About this time, intelligence was brought to Pizarro, that the squadron under Lorenzo de Aldana had quitted the port of Truxillo and was approaching along the coast towards Lima. On this intelligence, Gonzalo sent off Juan d'Acosta with fifty mounted musqueteers, with orders to keep in view of the ships, to prevent the royalists from being able to land for provisions or water. On arriving at Truxillo, Acosta only ventured to remain one day at that place, being afraid that Diego de Mora might bring a superior force against him from Caxamarca. He learnt likewise, that the royalists squadron had gone to the port of Santa, to which place he accordingly marched. Aldana got notice of his coming from some Spanish inhabitants of that place, and laid an ambuscade for him, consisting of an hundred and fifty musqueteers, in a place overgrown with tall reeds on the side of the road by which Acosta had to march in his way to Santa. Acosta had certainly fallen into the snare, if he had not fortunately made prisoners of some spies who had been sent on shore from the squadron, whom he was about to have hanged, when they prevailed on him to save their lives by giving him notice of the ambushment, and by farther informing him that he might make prisoners of some sailors who were taking in fresh water for the ships, by quitting the common road and going nearer the shore. He accordingly took that road and made the sailors prisoners, whom he sent to Gonzalo at Lima. Those belonging to Aldana, who were in ambush, learnt this transaction; but, being all on foot, and the insurgent party all horsemen, they could not attempt to rescue the prisoners from Acosta, as that part of the country consisted of very deep sands. Acosta returned to the port of Guavera, where he waited fresh orders from Lima.

Gonzalo treated the prisoners sent to him by Acosta with much kindness, supplying them with clothes and arms, and gave them their choice of any of the companies of his troops in which they might think proper to serve. From these men, he received exact information of all the late events which had occurred at Panama, of the succours which the president expected to receive from different parts of America, and of the force which accompanied Aldana on the present expedition. They informed him likewise that Aldana had set on shore Pedro de Ulloa, a Dominican friar, disguised in a secular habit, who had orders to distribute copies of the amnesty in every direction. In consequence of this information, he was sought for and soon found; and Gonzalo had him confined in a dungeon near the fish-ponds in his garden, which was infested with toads and vipers, where he remained till he recovered his liberty on the arrival of the fleet some time afterwards.

About this time, it was determined to dispatch the licentiate Carvajal with three hundred mounted musqueteers, together with the detachment under Juan d'Acosta, to scour the coast to the northwards, and to attack Diego de Mora who had withdrawn into the province of Caxamarca. When every thing was in readiness for this expedition, the lieutenant-general Carvajal went one morning early to Gonzalo, and represented to him, that it was by no means safe to entrust so important a command to the licentiate, as a person in whom they could not repose implicit confidence. That although he had hitherto attached himself to their party, it was obviously for the sole purpose of being revenged of the late viceroy; and, as that purpose was now accomplished, it did not appear that his fidelity could be depended upon. It was proper to recollect, he added, that all the brothers of the licentiate were greatly attached to his majesty, particularly the bishop of Lugo who enjoyed several high employments; so that it was not to be imagined the licentiate would act cordially in the interest of a party which was diametrically opposed to that in which all his nearest relations were engaged. Besides all which, this person had formerly been made a prisoner by themselves, without any just foundation, and had even been so nearly punished capitally, that he had been ordered to make his testament and to confess himself in preparation for death, which injurious treatment he could not be supposed to have forgotten. Gonzalo was so much convinced by these arguments, that he countermanded the order given to the licentiate Carvajal, and sent off Juan d'Acosta on the expedition to Caxamarca, with a force of two hundred and eighty men. D'Acosta accordingly set out on this intended service, taking the road for Truxillo; but on arriving at Baranza, about twenty four leagues from Lima, he halted at that place for reasons which will appear in the sequel.

At this period, the Captain Saavedra, who was lieutenant-governor of Guanuco for Gonzalo, received letters from Aldana urging him to quit the insurgent party and to declare for his majesty. He accordingly determined to do so; and under pretence of obeying the orders he had received from Gonzalo of joining his army at Lima, along with Hernando Alonzo, he assembled all the soldiers he could procure in that province, with whose assistance he fortified the city of Guanuco, and informed them of his resolution to exert his best endeavours in the service of the king. All his soldiers agreed to follow his example, except three or four who fled and informed Gonzalo of the defection of their governor. Saavedra retired immediately to Caxamarca, with forty horsemen, where he joined Diego de Mora and those who had withdrawn along with him from Truxillo, where both declared themselves for the royalist party. On learning the defection of Saavedra and the principal inhabitants of Guanuco, Gonzalo sent an officer to that place at the head of thirty soldiers; with orders to pillage and destroy the city: But the Indians of the neighbourhood, having armed themselves and taken possession of the place by the orders of their masters, made so resolute a defence that the insurgent detachment was beaten off, and constrained to return to Lima, being unable to procure any other plunder except some mares cattle and other animals belonging to the settlers.

On the arrival of Antonio de Robles at Cuzco, whom Gonzalo had sent to take the command in that city and province, Alfonso de Hinojosa, who had hitherto been lieutenant-governor there, resigned the command of the city and troops, but as was believed with much dissatisfaction. De Robles immediately collected as much money as he could procure, and enlisted all the soldiers that were to be found in that neighbourhood, with whom he marched to Xaquixaguana, about four leagues from Cuzco. At that place he learned that Diego Centeno; who had concealed himself for more than a year in a cave among the mountains, had recently left his concealment, on learning the arrival of the president, and had collected several of his former partisans, who had hidden themselves from the fury of Gonzalo in various parts of the woods and mountains. By this time Centeno had collected about forty men, mostly on foot, though some of them still had the horses with which they had made their escape. Although these men were neither so well armed or equipped as they could have wished, Centeno resolved to make an attempt upon Cuzco, shewing as much confidence as if he had been at the head of five hundred well armed troops. His principal followers were Luis de Ribera, Alfonso Perez de Esquival, Diego Alvarez, Francisco Negral, Pedro Ortiz de Zarate, and Friar Dominic Ruiz, commonly called Father Viscayno. With this small band of followers, Centeno drew nigh to Cuzco, being doubtless invited to that step by some of the principal inhabitants, for the purpose of freeing them from the tyranny of De Robles, a young man of low origin and little ability. It was even said that Alfonso de Hinojosa, from resentment against Gonzalo for superseding him in the government, had sent privately to offer his assistance to Centeno. Both of these reports are highly probable; as otherwise it would have been a most inexcusable rashness in Centeno, to call it no worse, to have presumed upon attacking Cuzco with the small number of men he had collected; as, besides the inhabitants of the city, there were more than five hundred soldiers there and in the environs, while he had only forty ill armed men, most of whom had swords or daggers fastened to poles, instead of pikes or lances.

On learning the approach of Centeno, De Robles returned to Cuzco, where he made such preparations as seemed necessary; and, on hearing that Centeno was within a days march, he took the field with three hundred men, sending forwards Francisco de Aguira to procure intelligence. This person was brother to one Peruchio de Aguira who had formerly been put to death by the lieutenant-general Carvajal, and was consequently a secret enemy to the insurgent party. Instead therefore of executing the commission confided to him by De Robles, he went immediately to join Centeno, whom he informed of every thing that was going on at Cuzco and of the state of affairs in that city. In the night before the festival of Corpus Christi of the year 1547, Centeno advanced toward the city of Cuzco, by a different road from that in which De Robles and his troops were posted; and, having turned one of his flanks, made an unexpected assault with great resolution, as resolved to conquer or die. Completely surprised and thrown into confusion, the troops of De Robles were unable to get into any order for defence, and even in several instances turned their arms against each other, insomuch that a good many of them were slain by their own comrades. On this occasion Centeno used the following stratagem, which succeeded admirably: Having taken off the saddles and bridles from the horses belonging to his small band of followers, he ordered them to be driven by his attendant Indians along the road which led to the front of the enemies camp, to call off their attention from his real attack on their flank and rear. By this means, as the horses were urged on by the Indians behind, they threw the troops of De Robles into confusion, and enabled Centeno to penetrate into the camp unperceived and unopposed, where he and his men exerted themselves so courageously that the insurgents were completely defeated and put to flight. [Illustration: Map: VICEROYALTY OF PERU]

By this successful exploit Centeno acquired great honour; it having been seldom seen that so small a number had defeated so disproportioned a force of infinitely better armed troops. It has been reported that, on this occasion, some men belonging to Alfonso de Hinojosa were the first to fly, in consequence of secret orders for that purpose: But these men never acknowledged the truth of this allegation, as disgraceful to themselves; and Centeno denied the story, as detracting from the glory of his victory.

