Franchet d'Esperey, General, G.O.C. 5th Army, vice Lanrezac superseded (Sept. 4), 107;

at the Marne, 115, 123, 125.

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, murder of, 1.

Franco-Belgian frontier, terrain near, 49.

Franco-British consultations in Aug. 1914, 6, 9;

Military relations during 1914, 108, 112 passim;

Understanding as to Co-operation in event of German attack on France, 5, 6, 9.

Franco-German war of 1870, fame in, of the Brandenburg Corps, 285.

Franière, German advance near, 57.

Frederick Charles of Prussia, Prince, and the Brandenburg Corps, 285.

Frederick the Great, German military following of, 346.

French, Field Marshal Sir J. P., G.C.B., &c. (now Viscount French of Ypres), and the Great War;

Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Aug. 1914, 2, 3, 8, 17;

the command "entirely independent," 15 (cf. 94 sqq., 177, and 329-30,

see also Ammunition, Channel Ports, Move Northward, Offensive);

anticipation by, of European War, 1, 8;

the first idea received of the coming in 1914, 2;

the violation of Belgian neutrality expected, 10-11;

at the Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914, 3;

views of, on landing of B.E.F., 6-7;

advance studies of, on problems of a B.E.F., 8-9;

all plans concentrated on a war of movement and manœuvre, 11;

at German manœuvres of 1911, and the Kaiser's remarks on his forces, 9-10;

instructions to, before leaving for France, 13-5, 94;

arrival in France, official visits, 33;

first meeting with Joffre and his staff, 34 sqq.;

visits of, to Corps Commanders, &c., and conferences with them, 40, 43, 47, 60, 62, 130, 154, 159, 202, 209, 210, 219, 243-4, 246, 249, 255, 337 et alibi;

visit of, to Lanrezac, 56;

and message sent to, later, 57;

interviews with Commander of French Reserve Divisions, 37;

letter to Kitchener on French dispositions W. of the Meuse,

request in, for Plumer to succeed Grierson, 38-40;

appreciation of the situation on Aug. 18, 40-2;

observations on the physique of the British troops, 42;

invitation to Louvain from the King of the Belgians, 42-3;

message from Belgian Government on evacuating Brussels, 45-6;

no idea of retreat then entertained by, 47;

visit to Lanrezac's G.H.Q., and the beginning of his retreat, 56-7;

Lanrezac's request to, 58;

and the reply, 59;

anxiety for the Mons salient, 61;

meeting with Sordet, 67-8;

the temptation of Maubeuge, 70;

orders issued for the retreat to continue, 71;

the vital problem before, as to a stand on Aug. 25, 73;

retreat decided on, 74;

account of the fighting at Landrecies sent by, to Kitchener, 75;

Dispatch by, on the Battle of Le Cateau, 79-80;

interviews with Joffre and with Lanrezac, 81, 82-3, 85-6;

Joffre's, telegram to, of appreciation of the services of the British Army, 85;

possible stand on the Oise considered by, and personal reconnaissance by, of the terrain, 85;

roadside talks with the British troops, 88-9;

idea of, for a stand between the Marne and the Seine, 92;

conference of, with Joffre, inability to make a stand insisted on, 92;

and reiterated, 93;

opinion of, on von Kluck's movement, 106;

pressure put upon to change his plans successfully resisted, 92, 93 sqq., 111-12;

independence of action, necessity for, felt and urged by, in letter to Lord Kitchener, 94;

interview in Paris with Kitchener, 95 sqq.;

results, 95-8;

letters to, from Joffre on French's proposed disposition of forces, 96-7, 97-8;

and the reply, 98;

letter to, from Gallieni (Sept. 2), on co-operation of the British, in the defence of Paris, and the reply (Sept. 3), 102-4;

Joffre's plans communicated to, 107;

and conference with him at Melun, 110, 114 sqq.;

object of, in writing this record, 111, 114 sqq.;

basis of orders issued by, on the Battle of the Marne, 114, 116-17, 122-3;

view of, on the enemy situation and intentions before the Battle of the Marne, 116-17;

visits by, to the British Corps, 118-19, 122;

problem before, on Sept. 7-8, 123-5;

memorandum issued by, on lessons of the Marne Battle, 129 sqq.;

the Marne crossed by, and a talk with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, 135-6;

despatch of, on the Battle of the Marne, 137;

estimate by, of the British contribution to the success of the Battle of the Marne, 140-1;

optimism of, after the Battle of the Marne, 142 sqq.;

further conferences with Joffre, 143;

principle of modern warfare brought home to, 145;

observations by, 145, 148, 149, 159-60, 161, 206-7, 222, 237, 243, 323 et alibi;

appreciation by, of the situation on Sept. 14-15, 153;

reviving hopes of enemy retreat, 153;

modified on Sept. 16, 154, 155;

grave anxiety beginning to possess, as to the safety of the Channel ports (q.v.), 155-7, 176;

the move N. from the Aisne for their defence with naval co-operation first conceived, 157, 162, 164;

letter to, from Maunoury, on his intended advance, and asking for British support, 161-2;

official correspondence of, on heavy artillery (q.v.), and Munitions (q.v.) begun, 163;

visit to, of Winston Churchill (Sept.), 163-4;

plans for co-operation with the Navy discussed, 164;

letters exchanged by, with Joffre, on the move N. of the British forces, 164 sqq.;

hampered by the smallness of his army, 165;

