My answer to (1) is this: Had we been in possession of the Belgian coast-line between Nieuport and the Dutch frontier in the early part of 1915, and had we maintained it to the end of the war, the Germans would have been deprived in a great measure of the power they have exercised throughout with such success, to prosecute their submarine campaign. Any price we might have had to pay in the way of losses would have been well worth the object attained.

In a lesser degree this may be said of the enemy's aircraft enterprises. I claim that the naval history of this war clearly bears out my contention.

As to (2), the extent of the line to be held would depend upon the degree of success attained by the operations. If we had been able to make good our advance from the left flank (between Nieuport and Dixmude) by means of powerful naval support from the sea, the least we should have effected would have been to clear the Germans out of the triangle Nieuport—Dixmude—Zeebrugge.

If the operation had then to be suspended, we should have had to hold the line Dixmude—Zeebrugge instead of Dixmude—Nieuport. In actual distance the former space is about double the latter. But our position at Zeebrugge would have afforded a large measure of naval support, and the country to the south-west of that place lends itself to inundations. This would have enabled us to occupy the north-eastern portion of the line in much less strength. Further, it was just in anticipation of such a necessity that the extra troops were asked for.

Inasmuch, however, as such a situation would have forced upon the enemy the necessity of holding a dangerous and exposed salient which could be reached on the north side by our guns from the Fleet, it is more than possible that he would have effected such a retirement as would have considerably shortened our line.

(3) This contention is disputed; but even if it were true, it is no sound military argument against embarking on an operation which promised such valuable results.

(4) There is a complete answer to this objection. Some two or three months later, large trainloads of ammunition—heavy, medium, and light—passed by the rear of the Army in France en route to Marseilles for shipment to the Dardanelles.

(5) The best possible means of warding off an attack is to take a strong and powerful initiative.

I cannot characterise these reasons for rejecting my plans as other than illogical, and I feel sure they must really have appeared so to their authors.

Perhaps the true explanation which underlay all this is to be found in the following Memorandum of the War Council of January 9th, 1915. It runs as follows:—

the possibility of employing british forces in a different theatre than that in which they are now used.

"The Council considered carefully your remarks on this subject in reply to Lord Kitchener's letter, and came to the conclusion that, certainly for the present, the main theatre of operations for British forces should be alongside the French Army, and that this should continue as long as France was liable to successful invasion and required armed support. It was also realised that, should the offensive operations subsequently drive the Germans out of France and back to Germany, British troops should assist in such operations. It was thought that, after another failure by Germany to force the lines of defence held by the French Army and yours, the military situation in France and Flanders might conceivably develop into one of stalemate, in which it would be impossible for German forces to break through into France, while at the same time the German defences would be impassable for offensive movements of the Allies without great loss of life and the expenditure of more ammunition than could be provided. In these circumstances, it was considered desirable to find some other theatre where such obstructions to advance would be less pronounced, and from where operations against the enemy might lead to more decisive results.

"For these reasons, the War Council decided that certain of the possible projects for pressing the war in other theatres should be carefully studied during the next few weeks, so that, as soon as the new forces are fit for action, plans may be ready to meet any eventuality that may be then deemed expedient, either from a political point of view, or to enable our forces to act with the best advantage in concert with the troops of other nations throwing in their lot with the Allies."

In fact, the idea became fixed in the minds of the War Council that a condition of stalemate was bound to occur on the Western front, and therefore other theatres which might afford greater opportunities of prosecuting a successful offensive must be sought.

I was asked for my views as to this, and I gave them in full. Space does not allow me to quote my memorandum on the subject in extenso, but my ideas will be gleaned from the concluding paragraphs, which run as follows:—

"Assuming however, that all the foregoing arguments are brushed aside, it remains to be seen where any effective action could be taken. The countries to be considered are the following:—

"(a) Russia.—Impossible, as there is no means of sending an Army there, the Baltic being closed. Archangel shut in winter and unsuitable at other seasons, and Vladivostok much too far away.

"(b) Denmark and (c) Holland.—One or other of these countries would have to declare war on Germany unless her neutrality were violated, and in both cases the overseas communication would be so vulnerable to mine or torpedo attack as to be in the highest degree insecure.

"(d) North German Coast.—Communications would be equally vulnerable.

"(e) Italy.—Assumes that Italy is a friendly belligerent, in which case she would probably not require the assistance of British troops, as her own action should be sufficient to finish Austria. It is unlikely that Italy would be induced to join in simply by the offer of troops which her military intelligence must know would be better employed elsewhere.

"(f) Istria and Dalmatia.—A very dangerous line of communication, and one which would be impossible in the face of a hostile Italy. The islands on the Dalmatian seaboard are specially favourable for the action of defending submarines and torpedo craft, while mines might render any approach to the coast out of the question. With an actively friendly Italy an advance through her territory would be more practicable, but, as stated in preceding paragraph, unnecessary.

"(g) Through Greece to Servia, presumably viâ, Salonika, presumes Greece to be a friendly belligerent. Probably the least objectionable of any possible proposal, but necessitating the strict neutrality of Bulgaria, as otherwise the land communications would be very open to attack. A hostile Italy would also jeopardise the whole force.

"(h) Gallipoli, Asia Minor, Syria.—Any attack on Turkey would be devoid of decisive result. In the most favourable circumstances it could only cause the relaxation of the pressure against Russia in the Caucasus and enable her to transfer two or three Corps to the West—a result quite incommensurate with the effort involved. To attack Turkey would be to play the German game and to bring about the end which Germany had in mind when she induced Turkey to join in the war, namely, to draw off troops from the decisive spot, which is Germany itself.

"To sum up, my opinions are—

"(1) That the impossibility of breaking through the German line in Flanders has not been proved, and that that operation is feasible provided a sufficiency of high-explosive shells and of guns is provided.

"(2) That, even if it were proved impossible to break the German line, so large a margin of safety is needed that troops could not be withdrawn from this theatre. It is to be remembered that the Allies are in a much better position to await the outcome of events. Time is against Germany; she will not sit for ever behind her entrenchments, and the Allies must be prepared with an adequate force to strike her whenever she may attempt to break out or withdraw.

