LIVERPOOL’S EXPERIENCE

A London cable dispatch to The New York Times, dated London, July 8, said:

Nearly 20,000 vessels have entered or left the port of Liverpool since the German submarine blockade began. This, said Sir A. Norman Hill, Secretary of the Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association, speaking at Liverpool yesterday, showed that the Germans had failed in their attempt to blockade British ports.

On these 20,000 voyages the Germans had captured or destroyed only twenty-nine ships, he continued. What did that represent? Ships which had sailed in and out of Liverpool had completed in safety 998 out of every 1,000 voyages upon which they started. That was a magnificent record, he held, of perils faced and overcome.

FIRST WEEK WITH NO LOSS

An Associated Press dispatch of July 22 from London remarked:

So far as British vessels were concerned, the German submarines drew a blank during the week ended yesterday. Not a single British merchant ship or fishing craft was sunk.

It was the first week since the war began that some loss to British shipping had not been occasioned by German cruisers, mines, or submarines.

During the week 1,326 vessels of more than 300 tons each arrived at or departed from ports of the United Kingdom.

The German war-zone decree went into effect on February 18. Since then the weekly losses of ships and lives from torpedoes have been as follows:

Of the two vessels torpedoed in the week of July 22, the Russian steamer Balwa was attacked on July 16. On the following day another Russian steamer, the General Radetzky, was torpedoed. Both hailed from Riga, and the crews of both were saved.

WARFARE MODIFIED?

A record reported to have been compiled chiefly from British Admiralty sources since the sinking of the Lusitania was published by The New York American on July 13, showing that out of 122 ships sunk by German submarines in the war zone, every passenger or sailor was saved on all but 14. Following is The American's summary:

GERMAN ACCOUNTS

In a Berlin dispatch of July 14, by wireless to Sayville, Long Island, the following was given out by the Overseas News Agency:

During the month of June twenty-nine British, three French, one Belgian, and nine Russian merchantmen were sunk by German submarines.

The total loss of the Entente Allies by submarines, including fishing steamers, which mostly were armed patrol boats, aggregated 125,000 tons.

The loss of human life was remarkably small, the submarines using every precaution and giving ample warning and time for crews to leave their ships if no resistance was attempted.

The total of losses in ships of the Allies' merchant marine around the English coast in the period between February 18 (the beginning of the German submarine war zone) and May 18, as compiled from German data, was published in the Frankfurter Zeitung of June 6. This publication, the first issue from German quarters, contains also a list of the various allied ships sunk, totaling 111, together with the nationality and tonnage of each, and a charted map of the British Isles showing where each ship was sunk.

In describing the achievements of the German submarine against their foes—the neutral ships sunk are not included—the Frankfurter Zeitung's article says:

In the period of three months since the 18th of February, a day memorable for history, our submarines have inflicted on the enemy merchant shipping, in the first place the English merchant marine, a total loss of 111 ships with a displacement of 234,239 tons. The figures may, perhaps, not seem especially large in comparison with the gigantic number of merchant ships flying the flag of the enemy. But in this method of warfare the percentage loss of ships of our opponent as compared with his total does not count, but rather the fact that through the regularity and inevitableness of the marine catastrophes the enemy shipping shall be disturbed as poignantly as possible, and that there should as a result of this disturbance appear in the economic life of England phenomena similar to those which the English plan of the isolation of Germany aims at without, however, having succeeded in getting any nearer to its goal, owing to the inherent strength and power of adaptation of German business.

The rise of prices now prevalent in England, and the paralyzing of great branches of trade which could not occur in an England that really ruled the sea, may be attributed in chief part to this war of the submarines. The advantage of the insular position of England has been greatly lessened, thanks to this excellent German weapon, even if it cannot be completely eliminated. But if one compares with the total voyages of the English merchant shipping the losses of the English merchant marine, amounting to more than 100 ships in a period of exactly ninety days, and a tonnage of 216,000 tons, (from the totals mentioned above there must be deducted the shares of France and Russia,) then we must consider only that part of the British merchant marine that entered ports of the island kingdom in this period or left them; and one must bear in mind further that a large number of those ships is contained several times in the English statistics, since they do coast service.

But as valuable booty for our submarines particularly those ships are to be regarded that import any kinds of commodities to England. And statistics will later be able to show on the basis of these figures the great success of the German submarine warfare, as indicated by figures.

A glance at the map that accompanies the list of losses suffices to show that mine fields as little as great distances are factors of decisive importance in the activities of our submarines. The closing of the English Channel and of the North Channel (between Ireland and Scotland) has not prevented our boats from penetrating wherever there was booty. Even on the northwest coast of Scotland and out in the west of Ireland the German submarines have carried on a successful hunt. The numbers in the little circles on the map represent the successive ships on the list.

The Frankfurter Zeitung adds figures given by the British Admiralty on the same subject. These, it says, total 130 merchant ships with a registered tonnage of 457,000 tons, from the beginning of the war to May 26. Added to these, it says, are 83 fishing vessels with a tonnage of 13,585 tons, making a total of 213 ships with 470,585 tons. It says:

These figures, however, are certainly incomplete, inasmuch as up to March 16 there had already been announced 145 ships with a total tonnage of 500,000 as lost, and the figures published by us above, based upon authentic material, concerning the victims of our submarines in three months, contradict beyond any power of dispute the euphemistic presentation of the British Admiralty. Even so, however, the English list still shows that since the beginning of the submarine warfare, although in that period there was little to speak of in the way of activities of the German cruisers abroad, the damage done to the English fleet has risen according to the confession of the Admiralty itself. Since Feb. 18, that is to say, since scarcely more than a quarter of a year, according to the English figures, no less than 56 British merchant ships with a tonnage of 187,000 tons (that is to say, more than 40 per cent. of the total number of merchant ships designated as lost) have been sunk. But if instead of these English figures the German compilation, which is indubitably correct, be accepted, then the entire picture changes considerably in our favor.

