Osborne, 12th July 1859.
The Queen has to acknowledge the receipt of Lord John Russell's letter reporting to her the result of the deliberations of the Cabinet, which has very much relieved her mind. Lord John does not say whether her letter was read to the Cabinet, but from his former letter she concludes it was. She is most anxious that there should exist no misapprehension on their part as to the Queen's views. Our position must be consistent and precisely defined. A negotiation to stop the effusion of blood, and to attain "a peace which would be for the interests of all belligerents," is a very vague term. Who is to judge of those interests? Is M. de Persigny or the Emperor Napoleon's opinion to be the guide, as they just now proposed to us? Austria must be considered the exponent of her own interests. Prussia has explained to us the interests of Germany in the maintenance of the line of the fortresses on the Mincio, and was answered; her views were entirely erroneous, and her apprehensions exaggerated. It will require the greatest caution on our part not to lose our neutral position, nor to be made the advocate of one side. Are the wishes of the Lombards, Tuscans, etc., really ascertainable, while their countries are occupied by French and Sardinian armies? The Queen encloses an extract of a letter from the first Napoleon to his son, Prince Eugène,59 showing how the expression of a wish for annexation has already of old been used as a means for conquest.
Footnote 59: Eugène de Beauharnais, Duke of Leuchtenberg, son of the Empress Josephine by her first marriage, and adopted son of Napoleon I.
Osborne, 13th July 1859.
The Queen has received the news of a concluded peace,60 which Lord John Russell has sent to her yesterday, with as much surprise as it must have caused Lord John. It was a joyous intelligence, as far as the stopping of the further effusion of innocent blood and the security against further diplomatic complications is concerned, but it gives cause for serious reflection. The Emperor Napoleon, by his military successes, and great apparent moderation or prudence immediately after them, has created for himself a most formidable position of strength in Europe. It is remarkable that he has acted towards Austria now just as he did towards Russia after the fall of Sebastopol; and if it was our lot then to be left alone to act the part of the extortioner whilst he acted that of the generous victor, the Queen is doubly glad that we should not now have fallen into the trap, to ask Austria (as friends and neutrals) concessions which he was ready to waive. He will now probably omit no occasion to cajole Austria as he has done to Russia, and turn her spirit of revenge upon Prussia and Germany—the Emperor's probable next victims. Should he thus have rendered himself the master of the entire Continent, the time may come for us either to obey or to fight him with terrible odds against us. This has been the Queen's view from the beginning of this complication, and events have hitherto wonderfully supported them. How Italy is to prosper under the Pope's presidency, whose misgovernment of his own small portion of it was the ostensible cause of the war, the Queen is at a loss to conceive. But the Emperor will be able to do just as he pleases, being in military command of the country, and having Sardinia, the Pope, and Austria as his debtors.
The Queen would like this letter to be communicated to the Cabinet.
Footnote 60: The armistice had arranged that the Emperors should meet at Villafranca, where peace was concluded. See Introductory Note, ante, p. 308. The Italian Confederation was to be under the presidency of the Pope.
Foreign Office, 13th July 1859.
Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he will read your Majesty's letter to the Cabinet to-morrow.
The Emperor Napoleon is left no doubt in a position of great power. That position has been made for him by allowing him to be the only champion of the cause of the people of Italy.
But that is no reason why we should seek a quarrel with France, and there is some reason to doubt whether the speeches made in the House of Lords, while they display our weakness and our alarm, are really patriotic in their purpose and tendency.
To be well armed, and to be just to all our neighbours, appears to Lord John Russell to be the most simple, the most safe, and the most honest policy.
Osborne, 14th July 1859.
The Queen acknowledges the receipt of Lord John Russell's communications of yesterday. She entirely agrees with him "that we have no reason to seek a quarrel with France," and that "the most simple and most safe and most honest" line of conduct for us will be "to be well armed, and to be just to all our neighbours."
She trusts that as the poor Duchess of Parma61 appears to be overlooked in the Italian Peace merely because nobody thinks it his business to befriend her, we shall in the above spirit ask for justice and consideration for her.
The Queen concurs with Lord John that it will now be useless to communicate to France the advice given to the Porte.
