As Prussia is surrounded by powerful states my successors must be prepared for frequent wars. The soldiers must be given the highest positions in Prussia for the same reason for which they received them in ancient Rome when that State conquered the world. Honors and rewards stimulate and encourage talent and praise arouses men to a generous emulation. It encourages men to enter the army. It is paradoxical to treat officers contemptuously and call theirs an honored profession. The men who are the principal supports of the State must be encouraged and be preferred to the soft and insipid society men who can only grace an ante-chamber.
Mr. Barker comments on the fact that in 1776, thirteen years after the ruinous Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great had accumulated financial resources sufficient to pay for another war lasting four years, and that he pursued the food policy of his fathers "which is still pursued by the Prusso-German Government." Moreover, he first exalted the German professor:
A hundred and fifty years ago Prussia was a land peopled by boors. Now it is a land peopled by professors, scientists, and artists. Frederick the Great was the first Prussian monarch to realize that science and art increase the strength and prestige of nations. Hence, he began cultivating the sciences and arts, and his successors followed his example. As science and art were found to be sources of national power, they were as thoroughly promoted as was the army itself, while in this country [England] education remained amateurish. Men toyed with science and the universities rather taught manners than efficiency.
The lesson of this centuries-old efficient governmental machine is a supreme one to democratic England, Mr. Barker thinks. Not that it is hopeless for a democracy to compete with a highly organized monarchy, for has not Switzerland shown that "a democracy may be efficient, business-like, provident, and ready for war?" England, on the other hand, has been a lover of luxury and ease. She must gird up her loins and fight or die. The Anglo-Saxon race is fighting for its existence, and delay is dangerous:
War is a one-man business. Every other consideration must be subordinated to that of achieving victory. When the United States fought for their life, they made President Lincoln virtually a Dictator. The freest and most unruly democracy allowed Habeas Corpus to be suspended and conscription to be introduced, to save itself. Great emergencies call for great measures. The War demands great sacrifices in every direction. However, if it leads to England's modernization, to the elimination of the weaknesses and vices of Anglo-Saxon democracy, if it leads to the unification and organization of the Empire, the purification of its institutions, and the recreation of the race, the gain may be greater than the loss, the colossal cost of the War notwithstanding. The British Empire and the United States, the Anglo-Saxon race in both hemispheres, have arrived at the turning point in their history. The next few months will confirm their greatness or mark the beginning of their fatal decline.
Stern is the denunciation of W.S. Lilly, in the same issue of The Nineteenth Century and After, upon the atrocities recounted in an article on German atrocities in France by Professor Morgan, appearing in the next preceding number. Mr. Lilly quotes Thomas Carlyle's sarcastic words about the "blind loquacious prurience of indiscriminate Philanthropism" that commands no revenge for great injustice. He says:
Apart from the "fierce and monstrous gladness," with which the German people have welcomed the hellish cruelty of their soldiery, they must be held responsible for its crimes. General von Bernhardi, indeed, assures them that "political morality differs from individual morality because there is no power above the State." And they have been given over to a strong delusion to believe this lie. Above the State is the Eternal Rule of Right and Wrong: above the State is the Supreme Moral Governor of the Universe; yes, above the State is God. Let us proclaim this august verity though in France Atheism has been triumphant; in England Agnosticism is fashionable; in Lutheran Germany—worst of all—evil has been enthroned in the place of good, and "devils to adore for deities" is the proper cult.
The resolution of the old Roman patriot that "Carthage must be destroyed" is quoted by this writer. He adds:
As stern a resolution is in the minds and on the lips of all true lovers of their country and of mankind, be they English or French, Russian, Italian, Japanese, and I do not hesitate to add American. German militarism must be utterly destroyed and the monstrous creation of blood and iron overthrown. Such is the plainest dictate of the instinct of self-preservation. It is also the plainest dictate of justice. Germany must be paid that she has deserved. When the triumphant Allies shall have made good their footing on her soil, they will not indeed rival her exploits or violating women and butchering children, of murdering prisoners and wounded, of slaying unoffending and peaceful peasants, of destroying shrines of religion and learning. But they will assuredly shoot or hang such of the chief perpetrators of these and the like atrocities as may fall into their hands. They will strip her of ill-gained territory. They will empty her arsenals and burn her war workshops. They will impose a colossal indemnity which will condemn her for long years to grinding poverty. They will confiscate her fleet. They will remove the treasures of her galleries and museums, and take toll of her libraries, to make compensation for her pillage and incendiarism in Belgium. The measure of punishment is always a matter of difficulty. But surely anything less than this would be wholly disproportionate to the rank offences of Germany. The reckoning, the retribution, the retaliation to be just must be most stern. The victorious Allies, who will be her judges, will not be moved by "mealymouthed philanthropies." "Justice shall strike and Mercy shall not hold her hands: she shall strike sore strokes, and Pity shall not break the blow."