After the derout of De Robles, Centeno took possession of Cuzco, where he was immediately elected captain-general of that city and province for his majesty. Next day, he caused Antonio de Robles to be beheaded, and distributed 100,000 crowns, which he found in that city belonging to Gonzalo, among his followers. He in the next place took measures for raising a respectable force; appointing Pedro de Rios and Juan de Vargas, the brother of Garcilasso de la Vega, captains of infantry, and Francisco Negral captain of Cavalry; Luis de Ribera being named major-general. Having armed and equipped about four hundred men, he set out for La Plata, with the intention of persuading Alfonso de Mendoza, who commanded at that place for Gonzalo, to declare for the king, or otherwise to take possession of that place by force.

About this time, Lucas Martin, who had been sent by Gonzalo to conduct the troops of Arequipa to Lima, set out from Arequipa with 130 men for that purpose; but when he had proceeded about four leagues on his march, his people mutinied and made him prisoner, electing Jerom de Villegas as their commander, and immediately marched off to join Centeno, who was then in the Collao waiting the issue of some negotiations in which he had employed Pedro Gonzalo de Zarate, schoolmaster at Cuzco. While in the Collao, Centeno was informed that Juan de Silveira, the Serjeant major of the army of the insurgents, had been sent by Gonzalo to conduct the troops of that province to Lima, and had made prisoners of five or six of the royalists whom he met with on his march. Silveira had collected about three hundred men on this occasion, and we shall relate what befel them in the sequel.

On learning the success of Centeno at Cuzco and the death of De Robles, and being likewise informed that the people of San Miguel had declared for his majesty, and that the captains Mercadillo and Porcel had joined Diego de Mora at Caxamarca; Gonzalo Pizarro saw that he had now only to depend on the force which was along with himself at Lima, and those under Pedro de Puelles, on whose fidelity he reposed entire confidence. In this predicament, he determined to alter the destination of Juan d'Acosta and to send him against Centeno with a respectable force, resolving to follow d'Acosta in person with all his army if necessary, then amounting to nine hundred men, among whom were many of the principal inhabitants of Peru. In forming this new resolution, his object was in the first place to reduce all the upper or mountainous provinces to subjection, and afterwards to make war on every other part of the country which had withdrawn from his authority. It has likewise been conjectured, that Gonzalo proposed to himself, in case of any reverse, to endeavour to make some new discovery and conquest, towards the Rio Plata, or Chili, or in some other place to the south and east of Peru. He certainly never avowed this intention openly, nor is it alleged that he communicated it to any of his confidents, as this would have indicated a want of confidence in his cause; so that this idea rests only on conjecture. In consequence of this new plan, Gonzalo recalled D'Acosta to Lima with all his troops, to the great mortification of that person and his followers; insomuch that seven or eight of them deserted, choosing Jerome de Soria as their commander. Many others would certainly have followed this example, if it had not been for the severe precautions exercised by D'Acosta on the occasion, who put to death Lorenza Mexia, son-in-law to the Conde de Gomera, and another soldier, whom he suspected of intending to desert. He likewise arrested several others who were suspected of similar intentions, whom he carried prisoners to Lima.

A few days before the arrival of D'Acosta at Lima, Gonzalo took some suspicion of the fidelity of Antonio Altamarino, his standard bearer, who appeared to conduct himself with a degree of coldness in the present emergency; and, without any direct proof or even any strong suspicious circumstances being alleged against him, he caused him to be arrested and put in irons as a criminal, had him strangled in prison during the night, and ordered his dead body to be suspended upon the public gibbet. Altamarino was one of the richest colonists in Peru, and Gonzalo, having confiscated all his wealth, distributed it among his most attached followers. After this, he gave the charge of the royal standard to Don Antonio de Ribera, who had just joined with thirty men from Guamanga, whence also he had brought some arms and cattle which he had taken from the inhabitants of that place. At this time Gonzalo found his affairs much embarrassed and growing every day worse, insomuch that he could only count upon the force which accompanied him in Lima; whereas a short time before he seemed absolute master of the whole kingdom of Peru. He was in great fear, if the new royal orders, the general amnesty, and the revocation of the obnoxious regulations, all of which had been brought out from Spain by the president, should come to the knowledge of his remaining followers, that they would all abandon him. In this state of uncertainty and dread, he assembled all the principal inhabitants and citizens of Lima at his house, to whom he represented, "That he had brought himself into a very embarrassing and even dangerous situation by his exertions in their service, during which he had endured much labour and danger in the wars he had carried on for their benefit, and for the protection of their property and rights, for all which they were indebted to the genius and valour of his brother the marquis. That, in the present situation of affairs, the whole colonists ought to consider their honour and interests as identified with his own, the conduct of both being sufficiently justified in sending deputies to inform the king of all that had occurred during the troubles and commotions. That the president had arrested these deputies at Panama, had seduced his officers, and had taken possession of his ships. That the president certainly had done all these things to advance his own private interest; as, if he had received orders from his majesty to make war against the kingdom, he would assuredly have given intelligence of this circumstance through Paniagua. That not satisfied with these outrages, the president now invaded the government to which he, Gonzalo, had been lawfully appointed, and disseminated numerous libels against him throughout the kingdom, as was well known to them all. That consequently, he was determined to use his utmost efforts to oppose the president, who treated him as an enemy without any legitimate cause. That the general interests of all the colonists and his own were obviously identified; as, should the president carry matters to extremity as every thing seemed to indicate, they would all be brought to a severe account for the consequences of the late wars and disorders, and would be held responsible for the murders and plunders which had been perpetrated during their continuance. He requested them therefore to reflect maturely on all these things; and, as he had hitherto exerted his utmost efforts in defence of their rights, it still remained not only to continue to defend the same, but even to preserve their lives and honours. For these purposes, therefore, he had now assembled them, and to lay before them a clear state of the present situation of affairs; and he requested of them to declare freely and openly their undisguised sentiments; engaging, on the faith and honour of a gentleman and a knight, which he was ready to confirm by a solemn oath, that he would not injure any one in person or estate for the opinion or advice they might now give; but should leave every one at full liberty to declare for either party in the present troubles, and even to retire wherever they might judge proper. Therefore, he expected that all who were disposed to adhere to him on the present occasion should declare themselves without reserve, as he would demand of them to confirm their promise by a written and signed engagement. He advised them accordingly to look well to their promises when once made; as if any one should violate the same, or should appear lukewarm or feeble in their efforts in the approaching crisis, he would immediately order them to be put to death even upon very slight circumstances of suspicion."

Every person in the assembly answered unhesitatingly, that they were ready to obey his orders in every thing to the utmost of their power and abilities, and to devote their lives and fortunes in his cause. Some even went so far in their pretended attachment, as to say that they would willingly risk their eternal salvation in his service. Many of them emulously strove to find out arguments for justifying the war which was now about to commence, and to enhance the obligations which the whole country lay under to Gonzalo for undertaking the management of the enterprize. Some even carried their base and scandalous flattery to such a pitch of extravagance, to conciliate the tyrant, that it were improper to contaminate our pages with a repetition of their words. After they had all expressed their attachment to the cause, Gonzalo drew out a paper in which the proposed engagement was already engrossed at full length; at the bottom of which he caused the licentiate Cepeda to write a solemn promise of executing all which that paper contained, and to obey Gonzalo in every thing he should command; after which, he made Cepeda sign that promise, and take a solemn oath to observe all its conditions. After Cepeda, all who were present in the assembly were made to sign and swear to the engagement in a similar manner.

