Proper loading is the business of the land forces and should be conducted by trained officers so as to ensure the shipment of materials and men. To make landing effective the necessary supplies should go on the vessels with the troops. A loading plan should be so drawn up in advance as to meet all emergencies. The length of time consumed for loading depends on the distance of the voyage.
At the most the limit of a short sea voyage for us has been considered about forty-eight hours. This is too small an estimate; it should undoubtedly be doubled. The Italian General Staff estimates the length of a short sea voyage to be five days. Besides, to preserve the fighting worth of our troops, we must allow sufficient time for rest.
The troop transport capacity of a ship has heretofore been calculated by the ship's tonnage, that is, sixty per cent. of the ship's capacity is net ton loading space. The necessary space for us, for a long sea voyage, is set at two tons for each man and six to seven tons for each horse. The English and Russian estimates are about the same. But the English transports to Cape Town accommodated a larger number of troops than was thought possible, and the American transports to Cuba were increased by one-third.
As for the arrangements which must be made for sleeping, cooking and washing and for a hospital service, we need not go any further here, as they have been discussed at length in the press. The stowing of equipment and baggage should be done in such a way as to make the articles available on landing in the order in which they are needed. The ship's space required for maintenance supplies for man and horse figures relatively as about one to five.
Coming next to the loading of the artillery, the rule should be to place all common and machine guns on deck. A certain amount of ammunition should be stowed so as to be quickly accessible. This is an essential measure to afford the transport protection from some privateer. The guns should be securely placed to prevent their movement by the motion of the sea and to render feasible their use on deck. Trials will soon be made to find the suitable means whereby field artillery may be put to successful use on shipboard, and this testing will certainly repay us. All rolling stock will be stowed away firmly in the freight space without removing the wheels. The material and personnel of the field hospital should be divided among the ships, so that a ship's hospital division may be formed. The airship division should be placed on deck in such fashion that observation flights may be made during the voyage.
The shipping of horses is especially difficult. By former methods the horses had to stand the entire trip and had practically no exercise. This left them in a weakened condition and made necessary a long rest after arrival. For a war transport, in which is required a rapid and successful offensive, such horses are not useful. Because of the important work to be done by them after landing, careful attention should be given to the horses to keep them in good working condition. To this end, proper nourishment must be given and facilities provided for daily exercise while on the transports, which should consume at least three-quarters of an hour for each horse.
Ships that are built particularly for the transportation of horses can be adjusted with four decks over each other, including upper deck stables and two courses for exercise, so that a transport of from three to four thousand net tons capacity can carry over one thousand horses. Three ships would accommodate two cavalry brigades. On every large steamer many horses can be shipped for a long trip, in addition to its regular quota of men and supplies.
After the transports have been prepared, about seven hundred and fifty horses, equal to one cavalry regiment, or six batteries, can be loaded daily on the lower decks. Cleanliness, ventilation and care are the three most important factors for the good health of the horses. Every horse transport must be given ventilating apparatus to assure sufficient fresh air. Artificial ventilation is to be preferred to natural ventilation, for if the latter becomes too strong the horses' lungs are easily affected. Through this cause, for example, the American transport to Cuba lost the greater number of their horses.
Likewise condensers are required for the necessary quantities of drinking water. It is recommended that each ship be given its own condenser. The provision of only one or two large condensers on special ships which supply the entire demand of the transport fleet, as the Americans employed in their expedition to Cuba, has not proved practical.
For the short sea voyage, our transports would be able to despatch substantially more troops, through Germany's geographical position. The strength of near-by powers requires, though, the immediate utilization of all ships and materials at our disposal, if the operations are to succeed. For short expeditions, the general rule will be to ship as many troops as the transports will carry. The forces will bivouac on the upper and lower decks and receive only straw bags and covers. They will keep their whole baggage with them. Cooking will be done in large field kettles. If time permits, it is recommended that the same adjustments as for a long journey be made for the horses, at least to provide separate stalls. This will prevent heavy losses in case of rough weather. Guns and accessories can be disposed of in the same manner as for long voyages.
The length of time for embarkation depends on whether the loading can be done from the wharves of the harbors or whether the troops and materials must be taken out by lighters and then transferred to the ships. The latter method is a waste of time and is dependent on wind and weather.