In The Fortnightly Review for July E.J. Dillon is sweeping in his arraignment of the new Pope Benedict XV. and the Vatican, of the Pope because of his "neutrality in matters of public morality," and of the Vatican because of its hostility to the cause of Allies. Toward martyred Belgium and suffering France the Pope "has been generous in lip sympathy and promises of rewards in the life to come," Mr. Dillon says; but he has "found no word of blame for their executioners." Mr. Dillon personally offered Benedict XV. "some important information on the subject which seemed adequate to change his views or modify his action," but he "turned the conversation to other topics." In fairness he adds that "personally Benedict XV. had been careful to keep aloof from Buelow and his band," and has neither said nor done anything blameworthy with the sole exception of the interview and message which he was reported to have given "to an American-German champion of militarism at the instigation of his intimate counsellor, Monsignor Gerlach"—an interview, by the way, which the Pope has since expressly repudiated.
HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT XV.
The Entrance of Italy into the War has Increased the Delicacy of
the
Pontiff's Position
(Photo from International News.)
Monsignor Gerlach, Mr. Dillon says, is "one of the most compromising
associates and dangerous mentors that any sovereign ever admitted to
his privacy," and continues:
Years ago, the story runs, Gerlach made the acquaintance of a worldly minded papal Nuntius in the fashionable salons of gay Vienna, and, being men of similar tastes and proclivities, the two enjoyed life together, eking out the wherewithal for their costly amusements in speculations on the Exchange. When the Nuntius returned to Rome, donned the Cardinal's hat, and was appointed to the See of Albano as Cardinal Agliardi, he bestowed a canonry on the boon companion who had followed him to the eternal city. The friendship continued unabated, and was further cemented by the identity of their political opinions, which favored the Triple Alliance. Gerlach became Agliardi's tout and electioneering agent when that Cardinal set up as candidate for the papacy on the death of Leo XIII. But as his chances of election were slender, the pair worked together to defeat Rampolla, who was hated and feared by Germany and Austria. Their bitter opponent was Cardinal Richard, a witty French prelate who labored might and main for Rampolla, and told me some amusing stories about Agliardi. Some years ago Gerlach's name emerged above the surface of private life in Rome in connection with what the French term un drame passionel, which led to violent scenes in public and to a number of duels later on. That this man of violent Pan-German sentiments should be the Pope's mentor and guide through the labyrinth of international politics seems a curious anachronism.
Although Cardinal della Chiesa, shortly before he became Benedict XV., was spoken of as the inheritor of Rampolla's Francophile leanings, it is "now conjectured that at the Conclave this legend secured from his not only the votes of the Teutonic Cardinals, who knew what his sentiments really were, but also those of the French and Belgians, who erroneously fancied that they knew," Dr. Dillon says. He does not hesitate to believe that the Pope is "at heart a staunch friend of Austria and a warm admirer of Germany, whom he looks upon as the embodiment of the principle of authority and conservatism." For the Vatican his words are more unsparing:
The Vatican, as distinguished from the Pope, was and is systematically hostile to the Allies. Its press organs, inspired by an astute and influential Italian ecclesiastic named Tedeschini, by Koeppenberg, a rabid German convert, and by the Calabrian Daffina, organized a formidable campaign against the King's Government and their supposed interventionist leanings. Its agents, including the priest Boncampagni and the German Catholics Erzberger, Koeppenberg, and others, were wont to meet in the Hôtel de Russie to arrange their daily plan of campaign, and when at last the people rose up against Giolitti and his enormities, the Vatican had its mob in readiness to make counter-demonstrations, and was prevented from letting it loose only by the superhuman efforts of decent Catholics and orderly citizens. It is a fair thing to add that the attitude of the Roman Catholic clergy throughout Italy has with some few exceptions been consistently patriotic. Even the bishops and archbishops of the provinces have deserved well of their King and country, while their flocks have left nothing to be desired on the score of loyalty and patriotism.