Footnote 61: Louise Marie de Bourbon, daughter of the Duc de Berri, and widow of Charles III., Duke of Parma. She was at this time Regent for her son Robert, a minor (born 1848), the present Duke.
Rome, 17th July 1859.
My Lord,—Some days since a letter from the "Pontifical Antechamber," directed to "Signor Odoni Russell, Agente Officioso di Sua Maestà Britannica," informed me that His Holiness the Pope desired to see me.
In consequence I proceeded to the Vatican, and was ushered into the presence of His Holiness by Monsignore Talbot, the "Cameriere" in waiting, who immediately withdrew, and I remained alone with the Pope.
His Holiness welcomed me with his usual benevolence and good humour. He seemed very gay, and spoke with more than customary frankness, so much so indeed that I have felt some hesitation as to the propriety of submitting what passed between us to your Lordship. But after mature reflection, I think it best you should be in possession of an accurate and conscientious account of the sentiments of His Holiness in the present important juncture of affairs.
"Caro mio Russell," the Pope said, "you have been so long at Naples that I was already thinking of sending after you to bring you back; we do not like you to leave us, and the more so as I have heard you were attached to the Mission of Mr Elliot,62 who is a son of Lord Minto; and if he entertains the same political views as his father, he is a dangerous man to the peace of Italy. Now I knew Lord Minto here, and although he may be a very good man, I do not think him a man of any capacity, and his doctrines were calculated to bring on the ruin of Italy."
I replied, "I cannot agree with your Holiness, for I consider Lord Minto to be a very clever man, whose honest, sound, and liberal views, had they been listened to, might have prevented the crisis which is now convulsing Italy."
The Pope said, "Well, of course you belong to his party, but, Poveri noi! what is to become of us with your uncle and Lord Palmerston at the head of affairs in England? They have always sympathised with the turbulent spirits of Italy, and their accession to power will greatly increase the hopes of the Piedmontese Party. Indeed, I well know what the English Government want: they want to see the Pope deprived of his temporal power."
I replied, "Again I regret to find your Holiness so entirely mistaken with respect to the policy of England. We derive great happiness from our free institutions, and we would be glad to see our neighbours in Europe as happy and as prosperous as we are, but we have no wish to interfere with the internal concerns of other nations, or to give advice without being asked for it; least of all as a Protestant Power would we think of interfering one way or the other with the Government of your Holiness."
The Pope said, "I do not doubt the good intentions of England, but unfortunately you do not understand this country, and your example is dangerous to the Italian minds, your speeches in Parliament excite them, and you fancy because constitutional liberties and institutions suit you, that they must suit all the world. Now the Italians are a dissatisfied, interfering, turbulent and intriguing race; they can never learn to govern themselves, it is impossible; only see how they follow Sardinia in all she tells them to do, simply because they love intrigue and revolution, whilst in reality they do not know what they want; a hot-headed people like the Italians require a firm and just government to guide and take care of them, and Italy might have continued tranquil and contented, had not the ambition of Sardinia led her to revolutionise the whole country. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, for instance, is an excellent and just man, and nevertheless, at the instigation of Piedmont, he was turned out of the country, and for no earthly purpose. I suppose you have read Monsieur About's book about Rome63? well, all he says is untrue, pure calumny, and it would be easy for me to have it all refuted; but he is really not worthy of such an honour. His book, I see, has been translated into English, and I have no doubt it will be much read and believed in England. Such books and our refugees mislead your countrymen, and I often wonder at the language your statesmen hold about us in the Houses of Parliament. I always read their speeches. Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, and Mr Gladstone do not know us; but when I think how kindly and hospitably Lord Granville was received at Rome last winter, and then read the extraordinary speech he made last February about us, I think the gout he suffered from here must have gone to his head when he reached England, and I wonder how Her Majesty the Queen could send for him to form a Government! Then again, Mr Gladstone, who allowed himself to be deceived about the Neapolitan prisoners—he does not know us and Italy—and Mr Cobden,—I knew him in 1847—he is always in favour of peace, and he must be very fond of animals, for when he came here from Spain he wanted me to write to that country and put a stop to bull-fights—a very good man, but I do not know his views about Italy. And Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, do you think he will be employed again? he seemed so anxious to get a place. Mr Disraeli was my friend; I regret him. But tell me, caro mio Russell, if you are a prophet, how all this war and fuss is to end?"