The time required for loading is as follows: Fifteen minutes for one hundred men, one minute for one horse, ten minutes for a cannon. In an operation by the Russians, 8,000 men, including infantry and cavalry, were embarked in eight hours. In our loading of East Asia transports, it required one to one and one-half hours to load one battalion. The speed of our loading has amazed departmental circles in general. It is certain, though, that this time can be greatly reduced through detailed preparation and training. Napoleon I, in the year 1795, had ostensibly drilled his troops so well that he could plan to put 132,000 men and their materials on shipboard in two hours.
It must be remembered that everything, troops, guns and supplies must eventually be landed on open coasts. Portable flat-bottom boats and building materials for piers must therefore be carried on the transports. Special vessels must accompany the transport fleet with large reserve supplies of food, equipment, ammunition, coal and so forth. A cable-laying ship is also required.
We must now consider to what extent Germany is able to load forces for the execution of operations which involve only a short voyage, in which success depends so much on speed. For embarkation on the North Sea, Hamburg and Bremen alone could furnish so many steamers capable of being converted into transports, that with their tonnage capacity the loading of four infantry divisions is possible in a period of four days. With the addition of ships from Emden, Wilhelmshaven, Glückstadt and Kiel we would be able to despatch in the same length of time, at least six infantry divisions, or five infantry and one cavalry division. To these must be added several especially large and fast German steamers, partly for the shipment that might be delayed and partly to expedite the return to home waters. A large number of troops can also be shipped from Baltic ports. Besides this, a repeated trip of the transport fleet is possible if the command of the sea is maintained continuously.
For longer sea voyages, in which the importance of speed is not so great, our transport fleet can be greatly increased through chartering or purchasing ships of foreign nations. Still, we are at present in the position to despatch about four infantry divisions, with present available ships, within ten or twelve days.
For transporting troops over the sea, it is the chief problem of the navy to clear the course to the hostile shore. All enterprises of this kind are dependent on the battle fleet, whose first aim, therefore, must be to run down and attack the enemy's fleet which the transports might encounter; if the opportunity is afforded our fleet must bring about an engagement for the command of the sea at least by the time of embarkation. As the mobilizing of the battle ships is finished before the transport fleet is ready to put to sea, they can undertake an early offensive to make secure the passage of the expedition. Also, throughout the voyage offensive operations can be undertaken by the battle fleet, in waters distant from the transport, which would serve the same ends of keeping the course clear.
The escorts of the transport squadron should consist of just enough ships to give immediate protection. A large number would increase unnecessarily the size of the transport fleet without increasing its safety, while every addition of strength to the battle fleet is of the greatest value. The task of the escorts is only to protect the transports from attacks by single or several small vessels of the enemy. Our torpedo boats are particularly adapted for escort service, and make it feasible to restrict the number of large battle ships used for this purpose. During the assembling of the transports, these boats may devote themselves to secure the safety of the traffic between the loading harbors.
The departure of the transports from the various harbors must be so regulated that they sail in close union, to assure a safe voyage and a quick landing. The loading commission must take appropriate means to expedite the loading in those harbors farthest removed from the central assembling points. As a rule, the transport steamers would sail with the battle fleet; but in the English expedition to South Africa and ours to East Asia, this rule was not followed.
An essential requirement is that the transports put to sea as soon as the loading is complete. They cannot wait for news of the success of the battle fleet. A certain risk is involved, but it is not great, for the transport fleet can always turn back. Only an early departure would insure successful, unexpected landing. The shorter the voyage the greater the necessity for a surprise attack.
In the event of our battle fleet being attacked, it does not follow that the transport operations must be abandoned, for if the voyage be short an energetic continuation of the venture will command a fair prospect of success. Even the victor in a great naval battle might not be able to carry out an attack against the transport squadron. An individual hostile battle ship or cruiser would find it difficult to break into the transport fleet.
An important factor in the sea voyage, perhaps the most important, is the weather. For short distances, it is possible to a certain degree to choose favorable weather for the passage, with the help of scientific forecasts. Conditions might be such that a delay would not harm the operations. Adverse weather conditions would more seriously affect long-distance transporting, to a degree that might cause abandonment. Our vessels must be so improved as to make them independent of wind and weather, to make certain the speed of the voyage and to permit the establishing of a time record. For the time of the passage, the highest speed of the slowest boat is the standard, which could probably be increased by towing with tugs.