Buelow's mission to Italy and his relations with Giolitti, the defeated abettor of Austria in the business preceding Italy's declaration of war, when they encountered the statecraft of Sonnino and Salandra, are given in this version of Buelow's playing of his "trump card":
Although the die was cast and Italy's decision taken, he had the Austrian concessions greatly amplified, and he offered them, not to the King's Government, but to Giolitti, his secret ally, who was not in office, but was known to be the Dictator of Italy. And Giolitti accepted them on the condition, to be fulfilled after the Cabinet's fall, that the territory would be further enlarged and consigned to Italy before the end of the war. The increase of prestige which this concession would bestow on the tribune was to be his reward for co-operation with the German Ambassador. Giolitti having thus approved the offer, undertook to have it ratified by Parliament, in spite of the engagements which the Cabinet had already entered into with the Allied Powers. In this sense he spoke to the King, wrote a letter designed for the nation, and obtained the public adhesion of a majority of the Chamber which was not then sitting. Thereupon the Cabinet resigned and left the destinies of Italy in the hands of the King and the nation. On the part of the Cabinet this was a brilliant tactical move and a further proof of the praiseworthy moral courage which it had displayed throughout the crisis. Indeed, the firmness, perseverance, and dignified disregard of mild invective and more deliberate criticism manifested by Sonnino and Salandra, entitle these Ministers to the lasting gratitude of their country. For it should be borne in mind that they had against them not only the Senate, the Chamber, a section of the Press, the "cream" of the aristocracy, the puny sons and daughters of the leaders of the Risorgimento, but also, strange to say, the majority of Italian diplomatists in the capitals of the Great Powers, one of whom actually fell ill at the thought that Italy was about to fight shoulder to shoulder with the State to which he was accredited. It would be interesting to psychologists to learn how this diplomatist and one or two of his colleagues felt when a few days later they were serenaded by enthusiastic crowds whom they were constrained to address.
In a Doubting Thomas article headed "Are We Winning?" the anonymous "Outis" in The Fortnightly Review concludes that "the Allies are winning, but very slowly. If their conquest is to be assured, Great Britain's task is to mobilize every soldier and every workman, in order to prove that whoever may fail, she at least does not intend to desist until the final triumph is won." Moreover, the conquest must be in the West "if anywhere," and he looks somewhat askance at the Dardanelles adventure:
A good many competent authorities have disliked the idea of the Dardanelles expedition, on the strength of a general principle applicable to all military operations. It is said that in every war there is one distinct objective, and that that should never be neglected for any subsidiary operations. Thus, in the present instance, our main effort is to drive the Germans out of France and Belgium, and then to attack them in their own territory. Anything which interferes with this or throws it, however temporarily, into the background, is held to be unwise, because it leads to the most dangerous of results in warfare—the dissipation of forces, which, if united, would win the desired success, but if disunited will probably fail. Thus we are told that we must not fritter away our energies in enterprises which, however important in themselves, are not comparable with the one unique preoccupation of our minds—the conquest of Germany in Europe.
Horace White has no two opinions in his article in The North American Review for July as to the wisdom and justice of the practice of American manufacturers in selling munitions which the Allies are using to kill their Germanic enemies. Mr. White expresses it as the belief of the great majority of people in the United States that Germany's war is without sufficient cause, and that when she invaded Belgium she "made herself the outlaw of the nations—a country whom no agreements can bind." Therefore he can see why no limit should ever be put to the world's expenditure for armaments "while one incorrigible outlaw is at large." He adds:
It is the opinion of most Americans that the most incorrigible and dangerous outlaw and armed maniac now existing is Germany, and that the first and indispensable step toward a restriction of armaments and a quiet world is to throttle and disarm her, and that no price is too great to pay for such a consummation. Any result of the present war which falls short of this will be the preliminary to a new armament and another war on a wider scale than the present one, since the United States will make preparations for the next one and most probably take part in it.
Hence proceeds Mr. White's justification for this neutral nation's supplying the Allies with arms:
Germany, by bursting her way through Belgium, was enabled to seize eighty to ninety per cent. of the coal and iron resources of France and the greater part of her apparatus for the production of arms. She holds also the entire resources of Belgium, both of raw material and finished product. The foul blow by which she possessed herself of these indispensable treasures had two consequences which she did not look for—the active hostility of England and the moral indignation of all other nations. In helping France to make good the loss which she sustained through such perfidy the American people think that they are doing God's service, and their only regret is that they cannot do more of it. If they had foreseen the present conditions they would have enlarged their gun factories and powder mills to meet the emergency more promptly.
A German writer in the New York Times of May 30, Mr. Vom Bruck, says: "If the German nation is wiped out with the help of American arms and ammunition no man of the white race in the United States would be able to think of such a catastrophe without horror and remorse." All of the contending nations say that they are fighting for existence, which means that if they do not win in the end they will be wiped out. With such an alternative staring us in the face very few tears would be shed by Americans, of any color, if both the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, with all their belongings, should be wiped off the face of the earth.