I replied, "Your Holiness has better claims to being a prophet than I have, and I sincerely hope all this may end well for Italy; but as regards the present and the past, I must again say that I deeply regret to see your Holiness misconceive the honest views and sincere sympathies of the statesmen you have named, for the welfare of Italy; they would like to see Italy independent, prosperous, progressing and contented, and able to take care of herself without foreign troops. Your Holiness has done me the honour to speak freely and openly with me; permit me to do the same, and ask your Holiness what England must think when she sees the temporal power of your Holiness imposed upon three millions of people by the constant presence of French and Austrian bayonets, and when, after ten years of occupation, the Austrians withdraw suddenly, there is at once an insurrection throughout the country; and if the French were to leave Rome it is generally acknowledged that a revolution would compel your Holiness to seek refuge in some foreign country. At the same time, when the troops of your Holiness are employed as at Perugia,64 the Government is too weak to control them; they pillage and murder, and, instead of investigating their conduct, the excesses committed by them are publicly rewarded."
The Pope smiled, paused, took a pinch of snuff, and then said good-humouredly: "Although I am not a prophet, I know one thing; this war will be followed by an European Congress, and a Congress about Italian Affairs is even worse for us than war. There will be changes in Italy, but mark my words, whatever these changes are, the Pope will ever be the Pope, whether he dwells in the Vatican or lives concealed in the Catacombs.
"Lastly, I will give you some advice. Prepare and take care of yourselves in England, for I am quite certain the French Emperor intends sooner or later to attack you."
The Pope then beckoned to me to approach, and making the sign of the Cross, he gave me his blessing in Latin, then with both his hands, he took one of mine, pressed it, and said with great warmth, "Be our friend in the hour of need." I have the honour to be, etc., etc.,
Footnote 62: Mr (afterwards Sir) Henry Elliot, P.C., G.C.B., was Plenipotentiary to Naples. He was subsequently Ambassador at Vienna, and died in 1907.
Footnote 63: Edmond About, a French journalist (1828-1885), had published La Question Romaine, an attack on the Papacy. See De la Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, vol. ii. p. 365.
Footnote 64: An insurrection against the Pope at Perugia bad been put down with great cruelty on the 20th of June.
Osborne, 18th July 1859.
The Queen returns these interesting letters to Lord John.65
The whole aspect of affairs gives cause for serious reflection and great anxiety for the future.
The conduct of France as regards Italy shows how little the Emperor Napoleon cared for, or thought of, its independence when he undertook this war, which (though in the last instance begun by Austria) he brought on, for purposes of his own.
The manifesto of the Emperor of Austria shows how unfortunate for her own interests the policy of Prussia has been.66 She had made herself answerable for the issue of the war by restraining the minor states, and stands now humiliated and isolated. Her position in Germany is at present very painful, and may be for the future very dangerous.
The Queen feels strongly that we are not without considerable responsibility in having from the first urged her to take no part in the war, which certainly had great influence on her actions—and she will very naturally look to us not to desert her when the evil hour for her may come.67
Footnote 65: These were letters from Lord Cowley and Sir James Hudson in reference to the Peace of Villafranca. The former announced, as a result of his conversation with the Empress and other persons, that among the causes which induced the French Emperor to consent to peace were his horror at any further sacrifice of life and time, disgust at what he considered Italian apathy for the cause which the French were upholding, and distrust of the intentions of the King of Sardinia and Count Cavour. Sir James Hudson described the unanimous feeling at Turin that the Nationalist cause had been betrayed. Cavour, he wrote, could obtain no further response to his remonstrances with Napoleon than "Il fait bien chaud: il fait bien chaud." Moreover, Napoleon knew (continued Sir James) "that Mazzini had dogged his footsteps to Milan, for, the day before yesterday, sixty-six Orsini bombshells were discovered there by the chief of the Sardinian police, who arrested the man (a known follower of Mazzini) who had them. The story is that he brought them from England for the purpose of using them against the Austrians!!" Count Cavour, who resigned in disgust and was succeeded by Rattazzi, remained out of office till the following January.