After the conclusion of this affair, Juan d'Acosta was ordered to prepare for marching to Cuzco by way of the mountain, at the head of three hundred men. Paez de Sotomayor was appointed his major-general on this expedition, Martin d'Olmos captain of cavalry, Diego de Gumiel captain of musqueteers, Martin de Almendras captain of pikemen, and Martin de Alarzon standard-bearer. The whole of this detachment being well provided with arms and all necessary equipments, left Lima taking the mountain road for Cuzco, on purpose to recover that important city from Centeno. At the same time Gonzalo received notice that the squadron commanded by Lorenzo de Aldana had been seen at the distance of about fifteen leagues from the port of Lima. It was determined therefore in a council of war, to encamp the whole insurgent army between Lima and the sea; as it was feared, if the ships got possession of the port, it might occasion great confusion and disturbance in the city, especially as in that case the necessary orders would have to be hastily issued and executed; by which means the malcontents might have an opportunity of withdrawing during the battle, and might even escape on board the ships to join the enemy; while, at the same time, there would be no leisure to watch the behaviour of the wavering, and to compel them to join the army. Orders were issued accordingly for the army to take the field, and it was publickly proclaimed throughout the city, that every one fit to carry arms, of every age and condition, was to join the troops, on pain of death. Pizarro gave notice that he would behead every person who acted contrary to these orders; and, while he marched in person at the head of the troops, he should leave the lieutenant-general in charge of the city, to execute rigorous punishment on all who lagged behind. All the inhabitants were so confounded and terrified by these threats, that no one dared to converse with another, and none had the courage either to fly or to determine what was best to be done in this emergency. Some however contrived to conceal themselves in places overgrown with tall reeds, or in caves, and many concealed their valuable effects under ground.

On the day preceding that which had been fixed upon by Gonzalo for marching from Lima, news was brought that three ships had entered the port of Lima, which occasioned universal consternation. The alarm was sounded, and Gonzalo marched out with all the men who could be collected on a sudden, taking up his encampment about midway between the city and the port, at the distance of about a league or four miles from each, that he might at the same time make head against his enemies if they attempted to land, and might prevent the inhabitants of Lima from having any communication with the vessels. He was at the same time unwilling to abandon the city, and wished to know exactly the intentions of Aldana, before going to a greater distance, and if possible to gain possession of the vessels by some contrivance or negociation, having no means of preventing them from gaining possession of the port, as one of his own captains, contrary to the opinion of the other officers, had lately sunk five vessels in the harbour. On this occasion Gonzalo mustered five hundred and fifty men, cavalry and infantry included; and, after encamping in the situation already mentioned, he placed eight horsemen in ambush close to the sea, with orders to prevent any person landing from the vessels to deliver or to receive letters, or to converse with any one. Next day, Gonzalo sent Juan Hernandez, an inhabitant of Lima, in a boat on board the ships, with orders to say in his name, if Aldana chose to send any of his people on shore to explain the object of his coming into Peru, that Hernandez would remain on board as an hostage for the safety of his messenger. Hernandez was conducted on board the admiral where Aldana retained him as proposed, and sent on shore the captain Penna to wait upon Gonzalo.

Penna was not conducted to camp till night, that he might have no opportunity of conversing with any one; and on being introduced to Gonzalo in his tent, he delivered to him a writing, containing the orders and instructions which the president had received from his majesty, the general amnesty granted by his majesty to all the colonists of Peru, and the revocation of the obnoxious regulations. He then expatiated, as instructed by Aldana, on the universal and great advantages which would accrue to all by giving a prompt and entire obedience to the commands of his majesty, who had not judged it convenient to continue Gonzalo in the government of Peru. That his majesty, being fully informed of all that had occurred in that country, had sent out De la Gasca as president, with instructions and full powers to provide a remedy for all the existing evils. Gonzalo proudly answered, that he would severely punish all who were on board the fleet, and would chastise the audacity of the president for the outrage he had committed in detaining his envoys and seizing his ships. He complained loudly against Aldana, for coming now against him as an enemy, after receiving his money, and accepting his commission to go into Spain on purpose to give an account of his conduct to the king.

After some farther discourse, all the officers belonging to Gonzalo left the tent, leaving him and Penna alone together. Gonzalo made him a long discourse, endeavouring to justify his conduct in regard to his past and present conduct; and concluded by making him an offer of 100,000 crowns, if he would contrive to put him in possession of the galleon commanded by Aldana, which composed the principal force of the hostile fleet. Penna rejected his proposal with disdain, declaring himself dishonoured by the offer, and that nothing whatever would induce him to be guilty of such treacherous conduct. At the conclusion of this conference, Penna was committed to the custody of Antonio de Ribeira, with strict injunctions that he should not be allowed to have the smallest intercourse with any individual whomsoever; and was sent back next day to the fleet, when Juan Fernandez returned to camp, having in the interval promised and resolved to use his utmost efforts in the service of his majesty on every favourable opportunity.

Aldana had rightly judged, that the surest means for succeeding in the mission on which he had been entrusted by the president, was to communicate the knowledge of the general pardon among the soldiers. For this purpose, therefore, he devised exceedingly proper measures to diffuse the intelligence among the troops, but which were at the same time exceedingly dangerous for Juan Hernandez. Aldana gave him copies of all his dispatches in duplicate, and entrusted him with letters for several principal persons in the camp of Gonzalo. Fernandez concealed such of these papers as he judged necessary in his boots, giving all the rest to Pizarro. Taking Gonzalo afterwards aside, he told him secretly that Aldana had endeavoured to prevail upon him to publish the royal pardon in the camp; and that accordingly he had thought it prudent to pretend compliance, and had taken charge of that general amnesty among his other dispatches, both to blind Aldana by the expectation of, doing what he wished, and on purpose to get these from him for the information of Gonzalo; pretending to be ignorant that Gonzalo knew of any such thing existing. Gonzalo thanked him for his prudent conduct, and considered him as a person worthy of entire confidence and much attached to the cause. He then received the papers which Fernandez offered, threatening the severest punishment against Aldana. Having thus craftily deceived Gonzalo, Fernandez contrived to deliver some of the letters he had in charge, and allowed some of them to fall on the ground, as if lost, yet so as they might be found by those to whom they were addressed.

When Gonzalo quitted Lima to encamp on the road towards the sea-port of Calao, he left Pedro Martin de Cicilia in charge of the city as provost-marshal. This man, who had attached himself to Gonzalo with much zeal from the very commencement of the troubles, was now about seventy years of age, yet healthy and vigorous, of a rough and cruel disposition, and entirely destitute of piety towards God or of loyalty to the sovereign. Gonzalo had given him orders to hang up every person he might find loitering in the city with out a written permission, or who might return thither from camp without a pass. Martin executed these rigorous orders with so much exactitude, that, meeting a person who came under the foregoing predicament, he had not sufficient patience to have him hanged, but dispatched him directly with his poignard. He generally went about the streets followed by the hangman, carrying a parcel of ropes, and loudly declared that he would hang up every one whom he found in the city without permission from Ganzalo.

One day several of the citizens came from the camp to the city, under the authority of a pass, to procure such provisions and other articles as they stood in need of, the principal persons among whom were Nicolas de Ribeira, who was alcalde or police judge of the city, Vasco de Guevara, Hernando Bravo de Lagunas, Francisco de Ampuero, Diego Tinoco, Alfonzo Ramirez de Sosa, Francisco de Barrionueva, Alfonzo de Barrionuevo, Martin de Menezes, Diego d'Escobar, and some others. After they had collected the articles of which they were in want, they left the city with their horses arms and servants; but, instead of returning towards the camp, they went off in the road for Truxillo. Being noticed by some spies, who gave immediate notice to Gonzalo, he caused them to be pursued by Juan de la Torre with a party of mounted musqueteers. At the distance of eight leagues from Lima, De la Torre came up with Vasco de Guevara and Francisco Ampuero, who had fallen behind with the intention of acting as a kind of rear guard, to give notice to the rest in case of a pursuit. They defended themselves courageously, and as their enemies could not take any certain aim, it being under night, they contrived to make their escape unwounded. De la Torre and his men found themselves unable to continue the pursuit with any chance of success, as their horses were already completely tired with their rapid march from camp. They returned, therefore, believing that, even if they were to get up with the fugitives, they would be unable to take them by force, as they were all men of quality, who would rather be slain than surrender. On their way back to camp, they fell in with Hernando Bravo, who had fallen behind his companions, and on bringing him a prisoner to Gonzalo he was ordered to immediate execution. Donna Ynez Bravo, who was sister to the prisoner and wife to Nicolas de Ribeira, one of the fugitives, on hearing the situation of her brother, hastened to the camp accompanied by her father, and threw herself at the feet of Gonzalo, whom she earnestly implored to spare the life of her brother. Being one of the most beautiful women of the country, and of the highest rank, and being seconded by most of the officers who served under Gonzalo, he at length allowed himself to be prevailed on to pardon her brother, who was the only person, during the whole subsistence of his usurpation, whom he forgave for a similar offence. On granting this pardon, Alfonzo de Caceres, one of the captains under Gonzalo, kissed his hand saying: "Illustrious prince! accursed be he who abandons you, or hesitates to sacrifice his life in your service." Yet, within three hours afterwards, Hernando Bravo and several others made their escape from the camp. Among these who now deserted were several persons of consideration who had attached themselves to Gonzalo from the very commencement of the troubles, so that their defection gave him infinite vexation and alarm, insomuch that hardly any one dared to speak to him, and he issued peremptory orders to put to death every person who might be found beyond the precincts of the camp.