The pacifist "mollycoddle," as Theodore Roosevelt dubbed him in his San Francisco Exposition speech, finds expression in these words of Bertrand Russell in the August number of the Atlantic Monthly:
All these three motives for armaments—cowardice, love of dominion, and lust for blood—are no longer ineradicable in civilized human nature. All are diminishing under the influence of modern social organization. All might be reduced to a degree which would make them almost innocuous, if early education and current moral standards were directed to that end. Passive resistance, if it were adopted deliberately by the will of a whole nation, with the same measure of courage and discipline which is now displayed in war, might achieve a far more perfect protection for what is good in national life than armies and navies can ever achieve, without demanding the carnage and waste and welter of brutality involved in modern war.
But it is hardly to be expected, Mr. Russell reluctantly concludes, that progress will come in this way, because "the imaginative effort required is too great." He adds:
It is much more likely that it will come, like the reign of law within the state, by the establishment of a central government of the world, able and willing to secure obedience by force, because the great majority of men will recognize that obedience is better than the present international anarchy.
A central government of this kind would command assent not as a partisan, but as the representative of the interests of the whole. Very soon resistance to it would be seen to be hopeless and wars would cease. Force directed by a neutral authority is not open to the same abuse or likely to cause the same long-drawn conflicts as force exercised by quarreling nations, each of which is the judge in its own cause. Although I firmly believe that the adoption of passive instead of active resistance would be good if a nation could be convinced of its goodness, yet it is rather to the ultimate creation of a strong central authority that I should look for the ending of war. But war will end only after a great labor has been performed in altering men's moral ideals, directing them to the good of all mankind, and not only of the separate nations into which men happen to have been born.
The leading article in the June issue of the Süddeutsche Monatshefte (Munich) is by Dr. George Grupp, one of Germany's most able scholars, and is entitled, "Never Can Germany be Overcome if She be United." Dr. Grupp finds evidences for this assertion all through history, and quotes some of the earliest commentators and historians to this effect:
As early as 1487 Felix Fabri, a Dominican of Ulm wrote: "Si Germani essent ubique concordes, totum orbem domarent." (If the Germans were united they would conquer the whole world.)
The sentence is an echo of the fiery address which one Aeneas Silvius, later to become pope, delivered to the German princes after the fall of Constantinople, and from which Felix Fabri himself gives a quotation....
To Germany alone the Greeks looked for any considerable help. An evidence of this is the beautiful and often quoted remark of the Athenian Laonikos Chalkokondylas: "If the Germans were united and the princes would obey, they would be unconquerable and the strongest of all mortals."
We encounter similar statements very frequently, both earlier and later, from the Roman courtier Dietrich von Nieheim and from the humanists, from the Alsatian Wimpheling and Sebastian Brant, from the Swabian Nauclerus and the Frank Pirckheimer. "What could Germany be," they cry, "if she would only make use of her own strength, exploit her own resources for herself! No people on earth could offer her resistance!"
Dr. Grupp claims that Germany's lack of unity has resulted only from her rule of goodwill toward all, within her borders as well as without.
It never occurred to the Germans as to other peoples to disturb the peaceful development of their neighbors. They allowed mighty powers to build themselves up unmolested and to rise above Germany's head. In their internal affairs they observed the same principle of justice; no line, no class, no province, no grant succeeded in obtaining so oppressive an ascendancy, that other lines and classes, other provinces and grants were simply annihilated. The unfortunate consequence was lack of unity.
Nowhere were or are there so many cultural centres, so many different movements, tendencies, parties. This great multifariousness of the German life was recognized and admired by others. But this very multifariousness had its darker side, the fatal, much deplored lack of unity.
Through the centuries, Dr. Grupp claims, Germany has been altogether too good-natured, allowing other nations to all but bleed her to death.
In her peaceable disharmony Germany has dreamed along carelessly and good-naturedly for centuries until the abrupt awakening when she saw a yawning abyss opened up at her feet. Good-naturedly she has allowed herself to be plundered and faithfully she has fought other nations' battles. As early as the 15th century the humanists remarked the fact that alien states gladly took German soldiers into their service, and later on it was worse than that. Foreign countries gladly waged their wars on German territory. Here was decided for the most part the fate of the Spanish world-empire, here France and England battled for supremacy. The Seven Years' War was not only a question of Schleswig; it was a question of whether North America and even far-away India should be French or English.
