Art may tell a truth
Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,
Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word.
So may you paint your picture, twice show truth,
Beyond mere imagery on the wall,—
So, note by note, bring music from your mind,
Deeper than ever e'en Beethoven dived,—
So write a book shall mean beyond the facts,
Suffice the eye and save the soul beside.
The truth in its fulness and completeness can not be compassed in any
single narrative of events. It is, of course, the case that history
depends for its value on scientific accuracy, but that is not the only
kind of truth on which it depends. No man, even the most careful and
exacting, can rely on having the whole of the materials before his eye,
and if he had them there they would not only be presented in tints
depending on his outlook, but would be too vast to admit of his using
more than isolated fragments to work into his picture of the whole.
Selection is a necessity, and when to the fact that there must be
selection there is added the other fact that every historian has his
personal equation, the notion of a history constructed by a single man
on the methods of the physicist is a delusion. The best that the great
historian can do is to present the details in the light of the spirit of
the period of which he is writing, and in order that he may present his
narrative aright, as his mind has reconstructed it, he must estimate his
details in the order in importance that was actually theirs. Now for
this the balance and the measuring rod do not suffice. Quality counts as
much as does quantity in determining importance. What is merely inert
and mechanical is the subject neither of the artist nor the historian.
It is, of course, necessary that by close and exact research the
materials should first of all be collected and assembled. But that is
only the first step, and it always has to be followed by a process of
grouping and fashioning. The result may have to be the leaving out (or
the leaving over for presentation by other artists) of aspects which
are not dealt with. We see this when we compare even the best portraits.
They do not wholly agree; it is enough if they correspond. For portraits
may vary in expression, and yet each may be true. The characteristic of
what is alive and is intelligent and spiritual is that it may have many
expressions, every one of which really harmonizes with every other. It
is because they can bring out expression in this fashion that we
continue to set high store on the work of a Gibbon or a Mommsen.
The moral of this is twofold. We must, to begin with, be content for the
present to remain in the stage at which all that can be done is to
collect and assemble facts and personal impressions with as great care
as we can. The whole truth we can not bring out or estimate until the
later period, altho we may be sure enough of what we have before us to
make us feel capable of doing justice of a rough kind, so far as
necessary action is concerned.
And there is yet another deduction to be drawn. It is at all events
possible that the wider view of a generation later than this may be one
in which Germany will be judged more gently than the Allies can judge
her to-day. We do not now look on the French Revolution as our
forefathers looked on it. We see, because recent historians have
impressed it on us, that it was a violent uprising against, not Louis
XVI., but a Louis XIV. What France really made her great Revolution to
bring about was the establishment of a Constitution. Horrible deeds were
perpetrated in the name of Liberty, but it was not due to any horrible
national spirit that they were perpetrated. France was responsible no
doubt for the deeds of the men who acted in her name. But she could
hardly have controlled them even had she passionately desired to do so.
And she did not passionately desire to do so because, however little the
mass of the people outside Paris may have wished to massacre the
adherents of the old regime, the people as a whole welcomed deliverance
from calamity, even at the price of violent action.
We judge the French nation wholly differently to-day from the way we
judged it then, and it judges us differently. Yet it would have been
well had we not in the end of the eighteenth century taken an
exaggerated view of the French state of mind. We now realize that even
so great a man as Burke mistook a fragment for the whole. Much blood and
treasure might have been spared, and Napoleon might never have come into
existence, had we and others been less hasty.
It is therefore a good thing to keep before us that it is at least
possible that the verdict of mankind will be hereafter that when the
victory was theirs the Allies judged the people of Germany in a hurry
and reflected this judgment in the spirit in which certain of the terms
of peace were declared. The war had its proximate origin in the Near
East. It arose out of a supposed menace to Teuton by Slav. The Slavs
were not easy people to deal with, and the Teutons were not easy people
either. It was easy to drift into war. It may well prove true that no
one really desired this, and that it was miscalculation about the
likelihood of securing peace by a determined attitude that led to
disaster. It is certain that the German Government was deeply
responsible for the consequences. In the face of its traditional policy
and of utterances that came from Berlin the members of that Government
can not plead a mere blunder. None the less, a great deal may have been
due to sheer ineptitude in estimating human nature. How much this was
so, or how much an immoral tradition had its natural results, we can not
as yet fully tell, for we have not the whole of the records before us.