On the same night, Captain Martin de Robles sent a message to Diego Maldonado, who had been alcalde of Cuzco, usually called the rich, intimating that Gonzalo had resolved in a consultation with his officers to put him to death. Maldonado very readily believed this information, as he had formerly been one of the inhabitants of Cuzco who made offer of their services to the late viceroy. Likewise, although then pardoned by Gonzalo, whom he accompanied in the march to Quito against the viceroy, he had fallen under new suspicions, and had even been put to the torture, on account of a letter which was dropt near Gonzalo, containing some very unpleasant truths; and although the real authors of that letter had been afterwards discovered, Maldonado could never forget the treatment he had suffered at that time. Besides this, he was the intimate friend of Antonio Altamirano, whom Gonzalo had recently put to death. Considering all these circumstances, Maldonado was so thoroughly convinced of the imminent danger in which he stood, that he immediately quitted his tent with only his sword and cloak, not even taking time to saddle a horse, though he had several good ones, or speaking to any of his servants. Though a very old man, he walked as fast as possible all night in a direction towards the sea, and concealed himself in the morning among some tall reeds near the shore about three leagues from where the ships of Aldana lay at anchor. As he was much afraid of being pursued, he revealed his situation to an Indian who happened to be near; and whom he prevailed upon to construct a float of reeds and straw, on which the Indian carried him on board one of the ships.

In the morning, Martin de Robles went to the tent of Maldonado; and finding him withdrawn as he expected, he immediately waited on Gonzalo, whom he informed of the circumstance, adding, "As the army was diminishing daily by the number and quality of the fugitives, he begged leave to advise that they should quit the present camp, and march into the interior provinces, as formerly agreed upon, without granting permission to any one to go into the city of Lima, lest many more might use that pretence for an opportunity to desert. Several of his own company, he said, had applied for leave to go into the city, to procure provisions; but he considered it better for himself to go therewith a detachment of soldiers to collect the provisions and necessaries required, that he might keep all his men in sight, and that he proposed on this occasion to take Maldonado from the Dominican convent, where he understood he had taken refuge, and to bring him a prisoner to the camp, where he ought to undergo condign punishment, as a warning to others." Gonzalo approved all that was said on this occasion by De Robles, in whom he had great confidence as a person who had taken part with him in all the past troubles, and desired him to act in the way he proposed. De Robles accordingly, taking all his own horses and attendants and those belonging to Maldonado, took along with him to Lima all the soldiers of his company in whom he could confide. After collecting such provisions and other necessaries as might serve his purpose, he set off for Truxillo with thirty armed horsemen, declaring publickly that Gonzalo was a tyrant and usurper, that all good subjects were bound to obey the orders of his majesty, and that he was resolved to join the president.

When this serious defection became known in the camp, it was universally believed that the army would soon disperse, and that Gonzalo would be massacred. Gonzalo endeavoured to restore order and confidence among his troops, pretending to care little for those who had deserted him; yet resolved to decamp next morning. That very night, Lope Martin, an inhabitant of Cuzco, deserted almost in sight of the whole army. Next morning Gonzalo quitted his present camp, and marched about two leagues to a new camp near an aqueduct, taking every precaution to prevent his people from deserting; believing that his principal danger on that account would be got over if he were once ten or twelve leagues from Lima. The licentiate Carvajal was appointed to take charge of the night guard, with strict injunctions to prevent desertion: But even he, in the middle of the night, quitted the camp accompanied by Paulo Hondegardo, Marco de Retamoso, Pedro Suarez d'Escovedo, Francisco de Miranda, Hernando de Vargas, and several others belonging to his company. These men went in the first place to Lima, whence they took the road towards Truxillo. A few hours afterwards, Gabriel de Roias left the camp, accompanied by his nephews Gabriel Bermudez and Gomez de Roias and several other persons of quality. These men left the camp unseen by any one, as they went through the quarter which had been confided to the charge of the licentiate Carvajal.

In the morning, Gonzalo was much distressed on learning the events of the past night, and more especially by the desertion of the licentiate Carvajal, whom he had disobliged by superseding him in the command which had been conferred on Juan d'Acosta, and by refusing him his niece Donna Francisca in marriage. The departure of the licentiate had a very bad effect on the minds of the troops; as they knew he was entrusted with all Gonzalos secrets, and had been greatly in his confidence ever since the death of the viceroy whom he had slain in the battle of Quito. Carvajal left to the value of more than 15,000 crowns in the camp, in gold silver and horses, all of which was immediately confiscated and divided among the soldiers: But the army was convinced he would not have abandoned so much valuable property, unless he had been satisfied that the affairs of Gonzalo were in a very bad condition, both in regard to power of resisting the president, and in respect of the right and justice of his pretensions. So great was the defection in the camp, that the greater part of the troops had resolved to disperse; and next morning, when the army had begun its march, two cavaliers, named Lopez and Villadente, quitting the ranks and causing their horses to vault in sight of the whole army, they cried, out aloud, "Long live the king, and let the tyrant die!" These men trusted, to the speed of their horses; and Gonzalo was so exceedingly suspicious of every one, that he expressly forbid these men to be pursued, being afraid that many might use that pretence for joining them. He continued his march accordingly, in all haste by the road of the plain country, leading towards Arequipa; in which march several of his musqueteers and others deserted, although he hanged ten or twelve persons of consideration in the course of three or four days. At length his force was reduced to two hundred men, and he was in continual dread that in some false alarm all his remaining men might disperse. Continuing his march, he at length came to the province of Nasca, about fifty leagues from Lima.

After Gonzalo had gone to a considerable distance from Lima, Don Antonio de Ribeira, Martin Pizarro, Antonio de Leon, and some other inhabitants of Lima, who as old and infirm had been allowed by Gonzalo to remain behind the army on giving up all their horses and arms, erected the standard of the city, and, assembling the small number of inhabitants that remained in the great square, they publickly declared for his majesty in their own names and in the names of all the loyal citizens of the city. After proclaiming the new regulations and orders of the president, the general amnesty granted by the king, and the abrogation of the obnoxious regulations, they sent notice of all the recent events to Aldana, who still remained on the coast to receive and protect all who were inclined to quit the party of the insurgents. At the same time, and for the same purpose, Juan Alfonso Palamino had landed with fifty men, yet keeping his boats always in readiness to reimbark, in case of the return of Gonzalo. Aldana likewise placed an advanced picket of twelve horsemen, of those who had deserted from the insurgents, on the road towards Arequipa, to bring him timely notice of any thing that might occur in that quarter, with orders to return with all speed in case of the enemy making a countermarch, or of any important event. Aldana likewise gave orders to Captain Alfonzo de Caceres to remain at Lima, to collect any of the deserters from Pizarro that might come there; and he dispatched Juan Yllanez in one of his vessels along the coast, with orders to land a monk and a soldier in some secure place, to carry dispatches to Centeno, announcing the events that had occurred at lima, and to furnish him with copies of the royal orders and general amnesty, and to communicate similar intelligence at Arequipa. He sent likewise several intelligent persons by land to Arequipa, with letters to different persons of consideration, and to carry orders and instructions to the captains Alfonzo de Mendoza and Juan de Silveira at La Plata. By means of the Indians of Jauja, who belonged to him, Aldana transmitted letters and copies of the amnesty to several of those persons who accompanied Juan d'Acosta, that the royal clemency might be made known in all parts of Peru. Most of these measures succeeded, and produced material advantages as will appear in the sequel. In the mean time, Lorenzo de Aldana remained on board ship, with about an hundred and fifty men, issuing such orders as seemed necessary in the present state of affairs.