Now the condition is suddenly reversed; the Germans are fighting for themselves, and the fact arouses the limitless rage of their opponents. Let us console ourselves with the fact that even in the Middle Ages it was said: "Teutonici nullius amici," in spite of their peaceableness.
Dr. Eduard Meyer has contributed an article to the Süddeutsche Monatshefte (Munich) on "Ancient Italy and the Rise of the Italian Nation." Dr. Meyer is professor of history in the University of Berlin, and is a brother of Dr. Kuno Meyer who recently attracted much attention in this country by severing his connection with Harvard University because of a prize "war poem" written by one of the undergraduates. A postscript reflects Dr. Meyer's present feeling toward Italy's defection:
The views which I have presented in this article are the fruit of long years of study and research; and I feel myself constrained to state explicitly that they are in no wise influenced by the events which we have experienced during the last few weeks. But it may be that a short postscript is necessary.
Italy has not won her present national unity by reason of her own strength; she owes it to the combinations of the changing world-situation and the victories of foreign powers, which her statesmen have known how to use to the best advantage.
According to Dr. Meyer, Italy's claim to be one of the great powers is not based on any actual ability to uphold that claim; it merely happens that her assertion has not been challenged.
She has claimed for herself the status of a great power on a par with the other large nations of the world; but she has not possessed the inner strength of herself to support such a claim without the help of stronger powers.
In August, 1914, Italy had the opportunity to decide her fate. If she could have made the choice then, if she could have gone into the world-war with all the might that she possessed and, staking her whole existence, have fought toward the highest goal, she might have won for herself a powerful and self-sufficient place in the world.
On account of his many utterances since the outbreak of the war, Ludwig Thoma's März (Munich), a weekly founded by him, has attracted much attention. An article entitled "Italy's Defection," in a recent issue, is most bitter in tone, accusing Italy of long-standing intrigue and treachery.
We know that Italy went still further from the fact that at the renewal of the alliance in 1912 in Paris she expressly announced that she would not march against France. It will be remembered how quick the French army command was to take stock of relations on the southeastern border, with the result that in the very first days of mobilization their troops were called from the Savoy Alps and by the eighth of August were giving battle on the Alsatian border.
But Italy still guarded the neutrality which she had proclaimed and with apparent reasonableness she was able to hold that the letter of the Triple Alliance did not compel her to enter the conflict. Laughing in her sleeve she could even give it out that her sympathetic neutrality would sufficiently guarantee to her allies certain suspended contracts of an economic nature. Neutral Italy furnished Germany to a considerable extent with products of its own land and others which were not unwelcome.
That the mobilization of an Italian army on France's borders might have been able to decide the war as far back as September, is a consideration which, in the face of this hypocritical neutrality, one cannot face without driving one's nails into one's flesh!
It was through the connivance of England that Italy weakly found herself forced to enter the war against her former allies.
Sir Edward Grey found the way to do it. Italy learned that England was no longer in a situation to hold the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal open and was obliged to take over the control of Italian imports. Even before this British agents had control of the port of Genoa and there was no doubt that through most irritating measures on England's part which skillfully concealed the motive behind them, a blow would be struck at the very roots of Italy's existence and famine would set in. Presently the Italian politicians and the crown were confronted with a dilemma which left them the choice only between war and revolution....
Not every people has the political government which it deserves; the Italian people are the victims of a government, essentially undeserved but traditionally faithless.
But Mars is now shaking the dice and behind the curtain of the future Revolution stands waiting.
An indication of the height to which the "Gott Strafe England" feeling has climbed in Germany is shown in the following announcement by the management of Die Woche (Berlin):
TO OUR READERS!
Many readers of Die Woche have taken offense at the words "Copyright by ..." (in English) and demand that this English formula be rendered hereafter in German. This desire, springing from patriotic motives, is easily understood, but unfortunately cannot be carried out for the form "Copyright by ..." is demanded by the American copyright law in this form. If we did not print these words in English, which is the official language of the United States, our copyright in America would be void and the protection both of ourselves and our writers would be forfeited.