In putting to sea all transport ships must retain the order of position they are to take in the squadron; this order is not broken until after leaving the harbor, so that the object of the voyage is known only to the home officials. The advance guard of troops will sail in the fastest ships so that they can make the unexpected landing. The pioneer and airship divisions are placed with the advance guard. The ships which have artillery ride on the flank of the troop transports. Then follow the ships carrying supplies. The cable ship comes last. The laying of the cable gives a continuous communication with the home country. For extensive voyages, preparations must be made for taking on coal on the open sea. The commander-in-chief of the expedition corps should be on a transport steamer so that in event of a fight the transport fleet will not be without proper guidance.
On long sea voyages, gymnastics, drilling and target practise can be pursued. Ample daily exercising of the horses will occupy the greater part of the time of the cavalry. For short sea voyages these features are not so necessary. In general, strict discipline must be exercised to overcome the tediousness of the trip.
While the command of the troops on every transport is in the oldest officer, the command of the ship remains in the hands of the captain, who is inferior in rank to the commander of the troops. If this captain has not served in the German navy, a midshipman may be signed as a coordinate officer. It is our policy to provide every transport ship with a naval officer.
Military history shows that an attempt to prevent a really bold landing is never successful. The defense must either scatter its forces along the coast to be protected, or concentrate its full strength to cover one point, while the assailant, through the mobility of its transport, can keep its landing plan uncertain, and under the protection of long-range guns on the ships can throw more troops quickly on the land than the defense is able to concentrate in the same time. A simultaneous landing at different places is hazardous if the opponent can muster considerable strength. An expedition is seldom so large that disadvantages arise through landing at one point. On the other hand, it would require a great many battleships for the protection of numerous landing places. A division of the forces weakens all of them, and great difficulty would be found in uniformly managing the start of the operations for want of time and means. Therefore, it is recommended, when the situation permits, to select one central place for landing.
For the disembarking a harbor is of course the most advantageous; less advantageous but always favorable is an enclosed, protected bay; the most unfavorable is the open coast. Yet a landing on the open coast would encounter little resistance if it is carried out with great speed. If the chosen landing place be near a bay or a seaport town, it would be the mission of the first landed advance guard to seize this port, to make it possible for the transport fleet to disembark the mass of troops, horses and materials. The occupation of a good harbor will greatly hasten the unloading, prevent a hostile attack from the sea and add greatly to the ability of the landing corps to carry on the operations. If a seizure of a port is not possible, the landing of the entire expedition must take place by means of prepared disembarking contrivances. Every transport must be equipped for landing on an open coast.
The best landing place is a site nearest the object of the operations, which would force the opponents to a decision before they were thoroughly prepared. Clear coast regions within range of the ships' guns are desirable, as is also quiet, deep water near to the landing site.
It is possible to land within range of important hostile garrisons and fortifications. Russian landing maneuvers have demonstrated the truth of this statement. Fortifications are effective against landing enterprises only when sufficient troops are on hand to defend the coast. If the assailant is successful in landing a detachment of troops out of the range of the fortifications, the latter would be ineffective for defense. The best security, however, for the initial landing is its unexpected delivery. Reconnoitering of the coast site by boats sent beforehand is an absurdity, for the opponents immediately become acquainted with the landing plans and are given time for preparations for defense. Of great importance for rapid, well-regulated landing is uniform management through the signal service of the ships and the telephone service on land, which can be installed advantageously. In anchoring the ships must be the correct distance apart, to avoid crowding.
The execution of the landing as a rule is as follows: The advance guard rides ahead, on the last stretch, with its own escort of battleships, and lands, if possible, unawares, usually at night. If the landing be on an open coast, the mass of troops which follow should immediately throw up earthworks. The entire disembarking must be made with great speed, for the quicker the landing is accomplished the less the danger of being disturbed. The most favorable time for attacking the coast is at dawn, for the landing can take place unknown to the enemy and day be used for disembarking. As the ships do not carry a sufficient number of patent boats for landing on an open coast, special flat-bottom boats should be prepared for unloading horses and heavy material. The English employ collapsible boats for landing men, which accommodate a crew of fifty, while the Russians have flat-bottom boats capable of holding two hundred men, or one complete cannon. It is recommended that we be permitted to try the Russian model, which has been well tested. Small power boats should be employed for tugging, as rowing would be a waste of valuable time. To permit horses to swim ashore is to be condemned, for it would cause confusion and delay, and we know from experience that a large number are sometimes lost. The Americans, in their landing in Cuba, lost seven per cent. of their horses. For the landing of artillery and heavy materials small landing bridges must be erected on the beach, for which prepared material is carried on the transports. The assembling of the troops must not be permitted on the beach, for all space there must be kept for the landing of supplies.