It was soon learnt that Gonzalo received regular advices of ever thing that occurred, and great care was likewise taken by Aldana to procure intelligence of all that passed in the camp of the insurgents; so that every day messengers went and came between both parties, and both were continually endeavouring to mislead each other by false reports. Accordingly it was reported one day that Gonzalo and his troops Were in full march for Lima, which occasioned much confusion and dismay in that city; but it was known afterwards that this rumour had been purposely spread by Gonzalo and his lieutenant-general, on purpose to prevent Aldana from pursuing them, a measure of which they were much afraid. In this unpromising state of his affairs, great numbers of the adherents of Gonzalo abandoned him, believing that he could not resist the power of his enemies. Such of them as had horses took the road to Truxillo; and all the rest endeavoured to reach the ships of Aldana, concealing themselves as well as they could in retired places till they might ascertain that Gonzalo had proceeded farther on his march, which indeed he continued to do with much precipitation. When he had proceeded to a considerable distance from Lima, all those who had abandoned him flocked to that city, and every day some fresh deserters came there, by which means Aldana got accurate intelligence of the proceedings of Gonzalo, who was reported to be in continual dread of being put to death by his own men. After the flight of the licentiate Carvajal and Gabriel de Roias, Gonzalo made no farther use of the royal standard, only displaying that which contained his own arms. His cruelty increased with his disappointment, insomuch that not a day passed in which he did not put some one to death. He took extraordinary precautions for his own personal safety, which were so far effectual, but every effort to prevent desertion was unavailing.

Lorenzo de Aldana sent intelligence of all these matters to the president, by means of messengers dispatched both by sea and land, earnestly urging him to come into Peru as quickly as possible, as the insurgent party seemed at so low an ebb that nothing was wanting but his presence to make it fall entirely in pieces and submit without a struggle. On the 9th. of September 1547, when assured that Gonzalo had retreated eighty leagues from Lima, Aldana landed with all his officers and all the inhabitants of Lima that had taken shelter on board his ships. He was received on shore with every demonstration of joy and respect, every one who was able appearing in arms to do him honour. Having appointed Juan Fernandez to the command of the ships, he took charge of the vacant government of Lima, where he made every possible preparation for carrying on the war, collecting arms ammunition and all other necessaries.

Some time after the departure of Juan d'Acosta from Lima for Cuzco by the mountain road, as already mentioned, at the head of three hundred men well armed and equipped, he got notice that Gonzalo Pizarro had abandoned that city; on which he sent Fra Pedro, a monk of the order of Mercy, to Gonzalo, to demand instructions for his ulterior proceedings. Pizarro sent back the monk with directions for Acosta to join him at a certain place. On his return to Acosta, accompanied by a person named Gonzalo Muquos, after delivering his dispatches, Friar Pedro gave him an account of all that had happened in the army of Gonzalo, and in particular of the great number of men that had deserted from him; which Acosta had not before learnt, though several of his soldiers had received the intelligence by letters brought to them by the Indians who frequented the camp, but which they dared not to communicate to each other. On the present occasion, the messengers from Gonzalo recommended to Acosta to keep this matter as secret as possible till such time as he should join Gonzalo. Acosta therefore, gave out that he had received favourable intelligence from the monk, and that Gonzalo had been successful on several occasions, being daily joined by many additional soldiers; and, as he had found it convenient and necessary to send off many confidential persons in various directions, these persons pretended to have deserted from Gonzalo by way of stratagem, on purpose, to gain possession of the ships commanded by Aldana. All this however was insufficient to disguise the truth from many of the followers of Aldana, particularly Paëz de Sotomayor, his major-general, and Martin d'Olmos one of his captains; who, coming to a knowledge of the real state of affairs, entered into a resolution of putting D'Acosta to death. They formed this resolution unknown to each other, as no one at this time dared to avow his sentiments to any other person, for fear of being put to death; yet, from certain indications, they began to suspect each other of entertaining similar sentiments, and at length opened themselves reciprocally, and communicated their purposes to several soldiers in whom they confided. Just when they were about to have put their enterprize into execution, Sotomayor got notice that D'Acosta was holding a secret conference in his tent with two of his captains, and that he had doubled his ordinary guard. From these circumstances, Sotomayor concluded that their conspiracy, having been revealed to several persons, had been betrayed to Acosta. He took therefore prompt measures to inform all his confederates, and both he and they took horse without delay, and left the camp in sight of all the army, to the number of thirty-five in all; among whom, besides Sotomayor and D'Olmos, the principal persons were Martin d'Alarzon who carried the grand standard, Hernando de Alvarado, Alfonzo Regel, Antonio de Avila, Garcias Gutierrez d'Escovedo, and Martin Monje; who, with all who went off on this occasion, were men of consideration and of much experience in the affairs of Peru. These men took immediately the road for Guamanga, and used such expedition that, though Acosta sent off sixty mounted musqueteers to pursue them, they made their escape in safety.

Acosta caused immediate investigations to be made in regard to such as had participated in this plot, and ordered several persons to be hanged who were proved to have known its circumstances: some others in the same predicament he detained prisoners, and dissembled with the rest who had been implicated, pretending not to know that they had participated in the conspiracy: Yet, during his march towards Cuzco, he put to death several of those of whom he was suspicious, and others who endeavoured to desert. On his arrival at Cuzco, he displaced all the magistrates who had been appointed by Centeno, nominating others in their stead in whom he thought he could confide, and appointed Juan Velasquez de Tapia to take the chief direction of affairs in that city and province; and having regulated every thing to his mind, he resumed his march for Arequipa to join Gonzalo, according to his directions. In this latter part of his march, about thirty of his men deserted from him, by two or three at a time, all of whom went directly to Lima where they joined Lorenzo de Aldana. Besides these, when Acosta had got about ten leagues beyond Cuzco, Martin de Almandras abandoned him with twenty of the best soldiers of his small army, and returned to Cuzco, where he found a sufficient number of the inhabitants disposed to join him in returning to their duty, and in concurrence with whom he deposed the magistracy appointed by Acosta, one of whom he sent away prisoner to Lima, and established a new set in the name of his majesty. Finding that the number of his followers diminished from day to day, Acosta accelerated his march as much as possible, both for his own security and to serve the insurgent cause in which he was engaged. Out of three hundred well armed and excellently equipped men, with whom he had set out from Lima, only one hundred remained with him on his arrival at Arequipa. He found Gonzalo Pizarro at that place, with only about three hundred and fifty men, who a very short while before had a fine army of fifteen hundred, besides all those who were dispersed in different parts of Peru under various captains, all of whom were then under his orders. Gonzalo was now exceedingly irresolute as to his future proceedings; being too weak to wait the attack of the royalists, who continually augmented in their numbers, and yet deeming it dishonourable to fly or to endeavour to conceal himself.

In the mean time Centeno remained in the Collao, waiting an answer from Captain Mendoza to the message he had sent by Gonzalo de Zarate as formerly mentioned. While there he received dispatches from the president, which were forwarded by Aldana, and accounts of the events which had occurred at Lima, particularly the flight of Gonzalo Pizarro to Arequipa, and the junction of Acosta with the insurgents at that place. On receiving this intelligence he sent a new message to Mendoza by means of Luis Garcias, giving him an account of all these events, and particularly informing him of the orders and instructions given to the president, the general amnesty, the revocation of the obnoxious regulations, and the determination of his majesty that Gonzalo Pizarro was not to continue in the government of Peru. He apprized him likewise, that most of the gentlemen and persons of consideration, who had hitherto followed Gonzalo, had now abandoned him on account of his tyrannical conduct, in murdering and plundering all the principal colonists, and more especially because of his rebellion against the sovereign, and refusal to submit to his royal orders, and to the authority of him who had been appointed to regulate the affairs of the kingdom. Wherefore, although all that had been done hitherto might in some measure be excused, he urged Mendoza to consider that in continuing to obey Gonzalo he could no longer avoid the reproach of acting as a rebel against the king. It was now necessary and proper therefore, to forget all individual interests or past disputes, and to devote himself entirely to his majesty, to whom he was enabled by his present situation to render important service.