To the Revue de Hongrie, the only French paper in Budapest, Count Andrássy contributes an article for July entitled "Les garanties d'une paix durable," and discusses the peace terms the Central Empires are to put forward in the event of final victory. He objects to the idea of annexation or anything more than "boundary corrections," and says:
Our war is a defensive war, which will achieve its aim when our enemies have been expelled from our territory and their ring has been broken. This aim could be best served by making peace with one or other of our enemies and winning him over to our cause. This would be of immense advantage to the future of civilization and ensure us against the horrors of a prolonged war. A separate peace would be the best chance for certain Powers to change their international policy. To my mind the issues of this war will greatly change the attitude of some hostile States toward us, and will bring about more intimate relations between them and ourselves, besides widening the foundations of the alliance between Hungary and her allies. And this is to be the rock upon which the European balance of power is to rest in the future. Our war is not a war of conquest, and the boundary changes of which some people speak are not the sine qua non of a good peace. Therefore I do not even wish to speak about certain territorial alterations, which, nevertheless, might be necessary.
Regarding the question of England and nationality, Count Andrássy says:
Victory no doubt affords us the right to demand the alteration of the map of Europe, yet, this not being our aim and not to our interest, we can be satisfied with certain compensations, as no doubt our enemies would not spare us if they were victorious. Lloyd George said that the States are to be shaped in the future according to nationalities, which means that the Monarchy is to be disrupted. An English scholar not long ago expressed the same view, and, in fact, in England this idea is being impressed upon the people. This policy is sounded in a country which dominates so many millions of alien nationalities. If England speaks in this way, though she is not in direct conflict with us, what can we expect from Russia or Italy? Everyone knows that Russia wants Galicia, the Bukovina, Màramaros; Serbia wants Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, and the Banat; Italy they won to their side by promising her our territory; Transylvania is promised to the one who cares to take it; henceforth, if we wish to defend it, we shall have to prepare for a new attack from another quarter. Yet nothing would be more alien to our thoughts than that if victorious we should annex foreign territory, for we would have seriously to consider if such conquest would be to our advantage or not. The same policy ought to be applied in Germany. Though her enemies would not spare her either, she must be cautious not to go too far in her appetites, and should seek for monetary compensations. Most of all she has to be careful not to claim territory, which would mean everlasting unrest and a new irredentism. It would be a bad policy even to touch the Balkans, for such interference would sooner or later bring Russia back to the Balkans, and the peoples there, menaced in their independence by us, would turn to Russia. We would thus place nations used to independence under alien rule, and such an act would neither be a wise nor a paying policy.
As regards Italy, Count Andrássy has also a solution which is quite generous. He says:
We would not do well if we were influenced by just revenge and turned our eyes on Italian territory. To force territory from a country whose people are so patriotic would be a source of weakness on our part. In the worst case, only boundary corrections can be thought of, and no conquest. Italy must recompense us by money and not territory, for not the Italian people, but its Government, committed a breach of faith against us.
The agricultural problem in France is the subject of an article by Professor Daniel Zolla in La Revue Hebdomadaire (Paris). Professor Zolla is a leader in the agricultural school at Grignon, and the main part of his article is a discussion of France's agricultural losses and how to repair them. He sums the present situation as follows:
At the end of May the enemy were occupying territory amounting to about two million hectares. In this zone as in the regions invaded though immediately evacuated, the agricultural losses have been admittedly severe: harvests, livestock, implements, fodder, have been stolen or destroyed; the buildings, burned or ruined, will have to be entirely rebuilt. The soil itself, ploughed with trenches, dug up by shells, infested with weeds, has lost much of its fertility....
In the invaded region which is one of the richest and most fertile in all France, the farming capital amounts at the least to five hundred francs per hectare, not counting the value of the buildings and of the land itself. For a total of two million hectares, the sum thus represented in the personal advances of farmers reach or surpass a billion, for in French Flanders and in Artois this minimum estimate of five hundred francs is greatly exceeded.
Concerning future indemnification for these losses, Professor Zolla writes:
It is the entire country at which the enemy wished to strike by ruining a certain number of the people; it is the country which should repair the ruin and indemnify the losses. Never will the principle of national solidarity apply with more justice and reason. The interest of the state can demand, it is true, that the victim who has become a creditor of the country shall not exact immediate payment of the sums due him. This is a question of the time needed to enable the country to pay and the representatives of the nation must be the judges of that.
But admitting the principle, it will suffice if it be known that the Treasury accepts the liability; it will be sufficient if certain annuities are promised and managed so that the parties can procure through the ordinary avenues of credit, the necessary indemnities.
This is the method which the National Assembly adopted in 1873. A sum of one hundred and eleven millions voted as relief, was represented by twenty-six annuities including interest at five per cent. and redemption.
Professor Zolla admits that France is going to encounter a serious difficulty in the scarcity of labor which is sure to follow the close of the war. It is not too early, he advises, to begin working on the solution of this problem so that France will be ready to meet it when it arises:
There are in the main, two methods by which the scarcity of farm labor can be offset:
1. By multiplying the machines which replace manual labor,
2. By modifying our agricultural methods so that preference is given to those which demand the least proportion of manual labor....