"(3) That there are no theatres, other than those in which operations are now in progress, in which decisive results could be attained.

"I have not gone into details in considering the question of the employment of forces in other theatres, as such operations were considered by the M.O. Directorate of the War Office when I was C.I.G.S., and I have no doubt that a full record of the conclusions which were reached are filed there."

General Joffre's final opinion is expressed in a memorandum, dated January 19th, 1915, of which the following is a summary:—

"1. I wish to call your particular attention to the following points:—

"2. The French General Staff consider a German offensive possible—even probable—in the near future. The Germans are certainly making new formations; the 38th Corps has been identified in Bavaria.

"3. Our front must therefore be made absolutely secure. If broken, for example, about Roye and Montdidier, the consequences for the Allies would be of the most serious description.

"4. In addition to (3) we must place ourselves in the position of being able to assume the offensive.

"5. Because of (3) and (4), reserves are absolutely necessary.

"6. For these reasons, I am anxious for a rapid release of the Corps north of the British line.

"7. We must never lose sight of the decisive result, and all secondary operations must give way.

"8. Operations towards Ostend—Zeebrugge, though important, are, for the moment, secondary, and in my opinion should follow rather than precede the principal action, viz., the Collection of Reserves.

"To resume:—

I always disagreed with these views, and remain convinced that my plans should have been accepted and tried. I will only add, as a further argument against embarking upon operations in other theatres of war, that our military forces at that time, and for at least fifteen months afterwards, were not sufficient to enable us to carry on great operations in more than one theatre with the necessary power and energy required for success. They could only have resulted in what actually happened in 1915, viz., the series of feeble and on the whole unsuccessful attempts to break through the German line in France, and an absolute failure, compelling ultimate withdrawal of our troops, in the Dardanelles.

I have dealt at perhaps wearisome length with the strategic alternatives and the problems which presented themselves for solution after the close of the First Battle of Ypres. It has been necessary to do so in order that my countrymen may understand the situation as it actually existed at the time, and that they may appreciate what seemed to me conclusive reasons why greater progress was not made in 1915.

Divided counsels lead to half measures and indecisive action. Such counsels have always had, and always will have, the most deterrent and disadvantageous effect on any vigorous prosecution of a war, great or small.(Back to Content)

CHAPTER XVI

THE OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14TH-19TH, 1914

For the plan sketched out in the last chapter, a certain amount of naval co-operation was secured. The Admiralty were always strongly in favour of my original proposal, and did not at all like the half-hearted operation which Joffre was substituting for it. They urged, with great force and reason, that the risks run by the ships in co-operation on the Belgian coast were increasingly great owing to the powerful fortifications erected by the Germans, and the presence of enemy submarines at Zeebrugge. Whilst, therefore, those risks might well be run in support of a real, strenuous, and powerful endeavour to wrench the coast-line from the enemy's grasp, the Admiralty felt that the Navy could not afford to sacrifice strength in hanging about day after day exposed to such risks, in the sole hope of rendering some slight help to an attack which had no great or decisive object in view. In proof of this, I quote the following telegrams which were received from the Admiralty. On December 20th, 1914, they wired as follows:—

"We are receiving almost daily requests from the French for naval support on the Belgian coast. We regret we are unable to comply. The small vessels by themselves cannot face the new shore batteries, and it is not justifiable to expose battleships to submarine perils unless to support a land attack of primary importance.

"If such an attack is delivered, all the support in my Memorandum forwarded to you through Secretary of State for War will, of course, be afforded. I would be glad if you would explain this to Gen. Foch, as it is painful to the officers concerned to make repeated refusals."

A previous wire had arrived on the 18th, the last few lines of which ran as follows:—

"It is not justifiable to expose 'Majestic' to submarine risks unless to support a real movement, in which case every risk will be run and ample support provided."

And before this, on the 12th, the following was received:—

"Will you please put us in communication with the French General who will conduct the operation.... Meanwhile, all our preparations as outlined are proceeding, ... but the serious risks to our ships, both from batteries and submarines, ought not to be incurred except in an operation of the first importance."

Admiral Hood, who afterwards fell so gloriously in the hour of victory at the Battle of Jutland, was then in command at Dover. He was responsible for the naval co-operation arranged for, and came to my Headquarters on the 13th to discuss plans. It was arranged that at daybreak on the 15th the advance from Nieuport was to be supported by two battleships, three monitors and six destroyers.

I urged the Quartermaster-General to do his utmost to provide more machine guns. At that time we had considerably less than one per company, and it was an arm in which the Germans were particularly well found. They must at that time have had at least six or seven to our one.

In the operations now under discussion, this disability was felt very severely. In discussing the progress of the fight with General d'Urbal on the 15th at Poperinghe, he told me that the slight and disappointing advance made by the French was due to their being everywhere held up by machine-gun fire. He said the enemy had received large machine-gun reinforcements, and he was then sending down special guns in armoured motors to endeavour to crush them.

From all parts of the line the same complaint came of the preponderance of the enemy's machine-gun fire.

The operations opened on the morning of the 14th by a combined attack on the line Hollebeke—Wytschaete ridge. It began when it was hardly daylight, at 7 a.m., by heavy artillery bombardment. At 7.45, the French right (five regiments of the 16th Corps) moved forward and captured the enemy's advance trenches on our left flank.

The 2nd Batt. Royal Scots and 1st Batt. Gordons (of Bowes' 8th Brigade, 3rd Division) then advanced on Petit Bois and Mendleston Farm. The Royal Scots seized and held the wood, which in the evening they entrenched on the eastern side. They captured about sixty prisoners, including some officers.

The Gordons at dusk had captured the enemy's trenches surrounding Mendleston Farm, but were again driven out of them by a powerful machine-gun counter-attack. They had to fall back on their own trenches.

The French 32nd Corps attacked to the north of the 16th on the line Klein Zillebeke—Zillebeke, and advanced some 200 to 300 yards. They repulsed a German counter-attack from Zandvoorde and captured the trenches in front of the château of Hollebeke.