Alfonzo de Mendoza was already well disposed to act the part of a loyal subject in the present situation of affairs, yet uncertain how best to conduct himself for that purpose; but by this message from Centeno, he was completely determined as to the regulation of his conduct on the present emergency, and immediately declared for his majesty. By agreement between him and Centeno, each was to retain the chief command of the troops now under their orders, and Mendoza departed from La Plata with his men to join Centeno in the Collao. The union of these leaders and their troops occasioned great joy to all their followers, now exceeding a thousand men; and they resolved to march immediately against Gonzalo, taking up a position at a certain pass to prevent him from escaping, and were likewise induced to remain at that place for the convenience of procuring provisions.

At this time the whole extent of Peru from Quito to Lima had declared for his majesty. Juan d'Olmos, who commanded under Gonzalo at Puerto Viejo, on observing the vessels under Aldana passing the port of Manta in that province, had sent an express to Gonzalo giving his opinion that these vessels seemed hostile, as they had not called at the port for refreshments. He at the same time sent some Indians on board, in their ordinary rafts or flat boats, to inquire the purpose of their voyage; by means of which Indians Aldana transmitted letters to D'Olmos, urging him to quit the insurgent party, with copies of all the papers connected with the mission of the president. After perusing these papers, D'Olmos transmitted them to Gomez Estacio who was lieutenant-governor of the province for Gonzalo at St Jago de Guyaquil, usually called Culata. On learning that his majesty did not approve of continuing Gonzalo in the government, and had sent out Gasca as president, Gomez wrote back to D'Olmos, that when the president arrived in the country he should know better how to act, and might probably join him; but in the present situation of affairs, he thought it best for both to remain quiet. Juan d'Olmos went immediately to visit Gomez, accompanied by seven or eight friends, under pretence of communing with him on the state of affairs; but, taking his opportunity, one day when Gomez was off his guard, he stabbed him with his poniard, and immediately got the people to declare for his majesty, after which he did the same at his own government of Puerto Viejo.

When Pedro de Puelles, the governor of Quito, became acquainted with these proceedings of D'Olmos, and that the fleet and army at Panama had declared for the president, he became exceedingly anxious as to the measures proper for him to pursue. At this time D'Olmos sent Diego de Urbina to Quito to endeavour to prevail on Puelles to declare for the royal party. Puelles declared he was ready to receive and obey the person sent out by the king, when once he was satisfied that his majesty had no intention of continuing Gonzalo in the government, but would make no alteration in the mean time; and with this indecisive answer Urbina returned to D'Olmos. A few days afterwards, Rodrigo de Salazar, in whom Puelles reposed entire confidence, entered into a conspiracy with several soldiers at Quito, assassinated Puelles, and declared for his majesty. After this exploit, Salazar set out from Quito for Tumbez with three hundred men, with the intention of joining the president. By these several events, and others which have been formerly related, almost the whole of Peru had already returned to obedience before the arrival of the president in the kingdom.

While these favourable events were going on in Peru, the president embarked at Panama with about five hundred men, and arrived safely at the port of Tumbez; one of his ships, commanded by Don Pedro de Cabrera, being under the necessity of stopping at Buenaventura, whence Cabrera and his men marched by land to Tumbez. On his arrival in Peru, the president received letters from all parts of the kingdom, by which the writers offered him their services and assistance, besides communicating their sentiments on the situation of the colony, and giving their advice how best to proceed in reducing it to order; to all of which letters he replied with great condescension. So many flocked to his standard from all quarters, that he considered himself sufficiently strong to overcome all resistance from the remnant of the insurgents, without drawing any reinforcements from the other Spanish colonies in America; on which account he sent off messengers to New Spain, Guatimala, Nicaragua, and St Domingo, informing the governors of these colonies of the favourable turn of affairs in Peru, and that he should now have no occasion for the reinforcements which he had formerly thought necessary. Soon after his arrival, he gave orders to his lieutenant-general, Pedro Alfonzo de Hinojosa, to march with the troops to form a junction with the royalists in Caxamarca. In the mean time Polo de Menzes remained in charge of the fleet, with which he advanced along the coast to the southwards, while the president, with a sufficient escort, went by the road of the plain to Truxillo, at which place he received intelligence from all parts of the country, stating that every thing went on well.

The president had resolved that he would not go to Lima till he had completed the purposes of his mission, by the final conquest of Gonzalo and his adherents, and the restoration of peace and order in the kingdom of Peru; on which account he transmitted orders to all quarters, that all who had declared for his majesty should meet him in the valley of Jauja, which he considered to be a convenient situation in which to assemble the whole loyal force of the kingdom, as in that place abundance of provisions could easily be procured. For this purpose, he sent orders to Lorenzo de Aldana, then at Lima, to march with all his force for Jauja; and joining the army under Hinojosa, now exceeding a thousand men, he marched for Jauja, all the army expressing the utmost satisfaction at the prospect of being freed from the tyranny of Gonzalo. Many of the principal persons who had joined with Gonzalo at the beginning of the troubles, were now exceedingly offended and displeased by the cruel murders of so many of their friends and neighbours; above five hundred men having been put to death, many of whom were persons of consideration and importance; insomuch that those who still remained along with him were continually in fear of their lives.

On his arrival at Arequipa, Gonzalo found that city entirely deserted, as most of the inhabitants had gone to join Diego Centeno after that officer got possession of Cuzco. Hearing that Centeno was in the Collao, near the lake of Titicaca, where after his junction with Mendoza, he had an army of near a thousand men, composed of the troops of Cuzco Las Charcas and Arequipa, and with which they occupied all the passes towards the interior, Gonzalo believed it almost impossible to attack these officers with any probability of success. He waited therefore at Arequipa about three weeks, expecting the junction of D'Acosta, who at length arrived, but with very diminished numbers, as already related, many having abandoned him, and having put many of his followers to death on suspicion that they intended to desert. After the junction of D'Acosta, Gonzalo found himself at the head of five hundred men. He now wrote to Centeno, giving a recital of all the events which had occurred during the troubles, and dwelt particularly on the favour he had always shewn him, and particularly instanced the pardon he had granted him when Gaspard Rodriguez and Philip Guttierrez were executed, though equally guilty with them, and although all his officers had urged him to put Centeno to death. In addition, Gonzalo made high offers to Centeno, promising to accede to every demand he might choose to make, if he would now join him. He sent this letter to Centeno by a person named Francisco Vaso, who immediately offered his services to Centeno, to whom he intimated that Diego Alvarez his standard-bearer was in correspondence with Gonzalo. Centeno was already informed of this circumstance by Alvarez himself, who assured him he had entered into this correspondence for a quite different purpose than that of betraying him or the royal cause.

Centeno thought proper to send a civil answer to Gonzalo, giving him many thanks for his offers, and freely acknowledging the favour he had formerly experienced. That as a mark of his gratitude, therefore, he now earnestly entreated him to reflect seriously on the present situation of affairs, to consider the gracious clemency of the king, who had granted a free pardon to him and all those who had taken any part in the past troubles. He assured Gonzalo, if he would abandon the insurrection, now evidently hopeless, and submit to the royal orders, that he would use his utmost endeavours to procure him an honourable and advantageous situation, and at the same time endeavoured to convince him that he would run no risk either in his person or property by following the present advice. On his return to Gonzalo with this letter, Vaso was met by the lieutenant-general Carvajal, who made minute inquiry respecting every thing he had seen and learnt, and gave him strict injunctions not to let it be known to the followers of Gonzalo that the force of Centeno exceeded seven hundred men. On being informed that Centeno refused to join him, Gonzalo disdained to read his letter, and ordered it immediately to be burnt in presence of several of his officers.