Footnote 66: He stated that he believed he could obtain better terms direct from the French Emperor than those to which England, Russia, and Prussia were likely to give their moral support as a basis of mediation.
Footnote 67: Lord Cowley wrote to Lord John Russell on the 20th of July:—
"... The two Emperors met in the most cordial manner, shaking hands as if no difference had existed between them. As soon as they were alone, the Emperor of Austria took the initiative, and stated at once that he was ready to cede to the Emperor of the French, for the sake of the restoration of peace, the territory which the latter had conquered, but that he could not do more, giving the reasons which I have mentioned to your Lordship in former despatches. The Emperor of the French replied that his own position in France, and the public declarations which he had made, rendered something in addition necessary: that the war had been undertaken for the freedom of Italy, and that he could not justify to France a peace which did not ensure this object. The Emperor Francis Joseph rejoined that he had no objection to offer to the Confederation which formed part of the Emperor Napoleon's programme, and that he was ready to enter it with Venetia, and when the Emperor Napoleon remarked that such a result would be a derision, if the whole power and influence of Austria were to be brought to bear upon the Confederation, the Emperor Francis Joseph exclaimed against any such interpretation being given to his words, his idea being that Venetia should be placed on the same footing, in the Italian Confederation, as Luxemburg holds in the Germanic Confederation....
"In the course of conversation between the two Imperial Sovereigns, the Emperor of Austria remarked to the Emperor of the French with many expressions of goodwill, and of a desire to see the dynasty of the latter firmly established on the throne of France, that His Majesty took an odd way to accomplish his end. 'Believe me,' said the Emperor Francis Joseph, 'dynasties are not established by having recourse to such bad company as you have chosen; revolutionists overturn, but do not construct.' The Emperor Napoleon appears to have taken the remark in very good part, and even to have excused himself to a certain degree, observing that it was a further reason that the Emperor Francis Joseph should aid him in putting an end to the war, and to the revolutionary spirit to which the war had given rise.
"The Emperors having separated in the same cordial manner in which they had met, the Emperor of the French himself drew up the preliminaries and sent them in the evening to Verona by his cousin, the Prince Napoleon. Being introduced to the Emperor of Austria, who received His Imperial Highness very courteously, His Majesty said, after reading the preliminaries, that he must beg the Prince to excuse him for a short time, as he had others to consult before signing them. He then went into an adjoining room where, according to Prince Napoleon's account, a loud and angry discussion ensued, in which the Prince distinguished the Emperor's voice broken by tears, as if His Majesty had been obliged to have recourse to persuasion, to silence the opposition made to the conditions, and it was not until some time had elapsed that His Majesty returned and signed the paper containing them, or rather I infer that he retained the paper signed by the Emperor Napoleon, and returned one of similar purport signed by himself; for among all the curious circumstances connected with this transaction, not the least curious is the fact that there does not exist any document recording the preliminaries with the double signature of both Emperors."
Osborne, 23rd July 1859.
The Queen's attention has been attracted by No. 86 (Foreign Department) of the printed abstracts of letters received from India, relating to the affairs of Bussahir.68 She would ask Sir C. Wood to consider, with his Council, whether means could not be found for making acts of confiscation, sequestration, spoliation, transfer of Government, or whatever they may be called, dependent upon some formal and judicial proceeding which should secure the Queen from acts being done in her name—which might not be entirely justifiable morally, as well as legally—which should relieve the Government agents from the fearful responsibility of being sole advisers on steps implying judicial condemnation without trial on their mere personal opinion, and from which they derive themselves additional personal advancement in power, position, possibly emolument, etc., etc., and lastly, which would give the people of India security that the Government only acts after impartial judicial investigation and the sifting of evidence.
The Queen would wish a report to be made to her upon this important subject.
Footnote 68: Bussahir was a State in the upper course of the Sutlej. In January, the Punjab, including the Sutlej States, had been made a distinct presidency, but Bussahir was not finally included until 1862.
Osborne, 21st August 1859.