difficulties of, due to the siege and fall of Antwerp, 175 sqq.;

exchange of messages on, between French and Kitchener, 179 sqq.;

strongly averse to sending troops inside Antwerp, 180;

steps taken by, to keep in touch with events at Antwerp, 184-5;

efforts of, to expedite the British move N., urgent note from, to Joffre, and the reply, 185 sqq.;

conclusions of, on the German situation on Oct. 1, hopes of, and orders issued by, 193-4;

basis of, 194;

visit to, from President Poincaré, 198;

visits by, to de Castelnau, and to Foch, plans detailed to, and concerted with the latter, 199-200;

instructions given by, to Allenby, 200-1, 202, 205;

and to Rawlinson, 201;

plans arranged by, with Foch, 203, 216, 218, 220;

and direction based thereon given to Corps Commanders, 219;

these plans modified by reports and observations, 218, 220, 222, 223 sqq.;

apprehension of, as to offensive advance conveyed to Foch, and his reply, 220-1;

all hope of an offensive abandoned (Oct. 21), 228;

reinforcements obtainable, 228;

visit of, to Pulteney at Hazebrouck, the fighting witnessed there, 205-7;

mistaken anticipations before the 1st Battle of Ypres, basis of, 216, 223,

the one reservation, 216-17;

grave decision taken by, on Oct. 19, workings of his mind, and manner in which the problem presented itself, 223 sqq.;

conclusions arrived at, a balance of certain against uncertain disaster, 225;

action taken on decision, 225 sqq.;

instructions given by, to Haig on Oct. 19, 225-6;

reserves lacking to, 225;

hopes of, in Oct., 1914, 231;

basis of, 229, 231 sqq.;

efforts of, to minimise the evils of divided command, 232-3;

estimate held by, of British operations during the second phase of the 1st Battle of Ypres, 237;

anxiety of, concerning the 2nd Corps, 240, 241;

apprehension of, on supply of Ammunition, 241;

visit to, of Foch, promising effective support to 1st Corps, 245;

blow to, of the falling back of the 1st Corps, 252-3;

the dramatic climax, 253 sqq.;

message sent by, to the O.C. London Scottish on their work of Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 263;

their aspect on parade noted by, 264;

hopes of, still constantly disappointed, 270-1;

consultations of, with Foch on the need of relieving the 1st Corps, 283-4;

the infection of his hopefulness, 274;

news of the great enemy attack received during, 277-8;

view of, on the true position for the British Army, 302,

(see also) 154 sqq. and Channel Ports);

visit to, while on the Aisne, from Winston Churchill (then at the Admiralty), agreement with on Naval co-operation, 302-3 sqq.;

letters to, from Churchill on the same subject, 303-5;

replies by, to memoranda from Kitchener on the Zeebrugge scheme, 311-13;

and to that of the War Council on possible different theatres of war, 315-17;

visit to, from Admiral Hood (Dec. 13), on Naval co-operation in the advance from Nieuport, 321;

ordered home for consultation with the Cabinet, 329;

the meeting at Walmer Castle, 329;

discussions with Kitchener on the situation;

insistence by French on his personal responsibility for all blame, 329-30;

sympathy shown to, by Asquith, 332;

feelings of, for Kitchener as soldier and as politician, their differences, a last and happy memory of a former chief, 333;

continued discussion with the War Cabinet, 334;

its alarmist views not shared by, 336;

nor by Foch, 337;

decision of, to form Armies, communicated to designated Commanders, 337;

the Christmas fraternisation stopped by, 338;

interview of, with Joffre by desire of the War Cabinet, 335, 336, 340;

on future plans, as to coastal advance, with Naval co-operation, 342;

plan of, to work the N. section with the Belgian and British Armies, 343;

why it failed, 343, 345;

state of mind of, at close of 1914;

the results of the year justifying, 345;

experiments conducted by, in the field, on new weapons for trench warfare, 354-5;

constant efforts of, to secure adequate supplies of Munitions of War and considered action by, of May 1915, with full knowledge of all entailed thereby, 347 sqq.;

earlier urgency, when chief of I.G.S., on the Munitions question;

financial opposition met by, 348;

visits to, of Members of both Houses of Parliament on whom the need of Guns and Munitions was urged, 355;

interviews given by, to the Press, on the question of Munitions, 355;

ordered to surrender part of his Munition reserves for the Dardanelles, 357;

Secretary and A.D.C. sent by, to lay proofs of the urgent need of Munitions before Lloyd George, as well as before Balfour and Bonar Law, 357;

text of the Memorandum sent at the same time, 357 sqq.;

the results, 360-1;

unprecedented action taken by, on the Munition question (May 9, 1915), and the results, 357 sqq.;

Offices held by, at various times,

Chief of Imperial General Staff, 1, 2;

I.G. of Forces, 8, 296;

I.Y., experiences as, fully borne out in the War, 295;

On his alleged call on Maunoury for assistance on Sept. 8, 135;

On the effect on the campaign of the shortage of Ammunition (q.v.), 350-1;

on his lack of reserves, 265;

on the lesson learnt from the failure at the Lys River, 145;

On his position as C.-in-C. in France, 94, 99-100, 329-30;

On the possibility of "bending" but not of "breaking" the enemy's trench line, 145;

Orders of the Day, issued by, see under British Expeditionary Force;

Submarine construction in sections suggested by (May 1914), 214.