No one disputes that we were bound to impose heavy terms on the Central
Powers. The Allies have won the war and they were entitled to
reparation. This the Germans do not appear to controvert. They are a
people with whom logic is held in high esteem. But we have to do
something more than define the mere consequences of victory. We have
also to make plain on what footing we shall be willing to live with the
German nation in days that lie ahead. And here some enlargement of the
spirit seems to be desirable in our own interests. We do not want to
fall again into the mistake that Burke made.
The spirit is at least as important as the letter in the doctrine of a
League of Nations. Such a League has for its main purpose the
supersession of the old principle of balancing the Powers. In the
absence of a League of Nations, or—what is the same thing in a less
organized form—of an entente or concert of Powers so general that none
are left shut out from it, the principle of balancing may have to be
relied on. I believe this to have been unavoidable when the Entente
between France, Russia and Great Britain was found to be required for
safety if the tendency to dominate of the Triple Alliance was to be held
in check. But in that case, and probably in every other case, reliance
on the principle could only be admissible for self-protection and never
for the mere exhibition of the power of the sword. If the principle is
resorted to with the latter object the group that is suspected of
aggressive intentions will by degrees find itself confronted with
another group of nations that have huddled together for self-protection
and may become very strong just because they have a moral justification
for their action. It was this that happened before the war which broke
out in 1914, and it was the state of tension which ensued that led up to
that war. Had there been no counter-grouping to that of the Central
Powers there would probably have been war all the same, but with this
difference, that defeat and not victory would have been the lot of the
Entente Powers.
Now the German-speaking peoples in the world amount to an enormous
number, at least to a hundred millions if those outside Germany and
Austria, and in the New World, as well as the Old, are taken into
account. It may be difficult for them to organize themselves for war,
but it will be less difficult for them to develop a common spirit which
may penetrate all over the world. It is just this development that
statesmen ought to watch carefully, for, given an interval long enough,
it is impossible to predict what influence these hundred millions of
people may not acquire and come to exercise. We do not want to have a
prolonged period of growing anxiety and unrest, such as obtained in our
relations with the French, notwithstanding the peace established by the
Treaty of Vienna. Of the anxiety and unrest which were ours for more
than one generation, the history of the Channel fortifications, of the
Volunteer force and of several other great and often costly
institutions, bears witness. Let us therefore take thought while there
is time to do so. We do not wish to see repeated anything analogous to
our former experience. The one thing that can avert it is the spirit in
which a League of Nations has been brought to birth. That spirit alone
can preclude the gradual nascence of desire to call into existence a new
balance of power. It is not enough to tell Germany and Austria that if
they behave well they will be admitted to the League of Nations. What
really matters is the feeling and manner in which the invitation is
given, and an obvious sincerity in the desire that they should work with
us as equals in a common endeavor to make the best of a world which
contains us both. One is quite conscious of the difficulties that must
attend the attempt to approach the question in the frame of mind that is
requisite. We may have to discipline ourselves considerably. But the
people of this country are capable of reflection, and so are the people
of the American Continent. The problem to be solved is one that presses
on our great Allies in the United States, where the German-speaking
population is very large, quite as much as it does on us. France and
Belgium have more to forgive, and France has a hard past from which to
avert her eyes. But she is a country of great intelligence, and it is
for the sake of everybody, and not merely in the interest of our recent
enemies, that enlargement of the spirit is requisite.
How the present situation is to be softened, how the people of the
Central Powers are to be brought to feel that they are not to remain
divided from us by an impassable gulf, this is not the occasion to
suggest. It is enough to repeat that the question is not one simply of
the letter of a treaty but is one of the spirit in which it is made.
Conditions change in this world with a rapidity that is often startling.
The fashion of the day passes before we know that what is novel and was
unexpected has come upon us. The foundations of a peace that is to be
enduring must therefore be sought in what is highest and most abiding in
human nature.
INDEX
- Agadir incident, the, 68
- Algeciras Conference, the, 69, 114
- Alsace-Lorraine, question of, 114
- America, Tschirsky on, 60
- Anglo-French Entente, Bülow on, 56
- Tschirsky, 59
- views of German Emperor on, 52
- Armaments, difficulty of question of, 21
- Army, British, advantages of voluntary system in, 199
- question of compulsory service, 198
- Asquith, Mr., consulted by Sir Edward Grey, 45
- Premier and War Secretary, 50
- presides at Imperial Defense Committee, 182
- Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 70, 113
- Bagdad Railway, the, William II. and, 63 et seq.