The Queen sends the enclosed draft to Lord John Russell; she is very sorry that she cannot give her approval to it. There are many points in it to which she cannot but feel the gravest objections. It is unnecessary, however, for her to go into these details, as it is against the principle of England volunteering at this moment the intrusion of a scheme of her own for the redistribution of the territories and Governments of Northern Italy, that she must above all protest. Moreover, a step of such importance, reversing the principle of non-intervention, which the Queen's Government has hitherto publicly declared and upheld, should, in the Queen's opinion, not be brought before her without having received the fullest deliberation and concurrence of the assembled Cabinet.
Footnote 69: A month earlier, on his return from the war, the Emperor had tried to enlist British support in his scheme for a European congress. But the Cabinet decided (24th July), with the Queen's full concurrence, that no answer should be returned to this proposal, till a Treaty, embodying the preliminaries of Villafranca, should have been signed.
Pembroke Lodge, 23rd August 1859.
Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he begs to explain that with respect to reversing the principle of non-intervention, he has never proposed any such course. If intervention were to mean giving friendly advice, or even offering mediation, your Majesty's Government from January to May would have pursued a course of intervention, for they were all that time advising Austria, France, Sardinia, and Germany.
If by friendly and judicious advice we can prevent a bloody and causeless war in Italy we are bound to give such advice.
If we refrain from doing so, we may ultimately be obliged to have recourse to intervention; that is to say, we may have to interfere against the ruthless tyranny of Austria, or the unchained ambition of France. It is with a view to prevent the necessity of intervention that Lord John Russell advises friendly representations.
Aldershot, 23rd August 1859.
... With regard to Lord John's letter of to-day, the Queen wishes merely to say that from the outbreak of the war our negotiations have ceased, and that the war is not over till the peace is concluded. Our interference before that period may be prompted by a desire to prevent a future war; but our first duty is not to interfere with the closing of the present. The desire to guard Italy against "the ruthless tyranny of Austria, and the unchained ambition of France" may produce a state of things in Italy, forcing both to make common cause against her, and backed by the rest of Europe to isolate England, and making her responsible for the issue. It will be little satisfaction then to reflect upon the fact that our interference has been merely advice.
94 Piccadilly, 23rd August 1859.
Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to state that Lord John Russell has shown him your Majesty's communication, in which your Majesty objects to a proposed despatch to Lord Cowley, on the ground that it would be a departure from the principle of non-intervention which has been publicly proclaimed as the rule for Great Britain in the late events between France and Austria. But Viscount Palmerston would beg humbly to submit to your Majesty that the intervention which all parties agreed that this country ought to abstain from, was active interference by force of arms in the war then going on, but that neither of the great political parties meant or asserted that this country should not interfere by its advice and opinions in regard to the matters to which the war related. Viscount Palmerston can assert that neither he nor any of those who were acting with him out of office ever contemplated giving such a meaning to the doctrine of non-intervention; and that such a meaning never was attached to it by the Conservative Leaders while they were in office, is proved from one end of their Blue Book to the other.70 The whole course of the Derby Government, in regard to the matters on which the war turned, was one uninterrupted series of interventions by advice, by opinions, and by censure now addressed to one party and now to another. Whatever may be thought of the judgment which was shown by them, or of the bias by which they were guided, the principle on which they acted was undoubtedly right and proper.
England is one of the greatest powers of the world, no event or series of events bearing on the balance of power, or on probabilities of peace or war can be matters of indifference to her, and her right to have and to express opinions on matters thus bearing on her interests is unquestionable; and she is equally entitled to give upon such matters any advice which she may think useful, or to suggest any arrangements which she may deem conducive to the general good.
It is no doubt true that the Conservative Party, since they have ceased to be responsible for the conduct of affairs, have held a different doctrine, and in their anxiety lest the influence of England should be exerted for the benefit of Italy, and to the disadvantage of Austria, have contended that any participation by Great Britain in the negotiations for the settlement of Italy would be a departure from the principle of non-intervention; but their own practice while in office refutes their newly adopted doctrine in opposition; and if that doctrine were to be admitted, Great Britain would, by her own act, reduce herself to the rank of a third-class European State.