Immediately after this, Gonzalo determined to march into the province of Las Charcas, and accordingly took the direct road towards the pass occupied by Centeno and Mendoza. In this march the van-guard was commanded by the lieutenant-general, who took and hanged more than twenty persons whom he fell in with during the march. Among these was a priest named Pantaleon, who carried some letters for Centeno, and whom Carvajal ordered to be hung up, with his breviary and ink-horn suspended from his neck. Continuing this march, the scouts of the two armies fell in with each other on Thursday the 19th of October 1547. Gonzalo immediately sent one of his chaplains with a message to Centeno, demanding leave to continue his march through the pass, without being obliged to give battle[32]. The chaplain was conducted by the bishop of Cuzco, who happened to be in the army of Centeno, to his tent; and Centeno gave strict charges to his troops to be on their guard and always in good order to receive the enemy in case of an attack. For above a month Centeno had been afflicted by an obstinate fever, for which he had been six times blooded without any relief, and was not expected to recover; so that he was quite incapable of acting on the present emergency, being confined constantly to bed.

[Footnote 32: No consequences seem to have followed from this demand, which does not appear to have been acceded or even listened to.--E.]

The illness of Centeno was known in the army of Gonzalo, and that his tent was pitched at some distance from the rest, to avoid the noise and bustle of the camp. Founding on this intelligence, Juan d'Acosta was detached with twenty picked men, with orders to approach silently in the night to the camp of the royalists, and to endeavour to carry off Centeno. Acosta accordingly drew near with so much caution that he surprised the centinels that were on guard over Centeno, and had very near reached his tent when the alarm was given by some negro servants. Being thus discovered, Acosta ordered his men to fire off their musquets, and immediately retreated back to the camp of Gonzalo without losing a man. In the confusion occasioned by this exploit, great numbers of the royalists hastened towards the tent occupied by Centeno; but on this occasion several of the soldiers belonging to Valdivia threw away their arms and fled. Next morning the scouts of both armies approached each other, followed by the respective armies, which at length came in sight. The army of Centeno consisted of about a thousand men, two hundred of whom were cavalry, an hundred and fifty armed with musquets, and all the rest with pikes. Of this army, Luis de Ribera was major-general, Pedro de Rios, Jerom Villegas, and Pedro de Ulloa, captains of cavalry, and Diego Alvarez carried the grand-standard. The captains of infantry were Juan de Vargas, Francisco Retamoso, Negral, Pantoia, and Diego Lopez de Zuniga; Luis Garcias being sergeant-major, or adjutant-general[33]. The army of Gonzalo consisted only of five hundred men, of which three hundred were musqueteers, and eighty cavalry, the remainder being armed with pikes. Of this army Carvajal was lieutenant-general; the licentiate Cepeda and Juan Velez de Guevara were captains of horse; and Juan d'Acosta, Ferdinand Bachicao, and Juan de la Torre captains of foot.

[Footnote 33: It is not easy to understand how Mendoza, who had joined Centeno some time before, happens to be omitted in this enumeration--E.]

Both armies being drawn up in good order, the insurgents advanced, to the sound of trumpets and other musical instruments, till within six hundred paces of the enemy, when Carvajal ordered them to halt. The royalists continued to advance till within a hundred paces less, and then halted likewise. At this time, forty musqueteers were detached from the army of Gonzalo, with orders to begin the engagement; and two other parties of musqueteers, of forty men each, were posted on the wings, Pizarro taking his station between his cavalry and infantry. Thirty musqueteers were likewise advanced from the army of Centeno, to skirmish with those of the insurgents. As Carvajal observed that the royalists waited the attack in good order, he ordered his troops to advance a few steps very slowly, in hopes of inducing the enemy to make some movement or evolution which might occasion confusion in their ranks. This had the desired, effect, as the royalists, believing that their enemies, though interior in number, wished to have the honour of making the attack, they began immediately to advance, and the insurgents by order of Carvajal stood firm to receive them. When tolerably near, Carvajal gave orders for a small number of his troops to fire their musquets, on which the royalists made a general discharge, and marched forwards at a quick step with levelled pikes, during which the royalist musqueteers made a second discharge without occasioning any loss to the enemy, as they were still three hundred paces distant. Carvajal made his men reserve their fire till the enemy was within about an hundred paces; when, with a few pieces of artillery, and the whole of his musqueteers, he threw in so destructive a volley that above an hundred and fifty of the royalists were slain, among whom were two of their captains. By this terrible slaughter, the whole infantry of the royalist army was thrown into disorder, entirely defeated, and took to flight, in spite of every effort of Captain Retimoso to rally them, who lay wounded in the field. Notwithstanding the defeat of the infantry, the royalist cavalry made a brave charge against the insurgents, of whom they killed and wounded a considerable number. On this occasion Gonzalo had his horse killed and was thrown to the ground, yet escaped unhurt. Pedro de Rios and Pedro de Ulloa, captains of cavalry belonging to Centeno, wheeled with their squadrons round the wing of the insurgent infantry, intending to charge their flank; but were opposed by the detachments of musqueteers which were posted on the wings, on which occasion De Rios and several others were slain. Being thus repulsed, and seeing their own infantry entirely defeated, the cavalry took likewise to flight and dispersed, every one endeavouring to save himself as he best could.

Gonzalo Pizarro, having thus gained an easy victory, marched on with his army in good order to the camp of Centeno, putting every person to death that came in the way. A considerable number of the dispersed royalists happened to seek safety in passing by the camp of Pizarro, which they found entirely deserted, insomuch that they were able to make use of the horses and mules belonging to the insurgent infantry to facilitate their flight, and even made a considerable booty in gold and silver. While the royalist cavalry were engaged vigorously with the insurgents, Bachicao, one of Gonzalos captains, believing that the royalists would be victorious, went over to them. After the victory was decided in favour of Gonzalo, Bachicao, imagining that his conduct had not been observed, and would remain unknown, or that he would be able to justify himself under some colourable pretence, returned to his post. But as his defection was known to Carvajal, he caused him to be instantly hung up, adding insulting raillery to his cruelty, calling him his dear comrade and using many other bantering expressions.

During this unfortunate battle, Centeno was so ill that he was carried on a kind of litter by six Indians, almost in a state of insensibility; yet, by the care and attention of some of his friends, he was saved after the defeat of his army. In this bloody engagement, which was fought near a place called Guarina, above three hundred and fifty men were slain on the side of the royalists, besides thirty more who were put to death in the pursuit by the insurgent cavalry. Among these were, the major-general Luis de Ribera, the captains Retamoso, Diego Lopez de Zuniga, Negral, Pantoia, and Diego Alvarez, with Friar Gonzalo of the order of Mercy, and several other persons of condition. The insurgents lost about an hundred men. After the battle, Carvajal pursued the fugitives at the head of the insurgent cavalry for several days, on the road towards Cuzco. He was very anxious to take the bishop of Cuzco, against whom he was much incensed for having joined Centeno and being present in the battle. The bishop however made his escape; but Carvajal gratified his revenge on several royalists whom he got up with, all of whom he hung up without mercy, among whom were a brother of the bishop and a Dominican friar. After the return of Carvajal from the pursuit, Gonzalo made a distribution of lands and Indians among his troops, engaging to put them into possession at a convenient opportunity. He likewise took great care of his wounded men, and caused the slain to be buried. He then sent Bovadilla with a detachment to the city of La Plata and the mines, to collect all the gold and silver that could be procured, and dispatched Diego de Carvajal, usually called the Beau, on a similar mission to Arequipa. Juan de la Torre was sent to take possession of Cuzco, where he put to death Vasquez de Tapia and the licentiate Martel.

After this favourable turn of affairs, Pizarro issued a proclamation by which all the soldiers who had served under Centeno were commanded to join his standard, under pain of death; granting an amnesty for all that passed, with the exception only of those principal leaders who had particularly exerted themselves for the royal cause. He then sent Pedro de Bustincia with a detachment, to oblige the curacas of Andaguaylas and the neighbouring districts to furnish provisions for his army. A few days afterwards Gonzalo repaired to Cuzco with about four hundred men, and used every effort to put himself into a situation for opposing the president; being so elated by the victory he had gained at Guarina over such superior numbers, that he and his followers believed themselves almost invincible.