- Balance of power, and the League of Nations, 222
- Balfour, A.J., and Imperial Defense, 184
- Ballin, Herr, and Tirpitz, 144
- Barnardiston, General, an unfounded charge against, 201
- Berchtold, Count, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 153
- Berlin, a curious legend originating in, 201
- and the Bagdad Railway question, 66
- author's visit to, 37
- Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Agadir crisis, 69, 71
- at Potsdam conference, 151
- author's interview with, and the formula of neutrality, 71, 73, 78, 79, 124
- desires preservation of peace, 161
- his accusation against Entente Powers, 103
- informed of Austrian ultimatum, 153
- letter to author after the Montreal address, 93
- loyalty to the Kaiser, 114
- succeeds Prince Bülow as Chancellor, 112
- Bismarck, Countess Wilhelm, 146
- Bismarck, Prince, a dictum of, 56
- and Britain's indefinite policy, 17
- and the inevitability of war, 23
- and the military party in Germany, 89
- and Tirpitz, 145-48
- denounces abrogation of Reinsurance Treaty, 146
- his affection for Emperor Frederick, 148
- his hatred of "prestige politics," 120
- Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, 126
- Boer War, the, attitude of the Kaiser during, 115
- Bosnia, annexation of, 70, 113
- Botha, General, co-operates in military preparations, 188
- Bridges, Colonel, British Military Attaché at Brussels, 202
- Britain's command of the sea, 195
- British Army, the reorganization of, 47
- British Expeditionary Force, the, mobilization of, 50
- organization of, 178
- unrecognized work of, 197
- British Government, the, paramount duty of, 18
- British Navy, a War Staff introduced into, 139, 181
- Bülow, Prince von, author's meeting with, 38
- on the Anglo-French Entente, 56
- opposes Bagdad Railway proposal, 67
- succeeded by Bethmann-Hollweg as Chancellor, 112
- Cambon, M. Jules, and relations between France and Germany, 113
- informed of Berlin "conversations," 78
- Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, and Imperial Defense, 182, 184
- Caprivi and the organization of German Navy, 138
- and the Reinsurance Treaty, 126, 127
- Cassel, Sir Ernest, visits Berlin, 70 (and note)
- Central Powers, the, preparations for war, 20
- their responsibility for the world war, 22
- Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J., Tariff Reform policy of, 54
- Churchill, Winston, naval policy of, 87, 181
- Committee of Imperial Defense, the, and its functions, 158, 159, 177, 182
- Compulsory service, author's views on, 198
- Cowans, Sir John, and the military preparations, 188
- Crewe, Lord, attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
- Curzon, Lord, meets German Emperor, 68
- Czernin, Count, on William II., 170
- D'Aerenthal, Count, diplomatic victory of, 113
- Dawson, Harbutt, "German Empire" of, 120
- Democracy and war, 27
- vindicated by the war, 108
- (See also Social Democracy)
- Diplomacy before the war, 35 et seq.
- Disarmament, German objections to, 55, 60
- Donop, Sir Stanley von, Master General of the Ordnance, 188
- Douglas, Sir Charles, and the voluntary system, 199
- Education, author's activities for, 39
- Edward VII., King, at Marienbad, 38
- "encirclement" policy of: Bethmann-Hollweg on, 112
- entertains the German Emperor, 62
- Einem, General von, at Windsor, 62
- author's interview with, 38
- Ellison, Colonel, at Berlin, 38
- England, a War Staff for the Navy in, 139, 181
- commercial rivalry with Germany, 114
- conservation of sea power and what it implied, 20, 21
- efforts to preserve peace end in failure, 22
- her alleged plans to violate Belgian neutrality, 201
- propagandists for German military party in, 24
- reorganization of army in, 185
- voluntary military system of, and its advantages, 199
- (See also Great Britain)
- England's precautions against Germany's war designs, 168-69
- Englishmen, defects and failings of, 28
- Entente, the, England's entry into—and the alternative, 118, 119, 162
- Ewart, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
- Expeditionary Force (see British Expeditionary Force)
- Falkenhayn, von, commanded to Potsdam, 150, 151
- France, apprehensive of Germany's intentions, 44
- Frankfurter Zeitung opposes Tirpitz's war objectives, 143
- Free Trade, Prince von Bülow's views on, 58
- French Revolution, the, 217
- French, Sir John, and reorganization of British Army, 48
- George V., King, entertains German Emperor, 67
- George, Lloyd, and the Agadir crisis, 70
- at meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
- German desire of commercial development, 55, 58, 60
- foreign policy: divided control of, 85
- Germans, psychology of, 40
- Germany, and the Agadir incident, 68
- and the Hague Conference, 60
- attitude of, before the war, 101 et seq.