Footnote 70: This was the Blue Book, the production of which would, according to Lord Malmesbury, have saved the Derby Ministry.
Osborne, 24th August 1859.
The Queen is really placed in a position of much difficulty, giving her deep pain. She has been obliged to object to so many drafts sent to her from the Foreign Office on the Italian Question, and yet, no sooner is one withdrawn or altered, than others are submitted exactly of the same purport or tendency, if even couched in new words. The Queen has so often expressed her views that she is almost reluctant to reiterate them. She wishes, however, Lord John to re-peruseTHE QUEEN AND LORD JOHN RUSSELL the two drafts enclosed, which just came to her. If they have any meaning or object, it must be to show to France that it would be to her interest to break in the Treaty of Zurich the leading conditions to which she pledged herself to Austria at Villafranca. Those preliminaries contained but three provisions affecting Austria: (1) That Austria was to cede Lombardy; (2) That an Italian Confederation should be encouraged, of which Venetia was to form part; (3) That the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena were to return to their Duchies. The two latter clauses must be considered as compensations for the losses inflicted in the first. Both the latter are now to be recommended by England, a neutral in the war, to be broken.
Now, either it is expected that our advice will not be listened to, in which case it would not be useful and hardly dignified to give it, or it is expected that France will follow it. If, on finding herself cheated, Austria were to feel herself obliged to take up arms again, we should be directly answerable for this fresh war. What would then be our alternative? Either to leave France in the lurch, to re-fight her own battle, which would entail lasting danger and disgrace on this country, or to join her in the fresh war against Austria—a misfortune from which the Queen feels herself equally bound to protect her country.
As this is a question of principle on which she clearly understood her Cabinet to have been unanimous, she must ask her correspondence to be circulated amongst its members, with a view to ascertain whether they also would be parties to its reversal, and in order to prevent the necessity of these frequent discussions, which, as the Queen has already said, are very painful to her.
London, 29th August 1859.
Sir,—In the middle of last week I received at Aldenham a letter from Mr Sidney Herbert,71 in which he told me that he had just received a visit from Lord Palmerston, much perturbed and annoyed, saying that the Queen had objected to all Lord John's despatches, and appeared to think that it was objectionable for England to give any advice on the subject of Italian affairs. Mr Herbert gave some good advice to Lord Palmerston, but, from the tone of his letter, I gather that he thought the objections made at Osborne unreasonable. I answered that I entirely concurred with him in the interest of everybody, that no feelings of irritation should exist between the Sovereign and her leading Ministers; that it was possible that the Queen, forgetting how very sensitive Lord John was to criticism, had pulled him up more sharply than he liked, but that I was convinced the objections made were not exactly those mentioned by Lord Palmerston. I heard nothing more till I received on Saturday evening a telegram, summoning me to a Cabinet this day. I came to Town immediately, and saw Lord Palmerston yesterday. I enquired the reason of the sudden summons for a Cabinet. He told me that there had been a discussion between the Queen and Lord John; that the Queen had objected to his (Lord John's) proposal that the despatch of 25th July should be now communicated to the French Government. Lord John had informed him of the fact, and had requested him to communicate with the Queen on the subject. Lord Palmerston then read to me a well-written memorandum on the abstract question of giving advice, which he had sent to Her Majesty. He told me that he had been to Osborne; that the Queen had expressed a wish through Sir Charles Wood that he should not discuss the whole matter with her; that he had had a satisfactory conversation with your Royal Highness, of which he gave me an abstract, which, however, contained his own arguments at greater length than your Royal Highness's. He said that Lord John had made a mistake with respect to the end of the despatch, in which Lord Cowley is desired to withhold it till after the Peace of Zurich was concluded. Lord John gave a different interpretation to it from what appeared to be the case, as described by a previous letter of Lord John, in which he had said that the sentence was added at the suggestion of the Cabinet, and with his entire approval. Lord Palmerston states that the Queen did not feel herself authorised to sanction a departure from what had been decided by the Cabinet, without the concurrence of the Cabinet, and that she thought it desirable, if the Cabinet met, that they should agree on the future policy as regards Italy. Lord John also wished for a Cabinet.