As the French had not established themselves in the position agreed upon, the 3rd Division was unable to advance further, whilst the 5th Division (right of 2nd Corps) and all the 3rd Corps were confined the whole day to demonstration and holding the enemy.

I visited the Poste de Commandement of the 3rd Division Commander (Haldane) on the Scherpenberg—a hill near Bailleul, surmounted by a windmill—in the afternoon, and witnessed the fighting for some time. It struck me that the enemy artillery fire was much weaker than ours.

The operations were continued on the 15th, and I again spent some time on the Scherpenberg watching the progress of the fight, so far as the weather permitted any view; we were again prevented from advancing owing to the delay of the French on our left. Our joint plan was that successive points had to be taken from north to south. It is obvious that the movement had to commence on the French left, but from the first our Allies failed to execute their task and we had to wait for them.

The weather was terrible and the ground simply quagmire, whilst the rain, cold, and the awful mud of the holding soil paralysed any energetic attempt to drive the enemy back. A desultory fire was kept up at all points along the line; but no great activity appeared to be possible. The rôle of the 2nd Corps was quite plain and clear: it had to wait for the 16th French Corps to reach its allotted points.

Later in the day I went round to the 3rd Corps Headquarters and there met the Corps Commander (Pulteney), Du Cane, his Chief of Staff, and Allenby, Commanding the Cavalry.

I discussed the general course of the operations with them. I had in my mind the possibility of giving some impetus to the general advance by making an attack with troops of the 3rd Corps across the River Douve, and thus directly supporting an advance by Smith-Dorrien's right, perhaps supported by the cavalry. The mud and water in the valley of that river, however, presented insuperable difficulties.

During the night of the 15th-16th, troops of the 5th Division captured some trenches to the south of Messines.

I was much perturbed at the slow progress we were making, as no better reports came from anywhere along the whole of the Allied line.

On the 16th I again visited the Scherpenberg, where I was met by Smith-Dorrien and Haldane. Smith-Dorrien assured me that the understanding between himself and the Commander of the 16th French Corps on his left (General Grosetti) to provide for mutual support and co-operation had been complete.

As our great aim was now to reduce the enemy's machine-gun fire, I directed Smith-Dorrien to send his pack artillery, which had recently been given him, close down behind the trenches and dig them well in.

De Maud'huy's attack north of Arras was begun on the 16th by a heavy artillery bombardment. The infantry attack followed on the 17th, but the results were disappointing, although a little ground was gained near Notre Dame de Lorette. Some slight progress was made by the French 21st Corps.

I tried to see Foch, but he was away from his Headquarters with de Maud'huy. I sent Henry Wilson after him to explain my views, namely, that our present plan must be modified, owing largely to the fact that we had considerably under-estimated the enemy's strength, particularly in the matter of machine guns. Foch sent Wilson back to tell me that he agreed in thinking that the present operations had not proved a success. He proposed to break them off as soon as we could reconsider our arrangements. He begged me, however, to continue demonstrating all along my front as much as possible, with a view to supporting the attack upon which de Maud'huy was now embarked.

It was at this time that one of the many instances occurred of the evils which attend divided command. There was undoubtedly a great opportunity on and about December 18th for a powerful attack opposite Wytschaete. I proposed to mass the 16th French and 2nd British Corps at this point, when I discovered that the 16th Corps was practically melting away on my left flank. Two brigades had been despatched to the north, and other units had been sent away to support de Maud'huy's attack on Arras. I was in complete ignorance of these moves until they were accomplished facts. I therefore had to give up all idea of a joint attack on any large scale for the present, and issued orders to Corps Commanders enjoining them to demonstrate on their immediate front, to keep the enemy occupied and seize any opportunity which might offer to capture hostile trenches.

Colonel Thomson (liaison officer with General de Castelnau) told me that the 2nd French Army had made some progress, the first line of the enemy trenches near Albert had been taken and the ground made good. Progress was also made near Roye.

Captain Spiers (11th Hussars), who was now my liaison officer with General de Maud'huy, came to me. He told me that a German counter-attack on Notre Dame de Lorrette had regained all ground lost by the enemy on the day before, but that the attack on Givenchy-les-La Bassée had succeeded only to the extent of capturing a trench west of the village, and that progress was being slowly made to the north. The ground won at St. Laurent was retained in spite of repeated German counter-attacks. Some trenches north of Notre Dame de Consolation (east of Vermelles) were also taken and held.

I have had occasion to mention Spiers' name before. He has since deservedly risen to much higher rank. In my mind I always used to class him with Captain Colquhoun Grant of Peninsular fame—one of Wellington's most trusted scouting officers.

I have a most vivid and grateful recollection of the invaluable services performed by this intrepid young officer. He is possessed of an extremely acute perception, and is able to express himself and deliver his reports in the clearest and most concise terms. He was always exact and accurate, and never failed to bring me back the information I most particularly wanted. I seldom knew him at fault. He was a perfect master of the French language and was popular with the staffs, and made welcome by the various generals to whom he was attached. His unfailing tact, judgment and resource were very marked. His reckless, daring courage often made me anxious for his safety, and, indeed, he was severely wounded on at least five separate occasions.

I remember well his coming back to report to me late one evening. He spoke with his usual confidence and decision, and the information which he gave me proved to be very important and accurate, but I noticed that his voice was weak and he looked very tired and worn in the face. I sent him away to his quarters as quickly as possible, thinking he wanted rest. All this time he had a bullet in his side, and in that condition he had travelled back several miles to make his report. He fainted after leaving my room, and lay in considerable danger for several days.

To resume my narrative. The 3rd, 4th, and Indian Corps were all energetic in carrying out my latest orders, and demonstrated with considerable activity. On the 19th the 8th Division captured some trenches at Neuve Chapelle, and the 7th Division at Rouges Bancs, but of the latter, the 2nd Batt. Scots Guards, in the 20th Brigade, were driven back by a counter-attack; as also were the Devons.

Attacks were made very early in the morning by the Garhwal, Sirhind, and Ferozepore Brigades. Each was successful, and parts of the enemy's trenches were captured.

The Garhwal Brigade captured two machine guns and some prisoners, but had to return to their own trenches in the evening.