- cause of her downfall, 167
- Chauvinist party in, 81
- commercial rivalry with England, 114
- decides upon war, 88
- defect of Imperial system in, 109
- desire for commercial expansion, 103
- Fleet Laws passed in the Reichstag, 142
- her responsibility for the world war, 90
- increases her armaments, 21, 94, 161
- influence of General Staff, 41, 107
- militarist party of, 39, 89, 108
- miscalculations at outbreak of war, 83, 159
- naval program of, 142, 156
- new Military Law passed, 136
- organization of her Navy, 138
- over-ambition of, 16
- peaceful penetration policy of, 39, 41
- politics in: an anecdote of, 85 (note)
- result of military spirit in, 15, 22
- scaremongers in, 24
- shipbuilding program of, 74
- the new Fleet Law, 75, 79, 87, 128
- the Press and Tirpitz, 143
- two inconsistent policies in, 107
- why she entered the war, 207
- Goltz, von der, his "Nation in Arms," 180
- Goschen, Sir Edward, demands his passports, 44
- Gosse, Edmund, meets the Emperor, 68
- Grant Duff, Colonel, 185
- Great Britain and Belgian neutrality, 202
- ante-war policy of, 13, 17
- deficiencies in military organization of, 46
- enters the war, 95
- her sea power before the war, 19
- indefinite policy of, 17, 28, 30
- question of her preparedness for war, 18, 177
- the educational problem in, 39
- Great War, the, and Germany's responsibility, 15
- Greindl, Baron, and a curious legend, 201
- Grey, Sir Edward (Lord Grey of Fallodon), an historical speech by, 44
- and the Bagdad Railway question, 64
- at meetings of Imperial Defense Committee, 182
- Bethmann-Hollweg on, 113
- denies an insinuation originating in Berlin, 203
- his efforts for peace, 88, 154, 155
- negotiates with Germany, 163
- presses Serbia to accept ultimatum, 155
- proposes a conference, 154
- Grierson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
- Hague Conference, the, 55
- Haig, Sir Douglas, and military preparations for war, 188
- and the reorganization of British Army, 48
- Haldane, Lord, a luncheon to the German Emperor, 67
- a visit to the United States and Canada, 37
- addresses at Montreal and Oxford, 92, 145
- advocates improved system of education, 39
- and Expeditionary and Territorial Forces, 48, 50, 178
- and the Bagdad Railway question, 63 et seq.
- becomes Lord Chancellor, 37, 87
- "conversations" at Berlin, 72, 124
- criticizes Bethmann-Hollweg's book, 101 et seq.
- dines with the Chancellor, 77
- entertained by General Staff, 41
- examines organization of German War Office, 38
- frank conversation with William II., 52 et seq.
- lunches with Emperor and Empress, 74
- on military preparations, 177 et seq.
- post-war problems and how they should be met, 208 et seq.
- rebuts a statement by Tirpitz, 164
- Secretary of State for War, 36
- studies in Germany, 36
- visits German Emperor, 37
- witnesses review of German troops, 51
- Hankey, Sir Maurice, his work recognized by Parliament, 185
- Harcourt, Lord, at Imperial Defense Committee meetings, 182
- Harnack, Professor, author's meeting with, 77
- Herzegovina, annexation of, 70, 113
- Hindenburg, General von, author's meeting with, 77
- Huguet, Colonel, interviewed by author, 45
- Imperial Defense Committee, the, 158, 159, 177, 182
- Isvolsky, M., 113, 162
- Jagow, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 133
- Kiaochow (see Tsingtau)
- Kiderlen-Waechter, Herr von,
- a talk with, 77
- and the Agadir incident, 69
- Kitchener, Lord,
- meets the Emperor, 68
- personality of, 179
- Kitchener's Army, 50, 178
- Lansdowne, Lord, and the agreement with France, 21
- Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, co-operates in military preparations, 188
- League of Nations, the, 220, 222
- Lucanus, von, snubbed by Bismarck, 148
- Lyncker, von, commanded to Potsdam, 150, 151
- Lyttelton, Sir Neville, 188
- MacDonald, Ramsay, lunches with German Emperor, 68
- Mahan, Admiral, his works studied by Tirpitz, 141
- McKenna, Mr., and the Navy, 87
- Metternich, Count, and Bagdad Railway question, 66
- at Windsor, 62
- author's relations with, 57
- Miles, Sir Herbert, assists in military preparations, 188
- Military preparations, the, 177 et seq.