ADMIRAL SIR HENRY B. JACKSON
Who Succeeded Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty
(Photo by Elliott & Fry.)

REGINALD WARNEFORD

[From Truth of London]

By Theodore Roosevelt

In an address at the Panama-Pacific Exposition in San Francisco, delivered on July 21, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt said:

I HAVE a very strong feeling about the Panama Exposition. It was my good fortune to take the action in 1903, failure to take which, in exactly the shape I took it, would have meant that no Panama Canal would have been built for half a century, and, therefore, that there would have been no exposition to celebrate the building of the canal. In everything we did in connection with the acquiring of the Panama Zone we acted in a way to do absolute justice to all other nations, to benefit all other nations, including especially the adjacent States, and to render the utmost service, from the standpoint alike of honor and of material interest, to the United States. I am glad that this is the case, for if there were the slightest taint upon our title or our conduct it would have been an improper and shameful thing to hold this exposition.

The building of the canal nearly doubles the potential efficiency of the United States Navy, as long as it is fortified and is in our hands; but if left unfortified it would at once become a menace to us.

What is true as to our proper attitude in regard to the canal is no less true as regards our proper attitude concerning the interests of the United States taken as a whole. The canal is to be a great agency for peace; it can be such only, and exactly in proportion as it increased our potential efficiency in war.

Those men who like myself believe that the highest duty of this nation is to prepare itself against war so that it may safely trust its honor and interest to its own strength are advocating merely that we do as a nation regarding our general interests what we have already done in Panama. If, instead of acting as this nation did in the Fall of 1903, we had confined ourselves to debates in Congress and diplomatic notes; if, in other words, we had treated elocution as a substitute for action, we would have done nobody any good, and for ourselves we would have earned the hearty derision of all other nations—the canal would not even have been begun at the present day, and there would have been a general consensus of international opinion to the effect that we were totally unfit to perform any of the duties of international life, especially in connection with the Western hemisphere.

Unfortunately in the last few years we have as regards pretty much everything not connected with the Isthmus of Panama so failed in our duty of national preparedness that I fear there actually is a general consensus of opinion to precisely this effect among the nations of the world as regards the United States at the present day. This is primarily due to our unpreparedness.

We have been culpably, well-nigh criminally, remiss as a nation in not preparing ourselves, and if, with the lessons taught the world by the dreadful tragedies of the last twelve months, we continue with soft complacency to stand helpless and naked before the world, we shall excite only contempt and derision if and when disaster ultimately overwhelms us.

Preparedness against war does not invariably avert war any more than a fire department in a city will invariably avert a fire; and there are well-meaning foolish people who point out this fact as offering an excuse for unpreparedness. It would be just as sensible if after the Chicago fire Chicago had announced that it would abolish its fire department as for our people to take the same view as regards military preparedness. Some years ago I was looking over some very old newspapers contemporaneous with the early establishment of paid fire departments in this country, and to my amusement I came across a letter which argued against a paid fire department upon the ground that the knowledge of its existence would tend to make householders careless, and therefore would encourage fires.

Greece was not prepared for war when she went to war with Turkey a score of years ago. But this fact did not stop the war. It merely made the war unsuccessful for Greece. China was not prepared for war with Japan twenty-odd years ago, nor for war with the Allies who marched to Peking fifteen years ago.

Colonel Roosevelt then discussed in detail the cases of China and Belgium, comparing Belgium with Switzerland, and asserting that Switzerland would have met Belgium's fate if she had not been prepared to oppose invasion. Then taking up the case of China, he said:

She has acted on the theory that the worst peace was better than the best war, and therefore she has suffered all the evils of the worst war and the worst peace. The average Chinaman took the view that China was too proud to fight and in practice made evident his hearty approval of the sentiments of that abject pacifist song: "I Didn't Raise My Boy to be a Soldier," a song which should have as a companion piece one entitled: "I Didn't Raise my Girl to be a Mother," approval of which of course deprives any men or women of all right of kinship with the soldiers and with the mothers and wives of the soldiers, whose valor and services we commemorate on the Fourth of July and on Decoration Day; a song, the singing of which seems incredible to every man and woman capable of being stirred to lofty and generous enthusiasm by the tremendous surge of Julia Ward Howe's "Battle Hymn of the Republic." China has steadily refused to prepare for war. Accordingly China has had province after province lopped off her, until one-half of her territory is now under Japanese, Russian, English and French control.

The professional pacifists, the peace-at-any-price, non-resistance, universal arbitration people are now seeking to Chinafy this country.

During the past year or so this nation has negotiated some thirty all-inclusive peace treaties by which it is agreed that if any issue arises, no matter of what kind, between itself and any other nation, it would take no final steps about it until a commission of investigation had discussed the matter for a year. This was an explicit promise in each case that if American women were raped and American men murdered, as has actually occurred in Mexico; or American men, women, and children drowned on the high seas, as in the case of the Gulflight and Lusitania; or if a foreign power secured and fortified Magdalena Bay or the Island of St. Thomas, we would appoint a commission and listen to a year's conversation on the subject before taking action.

England and France entered into these treaties with us, and we begged Germany to enter into one, and, although Germany refused, yet if we were right in entering into them with England and France, we deprived ourselves of moral justification in refusing to fulfill their spirit as regards Germany. Personally I believe that it was absolutely necessary when the concrete case arose to repudiate the principle to which we had thus committed ourselves. But it was a shameful thing to have put ourselves in such a position that it had to be repudiated, and it was inexcusable of us to decline to follow the principle in the case of the Lusitania without at the same time making frank confession of our error and misconduct by notifying all the powers with whom we had already made the treaties that they were withdrawn, because in practice we had found it impossible and improper to follow out the principle to which they committed us.