The 11th Brigade of the 4th Division, under Hunter Weston (1st Batt. Somerset L.I., 1st Batt. E. Lancs Regt., 1st Batt. Hampshire Regt., 1st Batt. Rifle Brigade), made a concerted attack on the morning of the 19th on the edge of Ploegsteert Wood. Some houses were captured, but the mud and the wet made progress difficult. However, they maintained their position well.

The success of the Indian Corps was destined to be of but short duration. During the night of the 20th the enemy regained all the trenches they had taken except some sap-heads near Givenchy. The Germans attacked at daybreak all along the line between Givenchy-les-La Bassée and la Quinque Rue. The Sirhind Brigade were driven back on Festubert, and Givenchy was lost, but retaken in the afternoon.

On the front of the Meerut Division only the Garhwal Brigade on the left held its ground, and in the evening the situation was serious, the Germans occupying nearly all our line between Givenchy and Richebourg, whilst the Corps reserves were all engaged. In the evening the three brigades of the Indian Cavalry Corps were thrown into the fight.

At night Sir James Willcocks reported his troops as much exhausted, and urged their immediate relief; the 1st Corps was therefore ordered to send two brigades (1st and 3rd) up to the line occupied by the Indian Corps.

At 2.35 p.m. these two brigades advanced and partially restored the situation on the front Givenchy—Festubert, driving the enemy out of Givenchy. The 2nd Brigade (2nd Batt. R. Sussex Regt., 1st Batt. N. Lancs, 1st Batt. Northants Regt., 2nd Batt. K.R.R.) had now also been ordered up, and advanced in support of the Lahore Division.

On the evening of the 21st the 1st Corps were ordered to take over the Indian Corps' line. In the early hours of the 22nd the 1st Brigade (1st Batt. Coldstream Guards, 1st Batt. Scots Guards, 1st Batt. Black Watch, 1st Batt. Cameron Highlanders) made Givenchy secure. The 3rd Brigade (2nd Batt. R. Munster Fusiliers, 1st Batt. S. Wales Borderers, 1st Batt. Gloucester Regt., 2nd Batt. Welsh Regt.) was unable to re-establish the original line on the left of the 1st Brigade, but occupied a line thrown slightly back.

The 2nd Brigade endeavoured to gain the old line at la Quinque Rue, but was unable to do so, and secured a position with its right in touch with the Meerut Brigade and in front of Festubert.

At 1 p.m. on the 22nd Sir Douglas Haig (commanding the 1st Corps) assumed command in this area.

On the 23rd the 27th Division, which had been despatched from England, completed its detrainment and concentrated in the area about Arques (near St. Omer).

On the 17th I received a letter from Kitchener from which I gleaned that the Cabinet were much perturbed by rumours of a contemplated invasion by the enemy, which apparently emanated from the Admiralty. The authorities at home were far from happy about the whole situation on the Western front, and it was greatly feared that our line might still be broken through by a determined German offensive.

I received orders to go home and consult with the Cabinet, and arrived at Folkestone about 11 a.m. on Sunday the 20th. Lord Kitchener met me there with his motor and we drove together to Walmer Castle, where the Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) was then staying. I had not seen Kitchener since our memorable meeting at Paris, early in September, but he met me in the most friendly manner, and said many kind things about our work in France, of which he clearly appreciated the difficulties. We discussed the situation fully en route, and I remember his putting many questions to me about all the principal members of the Headquarters Staff. Whilst assuring him of my entire satisfaction with each and all of them, I reminded him that, if any fault was to be found, I and no one else was responsible.

In this and many subsequent conversations of a similar kind, I always maintained that a Commander-in-Chief can only be held in contempt who allows any member of his staff, or, indeed, any officer under his orders, to bear blame which must always most properly belong to him and to him alone. A chief in supreme command has always the absolute power of replacing any officer who fails in his duty. To him comes the principal credit and reward when things go well, and to him and him alone must the blame be apportioned when they do not. Until any officer under him is found by him to be unfit for his position, it is contrary to all efficient discipline to allow such officer to be censured or removed by any outside authority.

This principle is one of the most sacred traditions of the British Army. It is the foundation upon which there has been slowly and carefully built up that mutual confidence which exists between officers and men, which is the real secret of their wonderful fighting power. I recalled to Kitchener's memory our service together in South Africa, and reminded him how truly and faithfully he had always kept up this tradition in his own exercise of command.

After four months of the most ruthless war the world has ever seen, it was a curious sensation to find myself once again on English soil and in the midst of peaceful surroundings. It was one of those mild, balmy days which we very seldom get in the month of December, and the usual English Sunday atmosphere of rest and repose was over every object, animate and inanimate.

I could not help feeling deeply the extraordinary contrast which the scene presented to that which I had left behind me a few hours before. Except that one noticed a few men in khaki, there was nothing to indicate the terrific war which was raging all the time just across the Channel.

The people of this country have never truly realised the wonderful immunity from the horrors of war which they alone of all the belligerent countries have enjoyed. I wonder if it has really struck any large number of them that, after more than four years of desperate strife, we are the only people in Europe who can proudly claim that no enemy has ever occupied one square inch of all our vast Empire throughout the world, except for a short time in East Africa. The soil of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, France, Russia, Italy, Serbia, and Roumania has been repeatedly violated. It is truly a great record when we come to think that the sun never sets on the British flag.

On arriving at Walmer Castle I was very kindly and cordially welcomed by the Prime Minister. Entering the historic old stronghold, where the great Iron Duke breathed his last, I remember being at first seized with a pang of regret; for I thought his spirit would have rested in greater peace, if, under that famous roof, I could have told the first Minister of the King that we had once again planted the British flag in the face of the enemy on the field of Waterloo. It was a dream I had indulged in from the first, but, alas! like many others, it was destined never to be realised.(Back to Content)

CHAPTER XVII

THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914

I had a long discussion with the Prime Minister at Walmer. Mr. Asquith possesses the rare quality of being able to discuss the most difficult and threatening situation with the utmost calmness and deliberation. He is a very attentive listener, and as he quickly appreciates and understands all that is told him, it did not take him long to become fully acquainted with the entire situation.