If a landing near a harbor is successful, the advance guard will strive to take the same unawares, to seize those coast sentinels at hand and to destroy the telegraph and signal service along the coast. If all this is successful, the transport fleet will be signaled to draw near. The advantage is apparent in landing in a large harbor or bay, which affords the possibility of protection from a sea attack, through the mining of the waters or through the guard of a limited number of battleships. Earthworks, equipped with cannon and machine guns, must be thrown up for the protection from the land side.
The piers must be distributed to make sufficient room for disembarking. The existing plans for improvising landing bridges and gangways should be extended, in order to expedite the landing. The piers and bridges will be used for ships carrying horses, artillery and heavy materials, while the infantry land by boats, under the protection of large guns on shore or of the escorting battleships, should the battle fleet maintain command of the sea. The landed troops should be supplied provisions for many days so that they can begin operations independent of the supply trains.
The time required for landing is considerably less than for loading. The natural desire of the troops to land quickly helps to shorten the time. One writer gives the following data: Lord Cochran landed 18,000 men on the open coast of America in five hours; in the Crimean War the English accomplished the disembarking of 45,000 men, 83 guns and about 100 horses in less than eleven hours. The French are slower on account of their handling of supply trains. The Russians, in their landing maneuvers in the Black Sea, have landed a slow division in eleven and one-half hours, where the steamers had to anchor five to six kilometers from the coast. The marine writer Degories figures that under average conditions it is possible to land 25,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 60 guns in six hours. If the landing can be made in a harbor, this time can be essentially lessened.
After the disembarking of the expedition, the further task of the transport fleet and its escort of battleships depends on the maritime strength of the country attacked. If the assailant continues in command of the sea, the transport fleet can remain as a floating base for the landed corps and can effect the reenforcement of the expedition. If the assailant is not in command of the sea, then the transport fleet must attempt to evade the operations of the hostile fleet, by an immediate retreat to home waters.
The operations of the landed expedition corps on the whole can be conducted according to the principles set down by the commanders of the troops, but these principles must take into account the particular conditions under which the forces operate. The well-known marine writer, Mahan, emphasizes the fact that a landing operation must be offensive to succeed. Military history shows that after boldly carried out landings at Abukir and Cape Breton, for example, the success of the extensive operations was impaired, almost lost, because of lack of energy and rapidity of execution of offensive movements. The assembled strength must be thrown forward on the line of least resistance. Defensive strategy should be used only when a delay is necessary to receive expected reenforcements. The primary aim of the operations is to dispose of hostile forces, within the shortest possible time and with the least loss to ourselves.
During the progress of the operations the country through which the troops pass can be drawn upon to supplement equipment and supplies, but the speed of the advance and the efficiency of the troops must not be decreased through extended raids. While the distance to the objective of the invasion is generally not great, it should be our endeavor to be independent of our base of supplies. Much progress has been made in the methods of making condensed foods, for man and horse, which will help to solve the problem of provisions. The army of invasion can also take an important site in the hostile country and utilize it as a base of operations. Continuous communication with the home country is therefore not absolutely necessary. In a densely populated and rich country it is easy to secure provisions and supplies. The maintenance of long lines of communications is hazardous in that it requires excessive guard duty. When the battle fleet has gained command of the sea it will be in a position to protect continuously the base on the coast, and would also make it possible for the corps of invasion to select new bases. Sherman's march to Savannah in the Civil War has shown the practicability of this plan. After one objective has been attained, it should be possible for the expedition to reembark to land at some other point on the coast for further operations.
Against the enemy's defenses we must throw our full strength and avoid enterprises that involve a delay or a weakening of our forces. Dearly purchased victories will in the end defeat our own aims.
If the operations of the troops are carried on along the coast, or if the objective of the operations is a harbor or a coast fortification, the battle fleet should act in unison with the land forces. Battleships are superior to the field artillery, as they can be moved at will and so are hard to put out of action. Continuous bombardment from the battleships would prove effective aid for the troops.