Military Résumés of Operations on All Fronts—
August, 1914 to August, 1915

By Lieutenant Walter E. Ives

Formerly of the Royal Prussian Thirteenth Dragoons

and

By An American Military Expert

One Year’s War

By Lieutenant Walter E. Ives

I.

THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN

THE first year of the European war has drawn to a close. A résumé covering the military events it has produced brings to view two distinct phases of the campaign. The first phase comprises the period from Aug. 3 to Oct. 27, and consists of a tenacious effort to carry through the original plan of war of the German General Staff: to strike a crushing blow at France, and after putting her "hors de combat," to turn on the enemy in the East. The second phase comprises the time from Oct. 27 to the present, and consists in the pursuance of military aims forming the direct reversal of the original ones.

The campaign against France, in consequence of the German plan of strategy the first one to come into prominence, can, in its first phase, be divided into four periods.

The first period comprises the operations in Belgium, German Lorraine and Alsace, from Aug. 3 to Aug. 23, the day before the Battle for the Invasion of France, commonly, but incorrectly known as the battle of Mons.

The main blow at France was to come through Belgium. Five German armies out of eight were hurled against this gateway to Northern France. In Lorraine and Alsace the Germans were temporarily to remain on the defensive. The protection of Lorraine was intrusted to the Bavarian (Sixth) Army, that of Alsace to the remaining two armies.

The French plan of operation was to check the invasion of Belgium on the line Tongres-Liége-Longwy, where the Belgian Army, from a strictly military point of view, forming the advance guards of the French Army of the North, was holding strong positions, and with superior forces to strike at the German Army of Lorraine. The aim was, avoiding Metz, to reach the Moselle near Trier through the valley of the Saar, and to roll up the German Army of the North from its left wing. An invasion of Alsace was merely to satisfy political aspirations.

The German advance in Belgium, however, remained unchecked, and in Lorraine the battles of Dieuze and Saarbourg on Aug. 20 decided the issue in favor of the Bavarians. In Alsace the French were victorious over the Eighth Army and took Muelhausen, while further north, between Muenster and Shirmeck, the Seventh Army checked the French invasion.

Meanwhile the German avalanche in Belgium had reached the second line of defense, Brussels-Namur-Longwy, before the French Army of the North. The capture of Namur prompted the French staff to recall advance guards, which had reached the fortress just as it surrendered, and to accept battle in the line Mons-Charleroi-Givet-Longwy. The battle for the invasion of France and the retirement of the French armies in all the theatres of action which it caused opens the second period of the campaign against France.

The English contingent from Havre had joined the French Army just before the German onslaught began. The battle was lost by the Allies tactically and strategically through the defeat of their right wing at Longwy and Neufchateau, and through the encircling of their left wing at Mons. The direct result of the outcome was the German invasion of France; the indirect consequence (resulting from the necessity of drawing troops from the other fields of action to stem the German invasion) was the retirement of the French armies in Lorraine and Alsace to the line Verdun-Nancy-St. Die, and further south to the passes of the Vosges, which they have been holding ever since.

Sweeping on through Northern France, the German Army of the North was breaking up all resistance in its path, such as was attempted by the British at St. Quentin on Aug. 28, and was tearing with it all fortresses, such as Longwy, La Fère, Maubeuge, and others; but it was failing in its principal aim: to embrace the skillfully retreating enemy before he could reach the line Paris-Verdun, which he had selected and prepared for the next stand.

On Aug. 30 the German plan of strategy was changed, and it was resolved to break the centre of the enemy, throwing his left wing into Paris and on the Seine and his right wing into Verdun, Toul, and Epinal. The armies of the centre were pushed forward, while either wing held back. The Allies were established in the general line Paris-Verdun.

The battle ensuing on Sept. 5 and the retreat of the Germans to the Aisne are the events of the third period of this campaign, lasting from Sept. 5 to Sept. 28. On Sept. 8, while the German attacks had all but pierced the French centre, having already bent it back beyond the line Sezanne-Vitry, the German right wing found itself outflanked by a new allied army from Paris, which was rapidly moving northward and threatened to roll up the entire German battle front from the direction of Compiègne. The critical question, who would succeed first, the Allies in outflanking the German right or the Germans in piercing the French centre, was decided in favor of the Allies. Anglo-French strategy triumphed.

The tactical aspect of the situation, though, is best illustrated by the message sent to his commander-in-chief by General Foch, commanding the French Army of the Centre when he received the order to counter-attack: "My left has been forced back, my right is routed. I shall attack with the centre." When the counter-attack came it found but rear guards opposing it. The retreat of the Germans, their right flank constantly in danger of being rolled up, was a fine military achievement. On Sept. 12 it halted on the Aisne. In the regions northeast of Verdun the German left wing joined hands with the Sixth German Army, which had followed up the retirement of the French Army of Lorraine to the line Verdun-St. Die.

Thus resting on Metz with its left wing the German battle-front was strongly established on a line passing Verdun, to the east and northeast, extending from there in a general westerly direction to the valley of the Aisne as far as the region north of Compiègne, and from that point northward to the region west of Peronne and Cambrai.

The stability of this line, enabling a constant shifting of forces toward the right wing, and the arrival there of the army released from Maubeuge, made possible the extension of the battle-front to the region of Arras, and frustrated all flanking movements on the part of the Allies.

The situation was again safe, but the plan to put the French army hors de combat was far from having been realized. The German General Staff therefore decided on a new plan. Its purpose was to gain control of the northeast coast of France. A wedge should be driven between the two allied countries, and Pas-de-Calais made the base of further operations against both. The following out of this plan constitutes the fourth and last period of the first phase of the western campaign. It starts with the beginning of the siege of Antwerp on Sept. 28 and ends with the first battle of Ypres on Oct. 27.