I replied that there seemed to be a double question: first, a difference between the Queen and Lord John Russell and himself; and second, the whole question of our Italian Policy. On the first point I could not but remember the apprehension generally felt at the formation of his first Government; that the feeling between the Sovereign and himself might not be such as to give strength to the Government; that the result, however, was most satisfactory. I was not aware of either the Queen or himself having given way on any one point of principle, but the best understanding was kept up in the most honourable way to both, and that, at the end of his Ministry, I knew that the Queen had expressed to several persons how much she regretted to lose his services. That I most sincerely hoped that there was no chance of misunderstanding now arising; that would be most disadvantageous to the Sovereign, to the public service, to the Government, and, above all, to himself. He interrupted me by assuring me that there was not the slightest chance of this. He repeated to me flattering things said by the Queen at the close of his last Administration, and told me that it was impossible for the Queen to have been more kind and civil than at his visit last week at Osborne. I continued that in Italian matters I believed the Cabinet was agreed. Our language to Italian Governments ought to show sympathy with Italy, and let them know that we were anxious that they should be left free to act and decide for themselves; that it should inform them in the clearest manner that in no case were they to obtain active assistance from us, and it ought to avoid giving any advice as to their conduct, which might make us responsible for the evil or danger which might accrue from following such advice. That our language to France and Austria ought to press upon them in every judicious manner the expediency of doing that which was likely to secure the permanent happiness of Italy, and to persuade them to abstain from forcing upon the Italians, persons and forms of Government to which they objected; nothing like a menace or a promise to be used....
I then saw Sidney Herbert, who told me that Charles Wood's report had entirely changed the aspect of things; that it was clear that the Queen had come to the assistance of the Cabinet, instead of opposing them; that reason had been entirely on her side, and that Johnny had reduced the question now to the single point, which was not of much importance, whether the 25th July despatch should now be communicated or not. He told me that Lord John was in a state of great irritation, and ready to kick over the traces. I dined at Lord Palmerston's, and met Sir Charles Wood and Mr Gladstone. I had some guarded conversation with the latter, who seemed very reasonable. Sir Charles Wood gave me all the information which I required. It appears to me that the really important point is that the whole Cabinet should know the real question between the Queen and her Ministers, and that, if Lord John can find plausible reasons for changing the date of the communication of the despatch, it may be better for the Queen to consent to this. Some of us will take care to have a decided opinion about the future course of our policy.
I presume Sir George Grey will be at the Cabinet, and will be able to report to your Royal Highness what has passed. If he is not there, I will write again. I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect, your Royal Highness's obedient, humble, and faithful Servant,
Footnote 71: See Lord Fitzmaurice's Life of Lord Granville, vol. i. chap. xiii.
Privy Council Office, 29th August 1859.
Sir,—The Cabinet was very satisfactory. Lord John looked ill, and evidently ashamed of much of his case. Many of the Cabinet thought that the despatch of 25th July had not only been sent but communicated. Others attached a different meaning to the closing paragraph than what it appears to bear. Lord John produced a most objectionable draft of despatch in lieu of that of the 25th. It was universally condemned, and Lord Palmerston was empowered to tell the Queen that the Cabinet now thought that the despatch of the 25th might be communicated.
Lords Palmerston and John Russell asked for further powers during the Recess, and recommended that we should give an opinion in favour of annexation of duchies to Sardinia. This was decidedly objected to, and we all professed our readiness to meet again if necessary.72
The Cabinet thoroughly understood what had passed between the Queen and her two Ministers, although we could not get Lord John to show us all we required.
Gladstone took me aside after it was over to say that I must have thought him stupid yesterday evening, that now he knew the facts he thought Her Majesty had been put to most unnecessary annoyance. The Chancellor said something of the same sort. I never saw the Cabinet more united.
The Duke of Argyll, Lord Elgin, and Mr Cardwell were absent. I am, Sir, with great respect, your obedient, humble, and faithful Servant,
Footnote 72: "Pam. asked for fuller powers to act during the recess, which was met by a general assurance of readiness to come up by night trains." Lord Granville to the Duke of Argyll. See the Life of Lord Granville, vol. i. p. 358.