It is important, then, that the command of land and naval forces be joined in a commander-in-chief who would direct the field forces as well as the naval forces. Small coast defenses of seaport cities could not for any length of time withstand such a combined attack. It is certain also that present-day coast defenses could not withstand an energetic attack from the land side. They are more vulnerable than inland fortresses because they are open to attack simultaneously from land and water. However, if the battle fleet cannot gain the command of the sea, and must retreat before the opposing forces, the operations of the landed troops must be conducted wholly as a war on land.
A reembarkation of the expedition corps is possible only when the battle fleet is able to prevent attack from the sea. In the event of defeat on land, reembarkation is not absolutely impossible, for if good order is maintained the improvised defenses of the landing sites, with the help of the fleet, will sufficiently delay the pursuers. If the reembarking must take place from some other point, preparations for its defense must be made in advance. When the reembarkation is done with the aim in view of attacking at another place, the rules as explained in the chapter on "Embarkation" must be adhered to. For such an operation, more time is essential, and pressure of the enemy should not be permitted to interfere with its management.
The recognized military complication with England and America affords an interesting example on account of the difference in distances in which the transporting of troops takes place, on account of the strength of the sea and land fighting forces of the two opponents, and lastly on account of the difference in the territorial extensions of the aforesaid countries, and on the whole challenges various measures.
A conflict with England must be fixed in the eye of Germany, for the great German struggle for commerce represents to England just as great a danger as the advance of Russia against India. Beginning operations with a naval war with England, we could almost foresee the result.
England has brought about the existence of such a powerful, active navy that we, with the best defenses we have, would hardly be able to win a decisive victory. Only by closing an alliance with Russia would the strength of England be injured indeed, but never by a direct threat from these provinces. But an alliance with France would in fact menace England. The latter, however, through her geographical location and through her large and timely expenditures, which every combined operation demands, could make possible by proper equipment a maritime superiority against this alliance.
England's weakness is in just that which forms our strength, namely, the land army. The English army responds to neither quantity nor quality of its great and powerful position in comparison with the extent of the land; therefore England, from convictions, proceeds so that every invasion of the land can be prevented by the fleet. These convictions are in no way justified, for while England in developing a powerful sea-fighting strength has every day prepared for war, she has not had a view of the consequences of confronting and beating a really weaker sea opponent with its fighting units.
These are the measures which Germany, in case of a threatened war with England, must adopt and practise: Our endeavors must be to engage the fleet, if possible; to throw part of our land forces upon the English coast, so that the conflict on the sea can be carried to the enemy's land, where our troops are already superior in quality to England's, and so that a victory for England's powerful naval strength could have but the smallest influence.
The army fighting strength of England under the commander-in-chief is composed of the army reserve, the militia, the volunteers and the yeomanry. In the event of an unexpected invasion, only the commander-in-chief and army reserve can be considered to any extent, for the militia needs so much time to assemble and equip that they would be in a weak position to assist the commander-in-chief in the first decisive battle. The volunteers and yeomanry cannot in so short a time be trained for war or be mobilized for action. Also their insignificant fighting value must be kept in view, beside which our well-trained troops will not let them seem as menacing opponents.
The English army is formed of three army corps with three divisions to each corps. A third to a half of these corps is comprised of militia, so that either it must be first completed, and then it would be too late for cooperation in the first decisive battle, or it would be so untrained that it really cannot be said to reach the strength of a division. Of two army corps, two divisions and one cavalry brigade are in Ireland, the greater part of which must remain there to prevent the undertaking of a German invasion through Ireland even though it brought about the longed-for freedom.
The preparation for defense should also be considered. This might consist of one army corps with three divisions, or one army corps comprised of two divisions, with perhaps a cavalry brigade made up from three army corps. Whereas the army strength of an English division is about 10,000 men, a German division carries 16,000 men, hence four German divisions and a cavalry division would have a superiority over the English army. But we are in a position to set over in England, in the shortest time, six divisions of infantry, or five divisions of infantry and one cavalry division.
How a well regulated operation against England is to be conducted across the sea, obviously cannot be forecasted here. The passage in moderate weather is a little over thirty hours' ride from our North Sea harbors. The English coast affords extensive stretches of shore which are suitable for landing troops. The land contains such large resources that the invading army can procure a living therefrom. On the other hand, the extent of the island is not so great that the English land defenses could ever succeed in timely destroying a successful invading force.
It is improbable that Germany could carry on for very long a well regulated war necessitating considerable reenforcement of troops. The supplies would have to be furnished for the greater part on land. Maintaining communication with the home country can therefore readily be seen to be of importance.
