| FEDERALIST No. I. General Introduction |
| FEDERALIST No. II. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence |
| FEDERALIST No. III. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) |
| FEDERALIST No. IV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) |
| FEDERALIST No. V. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) |
| FEDERALIST No. VI. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States |
| FEDERALIST No. VII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) |
| FEDERALIST No. VIII. The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States |
| FEDERALIST No. IX. The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection |
| FEDERALIST No. X. The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) |
| FEDERALIST No. XI. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy |
| FEDERALIST No. XII. The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue |
| FEDERALIST No. XIII. Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government |
| FEDERALIST No. XIV. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered |
| FEDERALIST No. XV. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
| FEDERALIST No. XVI. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) |
| FEDERALIST No. XVII. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) |
| FEDERALIST No. XVIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) |
| FEDERALIST No. XIX. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) |
| FEDERALIST No. XX. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXI. Other Defects of the Present Confederation |
| FEDERALIST No. XXII. The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXIII. The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union |
| FEDERALIST No. XXIV. The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered |
| FEDERALIST No. XXV. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXVI. The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered. |
| FEDERALIST No. XXVII. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXVIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXIX. Concerning the Militia |
| FEDERALIST No. XXX. Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
| FEDERALIST No. XXXI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXXII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXXIII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXXIV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXXV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXXVI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) |
| FEDERALIST No. XXXVII. Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government. |
| FEDERALIST No. XXXVIII. The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed. |
| FEDERALIST No. XXXIX. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles |
| FEDERALIST No. XL. On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained. |
| FEDERALIST No. XLI. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution |
| FEDERALIST No. XLII. The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered |
| FEDERALIST No. XLIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) |
| FEDERALIST No. XLIV. Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States |
| FEDERALIST No. XLV. The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments. |
| FEDERALIST No. XLVI. The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared |
| FEDERALIST No. XLVII. The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts. |
| FEDERALIST No. XLVIII. These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other. |
| FEDERALIST No. XLIX. Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention. |
| FEDERALIST No. L. Periodical Appeals to the People Considered |
| FEDERALIST No. LI. The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments. |
| FEDERALIST No. LII. The House of Representatives |
| FEDERALIST No. LIII. The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) |
| FEDERALIST No. LIV. The Apportionment of Members Among the States |
| FEDERALIST No. LV. The Total Number of the House of Representatives |
| FEDERALIST No. LVI. The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives) |
| FEDERALIST No. LVII. The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation. |
| FEDERALIST No. LVIII. Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands. |
| FEDERALIST No. LIV. Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members |
| FEDERALIST No. LX. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) |
| FEDERALIST No. LXI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) |
| FEDERALIST No. LXII. The Senate |
| FEDERALIST No. LXIII. The Senate Continued |
| FEDERALIST No. LXIV. The Powers of the Senate |
| FEDERALIST No. LXV. The Powers of the Senate Continued |
| FEDERALIST No. LXVI. Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered. |
| FEDERALIST No. LXVII. The Executive Department |
| FEDERALIST No. LXVIII. The Mode of Electing the President |
| FEDERALIST No. LXIX. The Real Character of the Executive |
| FEDERALIST No. LXX. The Executive Department Further Considered |
| FEDERALIST No. LXX. The Executive Department Further Considered |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXI. The Duration in Office of the Executive |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXII. The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered. |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXIII. The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXIV. The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive. |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXV. The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXVI. The Appointing Power of the Executive |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXVII. The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered. |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXVIII. The Judiciary Department |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXIX. The Judiciary Continued |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXX. The Powers of the Judiciary |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXXI. The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority. |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXXII. The Judiciary Continued. |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXXIII. The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXXIV. Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered. |
| FEDERALIST No. LXXXV. Concluding Remarks |