As I have said before, all the Cabinet were at this moment very anxious as to the general outlook, but neither by word nor gesture did the Prime Minister display the least want of hope and confidence.

During my sojourn in France I had received several most kind and encouraging letters from Mr. Asquith, in which he expressed his warm appreciation of all that we had done, and said how truly he realised the very trying circumstances which surrounded us. He personally reiterated these kindly sentiments; but it was evident that the Government had just begun to entertain doubts and fears which had induced them to call me into council. It was the faith inspired by this constant kindly sympathy, and his power as Prime Minister, which helped me to believe that the shortage in guns and ammunition which threatened ultimate destruction would be overcome. The glorious troops under my command had gone valiantly to their death when a few more guns and a few more shells would have many times saved their sacrifice. And still no sufficient supplies came.

The question of munitions and the fear of invasion formed the basis of our long conversation at Walmer. After lunch, I left with Kitchener and travelled by motor to London. With deep sorrow I recall the fact that this was the last of all the many days of happy personal intercourse which I spent with my old South African chief. As a soldier and a commander in the field I had always loved and venerated him; in his capacity as a politician and Minister my sentiments and feelings towards him were never the same.

I am willing to admit that our differences—which were great and far-reaching—may have been to some extent my own fault; but, be that as it may, our subsequent relations, down to the time of his tragic death, were always clouded by a certain mistrust of one another.

It rejoices my heart, and alleviates the pain and regret which I feel, to look back upon this one day spent almost entirely tête-à-tête with him. On our way to London we had to pass by his country place at Broome, and he insisted on stopping for an hour to show me round it. To describe what I saw would only be a repetition of what is already very well known. As he stood in the midst of its beautiful scenery and surroundings, the true spirit of the great soldier shone out as distinctly and clearly as it ever did in the many and varied experiences we went through together in the South African War.

The eloquent and touching tribute paid to this great soldier's memory by Lord Derby in the House of Lords in June, 1916, brought out with telling force and happy expression Kitchener's deep affection for his "beloved Broome."[7]

Indeed, beneath that seemingly hard and stern exterior there existed a mighty well of sensitive feeling and even of romance, which it appeared to be the one endeavour of his life to conceal from the observation even of his most intimate friends.

All the next day, and far into the following, my whole time was employed in discussing the situation with the War Cabinet.

The principal ground for all their fears proved subsequently, in the course of the year 1916, to be only too well founded as regards the Eastern front. But the reports of large movements of German troops to the West, which really induced Mr. Asquith to send for me, were not true. Constant reports, however, continued to reach the Government from secret and reliable sources, that the Russians were even then running very short of ammunition, and that their condition, as regards the supply of war material generally, would certainly oblige them to evacuate the enemy territory they had already won, and even necessitate a retirement behind the Vistula, if not the Bug, with the loss of Warsaw and other important fortresses. The home authorities were undoubtedly influenced in forming this opinion by reports which, however, did not emanate from any part of the Western theatre of war, and I believe their judgment was generally hampered and warped by paying too much regard to unauthorised statements. The divergence of views which existed on various dates during the month of December is curiously illustrated by the following quotations from letters and telegrams.

On the 2nd, Kitchener wired to me:—

"It is reported new corps are arriving in Russia and that some of the old corps lately between La Bassée and the sea have disappeared from that front. Can you ascertain what truth there is in this? It is thought possible the Germans may be replacing active corps by immature formations along northern portion of Allied lines so as to use their best troops in the Eastern theatre, where they are apparently developing great strength."

On the 18th he writes:—

"The Russian news is very serious. I fear we cannot rely on them for much more for some time."

On the 26th I received the following telegram from him:—

"I think before you see Joffre it may be useful for you to know I am inclined to think Russians have been bluffing to a certain extent. I cannot get answers to my questions from Petrograd which would clear up the situation. For instance, amount of reserve ammunition in hand, which, according to Military Attaché here, who is kept entirely in the dark by his Government, ought to be very considerable.

"A reason for a certain amount of bluff on their part might be that they are now negotiating to obtain from us a loan of forty millions. Anyway, their action in the field does not look as if they were as badly off as they make out."

All kinds of reports continued to arrive, insisting that masses of German troops were passing through Luxemburg and Belgium en route to the Western front; but these turned out subsequently to be either greatly exaggerated or to have no foundation whatever in fact.

The upshot of it all was that I received directions from the Prime Minister to seek out Joffre as soon after my return as possible, put these views and fears of the War Cabinet before him, and to report to them what he was prepared to do in order to meet the supposed threat.

Before leaving I was received in audience by His Majesty the King.

On my journey back to the front, I pondered long and anxiously over all that had passed in London. I had plainly told the War Cabinet that I did not share these alarmist views, which I considered were not founded on any definite or reliable information, and I had warned them that these views disagreed altogether with our appreciation of the situation at the front. I by no means liked my mission to Joffre; but the orders received were imperative.

On the morning of the 24th, I had a long conference with Murray and Macdonogh, and we once more thoroughly examined the situation in all its bearings.

The daily official reports tended to show that the Russians were still holding their own well, and that there was no immediate fear of a retirement behind the Vistula. Even if pessimistic views held in London were warranted by the actual facts, it did not appear that there was any reasonable probability of the Germans ever being able to mass a sufficient force in the Western theatre to enable them to break through our line.

In accordance with the Prime Minister's decision, I arranged a meeting with Joffre at Chantilly for the 27th.

I found things were going on better in the north on the Yser. The Belgians had been able to resume active hostilities, and the 5th Belgian Division had made good the ground on the right bank of the river about Dixmude.

I began the last of the six Christmas days I have during my life passed in the field by visiting Foch. I told him of my mission to Joffre, and discussed with him the situation in the East. He said he felt sure that the Russians were exaggerating their deficiencies in ammunition, rifles, etc., in their representations both to the British and French Governments. He thought that they were afraid that the troops in the West were not displaying sufficient energy, and their idea was to stimulate this. Moreover, he said he was confirmed in this view by what the Russians were then doing in Poland and Galicia, which was also confirmed from German sources. He could not believe that, if they were, as they said, so short of ammunition, they could continue these aggressive tactics. He went on to speak of the work of the French at Arras, and said they had been much hampered by weather conditions, but that they were making some slight progress everywhere. He thought we might shortly find some opportunity for action in the neighbourhood of La Bassée.

On my return to Headquarters I met Haig and Smith-Dorrien, who had come to lunch, and I discussed with them my wish to form "Armies" immediately. I wished Haig to command the 1st, 4th, and Indian Corps as the 1st Army, and Smith-Dorrien the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Corps as the 2nd Army. The cavalry was to remain at my immediate disposal. Orders to this effect came out on Christmas night.

Although I have never heard it actually confirmed, I believe a suggestion was made by the Pope to all the belligerent Powers that an armistice should be arranged for Christmas Day. It was further reported that the Central Powers had signified their assent, but that the Allied Governments refused to entertain the proposal. The suggestion was certainly never referred either to Joffre or to me.

Whether this statement was true or not, it is certain that, soon after daylight on Christmas morning, the Germans took a very bold initiative at several points along our front, in trying to establish some form of fraternisation. It began by individual unarmed men running from the German trenches across to ours, holding Christmas trees above their heads. These overtures were in some places favourably received and fraternisation of a limited kind took place during the day. It appeared that a little feasting went on, and junior officers, non-commissioned officers and men on either side conversed together in "No Man's Land."

When this was reported to me I issued immediate orders to prevent any recurrence of such conduct, and called the local commanders to strict account, which resulted in a good deal of trouble.

I have since often thought deeply over the principle involved in the manifestation of such sentiments between hostile armies in the field. I am not sure that, had the question of the agreement upon an armistice for the day been submitted to me, I should have dissented from it. I have always attached the utmost importance to the maintenance of that chivalry in war which has almost invariably characterised every campaign of modern times in which this country has been engaged. The Germans glaringly and wantonly set all such sentiments at defiance by their ruthless conduct of the present war; even from its very commencement.

Judging from my own experience, we never had a more chivalrous or generous foe than the Boers of South Africa, and I can recall numerous proofs of it.

For instance, I was in charge of the operations against General Beyers in the Western Transvaal during the latter part of December 1900. On the afternoon of Christmas Eve a flag of truce—that symbol of civilisation and chivalry in war which has been practically unknown during this war with Germany—appeared at our outposts, and a young Dutch officer was brought to my Headquarters carrying a request from Beyers regarding the burial of his dead.

Some important movements were then in progress, and I told him we must of necessity detain him there till the next day, but I hoped we would be able to make him as comfortable as possible. When he started back to his General on Christmas morning, I gave him a small box of cigars and a bottle of whiskey, asking him to present them to Beyers as a Christmas offering from me.

I had forgotten the incident when, a few days later, two cavalry soldiers who had been taken prisoners by the enemy marched back into camp with horses, arms and equipment complete. They brought me a note from Beyers, thanking me for my gift on Christmas Day and telling me that, although he had no whiskey or cigars to offer in return, he hoped I would regard his liberation of these men in the light of a Christmas gift.

When I told this story at the end of the war to my old friend and redoubtable opponent, General Christian Smuts, he expressed himself as very displeased with Beyer's improper use of what was not his own but his country's property. I pointed out to Smuts that it was the spirit which Beyers displayed which mattered—that spirit which was never more conspicuously displayed throughout the war than in the conduct of this same great soldier and statesman, General Smuts himself.

In the swift and kaleidoscopic changes which occur in world politics, the friend of to-day may be the enemy of to-morrow. Soldiers should have no politics, but should cultivate a freemasonry of their own and, emulating the knights of old, should honour a brave enemy only second to a comrade, and like them rejoice to split a friendly lance to-day and ride boot to boot in the charge to-morrow.

It is satisfactory to know that some such kindly and chivalrous spirit has at least made itself felt at times between the opposing flying services in the present war, for I have heard authentic stories which go to show that this has been the case.

On the 26th I met Willcocks and discussed the recent fighting of the Indian Corps with him. I considered that a certain amount of blame attached to the commanders of the units engaged, for embarking in an attack on trenches so far away from their own line before ensuring adequate support, especially in view of the muddy condition of the ground, and knowing, as they did, the exhausted state of the Indian troops and the effect of cold upon them. At first the General tried to combat this view; but he soon acknowledged the justice of my criticism.

I decided, regretfully, to make a change in the command of the Lahore Division. A commander very often, after having directed operations of a critical nature, needs rest and change of occupation to restore him to his full capacity for command.

I met Joffre at Chantilly on the morning of the 27th, as arranged.

I explained the mission I had from the British Government, and told him of their fears of impending severe Russian defeats and of the possibility, which they thought might be open to the enemy, of withdrawing large numbers of troops and massing a force on the Western front strong enough to break our line and attain, after all, their original objectives, namely, Paris and the Channel ports. I told Joffre that the English Government were anxious to hear his views and ideas on the points raised.

The French Commander-in-Chief was much astonished to hear that such a view of the situation could be really and seriously entertained. But he added that, of course, the French General Staff had plans ready to meet any eventuality. He expressed the opinion that the time was not now opportune for the discussion of such contingent possibilities as these.

We then talked over the reported Russian deficiencies in munitions of war, and he entered into some most interesting details as to the state of the French manufacture of ammunition and guns. He told me that they were producing almost entirely high-explosive shells and hardly any shrapnel, and that an enormous improvement was being made in the pattern of fuze, from which great results were expected. The latest manufactured ammunition for the "75" gun had shown wonderful results, particularly in the matter of destroying wire entanglements.

Joffre went on to say that the Russians were in close touch with the French factories, and were benefiting greatly by the experiments which had been carried out. Moreover, the French were able to supply the Russians with a considerable quantity of munitions of war. It took a long time to transmit; but he entertained great hopes that Roumania and Bulgaria would soon be in such sympathy with the Allies as to permit the transport of material to Russia viâ Salonika. The reports he had received indicated that the Russians had sufficient ammunition at hand, if they remained on the defensive, for six weeks.

He expressed himself as fairly satisfied with the Russian position and outlook, and thought the Germans were being so heavily punished that whole corps would have to be reorganised.

These views were subsequently embodied in a memorandum which I sent to Lord Kitchener for the information of the War Cabinet.

I then arrived at an understanding with Joffre as to future plans. I again urged strongly upon him my conviction that an advance on the extreme north, in co-operation with our Navy, was the proper rôle for British troops to fulfil, and went over all the old arguments. In effect he rejected my plans again, although holding out hopes that, at a later stage, the French Army might co-operate in such an advance.

In the absence of support from my own Government, it was hopeless to say anything more. Joffre's plan was as follows. He meant to break through the enemy's line from the south at Rheims and from the west at Arras. He desired to mass as many French Corps as possible behind these two points; therefore, at all other points of the line the rôles must be twofold: (1) to economise troops as much as possible in the trenches, so as to spare more men for action at decisive points, and (2) to organise good local reserves to keep the enemy in the front employed and prevent his sending troops to threatened points in the line.

As the history of the operations during 1915 will show, this general strategic idea was the foundation of all our efforts throughout that year. It brought about for the British Army the Battles of Neuve Chapelle, Ypres (second), Festubert, and Loos; and for the French other important actions, which, although local successes, did not result in achieving any appreciable advance towards the objectives which the plans sought to attain.

Those objects were not clearly defined till September, when we began our last combined attack to attain them and practically failed.

The attitude of our War Office in failing to speed up the manufacture of munitions of war and the practical collapse of the Russian Armies were to some extent responsible for the lack of success of our endeavours. But the detailment of troops and war material to the Dardanelles was undoubtedly the chief cause.

There was no other course for me to take, under the circumstances, than to fall in with Joffre's view; and in accordance with his plan I agreed to take over, in conjunction with the Belgians, the whole line from La Bassée to the sea, but only by degrees as troops became available.

Although Joffre at the time agreed in my wish to work the northern section entirely with the Belgian Army, it would appear that the French Government still insisted on keeping some hold on that part of the line with French troops.

On returning to my Headquarters I sent for Bridges, who was now my representative with His Majesty the King of the Belgians. On the morning of the 28th, we had a long conference on the subject of co-operation with the Belgian Army.

I had evolved a scheme in my own mind of amalgamating the Belgian and British Armies. I wanted to see Belgian brigades of infantry embodied in our own Army Corps at convenient sections in the line, and to apply the same process to the cavalry and artillery. This apparent surrender of independence was no doubt a heavy trial to impose upon the Belgian General Staff; but I believed it to be the surest and best method to adopt if we wished to get the highest efforts out of the two Armies.

When all is said, it must be acknowledged that the standard of training and war efficiency was higher in our troops than in the Belgian. This applied particularly to the leaders and the Staff; and, in spite of the drastic experiences of the Belgian Army during August and September, our own higher ranks certainly possessed a wider and more extensive experience in the field.

It can indeed hardly be doubted that a Division composed of two British infantry brigades and one Belgian would probably have done more, either in attack or defence, than such a unit composed entirely of Belgian troops.

Whatever views may be held on this point, it must be allowed that the scheme I proposed would have ensured a much greater unity of effort.

I talked it all over at great length with Bridges, and on leaving me he went back to put the proposal before the King of the Belgians. I entertained little hope of getting a favourable hearing; for, although I knew the King's lofty spirit and generous impulses would prompt him to make any personal sacrifice to attain greater power and efficiency for our united forces, yet I was also well aware of his difficulties with his own Ministers.

Two days later Bridges brought me His Majesty's answer. He told me it was possible the King himself might fall in with my suggestion. Ten thousand rifles would have to be retained for the "inundated" line, leaving 40,000 rifles available for the proposed amalgamation. This, I thought, would at once render the united Armies strong enough in the north to justify me in allowing Joffre to remove the 9th and 20th French Corps to the points where he so much needed strength for his own line.

This amalgamation of the British and Belgian Armies would certainly, have effected a great economy of force and fighting power, and have perhaps led to important results; but the scheme never came to fruition, both because the King of the Belgians was unable to gain the consent of his Government and because the French would not agree to the plan. Finally, I could get no support or help from our own people at home.

On the 27th, the French had some success at Carency (north of Arras), capturing several German trenches and advancing the line some 500 yards.

In spite of the "growls" in which I have so freely indulged, the close of 1914 yet found me in a hopeful and sanguine frame of mind.

When the state of affairs which might have been came to be compared with the situation as it was, there was really very little reason for pessimism. We had scored one great offensive and another great defensive victory, and we had suffered no severe defeat.

The Germans were bound down behind their entrenchments from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier, and under the highest trial, the Allies had proved their ability to hold their actual lines inviolate.

Our Fleet had gained command of the sea, from which they had finally and completely driven the German flag. The spirit of the Allied nations was high and confident. On the other hand, had the enemy shown more of the skill and intrepidity of those great leaders of the past—Frederick, Napoleon, and von Moltke (whose teachings German writers of to-day claim that their commanders have so closely assimilated)—and the Allies a little less watchfulness and keenness, we might have seen Paris and the Channel seaboard in the enemy's hands, the British Army, irretrievably separated from its Allies, driven to the coast, and the French holding the southern provinces of the Republic with their capital at Bordeaux.

Finally, Russia, our great hope and mainstay for the future, was inspiring the utmost hope and encouragement amongst the Allies by the splendid deeds with which she heralded the close of the year.

The last entry in my diary—December 31st, 1914—is as follows:—

"Our night conference showed more and increasingly important Russian successes."

It was good to end the year with courage born of hope and confidence in the future. Time works wonders in all directions. Just as we could not foresee the utter collapse and failure of our great Eastern ally, so we could not discern the hidden forging of that sword of justice and retribution whose destined wielders were even then stirring from their fifty years of slumber and dreams of everlasting peace, to rise like some giant from the shores of the Western Atlantic and, with overwhelming force, to stride eastward and help lay low the German dragon once and for all time in the dust.(Back to Content)

CHAPTER XVIII

AMMUNITION

From the beginning of the Battle of the Aisne up to the close of the Battle of Loos, at the end of 1915, the scanty supply of munitions of war paralysed all our power of initiative and, at critical times, menaced our defence with irretrievable disaster. Great anxiety on this subject overshadowed all my direction of military operations, and deep concern at the failure of the Government to appreciate and remedy our difficulties from this cause dominated all my work. In this chapter it is my object to make known some of the efforts I made to awaken both the Government and the public from that apathy which meant certain defeat. I exhausted every effort, by urgent official demands to the War Office, and personal appeals to Lord Kitchener and such Cabinet Ministers as I came in contact with. When these efforts got no response, I gave interviews to the press and authorised public men who visited me to urge this vital necessity in their addresses. Nothing less than my deliberate conclusion, after all these measures had failed and nine months of war had elapsed, that the Empire itself was in jeopardy, forced me to act in May 1915 as I did. I was conscious before taking this step, which meant the overthrow of the Government, that it also meant the end of my career in France, with all the hopes and ambitions that only a soldier can understand. But the consciousness of the great results achieved in this upheaval has been my reward, and I trust that a recital of my difficulties may, if occasion arise in the future, protect the British Army in the field from the recurrence of any similar situation.

During my term of office as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, from March 1912 to April 1914, I had urged these vital necessities upon the Government, but my demands were steadily opposed by the Finance Department and the Treasury. All our experiences in the South African War, and the warnings which the Manchurian campaign plainly gave, passed altogether unheeded in the years preceding the present war. I was always a strong advocate for the supply of high-explosive shell to our horse and field artillery, but I got very little support, and even such as was given to me was lukewarm in the extreme. I believe the Ordnance Board was not in favour of it.

As early as the middle of September 1914 the British Army in France was subjected to heavy bombardment from German 8-in. howitzers, to which they were quite unable to reply. At the same time the daily expenditure of artillery ammunition became far in excess of the receipts from home, and we were unable to maintain the stocks on the lines of communication up to anything like the proper war establishment. For example, the 18-pdrs. fired an average of 14 rounds a day, whilst the receipts were barely seven. The 60-pdr. guns and the 4.5-in. howitzers fired over 40 rounds a day, against a supply of eight or nine rounds at most. In private letters and telegrams I had repeatedly brought this to the notice of the Secretary of State, and a strong official memorandum on the subject was sent to the War Office on September 28th. A further communication to the same effect was made on October 10th; and on the 29th of the same month the War Office were officially told that the state of the ammunition supply had necessitated the issue of an order restricting expenditure to 20 rounds per gun daily, and that a further restriction to 10 rounds would be necessary if the supply did not improve. This was during the most desperate period of the First Battle of Ypres, when the average daily expenditure of 18-pdr. ammunition had amounted to 81 rounds per gun.

In some cases the expenditure per gun had reached the enormous total of 300 rounds daily.

A proportion of at least 25 per cent. of high-explosive shells for 13 and 18 pdrs. was included in the demands to which I have referred above.

In a communication to the War Office on December 31st, the view was expressed that considerably more high explosive was necessary, and the following table was laid down as our minimum requirements to carry on the war with any prospect of success:—

required output of ammunition.

•   Rounds per gun a day.
• 13-pdr. 50 (25 H.E.)
• 18-pdr. 50 (25 H.E.)
• 4.5-in. howitzer 40 (35 H.E.)
• 6-in. howitzer 25 (all H.E.)
• 60-pdr. 25 (15 H.E.)
• 4.7-in. gun 25 (15 H.E.)
• 6-in. gun 25 (all H.E.)
• 9.2-in. howitzer 12 (all H.E.)

It was explained that this output was necessary for a period of active operations, and should be continued even during a lull, till a reserve of three or four times the amount laid down in war establishments had been accumulated. To this request there was no reply until January 19th. The War Office then declined to work up to more than 20 rounds a day, and refused a request for 50 per cent, of high explosives.

This amazing attitude at a most critical time compelled me to consider means by which the several members of the Government, and the public also, might be advised of this deplorable apathy which, if long continued, meant the destruction of our Army.

In this letter from the War Office, of January 19th, which I have already mentioned, an estimate was attached of the receipts which we might rely upon up to and including the month of May. This estimate was far below our requirements, whilst the actual receipts fell far short of it. The actual supply in May proved to be less than one half of the War Office estimate, which was the only one ever furnished for our guidance. Such failure made it quite impossible to make any reliable forecast of the condition of the ammunition supply at any particular date. This state of uncertainty rendered the formulation of plans for co-operating with the French most difficult, if not impossible.

During the winter of 1914-15 it was hoped to accumulate some small reserve of ammunition, but, during this period, all our efforts in this direction were of no avail, because the number of rounds per 18-pdr. gun throughout this period fell to less than five!

I had serious misgivings that the morale of the Army was becoming affected by this first long and weary winter of inactivity in the trenches, and to render the defence effective it was necessary to undertake an offensive operation.

Early in March a small reserve of ammunition had been accumulated, and the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was fought and won. Had proper steps been taken to increase the supply when my first strong appeals were sent in during September 1914, the offensive operation commenced so successfully at Neuve Chapelle might have been much further developed, and, indeed, possibly have led to great and important results. But the battle had to be broken off after three days' fighting because we were brought to a standstill through want of ammunition.

Immediately afterwards I again addressed the strongest representations I could frame to the War Office. I begged that His Majesty's Government might be informed that, if their object was to drive the enemy off French and Belgian territory during 1915, no progress towards this objective could be obtained unless and until the supply of artillery ammunition should enable the Army to engage in sustained operations. The only official reply which I received to this letter was an injunction to use the utmost economy, but a private letter, dated March 16th, was addressed by Sir James Wolfe Murray to Sir William Robertson, who was then my Chief of Staff. This letter was said to have been dictated by the Secretary of State, and its contents hinted very strongly that an impression prevailed at the War Office that we were wasting ammunition.

The operations at Neuve Chapelle used up all our available resources, and it became necessary to restore them by reverting for a time to a strictly defensive attitude.