed during the afternoon and following night.

On August 31, 1918, the remainder of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line south of the Arras-Cambrai road, including Ocean Work, was captured by the Second Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General F. O. W. Loomis).

In the meantime, the Fourth (British) Division had doggedly pushed ahead, crossing the valley of the Sensee River and capturing the villages of Haucourt, Remy, and Eterpigny. This advance was over very difficult, thickly wooded country, and the fighting was very heavy, particularly in the vicinity of St.-Servin's Farm, which, after changing hands several times, remained in possession of the enemy until September 2, 1918.

On the night of August 31-September 1 the Fourth Canadian Division came into the line on a one-brigade front between the First Canadian Division and Fourth (British) Division.

The important strong point known as the Crow's Nest was captured by the Third Canadian Infantry Brigade on September 1, 1918.

During the afternoon and evening of September 1, 1918, the enemy delivered violent counterattacks, directed against the junction of the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions. Two fresh divisions and two divisions already in the line were identified in the course of this heavy fighting. The Canadian troops were forced back slightly twice, but the ground was each time regained and finally held. The hand-to-hand fighting for the possession of the crest of the spur at this point really continued until zero hour the next day, the troops attacking the Drocourt-Queant line, as they moved forward, taking over the fight from the troops then holding the line.

At 5.00 a. m. September 2, 1918, the major operation against the Drocourt-Queant line was launched. Preceded by a dense barrage, and assisted by tanks, the infantry pushed forward rapidly, and the Drocourt-Queant line (the first objective) and its support line (the second objective), including the village of Dury, were captured according to program. With the capture of the second objective the field artillery barrage was shot out, and the attack farther east had to be carried forward without its assistance. The enemy's resistance, free of the demoralizing effect of the barrage, stiffened considerably, the open country being swept continually by intense machine-gun fire. In addition, the tanks soon became casualties from enemy guns firing point-blank, and the advance on the left and center was held up.

Brutinel's Brigade, reenforced by a regiment of cavalry (Tenth Royal Hussars) and armored cars, endeavored to pass through to capture the Marquion Bridge on the Canal du Nord. Wire, trenches, and sunken roads, however, confined the movements of the force to the Arras-Cambrai road; and this was rendered impassable by enemy machine-gun fire and by batteries firing over open sights.

On the right, however, the First Canadian Division pushed forward despite very heavy machine-gun and direct artillery fire, and captured the villages of Cagnicourt and Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, the Bois de Bouche and Bois de Loison to the east of Cagnicourt.

Further progress made by the First Canadian Division in the afternoon resulted in the capture of the heavily wired Buissy Switch line as far south as the outskirts of Buissy; this largely outflanked the enemy still holding out in front of the Fourth Canadian Division, and compelled their retirement during the night behind the Canal du Nord.

By now the number of unwounded prisoners captured exceeded 5,000, and Canadian infantry had penetrated the enemy's defenses to a depth exceeding 6,000 yards.

In the night of September 3-4, 1918, the Second and Third Canadian Divisions relieved the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions respectively, and the Fourth (British) Division was relieved by the First (British) Division, which had come under the Canadian Corps on September 1, 1918, and had been concentrated after that date in the Monchy-le-Preux, Vis-en-Artois, Guemappe area.

The next objective on the Canadian front was now the Canal du Nord. This position, however, was so strongly held and the natural difficulties of the terrain involved were so great that it was decided to make further preparations before attempting this operation which, from its very nature, would have to form part of a larger scheme.

The Canadians now held positions which were defensively very strong. The line, therefore, was held very thinly in order to gain an opportunity to rest and refit the divisions. Until September 27, 1918, no changes developed on the Canadian front. Night patrolling and sniping, of course, were kept up. There was also continuous night firing by artillery and machine guns, while the heavy artillery (Brigadier General R. H. Massie) carried out daily wire cutting, counterbattery shoots, and gas concentrations.