It is conclusive that the first aim of every operation of invasion in England is their field army, and the second must be London. It is probable that these two objectives would fall together, in that the field army, on account of the small value of the volunteers, is needed for the protection of London fortifications, so as not to leave the metropolis insufficiently defended. Powerful public opinion would demand this for fear that London would fall into the hands of the invaders. But if London is taken by the invading army this would still be only one of the many war ports which must be seized, to secure a base of supplies and for the further operations which have every view to concluding the overthrow of England.
Operations against the United States of North America must be entirely different. With that country, in particular, political friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years, and has, until now, been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part. However, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force, in order to combat the encroachment of the United States upon our interests. Our main factor here is our fleet. Our battle fleet has every prospect of victoriously defeating the forces of the United States, widely dispersed over the two oceans. It is certain that after the defeat of the United States fleet, the great extension of unprotected coast line and powerful resources of that country would compel them to make peace.
There is no effective method to force this opponent to relinquish its maritime operations, even though there is only a trifling number of American merchantmen, except the simultaneous blockading with our sea forces of American ports, which can only be taken with heavy losses, while our fleet demonstrated the actual limited worth of the unpacified American colonies.
It must be deemed a possibility that the battle fleet of the United States would not risk an engagement at sea except to avoid a disaster, but would await, in its fortified harbors, a favorable opportunity to strike. It is evident, then, that a naval war against the United States cannot be carried on with success without at the same time inaugurating action on land. Because of the great extensions of the United States it would not be satisfactory for the operation of an invading army to be directed toward conquering the interior of the land. It is almost a certainty, however, that a victorious assault on the Atlantic coast, tying up the importing and exporting business of the whole country, would bring about such an annoying situation that the government would be willing to treat for peace.
If the German invading force were equipped and ready for transporting the moment the battle fleet is despatched, under average conditions these corps can begin operations on American soil within at least four weeks. To what extent we will be able to succeed has already been considered.
The United States at this time is not in a position to oppose our troops with an army of equal rank. Its regular army actually totals 65,000 men, of whom not more than 30,000 are ready to defend the home country. Of these at least 10,000 men are required to guard Indian territory and for the garrisoning of coast-wise fortifications, so that only a regular army of 20,000 is available for field service. There is also a militia of 100,000 men, the larger number of whom have not been trained since the last war summons, and they are poorly equipped with inferior rifles and still more poorly drilled.
If an unexpected invasion of the United States is prevented by the length of time for the transporting of troops, and only an unexpected landing can take place, it must be emphasized that the weakness and inexperience of their regular army would essentially facilitate a quick invasion.
For the continued occupation of as large a territory as the United States, if they can oppose us for any length of time, an important fighting force will be necessary, to protect the operating lines and to carry on a successful warfare. An invading operation will be difficult to reenforce, in that a second trip of the transport fleet will be required, in order to despatch the necessary number of troops, at such a great distance.
It is upon the whole questionable whether there is anything to be gained in occupying for any length of time so large a stretch of land as the United States. The fact that one or two of her provinces are occupied by the invaders would not alone move the Americans to sue for peace. To accomplish this end the invaders would have to inflict real material damage by injuring the whole country through the successful seizure of many of the Atlantic seaports in which the threads of the entire wealth of the nation meet. It should be so managed that a line of land operations would be in close juncture with the fleet, through which we would be in a position to seize, within a short time, many of these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means of supply, disorganize all governmental affairs, assume control of all useful buildings, confiscate all war and transport supplies, and lastly, to impose heavy indemnities. For enterprises of this sort small land forces would answer our purpose, for it would be unwise for the American garrisons to attempt an attack.
Their excellently developed net of railways will enable them to concentrate their troops in a relatively short time at the various recognized landing points on the coast. But there are many other splendid landings, and it appears feasible for the invading corps to conduct its operations on these points with the cooperation of the fleet. The land corps can either advance aggressively against the concentrated opposing forces, or through embarking evade an attack and land at a new place.
As a matter of fact, Germany is the only great power which is in a position to conquer the United States. England could of course carry out a successful attack on the sea, but she would not be prepared to protect her Canadian provinces, with which the Americans could compensate themselves for a total or crushing defeat on the sea. None of the other great powers can provide the necessary transport fleet to attempt an invasion.