While these things were going on in the south of Peru, the president marched by the mountain road for the valley of Jauja, accompanied by the troops which he had brought from the Tierra Firma, and those of the captains Diego de Mora, Gomez de Alvarado, Juan de Saavedra, Porcel, and the others that had assembled in Caxamarca. He sent orders likewise to Salazar, who now commanded at Quito, to join him with all his men; and ordered Lorenzo de Aldana to join him from Lima with all the soldiers from the fleet and those he had drawn together after the flight of Gonzalo to Arequipa. The president arrived first of all at Jauja with an escort of an hundred men, where he immediately took the proper measures for collecting arms and military stores, and provisions. On the same day he was joined by the licentiate Carvajal and Gabriel de Royas; and soon afterwards Ferdinand Mexia de Guzman, and Juan Alphonzo Palamino arrived with their companies. Lorenzo de Aldana remained at Lima with his own company, it being of great importance to keep possession of that city and its post. In a short time the president had collected an army of above fifteen hundred men in Jauja, and employed all the forges and artists he could procure to fabricate new musquets, to put all the old ones into good repair, and to provide abundance of pikes and all other arms, both offensive and defensive. In these preparations he not only exerted the utmost diligence, but shewed a great deal of intelligence and knowledge, far beyond what could tare been expected from a person who had hitherto been entirely occupied in civil and religious pursuits. He carefully visited his camps, and inspected the workmen who were employed by his orders, taking at the same time every possible care of such of his soldiers as were sick, exerting himself to the utmost in every thing relative to the good of the service, beyond what could have been expected from any single person, by which means he acquired the entire confidence and affection of all who were under his command. His army had always been in hope that their services would not be required, and even at one time believed that the president would not have had occasion to assemble an army, as they thought that Centeno was strong enough to have conquered Gonzalo.

Immediately on receiving intelligence of the victory which Gonzalo had gained at Guarina, the president sent the captains Lope Martin and Mercadillo, with a detachment of fifty men, to occupy the passes of Guamanga, about thirty leagues from Jauja on the way to Cuzco, to learn the motions of the enemy, and to collect all who might have been able to escape from Cuzco. While at Guamanga, Lope Martin got notice that Pedro de Bustincia was in the district of Andahuaylas collecting provisions for the army of Gonzalo, as formerly mentioned. Accompanied by fifteen mounted musqueteers, Martin went into that district, where he unexpectedly attacked Bustincia during the night, and made him and all his people prisoners. After hanging some of these men, he returned to Guamanga, bringing all the curacas of the neighbourhood along with him, by whose means intelligence was conveyed to all parts of the country, giving notice of the arrival of the president in the valley of Jauja, and the great preparations he was making in that place.

From Jauja the president sent his lieutenant-general, Alfonzo de Alvarado, to bring up from Lima all the soldiers that could be spared from that place, together with some pieces of artillery from the ships, and clothes and money for the supply of such of the soldiers as were in want; all of which services were performed by Alvarado in a short time. The president now mustered his army, of which Pedro Alfonzo de Hinojosa was lieutenant-general, and the licenciate Bendicto de Carvajal carried the royal standard, Don Pedro de Cabrera, Gomez de Alvarado, Juan de Saavedra, Diego de Mora, Francisco Hernandez, Rodrigo de Salazar, and Alfonzo de Mendoza were captains of cavalry; Don Balthazar de Castillo, Pablo de Menezes, Hernando Mexia de Guzman, Juan Alfonzo Palomino, Gomez de Solis, Francisco Mosquera, Don Ferdinand de Cardinas, the adelantado Andagoya, Francisco d'Olmos, Gomez d'Arias, and three other captains, Porcel, Pardaval, and Serna, commanded the infantry. Gabriel de Royas was appointed to command the artillery. Besides the military officers already mentioned, the president was attended by the archbishop of Lima, the bishops of Cuzco and Quito, the provincials of the Dominicans and of the order of Mercy, and by several other ecclesiastics, both priests and friars. On a general muster and review of the army, it was found to consist of seven hundred musqueteers, five hundred pikemen, and four hundred cavalry. Afterwards, on arriving at Xaquixaguana on the march towards Cuzco, it was augmented to nineteen hundred men, by the junction of several other detachments, forming the largest and best appointed array hitherto seen in Peru.

The president, having completed his preparations, began his march from Jauja in good order on the 19th of December 1547, taking the route of Cuzco, and especially desirous of crossing the river Abancay[34] in some safe place. In this part of his march he was joined by Pedro de Valdivia, the governor of Chili. Valdivia had come by sea to Lima, on purpose to raise men, and to procure various stores of which he was in want, with clothing and ammunition, on purpose to enable him to proceed in the conquest of Chili. On his arrival at Lima, and learning the situation of affairs in Peru, he determined upon joining the president. His arrival was considered as an indication of good fortune; for, although the president had already in his army many officers of merit and capacity, and of eminent rank and fortune, there was not any one in Peru who possessed so much experience in the manner of conducting warlike operations in that country as Valdivia, on which account he was considered as a fit person to be opposed to the experience and stratagems of Carvajal, who was much dreaded by every one in the presidents army, more especially since the late defeat of Centeno, which was entirely attributed to the talents of Carvajal. About the same time Centeno joined the president with more than thirty horse, who had accompanied him ever since the defeat of Guarina. Continuing his march amid considerable difficulties, owing to the scarcity of provisions, the president at length reached the province of Andahuaylas, where he judged it proper to remain during the winter, on account of the violent rains which fell night and day almost without ceasing, by which the tents were all rotted. The maize which they procured as food for the troops was all wet and spoiled, by which a considerable number of the soldiers were afflicted with dysentery, of which some died, notwithstanding the care taken of the sick by Francisco de la Rocha, a Trinitarian monk, who acted as physician to the army. Although there were above four hundred sick at one time, so great was the care bestowed, that they were as well attended and as plentifully supplied with medicines as if in a populous city, insomuch that they almost all recovered.

[Footnote 34: Rather the Pachacamac, near which the town or city of Abancay is situated, and where probably the president proposed to pass that river.--E.]

The arrival of Valdivia and Centeno diffused much joy through the army, which was expressed in frequent feasts and entertainments, with concerts of music, running at the ring, and similar amusements. During the continuance of the army in winter quarters at Andahuaylas, the general Hinojosa with Alfonzo de Alvarado and Valdivia applied themselves indefatigably to have every thing in the best possible order for taking the field. On the commencement of spring, and when the rains began sensibly to diminish, the army broke up from Andahuaylas and marched to the bridge of Abancay, about twenty leagues from Cuzco, where it halted until bridges were constructed across the Apurimac at the distance of twelve leagues from Cuzco[35], as the enemy had broken down all the bridges over that river, and it was necessary either to construct new ones, or to make a circuit of more than seventy leagues to get to Cuzco. On purpose to distract the enemy, the president caused materials for the construction of bridges to be carried to three different points on the Apurimac; one on the great road of the Incas[36], a second in the valley of Cotabamba, about twelve leagues farther up the river, and a third still farther up the Apurimac, at a village belonging to Don Pedro de Puertocarrero, where that officer was posted with a hundred men to guard the passage. For the construction of these bridges cables and ropes were prepared, after the manner of the native Peruvians as formerly described in our general account of the country; and beams and pillars were got ready on which to fix the cables when the army should be collected at the intended place of passing the river. Had Gonzalo been able to ascertain the place at which it was intended to pass, he had assuredly opposed the royalists, and would at least have made it exceedingly difficult for them to construct a bridge; but as he could not ascertain the actual point fixed on, he did not consider it safe to divide his force so as to oppose the royalists at the three points of demonstration, and satisfied himself therefore by posting spies at the different places, to bring him immediate notice of the place where the royalists might begin their operations, that he might know where to march to oppose them. But the secret was confined to the knowledge of the president, and the members of his council of war.

[Footnote 35: Abancay on the Pachacamac is not above 14 Spanish leagues from Cuzco in a straight line. The other bridges mentioned in the text must have been thrown over the Apurimac Proper, somewhere near the town or village of Limatambo.--E.]

[Footnote 36: This was probably by Limatambo, as on the great road the Incas had palaces for lodging in with their attendants, called tambos.--E.]