All the associations which are fortunately so numerous in our country, all the agricultural societies, all the co-operative societies which are already formed, should double their efforts to put at the disposition of their members those implements which on account of their high price are not available for the individual farmer.
Prices will rise after the war, but this, argues Professor Zolla, will be beneficial rather than otherwise.
High prices will be offset by large production: this excess of production will, however, follow on the activity of the rural producer, and that activity will be maintained and increased by high prices which always insure large profits.
In short, the rise in price wall be most favorable to the agricultural interests just at a time when the difficulties of obtaining labor will come to swell the necessary expenses of production. The crisis which might be in store is thus dissipated and the agricultural situation remains much as it was before the war—that is to say, very satisfactory.
The losses undergone will be considerable in the invaded regions, the obstacles which the farmer must overcome will be great but not insurmountable, but success will recompense the valor and the hard labor of our countrymen. And to be just we must not forget that this will be made possible by the work of the French women in the fields.
In the Revue des Deux Mondes (Paris), of which he is managing editor, M. Francis Charmes, of the Académie Française, replies to a speech made by von Bethmann-Hollweg before the Reichstag, in which the German Chancellor expressed sympathy for the deluded French soldiers, who had not an inkling of the true course which the war was taking. M. Charmes ironically remarks:
We do not publish, he [von Bethmann-Hollweg] claims, any of the German dispatches, so that opinion is quite unenlightened as to what is actually happening on the field of battle.
One would think, according to M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, that the German dispatches are a source on which one can rely with full confidence, and one would imagine, too, since he had thus reproached us, that the German newspapers published the French dispatches.
As a matter of fact, they do not and if it is necessary to hear both sides to know the truth then the Germans are quite ignorant of it. They are indeed very far removed from knowing it, and it is a constant surprise to our officers and our soldiers to discover when they question their prisoners, the profound illusions under which they labor.
Some time ago Dr. Wilhelm von Bode, the well-known director of the Berlin Art Museums and Germany's authority in matters of art, issued a justification of German conduct in Rheims and Louvain, which he supported by a review of Germany's world-contribution to art. "The German Science of Art and the War," was the title of the article. Jacques Mesnil, writing in the Mercure de France, presents a reply to Dr. von Bode's polemic.
He brands as infantile the reasoning by which Dr. Bode proves the German soldier incapable of destroying a work of art. The German professor stated that civilization, and with it art, could not have survived were it not for the protection of German militarism. M. Mesnil replies:
M. Bode should have been able to separate a little better two things which have nothing to do with each other: strategy and the history of art. He should have explained the conduct of the soldiers by the service which is required of them; he should have pointed out precisely the point of view of the archaeologist as incompatible with that of the warrior and he should have freed of responsibility those who, loving the picturesque old cities and the pure creations of artists, could not sympathize with those who destroy them.
Far from this, he has invoked the merits of German science to justify the outrages of the soldiery and in his eyes the fact that German savants have added to the progress of archaeology suffices to prove that the German army is incapable of destroying works of art.
Examination of Professor von Bode's claim that Germany leads the world in the "science of art," would seem to M. Mesnil to show that the German art-scientist is little more than a painstaking classifier, a mere cataloguer.
Taken as a whole, the art historians in Germany are a lot of excellent laborers, energetic and conscientious, who could render valuable service were they well directed. But it is precisely their direction which is at fault. Those among them who play the rôle of leader do not know how to distinguish the relative importance of the problems which come to their consideration; in confused multitude of facts, they follow a purely exterior and quite military order in their classifications; in the same way that a man in the army is a man only and that all the human units are in rigid divisions, so for the apostles of "the science of art" a fact is a fact and automatically falls under the head destined for it.
An article in La Revue (Paris), "Carnegie and the German Peace," would seem to indicate that France is not yet looking toward peace. The article is by Jean Finot himself, the well-known editor and publisher of La Revue, and it gives the pacifists short shrift indeed. The American peace propaganda, M. Finot characterizes as "the attempt at corruption," and he holds Mr. Carnegie responsible:
Unfortunately Mr. Carnegie endeavors to keep them [his opinions regarding peace] alive by supporting them with considerable sums of money for their diffusion abroad. A movement for "a German peace" has thus sprung up in America and it is taking on more and more disquieting proportions....
Mr. Carnegie has been accused and not perhaps without reason, of subsidizing many Germanophile publications and thus of aiding in the work of corruption which Germany and her agents are carrying on throughout the whole world.