- Moltke, Count von, his scheme for rapid mobilization, 38
- Moltke, General von, a chat with, 42
- present at meeting of Bismarck and Kaiser, 148
- Morley, Lord, at luncheon to the Emperor, 68
- attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
- Morocco difficulty, the, 115
- France's request to England, 44
- Moulton, Lord, meets German Emperor, 68
- National philosophy, German, 30
- Navy, British, mobilization of, 50
- sea power the dominant element in military policy, 200
- why strengthened and increased, 87, 129, 181
- Navy, German, Bülow on, 57
- Nicholson, Lord, and a new military system, 196
- chief of General Staff, 188
- Officers' Training Corps, organization of, 192
- Ottley, Admiral Sir Charles, secretary of Committee of Imperial Defense, 185
- Panther sent to Agadir, 68
- Peace terms, the, burden of, 210
- Post-war problems, and how they should be met, 208
- Potsdam, a reported Crown Council at, and Tirpitz's version of, 131, 149
- Reinsurance Treaty of 1884, 126, 146
- Repington, Col. A'Court, 191
- Reventlow, Count, 38 (note)
- Richter opposes Tirpitz on the naval program, 142
- Russia, army of, 180
- her hostility to Austria, 113
- not wishful for war, 162
- Russo-Japanese War, William II. and, 116
- Sargent, J.S., lunches with the Emperor, 68
- Schoen, Baron von, accompanies William II. to England, 62
- and the Bagdad Railway question, 65
- Serbia as "provocative neighbor," 23
- Skiernevice (see Reinsurance Treaty)
- Social Democracy, and militarism, 108
- Special Reserve, the, organization of, 178
- Spender, J.A., meets the Emperor, 68
- Stosch, and the German Navy, 138
- Tangier, William II. at, 53, 115
- Tariff Reform, the Kaiser on, 55
- Teaching universities, author and, 39
- Technical colleges in England, 40
- Territorial Force, the, its part in the world war, 49
- mobilization of, 50
- organization of, 48, 178
- Tirpitz, Admiral von, an admission by, 138
- an interview with, 74
- and Bethmann-Hollweg's policy, 141
- criticizes author, 160
- demands a definite policy for war, 143
- his "Erinnerungen" discussed, 137 et seq.
- his influence in Germany, 82
- informed of Austria's demands to Serbia, 153
- mentality of, 137
- outstanding thesis of his book, 141
- tribute to British sea power, 161
- visits Bismarck, 145, 148
- Trench warfare, unpreparedness for, 191
- Tschirsky, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 153
- author's interview with, 38
- on Anglo-French Entente, 59
- on the English Press, 61
- Tsingtau as German naval base, 140
- Two-Power standard, discussed with German Emperor and Prince Bülow, 54, 57
- United States (see America)
- Voluntary system, the, advantages of, 199
- William II., Emperor, an ominous admission by, 43
- and the Agadir crisis, 69, 70
- and the Anglo-French Entente, 52
- Bismarck's message to, 148
- consults Bethmann-Hollweg and Zimmermann, 132
- Count Czernin on, 170
- desires exchange of views between Berlin and London, 70, 71
- Emperor of Austria's letter to, and memorandum on policy, 131
- frank speech with author, 52 et seq.
- his proposal on Bagdad Railway question, 66
- his reception in London, 68
- incautious speeches of, 69, 117, 161
- pays surprise visit to Bismarck, 148
- promises support to Austria, 150
- reads a poem to author, 165
- reviews his troops, 51
- Tirpitz and, 142
- visits King Edward and King George, 62, 67
- Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur, meets the Emperor, 68
- Wilson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
- Windsor, the German Emperor's visit to, 62
- Zimmermann, Herr, at Potsdam conference, 151