The first step toward the accomplishment of the new aims was the capture of Antwerp. Antwerp in the hands of the Allies meant a constant menace to the German line of communication; in possession of the Germans it signified the key to Northern France. The fortress was taken on Oct. 9. The next point of strategic importance for the pursuance of the German plan was Lille, which was taken on Oct. 12.

But the change in the German plan of strategy had been recognized by the Allies, and a new English army from Havre was hurried to the line Bethune-Dunkirk to extend the allied left wing to the coast and block the road to Calais. It reached West Flanders on Oct. 13, and on Oct. 16 it came in contact with the German Army that approached from Antwerp. The latter joined the German right wing north of Lille and extended it to Westende. On the 18th, after having brought up all their reserves, the Germans began their onslaught to break through in the region of Dixmude and Ypres.

While, by Oct. 27, no appreciable impression had been made on the allied battleline, the situation in the eastern seat of war had begun to assume an alarming aspect, and necessitated the complete change in the German plan of strategy, which marks the beginning of the second phase of the war.

On the western front this second phase meant for the Germans the going into the defensive along the entire battleline, which the allied armies have been relentlessly attempting to break. In spite of their continuous heroic efforts only minor successes, such as that of the British at Neuve Chapelle and that of the French to the north of Arras, have been achieved. Counter attacks, forming the most essential element of the modern defensive, have been launched by the Germans incessantly, and have on several occasions resulted in successes similar to those of the Allies, as, for instance, at Soissons and at Ypres. On the whole, no changes of strategic importance have taken place, and the German wall in France stands firm to this day.

II.

THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN

While, in the early days of August, the bulk of the German Army was moving westward, not more than ten army corps were available for the campaign against Russia. To them and to the Austrian armies fell the task of laying the basis for the offensive contemplated for a later date. The plan of campaign was to draw the Russians into the Polish bag and tie it up. It was based on the knowledge that Russia's principal strategic aim must, under all circumstances, be Cracow, the gateway to Vienna and Berlin.

The enemy was to be allowed to reach it through Poland, while the Germans should hold on to East Prussia and the Austrians to Galicia, to flank the Russian advance from the north and south in preparation for a campaign against the Russian lines of communication. This scheme of bagging the enemy has governed all strategic moves of the campaign against Russia to this day.

But the Muscovites were on their guard. They paid little attention to the few German divisions that were thrown into Poland in August, in order to attract a Russian offensive, and began hammering at the Teutonic flanking positions along the East Prussian frontier in the north and the line Lublin-Tarnopol in the south.

While the Russian offensive in East Prussia came to grief at Tannenberg, it was most successful against Galicia, and the eighth week of the war already found the Russian invasion west of the San, Przemysl besieged, and the Austrian right wing flanked by vast bodies of cavalry, which had penetrated the Carpathian passes and reached the region of Munkacs.

To relieve the pressure exerted on their Allies and give them a chance once more to establish themselves in north-eastern Galicia, four German army corps invaded Poland and advanced toward Radom and Ivangorod. This counter move was successful. Menaced in their right flank, the Russians quickly took back their army beyond the San. The Austrians followed, raised the siege of Przemysl, and drove the invaders from Hungary and straightened out their line from Sandomir to Czernowitz.

Meanwhile heavy Russian reinforcements had been brought up from Ivangorod and were gradually put in action against the Germans east of Radom. On Oct. 24, as soon as the Russian superiority became alarming, the four German army corps, having, temporarily at least, accomplished their purpose of re-establishing the Austrian campaign, beat a hasty retreat toward Silesia, during which the second purpose of their invasion, to draw into the Polish bag great masses of Russian troops, was successfully achieved, the Russians having been led to believe that they were pursuing a great German army.

Simultaneously, though, with their advance in the path of the German retreat in Poland, the Russians once more concentrated vast forces against the menacing projection of the Austrian battleline in Galicia, and the early days of November witnessed the second invasion of the Austrian province. At the same time a new drive was made on East Prussia, and the Germans were forced back into the region of the Masurian Lakes.

The retirement of the entire Teutonic battleline before the Russians, who toward the end of October had reached the maximum of their strength, marks the end of the first phase of the eastern campaign. It had not accomplished all that had been expected of it. The enemy had been drawn far into South Poland, but the base of operations for the general offensive against his communications in the north had not been established just where it should have been, and the Russian frontier fortifications had been found better prepared for resistance than those of Belgium, while in the south the Austrian base of operations was entirely in the hands of the enemy.

The second phase of the eastern campaign was therefore opened from a new base—Thorn, where the main army had been gathered ever since Oct. 27, when the Russian danger had become alarming, and the offensive in the west had been abandoned. It was suddenly launched with irresistible force on Nov. 12, and rolled back numerically inferior Russian armies, whose task it had been to protect the right flank of the Russian advance on Silesia.

Recognizing the danger to their operations in South Poland and Galicia, where they had meanwhile approached the line of the Warta, Cracow, and Neu Sandec, the Russians threw troops into North Poland from all sides and succeeded in temporarily detaining the German advance there, while they were continuing their supreme efforts to break the Austro-German line south of Cracow. But the line held. At the same time the German drive in North Poland was making steady headway.

On Dec. 6 the Germans took Lodz, and further north advanced on Lowitz, and the Russian offensive in the Cracow district was given up. While all troops that could be spared were sent northeast to support the prepared lines of the Bzura and Rawka Rivers, the Russians in the south fell back behind the Nida and Dunajec, joining with their right wing their northern army in the region of Tomaschew, and extending their left through the region of Gorlitz and Torka toward the Pruth. In this line the Teutonic advance was checked. A new German drive on the road from Soldau to Warsaw could likewise make no headway beyond Mlawa, while on the other hand in East Prussia the Russian offensive had been brought to a standstill.

A siege warfare, like that in France, seemed imminent, except in the Bukowina, where Russian forces during January were driving Austrian troops before them. The Russian invasion of that province, however, so distant from all strategically important points, was but a political manœuvre.

The first movement of any consequence to occur was a desperate attempt of the Austrians early in February to push forward with their right wing in the direction of Stanislau, chiefly to bring relief to the garrison of Przemysl. Simultaneously they began sweeping the Russians out of Bukovina. The latter undertaking was successful, but the advance on Stanislau was thrown back toward Nadworna.

While the Austrian offensive was under way, General von Hindenburg unexpectedly launched a vigorous attack in East Prussia, which resulted in the destruction of the Russian East Prussian Army in the region of the Masurian Lakes. Once more a successful drive at the Russian "bread line" from the north seemed at hand. Already the armies pursuing the Russians were hammering at the Russian fortifications along the Niemen, Bobr, and Narew when the surrender of Przemysl, the siege of which had uninterruptedly gone on behind the Russian lines since November, on March 22 again presented to the Russians an opportunity to break the Austrian battleline.

To check the onslaught of the reinforced Russian armies against the Carpathian passes early in April, troops must be drawn from General von Hindenberg's armies, and the consequence was another deadlock in the north. Meanwhile the reinforced Teutonic troops were hurriedly concentrated for the counter-attack against the Russian offensive in the Carpathians, and a great drive began against the Russian positions on the Dunajec line, east of Cracow, early in May. Breaking all resistance, it swept on toward Jaroslau and Przemysl on a sixty-mile front.

Threatened in their right and left flanks, respectively, the Russian lines on the Nida and in the Carpathians fell back rapidly, while reinforcements were sent to stem the Teutonic advance along the San. But the Russian efforts were in vain. The momentum the Teutonic offensive had gained carried it across the river, while further south the Austrian right wing cleared the entire Carpathian front of the enemy, hotly pushing his retreat.

Przemysl was recaptured, the third Russian line of defense from Rawa-Ruska to Grodeck and the Dniester was broken, and the end of June saw Lemberg once more in the hands of the Teutons, and the Russian line on the defensive and sorely pressed along a front extending from the Bessarabian frontier along the Dniester to the mouth of the Zlota-Lipa, and from there along the Zlota-Lipa and the Bug, well into Russian territory, leaving the river southeast of Grubeschow, and continuing from there in a northwesterly direction to the region of Krasnik.

Here it joined hands with the left wing of the Russian Army of the Nida, which had retired before the Austro-German advance in a northeasterly direction, intrenching along a line from Krasnik across the Vistula and through Sjenno and Jastrshob (about fifteen miles southwest of Radom) to the region of Tomaschew on the Pilitza.

While this great Spring offensive from the Dunajec line was well under way, small German forces invaded the Russian province of Courland. Finding at first little resistance in the path of their unexpected advance, they took Libau and established themselves on the Dubissa-Windau line. During July the operations in Courland steadily assumed greater proportions.

Two bases for the campaign against the Russian lines of communication have thus been firmly established in the flanks of the Russian Armies west of the Vistula, both protruding far into their rear. Drives against the Dunaburg-Warsaw line from the north and the Minsk-Ivangorod line from the south will open the second year of the eastern campaign. The first year of the incessant struggle has brought the aims of the German strategy, the bagging of the Russian Armies, within sight of its realization.

III.

CAMPAIGNS OF MINOR IMPORTANCE

While the struggle in the two principal seats of war has been going on, the passing year has witnessed fighting also of secondary importance, though not less heroic, in three other fields of action: Serbia, Turkey, and the Austro-Italian frontier. Whereas Turkey joined the Teutons but three months after the beginning of hostilities, and Italy was involved only at the end of May, Serbia was one of the first nations to take the field.

Austria's campaign against the little kingdom could under no circumstances influence the events of the war, and was therefore void of any strategic importance. For this reason, but three Austrian Army corps were engaged in it.

The purpose was merely to keep the Serbians busy, and prevent them from invading Austrian soil. For the sake of the moral effect on the other Balkan States the capture of Belgrade should be attempted. In view of the strength of the Danube fortifications the operations were launched from Bosnia and resulted in the forcing of the Drina line and the capture of Valjevo on Nov. 17. The Serbian positions on the Danube having thus been flanked, the abandonment of Belgrade on Dec. 2 was a natural consequence of the Battle of Valjevo.

Misled by their successes into the belief that the Serbian army had been placed hors de combat, the Austrians advanced beyond the lines destined to constitute the object of their offensive. In the difficult mountain districts southeast of Valjevo the Serbians turned on the invaders with superior forces and defeated them. The Austrian retreat to the Drina which followed, necessitated the evacuation of Belgrade on Dec. 15. Since then, the situation on the Serbian frontier has been a deadlock, only desultory and insignificant fighting occurring for the rest of the year.

In contrast to the operations in Serbia, Turkey's campaign has direct bearing on the European war. Its chief feature, the closing of the Dardanelles, has been a serious blow to Russia. The frantic efforts of the Allies to open them are the plainest evidence of its importance.

The attempt in March to force the straits by naval power having resulted in failure, an army was landed on the west coast of Gallipoli, and after heavy fighting established itself on a line running from Eski-Hissarlik on the south coast of the peninsula to the region of Sari-Bair, on the north coast, constituting a front of approximately twenty miles, within five miles of the west coast. No progress further than this have the Allies been able to make up to the present, and the watch at the Dardanelles stands firm as yet.

The attacks of the Anglo-French armies, however, exerted influence on Turkey's operations in other fields of action. They caused the complete abandonment of a contemplated invasion of Egypt and compelled the Turkish troops to go on the defensive in the Caucasian seat of war. This enabled Russia to call back to Poland troops sorely needed there, with which they had had to check the Turkish advance on Kars in January. Since February both battlelines along the Caucasian front have been weakened and no fighting of any consequence has occurred in this campaign of merely secondary importance.

The operations in the latest field of action, along the Austro-Italian frontier, have been going on for but eight weeks, and do not, therefore, allow any conclusions as to their importance to be made as yet. So far the Italians have been unable to make any effective impression on either Austria's Tyrolese frontier or on the front of the Isonzo. All attempts to break through the Austrian lines have thus far failed. The aim of Austria's strategy is to maintain a deadlock until the issue has been decided in Poland.

In determining the results of the first year of the world war the question as to which side is holding the advantage at the close of this important period depends entirely upon what were the political aims of the adversaries. The Teutonic allies' contention has ever been, rightly or wrongly, that they are not waging a war for territorial aggrandizement, but purely one in self-defense. From this point of view they can be well satisfied with the results they have so far attained.

An American View

By the Military Expert of The New York Times

FIRST PHASE

Opening the Way to France Through Belgium

By Aug. 4, 1914, war had been declared by all the nations now engaged except Turkey and Italy. Subsequent events have proved that of them all the Teutonic allies were the only nations actually prepared and that as between Austria and Germany the preparation of the latter was much more complete. It was the Germans, therefore, who, with the entire campaign carefully mapped out in advance, took the initiative. Germany, too, at the very outset saw the one clear path to victory.

One or the other of her Continental enemies must not only be defeated, but crushed and eliminated from the conflict before the other could mobilize against her. One of them, Russia, would probably take the longer time to effect her mobilization. Russia had started, it is true, before war was declared. But interior railroads in Russia are few. Russia, too, is proverbially slow, if for no other reason than by virtue of her ponderous numbers. France, on the other hand, is checked and counter-checked by good strategic railroads, and, having no such vast territory over which her troops would have to be moved, would be able to mobilize in a much shorter time than her ally. England, for a few weeks at least, could be disregarded. Deceived as to the extent of Russian unpreparedness and believing that Russia's slowness would prevent an active offense for some weeks, Germany selected France as her first objective, and took immediate steps to hurl twenty-four army corps across the French border at various points, aiming at Paris.

These twenty-four corps were divided into three armies—the Army of the Meuse, based on Cologne; the Army of the Moselle, based on Metz and Coblenz, and the Army of the Rhine, based on Strassburg. All of these three armies were naturally to converge on Paris. The route of the Army of the Meuse would pass through Liége, Namur, and Maubeuge, and would therefore have to cross a part of Belgium; the Army of the Moselle would take a route through Sedan and Soissons, passing north of the Verdun fortress, but of necessity crossing the Duchy of Luxemburg; the Army of the Rhine, after crossing the screen of the Vosges Mountains, would pass through Nancy and Toul, between the fortresses of Epinal and Belfort.

It is obvious that the march to Paris would be most quickly achieved through the flat country of Belgium, where the French frontier is practically unguarded and only the weakly manned barrier fortresses of Belgium barred the way. The remainder of the French frontier from Luxemburg to Switzerland was well fortified, and Germany had no time to spend in reducing fortified places.

The main advance was therefore to take place through Belgium, the Army of the Moselle co-operating, while to the Army of the Rhine was assigned the offensive-defensive rôle of advancing to the barrier fortresses of Epinal and Belfort to check any French advance that might be directed against the communications of the Armies of the Moselle and the Meuse to the north. The railroad communications through the Belgian plain were splendidly adapted to this plan, backed as they were by the military railroads which Germany had constructed several years before, running through the industrial districts in the north of the German Empire up to the Belgian border.

Germany's first move was the invasion of Luxemburg, violating the neutrality of a State which, under the treaty making her independent and guaranteeing neutrality, (to which treaty Germany was a party,) was not permitted to maintain an army. Two days later Germany asked passage for her troops through Belgium, for the purpose of attacking France. Belgium promptly refused, and on Aug. 4 Germany began the forcing of this passage by an attack on Liége.

Thus, at the outset the German plan went awry. Although the contemplated line of advance was through Liége and Namur, it was not sufficient, with Belgium openly in arms to defend her country, to reduce only these two towns. The Belgian Army could, and later did, fall back to the north on Louvain, Brussels, and Antwerp, and so be directly on the German flank and in a position to strike at the line of communications. It was therefore necessary to subjugate all of Belgium either by destroying the Belgian Army or driving it before them in their advance.

Thus, the German advance was not only doomed to delay, but at least 100,000 troops were needed to garrison a hostile country and to protect the life lines running to the rear.

Three days after the attack on Liége opened the Germans penetrated between the outer forts, their infantry advancing in close formation and sustaining enormous losses. But Liége was worth the price paid. Some of the forts held out for days, but were finally reduced by the fire of the 42-centimeter guns—the first of the German surprises. The Belgian garrison, however, had done its work. The German advance was delayed for ten precious days, during which the first consignment of the British expeditionary force had reached the Continent and France and Russia had largely completed their mobilization.

As soon as it was realized that the unexpected Belgian resistance had retarded the German advance and in all probability had disarranged the German plan of campaign, the French, even before the guns of Liége had cooled, struck at Alsace, through the Belford Gap and over the Vosges Mountains. At first this French offensive was successful. Points on the Metz-Strassburg Railroad were taken and the town of Mülhausen captured. But almost before the news of success reached Paris the French had been defeated, not only in Alsace but also in Lorraine, whence French troops had been sent to engage the German Army of the Moselle. The result was the retirement of the French to the line of their first defense—a line that had been prepared for just such an emergency during the years since 1871.

While the German armies of the Moselle and of the Rhine were thus occupied in repelling the French advance the Army of the Meuse was forcing its way through Belgium. Throwing out a strong cavalry screen in its front, this army advanced through Tongres, St. Frond, Laugen, Haelen, and Terlemont, and finally confronted the Belgians on the line from Louvain to Namur. Fighting on this front filled almost a week, when the destruction of the fortifications of Namur forced the Belgians to fall back, pivoting on Louvain to the line from Louvain to Wavre, the last line in front of Brussels. On Aug. 20 the Belgians were defeated at Louvain and the Germans entered Brussels, the Belgian Government having previously retired to Antwerp. The first phase of the German advance was thus completed and the way to France was open.

SECOND PHASE

From the Fall of Brussels to von Kluck’s Retreat to the Aisne

Immediately following the fall of Namur, which forced the Belgians to take up the Louvain-Wavre line, the main German Army of the Meuse started for France, leaving possibly two army corps to drive the Belgians from Brussels and to protect their flank and their lines of communication. The German advance first came in contact with the French and British along a line from Mons to Charleroi, southwest of Brussels. The British were supposed to have been between two French armies, but for some reason the army which had been assigned to position on the British left did not appear. Being outflanked, a retreat followed, the French being defeated at the same time at Charleroi. The German Army of the Moselle then attacked along the Meuse, and, being also successful, was on the flank and rear of the British and French retreating from Mons and Charleroi.

Thus a great enveloping movement was disclosed which for some days gave every evidence of being successful. It was defeated, however, entirely by the British, who, though outflanked and outnumbered three to one, fought steadily night and day for six days, their small force holding in complete check all of von Kluck's army corps. Retreat was of course inevitable, but the retreat was made in good order and with the morale of the troops unshaken.

In the meantime the German General Staff, which had confidently expected to crush France before Russia could become a factor to be reckoned with, saw with alarm Russia pouring her troops into East Prussia in a drive against Königsberg, while in South Poland another Russian army was preparing a drive against Galicia, operating from the Ivangorod-Rowno railroad. Germany saw the Austrians being defeated everywhere; Lemberg, the capital of Galicia, captured; Przemysl masked, and the Russians fighting their way westward through Galicia between the Carpathians and the Vistula. But Austria's troubles at this stage were her own. Germany had all she could do to turn back the Russian invasion of East Prussia.

To face the peril on her eastern borders Germany detached several army corps—probably five—from the western front, with them reinforced her eastern army, and in a few days after their arrival inflicted a disastrous defeat on the Russians at Tannenburg, driving them back practically to their own borders. But the damage had been done. The armies of the west had been weakened at a critical point, and General Joffre was given the opportunity he had been seeking since the beginning of the war.

The French and British, whose retreat had carried them to the Marne, now outnumbered the Germans, and, what is more important, were able to concentrate their forces by calling in those troops who had been engaged in the counter-offensive in Alsace. Taking advantage of their superiority in numbers, the Allies took the offensive. Holding the Germans fast in the centre, the Paris garrison struck hurriedly northeast toward Soisson with the idea of getting around von Kluck's flank. For several days it seemed that von Kluck and his army must be captured. But, moving north with great rapidity, abandoning much of his artillery and supplies, he escaped the net Joffre had spread for him, and anchored himself securely behind the Aisne. The great German movement was thus brought to an abrupt halt, and they were now on the defensive. Paris was saved. For ten days the Allies fought desperately to cross the Aisne and force von Kluck to continue his retreat. But finally the effort was given up, and the two armies faced each other across the Aisne deadlocked.

The Russians meanwhile had not been idle. Although their operations against the reinforced German Army had a negative result, against the Austrians in Galicia their success continued. Przemysl had not been taken, but, hemming it in securely, the Russians passed on and took the fortified town of Jaroslau, near the lower San. The menace of the Russian invasion of Galicia then became apparent. Galicia, with her wealth of oil and minerals, the fertile plains of Hungary just the other side of the Carpathians, Cracow, opening the gate to Breslau and Berlin—these were the things the Teutons stood in danger of losing, and it is not surprising that they viewed the Russian advance with alarm.

There is but one more incident to record before closing what might well be considered the second phase of the war. That is the fall of Antwerp. It was Belgium's final sacrifice on the altar of her national honor. And no matter what our ancestry may be, nor how our sympathies may lie, we cannot but reverence a people whose sense of national duty and honor is so high that they are willing to sacrifice and do sacrifice their all to maintain it.

THIRD PHASE

From the Fall of Antwerp to the Beginning of the Battle for Warsaw

When it became apparent to General French that the line of the Aisne, to which the Germans had retreated after the battle of the Marne, was too strong to be forced, he withdrew his troops, about 100,000 men, from the line, his place being filled by the French reserves. The object of the withdrawal was another flanking movement against the German right. The idea seems to have been that by withdrawing and entraining at night the movement would be entirely concealed from the Germans until the British were actually in Belgium, and that an advance along the left bank of the Scheldt would turn the flank of the whole German army in France, compelling a general retreat. The movement was discovered by German air scouts, however, and the troops that had been before Antwerp met and checked the British, who took up finally the line along the Yser Canal, through Ypres to La Bassée, opposed by three German army corps.

But one thing saved the British from another defeat and prevented a more disastrous retreat than that from Mons and Charleroi. When the Germans took Antwerp the Belgian garrison of about 50,000 men escaped and by a brilliant retreat retired to a line from Nieuport to Dixmude. They thus guarded the left flank of the British line and by a stubborn resistance prevented this flank from being turned and the British driven south toward Paris. Nothing else prevented Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne from falling into German hands at this time.

As it afterward turned out, the German plan, after the fall of Antwerp, was a sudden drive to Calais. The plan was conceived and the movement begun at the same time General French put into execution his attempt to outflank the German position. These forces met on the Ypres-La Bassée line, and both were halted. It was a fortuitous chance, then, that the Germans were held back from the coast, as well as deprived of an opportunity to strike at Paris from the north. For three weeks the Germans battled fiercely, with almost total disregard for the loss of life involved. Finally the attack died out, and with its death the whole line from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier settled down to trench warfare.

While the armies in the west were checking each other until the status of a "stalemate" had been reached, affairs in the eastern theatre had been moving rapidly. Persuaded by German money, a temptation the Turk has ever been powerless to resist, Turkey late in October joined hands with the Teutons and declared war on the Allies. The Japanese, who had at the outset joined hands with England, had, after a wonderful defense by the Germans, taken the German Chinese city of Kiao-Chau. But of more importance still was the activity of the opposing armies in Russia and in Galicia.

After the battle of Fannenburg, in which Russia was defeated and driven back to her own borders, the Germans invaded Suwalki Province in Northern Poland. The Russians again took the offensive, defeated the Germans in the battle of Augustovo, and, pressing westward, again entered East Prussia in the region of the Mazurian Lakes. In this territory a deadlock followed, both Russians and Germans remaining with horns locked and unable to move until early Spring.

In Galicia, however, events moved with greater rapidity, and the results were vastly more important. After the fall of Lemberg and Jaroslau the Russians pressed forward across the San to Tarnow, masking Przemysl on the way, and took up a line along the Dunajec to the Carpathians and east through Galicia along the Dniester and the Pruth to the Rumanian frontier, thus threatening not only the plains of Hungary, which lay just across the Carpathian summits, but also Bukowina, the Crownland of Austria.

Austria's plight was desperate, and German assistance was necessary. Von Hindenburg's first attack on Warsaw, the battle being called the battle of the Vistula, was the answer. The Germans advanced against the Russian centre, the Austrians against the left in Galicia. At first both were successful, but heavy Russian reinforcements succeeded in turning the German left, almost at the very gates of Warsaw. The Germans were forced to retreat, and fell back to their own borders. The Austrians were at the same time compelled to retreat, due to the uncovering of their flank, and again Russia was in supreme control of Galicia as far west as Cracow. As the Germans retreated the Russians followed, and another invasion of Germany was threatened, and it was von Hindenburg again who was to throw it back.

This he did, driving forward in three columns, two of which were intended to move against the Russian flanks. The Russian centre fell back to Lodz, but the right was still threatened. Again Russia assembled her reserves, and before von Hindenburg realized the situation a Russian army was not only on his flank but in his rear. A retreat was necessary. The Germans, assisted by corps drawn from the west, cut their way out and escaped from the Russian trap through the failure of one of the Russian armies to co-operate in the movement in time. But the German offense had failed and the effort had been terribly expensive.

Another offense was immediately planned—this time to move along the Vistula and strike at Warsaw from the southwest. This also was a failure, and the two armies finally became deadlocked along the line of the Bzura and the Rawka Rivers.

No further fighting of importance in this theatre until February, when the battle of the Mazurian Lakes was fought. It will be recalled that after the German defeat at Augustovo the Russians pursued the Germans into the lake district, where the two armies became practically deadlocked. This situation was broken by the Germans, who suddenly attacked both flanks of the Russian army and inflicted upon it a disastrous defeat, in which one army corps surrendered and the remainder escaped only after enormous losses.

But the victory, like other German victories, while decisive as far as the particular Russian army involved was concerned, did nothing toward hastening peace. The beginning of Spring found the armies in both theatres completely at a standstill, except in Galicia.

In the west since the failure of the German drive on Calais there has been no movement that has affected the general situation. The anniversary of the declaration of war finds the lines of the Germans and the French practically where they were six months ago. A number of battles have been fought for the possession of certain points of vantage—in the Champagne, the Argonne, at Neuve Chapelle, Ypres, Les Eparges, Hartmannsweilerkopf, Metzeral, Souchez—but they have resulted in only a local effect, although they have been accompanied in almost every case by losses that have been staggering.

The principal event of the Spring in the west has been the advent of Italy into the maelstrom. But this has not affected the situation up to the present time. Italy has a hard problem on her hands which must be solved before she can make herself felt. She has but one line of advance—the line of the Isonzo. But she dare not advance and leave the passes through the Tyrolean and the Carnic Alps open for Germany and Austria to pour troops in against her flank and rear. Her task therefore is first to stop every pass by which this can be done; and then, and then only, is she ready to move. This is being done, but the task is a difficult one, the country impossible from a military viewpoint, and progress necessarily slow.

In the east, however, the coming of Spring brought a series of the most tremendous movements of the war. The Allies began an operation against the Dardanelles, with the object of forcing the strait, taking Constantinople, and thus at once releasing the great store of grain in Southern Russia and providing a means of getting ammunition to Russia from the west. The operations at first were entirely naval. But after serious loss, with no corresponding advantage, it was realized that the naval forces alone were not sufficient, and troops were landed on the western end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. This force has been for three months hammering at the positions of the Turks along the Achibaba line, but, except for the possible influence on the Balkan States of the presence of these expeditionary forces on Gallipoli, little headway has been made. Certain it is that there is no indication that the near future will bring the Allies into Constantinople.

In Galicia the Spring began with the capitulation of Przemysl and the surrender to the Russians of about 125,000 Austrians. This was the greatest victory in the eastern theatre thus far, and immediately opened the way wide to the passes in the Carpathians that led to the Hungarian plains and to Cracow. Russia evidently felt that if she confined her operations to Austria she could, by pushing the attack into Hungary, crush Austria completely and eliminate her from the war. Accordingly, the opportunity of laying siege to Cracow was passed by and Russian efforts concentrated in forcing the Carpathian passes.