The recent peace congress of women at The Hague comes in for some strong language:
The international congress of women pacifists seems to be due to Mr. Carnegie's generosity. This poisoning of public opinion, carried out systematically by his agents and his money, has become particularly odious. We do not suspect the honesty of his intentions, but we deplore his profound lack of comprehension of the events which have been taking place before his eyes.
Among the American women noted for their talent and character, Miss Jane Addams occupies a prominent place. But it seems that her sturdy honesty was not sufficient to resist the temptation of putting herself at the heels of Mr. Carnegie. We are convinced the charges of other than purely disinterested motives against Miss Addams are wholly unjustified. But she has participated in the women's congress at The Hague under truly regrettable conditions.
M. Finot's references to Chautauqua and the part it plays in the preparation of American opinion are veiled but none the less suggestive:
The important rôle which the Chautauqua conferences play in the United States is well known. These conferences of teachers which have so profound an influence on American opinion have been supported by Mr. Carnegie in the interests of realizing this idea of a precipitate peace, of a German peace. All manner of adventurers and seekers of easy fortunes have gathered around this strange deviation of the pacifist ideal represented by the multi-millionaire and the men of his stripe.
In an article headed "Ought the War to Last Long—and Can It Last Long?" V. Kuzmin-Karavaeff says in the Russian European Messenger for June:
It is, of course, impossible to say how long the war will last. But the case is altered if the question be put in another form: Ought the war to last long, and can it last long? The ten months which have elapsed make it entirely possible to answer it, for, in answering it, there is no need to guess at the thoughts, wishes, and hopes of the Germans which are bound up with the war.
In the eyes of Russia and her Allies the present war has as its object the crushing and dispersing of "the nest of militarism," constructed in the centre of Europe by the hand of Bismarck and the vainglory of Wilhelm II. That was clearly defined last autumn by our diplomatic department. That is precisely the way in which it was and is defined by all classes of the Russian people, not excluding those who are represented by Kropotkin and Plekhanoff. The present war became far more for Germany than a war for the integrity of her territory, for her colonial interests, or for her commercial supremacy, from the moment when three—now four—great powers rose at her arrogant challenge. Germany is everywhere attacking, but, in reality, she is conducting a desperate war of defence for the organization of her existence, which, for the space of forty years, has rested on a nervous anticipation of war with her neighbors. Germany's offensive is a strategical manœuvre. As a matter of fact, she is fighting like a wild animal surrounded on all sides. And, of course, she will carry on the war until the last degree of exhaustion is reached. She has accumulated within her many forces—technical forces. Mere technical forces cannot stand their ground in the end. But no little time must still elapse. And the war must continue for a long time still, if the "nest of militarism" is to be annihilated.
But, on the other hand, can it continue a long time? We Russians have a complete right to say, with conviction: Yes. Ten months of war have plainly demonstrated that we still possess a land which is still intact, and personal and economic forces.
To the east of the Dnieper and Moscow the war is hardly felt at all. This is particularly true of the principal foundations of our life—the peasant country parts numbering their hundred millions. The villages have sent to the war millions of young men, and even fathers of families, heads of households. Many tears have already been shed in the country, and there are many orphans, many cripples. But the peasant countryside has not suffered economically. On the contrary, after ten months of war and closed liquor-shops, it has reconstructed itself and smartened itself up to a noteworthy degree. The fields have been sown. From among the huge mass only those laboring hands have been withdrawn for the war which would not have remained at home in any case, but would have been lured away to earn money elsewhere.
The same thing is observable also in the towns. The masses in the towns have increased their deposits in the savings banks tenfold, while consuming more meat than before the war, and resorting less frequently to the loan banks. Information made its way out of Germany long ago to the effect that all the males there, with the exception of decrepit old men and small children, have been called to the army. The peculiar "crisis in men" in Berlin has frequently served as a subject of jest in the humorous press.
In Russia, every railway station swarms with young, healthy, powerful porters who offer their services; every large restaurant has a host of waiters; the wharves on the Volga and, in conclusion, the mere throngs on the streets bear witness to the fact that nothing resembling the "crisis in men" exists with us. Numerous as have been the soldiers who have gone to the war, the supply of men who are capable of bearing arms is still colossally great with us. Consequently, we have the material to fill up losses in the army. And that being the case, we can go on with the war for a long time to come—for as long a time as may be necessary to bring it to a proper ending.
Germanic influences in the Balkan Peninsula are discussed by A. Pogodin in the magazine Russian Thought. Mr. Pogodin says: