It had been long proposed to send a deputation from Gonzalo and the communities of Peru into Spain, to lay an account before his majesty of all that had occurred in the colony; and many of the principal insurgents insisted on the necessity of this measure, to justify their conduct. Others again, among whom the principal persons were the lieutenant-general Carvajal and Captain Bachicao, were of an opposite opinion; insisting that it were better to wait till his majesty might think proper to send out persons to inquire into the cause of his revenues being detained. They alleged that the viceroy must have already fully informed his majesty upon all the late transactions, and would doubtless be listened to in preference to any thing which they could say in defence of their conduct. On this account, the leaders of the insurgents regretted that they had not at the first sent over the judges of the royal audience into Spain, to give an account of their reasons for having made the viceroy a prisoner. And, after many deliberations on this subject, it was at length determined to send home the Doctor Texada, one of the oydors, in the name of the royal audience, to lay an account of the whole before the king. It was at the same time resolved, that Francisco Maldonado, who was master of the household of Gonzalo Pizarro, should accompany Texada, carrying justificatory letters from his master; but without any title, credence, or powers whatever. By these measures, two purposes were served at the same time, both of which were deemed useful: In sending a deputation to the king to justify their proceeding, those of their party who pressed that measure were satisfied; and by employing Texada on this errand, the court of royal audience was virtually broken up, as Ortiz de Zarate could not then hold sittings by himself[11]. When this proposal was communicated to Texada, he readily consented to undertake the office, on condition that he were furnished with 6000 crowns to defray the expences of his voyage. Accordingly, Cepeda and he composed all the memorials and dispatches which were deemed necessary, which were signed by these two judges only, as Ortiz refused his concurrence.

[Footnote 11: Zarate seems to forget the existence of Cepeda, one of the judges; but he seems to have entirely devoted himself to the party of the usurper, while Ortiz affected at least to retain a sense of loyalty.--E.]

When all was in readiness for the dispatch of Texada and Maldonado, a ship which lay in the harbour of Lima was ordered to be fitted out for their reception, of which Captain Bachicao was to have taken the command, with a sufficient number of cannon, and twenty soldiers; having orders to take possession of all the ships he might fall in with along the coast. At this time, Vaca de Castro, the ex-president, who still remained a prisoner in this ship, contrived to gain over a majority of the seamen belonging to the vessel, with the assistance of his friend Garcia de Montalva who occasionally visited him. By these means he acquired the command of the vessel, which was already provided with every thing needful for the voyage, and immediately set sail. This untoward incident gave much uneasiness to Gonzalo Pizarro, both because it delayed the departure of Texada, and because he judged that it could not have happened without the concurrence of several concealed enemies to the present state of affairs. On this the troops were ordered under arms, and all the principal persons who were suspected of disaffection to the party of Pizarro were taken into custody and committed to the common prison of the city, both those who had fled from Cuzco, and those belonging to other cities who had not joined his party. One of the persons committed to prison on this occasion was the licentiate Carvajal, to whom the lieutenant-general Carvajal sent a message, desiring him to confess and make his will, as he was immediately to be put to death. The licentiate did accordingly what he was desired, and prepared himself to die with much firmness and resolution; yet he was urged to be more expeditious, and the executioner was present, provided with cords for tying his hands and strangling him. Every one believed the last hour of the licentiate was come; more especially as, considering his rank and quality, it was not thought possible that he could be treated in this manner merely to frighten him. It was likewise universally believed, that the execution of the licentiate would be speedily followed by that of all the other prisoners; which it was conceived would prove of material detriment to the colony, as they consisted of the very principal people of the country, and of those who had always evinced the most zealous loyalty to the service of his majesty.

While matters seemed fast tending to this extremity, several of the most judicious persons went to Gonzalo Pizarro, and requested of him to reflect that the licentiate Carvajal was one of the principal persons in the country, and that his brother had been already unjustly put to death by the viceroy, under pretence of the licentiate having joined the party of Pizarro. They urged that it was exceedingly imprudent at this time to put the licentiate to death, as that would necessarily renew the discontents which had formerly taken place on the death of his brother the commissary. They even added, that much good service might be expected from the licentiate, were it only in pursuit of revenge for the death of his brother. They insisted that neither the licentiate nor any of the other prisoners had any hand in the flight of Vaca de Castro; but that it might easily be seen that the slightest pretexts were resorted to on purpose to accuse them, who were already under suspicion as disaffected to the ruling party. Teased and fatigued by these solicitations, Gonzalo Pizarro refused to be spoken to on the subject; so that the licentiate and his friends were induced to try another expedient for his release. They conveyed to the lieutenant-general an ingot of gold weighing forty marks[12], with a promise of a much larger present if he would save the life of the licentiate. The lieutenant-general accepted their offers, delayed the execution of the licentiate, and prevailed on Gonzalo Pizarro to set him and all the other suspected persons at liberty.

[Footnote 12: The weight of this is 820 ounces, which at L. 4 an ounce comes to L. 1280, and was then worth as much as L. 7680 is in efficient value.--E]

After the conclusion of this business, measures were taken for the dispatch of Texada and Maldonado; and at this time there happened to arrive a brigantine from Arequipa, which was fitted out along with some other vessels, and armed with a part of the artillery which had been brought down from Cuzco. In these vessels Bachicao embarked along with the deputies, accompanied by sixty musqueteers, who were all that could be prevailed upon to undertake the voyage. They proceeded on their voyage along the coast to the northwards, and arrived one morning early at Tumbez, where they understood the viceroy then resided. Immediately on their being perceived making for the coast, the adherents of the viceroy gave the alarm and stood on their defence: But as the viceroy believed that Gonzalo Pizarro was on board in person accompanied by a formidable body of troops, he retired in all haste from Tumbez accompanied by an hundred and fifty men, taking the road for Quito. Several of his people however did not think fit to accompany his flight, and preferred giving themselves up to Bachicao, who likewise took possession of two ships which happened to be in the port of Tumbez. From thence, Bachicao went to Puerto Viejo and other places, where he drew together about an hundred and fifty men, all of whom he took along with him in the ships of his squadron. Among these were Bartholomew Perez, and Juan Delmos, respectable inhabitants of Puerto Viejo.

Continuing his voyage towards Panama, Bachicao put in at the Isle of Pearls, about twenty leagues from Panama to procure refreshments. While at that place, the inhabitants of Panama received notice of his arrival, and sent two deputies to learn his intentions, requesting at the same time that he would not come into their boundaries with his troops. Bachicao sent back word, that although he happened to be accompanied by armed men, it was merely on purpose to defend himself against the viceroy, and that he had not the most distant intention of injuring or even displeasing the inhabitants of Panama. He informed them, that he was entrusted with the transport of the Doctor Texada, one of the royal judges, who was charged with a commission from the court of audience to give an account to his majesty of the events which had occurred in Peru. He farther declared that he should only land in Panama to provide necessaries for his voyage back to Peru, and would reimbark without delay. Lulled into security by these assurances, the inhabitants of Panama took no measures for defence. On coming into the port, two ships which happened to be there, made sail to go away; one of which was taken possession of by one of the brigantines belonging to Bachicao, and brought back to the harbour, with the master and chief mate hanging from the yard arms. This sad spectacle gave great uneasiness to the inhabitants, who judged from this tragical event, that the purposes of Bachicao were very different from his words and promises. But it was not now time to think of defence, and they were constrained to submit, though filled with terror and dismay, leaving their lives and properties entirely at the discretion of Bachicao, who was no less cruel than the lieutenant-general Carvajal, or even more so if possible; being at the same time exceedingly addicted to cursing and blasphemy, and among all his vices not a single spark of virtue could be found to relieve the picture.

At this time Captain Juan de Gusman was in Panama raising soldiers for the service of the viceroy; but he found it advisable to retire on the arrival of Bachicao, with whom all these soldiers now inlisted. Bachicao likewise got possession of the artillery which had belonged to the vessel in which Vaca de Castro escaped from Lima. Seeing himself master of Panama, Bachicao who was a brutal passionate fellow, exercised the command there in a cruel and tyrannical manner, disposing at his will of the goods and properties of every one, violating every rule of law and justice, oppressing the liberties of the community, and holding every individual under such slavish constraint, that no one dared to act otherwise than as he pleased to dictate. Learning or suspecting that two of his captains had formed the design of putting him to death, he ordered them both to be beheaded without any form of trial; and in similar acts of injustice, and in every transaction, he used no other formality than ordering it to be intimated by the public crier, "That Captain Ferdinand Bachicao had ordained such and such to be done." He thus usurped supreme and absolute authority, paying not the smallest regard to the laws, or even to the external forms of justice.

The licentiate Vaca de Castro, who was at Panama when Bachicao arrived, fled immediately across the isthmus to Nombre de Dios on the Atlantic, where he embarked accompanied by Diego Alvarez de Cueto and Jerom Zurbano. Doctor Texada and Francisco Maldonado escaped likewise to the same port, where they all embarked together for Spain. Texada died on the voyage while passing the Bahamas. On their arrival in Spain, Moldonado and Cueto went directly to Germany, where the emperor Don Carlos then was, where each gave an account of the business with which they were entrusted. Vaca de Castro remained for some time at Tercera in the Azores; whence he went to Lisbon, and afterwards to the court of Spain; alleging that he did not dare to go by way of Seville, on account of the influence in that place of the brothers relations and friends of Juan Tello, whom he had put to death after the defeat of the younger Almagro. On his arrival at court, De Castro was put under arrest in his own house by order of the council of the Indies. He was afterwards brought to trial on a variety of accusations, in the course of which he was kept prisoner for five years in the citadel of Arevalo. He was afterwards removed to a private house in Simanca, from which he was not permitted to go out: And in consequence of a subsequent revolution in the court of Spain, he was allowed to remain a prisoner at large in the city and territory of Valladolid, till his cause was finally adjuged[13].

[Footnote 13: We learn from Garcilasso, that Vara de Castro was in the end honourably acquitted, and that in the year 1461, when Garcilasso was at Madrid, De Castro was senior member of the council of the Indies. His son, Don Antonio, was made knight of St. Jago, and had a grant of lands and Indians in Peru to the extent of 20,000 pieces of eight yearly.--E.]

On the flight of the viceroy from Tumbez with an hundred and fifty men, as before related, in consequence of the arrival of Bachicao, he retired to Quito, where he was honourably received. In this place he increased his force to two hundred men, and finding the country fertile and abounding in provisions, he determined to remain there till he might receive ulterior orders from his majesty, in reply to the informations he had transmitted by Diego Alvarez de Cueto. In the mean time he appointed strong guards to defend the passes in the mountains, and stationed spies on the different roads, that he might have early intimation of the procedure of Gonzalo Pizarro at Lima, which is three hundred leagues from Quito. About this time four soldiers belonging to Gonzalo deserted on account of some injurious treatment, and seized a small bark in the port of Lima, in which they sailed northwards to a place where they landed, and whence they travelled by land to Quito. On their arrival, they represented to the viceroy, that the inhabitants of Lima and other places were exceedingly discontented by the conduct of Gonzalo, who subjected them to the most harassing and vexatious tyranny, driving them from their houses, and despoiling them of their goods, so that many of the colonists were reduced to depend on other persons for their subsistence. That Gonzalo imposed such burthensome contributions on the whole inhabitants, that they were unable to endure them; and that all were so weary of his tyranny, that they would gladly join any person who might come among them in the name of the king, to relieve them from the cruel oppression and tyrannous violence of the usurper. In consequence of this statement, the viceroy was induced to march from Quito towards San Miguel, appointing to the command of his troops one Diego de Occampo, an inhabitant of Quito, who had joined him on his arrival at Tumbez, and had expended large sums in his service from his own private fortune.

The licentiate Alvarez always accompanied the viceroy, and these two established themselves as the court of royal audience, in virtue of a commission from his majesty which the viceroy still held. By this royal order, the viceroy was authorised after his arrival at Lima, to hold audience in conjunction with two or one of the oydors who might first arrive, or even in case that any two or three of them should chance to die. In pursuance of this authority, the viceroy ordered a new seal to be made, which he committed to the custody of Juan de Leon, alcalde or police judge of Lima, who had been nominated by the Marquis of Camarosa, grand-chancellor of the Indies, as his deputy or chancellor of the audience of Lima. De Leon had fled from Gonzalo Pizarro, and had joined the viceroy at Quito. In consequence of this arrangement, the viceroy issued such orders and proclamations as seemed needful or expedient, in the name of the emperor Don Carlos; authenticating them with the royal seal, and by the signatures of himself and the licentiate Alvarez. By these means there were two royal audiences in Peru, one at the city of Lima, and the other wherever the viceroy happened to reside; so that it frequently happened that two opposite and contradictory decrees were pronounced and promulgated, in one and the same cause.

On taking the resolution of marching from Quito, the viceroy sent his brother-in-law, Diego Alvarez de Cueto, to inform his majesty of the state of affairs, and to solicit such reinforcements as might enable him to re-establish his authority in Peru, by waging war against Gonzalo Pizarro. Cueto went accordingly to Spain in the same fleet with Vaca de Castro and Texada, as already related. The viceroy advanced southwards to San Miguel, which is an hundred and fifty leagues from Quito, determining to remain at that place till he might receive farther orders from his majesty. The inhabitants of San Miguel gave him the best reception in their power, and furnished him as far as they were able with every thing he was in want of. He continually kept his small army on foot, to preserve the honour and reputation of his character as viceroy, and that he might be in a convenient situation for receiving such reinforcements as might come from Spain or from any of the American colonies; as every one coming by land from these quarters must necessarily pass by the way of San Miguel, especially if accompanied by horses or beasts of burthen. He expected therefore to be able in this place to collect reinforcements to his army, so as to be in condition to renew the war, and employed himself to collect men, horses, and arms, so that he was soon at the head of five hundred men, tolerably equipped. Some of these indeed were in want of defensive armour, which they endeavoured to supply by fabricating cuirasses of iron, and of hard leather.

At the time when Gonzalo Pizarro sent Bachicao with the brigantines to get possession of the ships belonging to the viceroy, he dispatched Gonzalo Diaz de Pinera and Jerom de Villegas to collect the soldiers who dwelt in Truxillo and San Miguel, that they might make head against the viceroy in the north of Peru. These officers remained in San Miguel with about eighty men whom they had drawn to their party, till they heard of the approach of the viceroy; on which, not being in sufficient force to oppose him, they retreated towards Truxillo, and established themselves in the province of Collique, about forty leagues[14] from San Miguel. From thence they sent intimation to Gonzalo of the advance of the viceroy, and that his army increased daily in numbers, insomuch that it behoved him to think of some appropriate measures to avert the threatened danger. Diaz and Villegas were likewise informed that the viceroy had sent Juan de Pereira, one of his officers, into the province of Chachapoyas, in which there were very few Spanish settlers, to endeavour to collect reinforcements. As they believed that Pereira and his followers entertained no suspicions of their being in the neighbourhood, Diaz and Villegas determined on attempting to surprize them, which they did so effectually one night, that they made the whole party prisoners without resistance. Having beheaded Pereira and two of his principal followers, they obliged the rest of the party, about sixty horsemen, to enter into the service of Gonzalo, by threats of putting them all to death if they refused; after which they returned to their post.

[Footnote 14: The distance in the text is probably a mistake for fourteen leagues, as about that distance to the S.E. of San Miguel there is a river named Chola, which may have given name to the district or valley in which it runs.--E.]

The viceroy was greatly incensed by this untoward event, and determined to seek an opportunity of revenge. With this view he departed secretly from San Miguel with a body of an hundred and fifty horse, and took such judicious measures that he arrived one night undiscovered at Collique, where he surprized the enemy, and obliged them to fly in all directions. Diaz made his escape almost alone into a district inhabited by hostile Indians, who assailed him and put him to death. Villegas and Ferdinand Alvarado were more fortunate in their escape, as they were able to collect some of their dispersed troops, with whom they took up a new and more secure position not far from Truxillo, and at a safer distance from San Miguel.

As Gonzalo Pizarro was informed that the viceroy augmented his army from time to time, more especially after this successful enterprize, he resolved to march against him without delay; as hardly a day passed in which the viceroy was not joined by soldiers, horses, and arms from Spain, or some of the American colonies, all of which were landed at the port of Tumbez. He was likewise in dread lest some dispatch might arrive from the emperor, favourable to the viceroy, by which his own adherents might be intimidated, and numbers might be induced to change sides. With this view he assembled his army, determined to march in person against the viceroy, and if possible to bring him to action. He issued therefore the proper orders to all his officers, reviewed and mustered his troops, advanced them the necessary funds for taking the field, and sent off the baggage, artillery, ammunition and provisions, with the main body of the army towards Truxillo, remaining behind at Lima with some of his principal officers, to follow in proper time. About this time a vessel arrived from Arequipa with a very seasonable supply of 100,000 crowns; and another vessel from Tierra Firma, belonging to Gonzalo Martel, sent by his wife to enable him to return home. The arrival of these two vessels was very opportune for Gonzalo Pizarro, as they served to transport great quantities of musquets, pikes, ammunition, and other implements of war, together with a guard of an hundred and fifty men, and greatly facilitated the intended expedition against the viceroy.

On quitting Lima, Gonzalo Pizarro thought proper to take the oydor Cepeda and Juan de Caceres the accountant-general along with him, both to give the more eclat and appearance of legal authority to his measures, and on purpose to break up the court of royal audience, as Ortiz de Zarate would then be the only judge remaining at Lima, who was not thought of much importance, as he was in bad health. Besides, Blas de Soto, his brother, had married the daughter of that judge; and although that marriage had been effected contrary to the wish of Ortiz, it was considered as some tie upon his conduct. For greater security, however, Gonzalo used the precaution of carrying the royal seal along with him. Gonzalo Pizarro chose to go by sea; and on leaving Lima, he appointed Lorenzo de Aldana as lieutenant-governor of that city, with a garrison of eighty soldiers, to preserve tranquillity during his absence. This small number was considered sufficient to prevent any attempt towards a revolutionary movement, as most of the inhabitants of Lima accompanied the expedition. Gonzalo embarked in March 1545, and landed at the port of Santa, fifteen leagues south from Truxillo, at which city he arrived on Palm Sunday. He remained at this place for some time, waiting the junction of his troops, sending messages in various directions to expedite their march. After some time, he marched from Truxillo into the province of Collique, where the whole of his army assembled. At this place he reviewed his army, which amounted to above six hundred horse and foot. The troops under the viceroy were nearly as numerous; but those under Gonzalo were much better armed, and better supplied with every thing requisite for war, as well as being all veteran soldiers, accustomed to war and discipline, and well acquainted with all the difficult passes of the country. The troops of the viceroy on the contrary, had for the most part come recently from Spain, were quite unaccustomed to war, and ill armed; besides which their powder was bad in quality.

Gonzalo used every effort to collect provisions and all kinds of necessaries for his army, more especially as he had to pass through a desert country which intervened between the province of Motupe[15] and the city of San Miguel, a distance of twenty-two leagues without any inhabitants, and entirely destitute of water or other means of refreshment, consisting every where of burning sands without shelter from the heat of the sun and almost under the equinoctial line. As this march was necessarily attended with much inconvenience and difficulty, Gonzalo used every proper precaution that his troops might be supplied abundantly with water and other necessaries. For this purpose all the neighbouring Indians were ordered to bring a prodigious quantity of jars and other vessels calculated to contain water. The soldiers were ordered to leave at Motupe all their clothes and baggage of which they were not in immediate want, which were to be brought forward by the Indians. Above all things, it was taken care that a sufficiency of water should accompany the army, both for the troops, and for the horses and other animals. Every thing being in readiness, Gonzalo sent forwards a party of twenty-five horsemen by the ordinary road through the desert, that they might be observed by the scouts belonging to the viceroy, and that he might be led to believe the army came in that direction. He then took a different route through the same desert with the army, marching as expeditiously as possible, every soldier being ordered to carry his provisions along with him on his horse. By these precautions, and the rapidity of the march, the viceroy was not informed of the approach of Gonzalo and his army, till they were very near San Miguel. Immediately on learning their approach, he sounded the alarm, giving out that he intended to meet and give battle to the insurgents; but as soon as his army was drawn out from the city, he took a quite opposite course, directing his march with all possible expedition towards the mountain of Caxas.

[Footnote 15: Named Morrope in modern maps. The desert in the text is of great extent, reaching from the river Leche to the Piura, a distance of above eighty English miles.]

Gonzalo Pizarro got notice of the retreat of the viceroy about four hours afterwards, in consequence of which he made no halt at San Miguel, except to procure guides to direct him in the road which the viceroy had taken. In the first night of this pursuit, the army of Gonzalo marched eight Spanish leagues, or near thirty English miles, and several of the royalists who had lagged behind the rest, together with the whole baggage belonging to the retreating army fell into his hands. Gonzalo hanged such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and continued the pursuit of the flying royalists with the utmost diligence, through difficult and almost impracticable roads, where no provisions could be procured, always coming up with some of the hindmost of the enemy. Gonzalo likewise sent on several Indians with letters to the principal officers who served under the viceroy, urging them to put him to death, and offering them their pardons for the past and to give them high rewards. He continued the pursuit above fifty leagues or two hundred miles, till at length the horses were no longer able to carry their riders, and the men were incapable of proceeding, both from excessive fatigue and by the failure of provisions. The insurgent army at length arrived at Ayabaca[16], where the hot pursuit of the viceroy was discontinued, and the troops of Gonzalo halted for rest and refreshment. Besides the difficulty of overtaking the royalists, Gonzalo had received assurances from some of the principal followers of the viceroy that they would either put him to death, or deliver him up as a prisoner; and, as this came afterwards to the knowledge of the viceroy, he put several of these officers and gentlemen of his army to death. After Gonzalo had supplied his army with such provisions as could be furnished at Ayabaca, he resumed the pursuit, but with less rapidity than before, and keeping his army always in compact order; yet at this time some of his troops remained behind, partly owing to extreme fatigue, and partly from discontent. Leaving the viceroy to continue his retreat to Quito, and Gonzalo in pursuit, it is proper to mention some events that occurred at this time in other parts of Peru.

[Footnote 16: Notwithstanding the distance mentioned in the text, Ayabaca is only about 60 miles, or fifteen Spanish leagues in a straight line N.N.E. from San Miguel.--E.]

In this march, Gonzalo did not think proper to carry along with his army any of the soldiers belonging to the viceroy whom he had taken during the pursuit, both because he could not confide in them, because he had already a sufficient force in proportion to the enemy, and because provisions were very difficult to be procured, as the viceroy had stripped every place through which he passed as much as possible. For this reason, Gonzalo Pizarro sent back all his prisoners to Truxillo, Lima, or such other places as they thought proper, having in the first place put to death such of their chiefs as he considered most strongly attached to the viceroy. As these soldiers were dispersed over several parts of the country, they began to declaim in favour of the viceroy and against the tyrannical conduct of Gonzalo, and found many persons abundantly disposed to listen to their harangues; both because what they alleged was true in itself, and because most of the Spanish inhabitants of Peru were much inclined to revolution and change of party, especially the soldiery and those who were lazy and unoccupied. The real settlers and principal inhabitants of the cities were quite of an opposite description, being friends of peace and order, as most conducive to their interest and happiness, and necessary to the preservation of their properties, and being more exposed in time of civil war than even the soldiers to be harassed and tormented in many ways, as the ruling party was apt on the slightest pretexts to put them to death on purpose to seize their effects, with which to gratify and reward the partizans of their tyranny and injustice. These seditious discourses were so openly indulged in, that they reached the knowledge of the lieutenants of Gonzalo; who, each in his peculiar jurisdiction, punished the authors as they deemed right. At Lima, to which most of these prisoners had gone, Pedro Martin de Cecilia the provost marshal was a violent partizan of Gonzalo, and caused several of these malecontents to be hanged. Lorenzo de Aldana, who had been left by Gonzalo as lieutenant-governor of Lima, was a prudent man, and conducted himself in a quite different manner, being disinclined from acting with such violence as might occasion displeasure to either party in the sequel; for which reason he used all his influence to prevent putting any one to death, or from injuring any person in any manner. Although he held his office from Gonzalo, he never exerted himself zealously in his service, so that the partizans of that usurper considered him as secretly gained by the other party, more especially as he always behaved well to the known friends of the viceroy. On this account, all these men flocked to Lima, where they believed themselves in greater security than anywhere else. The partizans of Gonzalo, on the other hand, made loud complaints against the favourable behaviour of Aldana to the royalists; and in particular one of the alcaldes of Lima, named Christopher de Burgos, spoke of it so openly that Aldana thought it necessary to give him a public reprimand, and even committed him to prison for some time. Several even went so far as to communicate their suspicions of the fidelity of Aldana to Gonzalo Pizarro by letters, and even persuaded him of the truth of their allegations: But he refrained from manifesting his want of confidence in the lieutenant-governor, considering it dangerous to deprive him of his office while the army was at so great a distance, more especially as Aldana had a respectable military force, and was much esteemed by the citizens of Lima.

We have formerly mentioned that several inhabitants of the city of La Plata in the province of Las Charcas, on receiving orders to that effect from the viceroy, had set out from that city on purpose to offer him their services against Gonzalo; but having learnt his imprisonment while on their way to Lima, they returned to their habitations. Gonzalo Pizarro was particularly displeased with these men, as he expected to have been especially favoured by the inhabitants of his own peculiar district, and sent therefore a person named Francisco de Almendras as lieutenant-governor to La Plata, a coarse brutal fellow without feeling or humanity, and one of the most cruel satellites of his tyrannical usurpation; whom he instructed to be peculiarly watchful of the behaviour of those who had shewn an intention of joining the viceroy, and to make them feel on every opportunity how much he was dissatisfied with their conduct on that occasion. In pursuance of his instructions, Almendras deprived the principal persons among these loyalists of their lands and Indians, and exacted heavy contributions from them towards defraying the expences of the war. He likewise affronted and used them ill on all occasions, and even on very frivolous pretences. One Don Gomez de Luna, a principal person among the loyalists of La Plata, happened one day to observe in conversation at his own house, that the emperor Don Carlos must assuredly at length recover the command over Peru. This loyal sentiment was reported to Almendras, who immediately ordered De Luna to be arrested and thrown into the common prison. The magistrates of the city went in a body to supplicate Almendras either to liberate De Luna, or at least to confine him in a place more conformable to his rank; and as Almendras refused to give a satisfactory answer to their representation, one of the magistrates declared publicly, that, if he would not liberate de Luna, they would do so in spite of him. Almendras dissembled his sentiments at the time, but went next night to the prison, whence he caused De Luna to be taken out to the public square and beheaded.

The inhabitants of the city were exceedingly disgusted by this cruel act of tyranny, which they considered as an outrage against the whole community; and particularly one Diego Centeno was most sensibly affected, as he and De Luna had been extremely intimate. At the commencement of the troubles respecting the obnoxious regulations, Centeno had attached himself to Gonzalo Pizarro, whom he had accompanied to Cuzco, in the capacity of procurator from the province of Las Charcas, being one of the principal persons of his party. Having noticed the bad intentions of Pizarro, and that he did not limit his designs to those objects which he at first proposed, Centeno abandoned the party of Gonzalo and returned to his own house. He now determined to use his utmost endeavours to revenge the cruel death of his friend De Luna, that he might save himself and others from the tyrannous rule of Almendras, and on purpose to restore the country to obedience to its legitimate sovereign. With this view, he communicated his sentiments to some of the principal settlers, among whom were Lopez de Mendoza, Alfonso Perez de Esquivel, Alfonzo de Camargo, Fernando Nunnez de Segura, Lopez de Mendiera, Juan Ortiz de Zarate, and several others whom he believed to have loyal intentions, all of whom he found disposed to second him in executing the enterprize which he had in view. In the prosecution of this purpose, they all assembled one Sunday morning, according to custom, at the house of Almendras, under pretence of accompanying him to church. When all were assembled, although Almendras had a considerable guard, Ceuteno went up to him as if to converse on some affair of moment, and stabbed him repeatedly with his dagger. The conspirators then dragged him out to the public square and cut off his head, declaring him a traitor, and proclaiming that they had done so for the service of the king.

Considering that Almendras was universally detested, the conspirators had not thought it necessary to use any precautions for conciliating the people; yet all the inhabitants declared for the king, and took immediate measures to support his authority and to defend themselves against the resentment of Gonzalo and the insurgents. For this purpose, they elected Centeno as commander in chief of the province; in which capacity he appointed proper persons to be captains of cavalry and infantry under his authority, and used every effort to inlist a body of troops, which he paid out of his own funds, being one of the richest men in the country; but in this he was assisted by the other inhabitants of the province, who contributed towards the expence. Centeno was of an honourable family, being descended from Hernan Centeno who had made himself illustrious in the wars of Castillo. He was about thirty-five years of age, of very agreeable manners, of a liberal disposition, personally brave, of an excellent character and universally respected. At this time he enjoyed a revenue exceeding 80,000 crowns; but about two years afterwards, on the discovery of the famous mines of Potosi, he became possessed of above 100,000 crowns of annual rent by means of his Indians, as his estate lay very near these mines.

Having assembled a body of troops, Centeno used every effort to provide them with arms and all other necessary equipments. He placed guards at all the passes, to prevent any intelligence from being conveyed to the enemy till his affairs were in proper order. He sent likewise Lopez de Mendoza one of his captains, first to Porco and thence to Arequipa to collect as many men as possible, and to endeavour to arrest Pedro do Puentes the lieutenant of Gonzalo at Arequipa. But Puentes fled immediately from Arequipa on receiving intelligence of the events which had occurred at Las Charcas. Mendoza therefore took possession of Arequipa without resistance; whence he reinforced himself with all the men, arms, and horses, he could procure, and carried off all the money he could find, with which and his reinforcement he returned to Centeno at La Plata.

On the return of Mendoza, Centeno found himself at the head of two hundred and fifty men well equipped for war, to whom he explained his sentiments and views, and gave an account of the criminal usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, in the following terms. "You know that Gonzalo, on leaving Cuzco, pretended merely to present the humble remonstrances of the colonists respecting the obnoxious regulations; and you have been informed that, even at the outset, he put to death Gaspard de Roias, Philip Gutierrez, and Arias Maldonado. You have learnt how he conspired with the judges of the royal audience and other inhabitants of Lima, to arrest and depose the viceroy, both of which were done accordingly. After this, while at the very gates of Lima, and before his public entry into that city, he sent in his lieutenant-general, who arrested many of the most considerable and richest inhabitants of the country, under the eyes of the judges, merely because these men had joined the viceroy, and even hanged three of them without any form of trial, Pedro de Barco, Martin de Florencia, and Juan Saavedra. He in the next place has broken up the royal court of audience, sending off its judges to different places, having in the first place obliged them to appoint him to the government. He has since, as you well know, caused many others to be put to death, merely on suspicion that they were favourable to the viceroy, and intended to join his party. Not satisfied with all this, he has seized all the treasure belonging to his majesty in the different receipts of the colony, and has imposed excessive contributions on the inhabitants, from whom he has exacted above 150,000 ducats by means of taxes imposed at his own pleasure. Adding crime to crime, he has again levied forces against the authority of his majesty, with which he has marched against the viceroy, and has carried insubordination and confusion into every part of the country; permitting and encouraging many to hold public discourse contrary to the respect and obedience which is due to his majesty. They were likewise aware, that Gonzalo had token away the repartimientos, or allotments of lands and Indians from many persons, and had converted them to his own emolument. Finally, he laid before them the strong obligations by which they were all bound, as faithful subjects, to exert their utmost endeavours in the service of their sovereign, lest they should draw upon themselves the imputation of being rebels and traitors." By these representations, and others which it were tedious to repeat, he disposed his auditors to concur in his loyal sentiments, and willingly to obey his orders. After this, Centeno sent one of his captains with a detachment to Chicuito, a place belonging particularly to the king, between Orcaza and Las Charcas, with orders to guard the passes with the utmost vigilance, till he and the royalists were in full readiness to execute their principal enterprize, as will be related in the sequel.

Notwithstanding every precaution employed by Centeno to conceal his operations and intentions, it was impossible to prevent intelligence from spreading in various directions, more especially after the expedition of Mendoza to Arequipa. Every thing he had already done, even the number of his troops, and of the musquets and horses he had collected, was fully known, by means of Indians and Spaniards who had escaped from La Plata, in spite of the guards which had been set, to watch the passes of the mountains. Alfonso de Toro, who acted as lieutenant governor of Cuzco under Gonzalo Pizarro, happened at this time to be a hundred leagues to the northward of that city, keeping guard in one of the passes of the mountains, as by letters from Gonzalo the viceroy was reported to have gone into the mountainous country, and was supposed to have directed his march by that road toward the south of Peru. On receiving notice of the late revolution at La Plata, De Toro returned in all diligence to Cuzco, where he levied forces to oppose Centeno; and, having assembled the magistrates and principal inhabitants of Cuzco, he informed them of what had occurred at Las Charcas, and as there was a sufficient force in Cuzco to suppress the royalists, he thought it incumbent on him to march to La Plata for that purpose. To gain them over to his purpose, he represented that Centeno had revolted without any just cause, and had usurped authority in Las Charcas for his own private ends, under pretence of serving the king; whereas Gonzalo Pizarro, being actual governor of the kingdom of Peru, ought to be obeyed as such till his majesty sent orders to the contrary. That the revolt of Centeno, being both criminal in itself and contrary to the law, every one was bound to resist him, and to punish his temerity. He recalled to their remembrance, that Gonzalo Pizarro was engaged in serving the general interest of the colonists, to procure the revocation of the obnoxious ordinances, in which common cause he had exposed his fortune and personal safety to every hazard, as it was well known that every inhabitant of Peru would be stripped of his property if the regulations were put in force. That besides the general advantage procured by Gonzalo in setting aside the obnoxious regulations, for which all were infinitely indebted to him, it was obvious that he had not in any respect conducted himself contrary to the royal orders, and had not in any manner set himself against the authority of the sovereign; since, on his arrival at Lima for the purpose of presenting their remonstrances, the judges of the royal audience had already arrested the viceroy and sent him out of the kingdom, of which these judges had appointed Gonzalo interim governor; and that in marching in a warlike manner against the viceroy, he had acted at the request and by the orders of the royal audience; as was manifest by his being accompanied by Cepeda, one of the royal judges and chairman of the audience. He asserted that no person in Peru could take upon him to determine whether the audience had acted right or otherwise in conferring the government on Gonzalo; and that it was the duty of all to support him in that office, till they received the ulterior orders of the sovereign.

At the close of this discourse, every one acknowledged the justice of what he had represented, and voluntarily offered to support Gonzalo with their lives and fortunes; although in reality most of them did so more from fear than good will, as they stood in great awe of De Toro, who had hanged several persons in a summary manner, and had made himself universally dreaded by his cruel and ferocious disposition and conduct, so that no one dared to oppose or contradict him in any thing. After a short deliberation, a set of resolutions were entered into, in which the transactions of Centeno in Las Charcas were recited as seditious and unlawful, and he was declared to have assassinated Francisco de Almendras, the lieutenant governor, to have levied forces in rebellion against the legitimate government, and to have passed the boundaries of the province of Las Charcas in hostile manner; for all which reasons it was just and proper to make war upon him, and to reduce him to obedience. All this was done principally to satisfy or to amuse the people, and to make them believe that the partizans of Gonzalo acted reasonably and lawfully, as all those who signed these resolutions were perfectly aware of the real state of affairs. In reality, although matters were thus represented in the popular assemblages, in justification of the measures of the insurgent party, or at least to excuse their actions under specious pretences, those who took an active part on the present occasion, used often to declare, both in the presence and absence of Gonzalo, that the king would certainly give, or ought to give him the government of Peru, as they were resolved not to receive any other person in that capacity, such being the resolution of Gonzalo in which they all concurred.

Alfonso de Toro now proceeded to levy an army, of which he declared himself captain general and commander in chief, and appointed captains and other officers to command under his authority. In all his proceedings he carried himself with a high hand, employing force and violence, instead of persuasion and good treatment. He protested publickly and with many oaths, that he would hang up every one who did not assist and contribute to the cause; and even had several persons carried to the foot of the gallows, whose lives he was induced to spare by dint of solicitations. He abused and maltreated others, using everyone in the most outrageous manner who did not give way to him in all things. By this violent procedure he completed his warlike preparations at very small expence; insomuch that it appeared afterwards by his accounts, that he had not expended above twenty thousand crowns in this expedition, as he took away gratuitously all the horses that were to be found in Cuzco, and constrained all the inhabitants who were able to carry arms to accompany him in the expedition against Centeno. By these means De Toro collected three hundred men, tolerably armed and equipped, with which he marched from Cuzco to a place named Urcos, about six leagues from that city, where he remained three weeks in anxious expectation of intelligence from Las Charcas: But all the roads and passes between and La Plata, were so well guarded by the Indians, who were entirely disposed to favour Centeno, that he was unable to learn any thing of the movements or intentions of the royalists in Las Charcas, so that he was constrained to remain continually on the alert lest he might have been surprized. Besides these military precautions, he rigorously punished all who presumed to show the slightest disinclination towards the interest of the Pizarrian faction, or to express their sentiments in any respect in disapprobation of his own designs; insomuch that all were constrained from dread of punishment to appear heartily attached to the cause in which he was engaged.

After remaining three weeks encamped at Urcos, he determined to march in search of Centeno, and advanced for that purpose to the village named Del Rey. As the troops of Centeno happened to be a good deal scattered at this time, he was under the necessity of retreating on the approach of De Toro. These hostile chiefs being encamped at the distance of about twelve leagues, entered into a negotiation to endeavour to form an accommodation; but, as they were unable to agree upon any terms, De Toro advanced for the purpose of attacking Centeno; who, on the other hand, was unwilling to risk the chance of an engagement, owing to the inferiority of his force, and because a defeat might have dispirited his own party and have been of great advantage to the cause of the insurgents. On this account he retired in proportion as De Toro advanced, accompanied by a great number of large Peruvian sheep loaded with provisions and ammunition, and carrying along with him all the principal curacas or native chiefs, to prevent De Toro from being able to avail himself of the assistance of the Indians. In this manner Centeno continued to retreat across a desert and uninhabited country of forty leagues extent, till he arrived at a place named Casabindo, through which Diego de Roias had formerly descended from the elevated region of Peru into the eastern plain of the Rio de la Plata. Alfonso de Toro continued the pursuit as far as the city of La Plata, which is an hundred and eighty leagues to the south of Cuzca. Finding that place abandoned and entirely stript of every thing which might contribute to the subsistence of his troops, and being unable to procure provisions on account of the absence of all the curacas or caciques, he was under the necessity to discontinue his pursuit of Centeno, and even found himself compelled to return towards Cuzco. In this retreat, De Toro took the command of the advanced guard of fifty men, ordering the main body to march at leisure, and left a rear-guard of thirty of his best mounted cavalry under Alfonso de Mendoza, with orders to use every possible means of procuring intelligence of the motions of Centeno; that, in case of his following, the troops might be collected together in good order to rejoin the van.

The departure of De Toro from La-Plata on his return to Cuzco was soon communicated to Centeno by means of the Indians. He was astonished at this sudden alteration of affairs; and, as he understood that De Toro marched in great hast, without keeping his troops in close array, he supposed that circumstance to have been occasioned by De Toro entertaining suspicions of the fidelity of his followers, and that he had found them ill-disposed towards the party of the Pizarrians. On these considerations, Centeno resolved to pursue in his turn, in hope of drawing some advantage to the cause in which he was engaged from this measure, and even expecting that several of the followers of Toro might come over to his side. He sent off therefore the captain Lope de Mendoza with fifty light armed cavalry in pursuit of the enemy. Mendoza got in a short time to Collao; and, although de Toro and most of his troops had already passed beyond that place, he made prisoners of about fifty who remained behind, whom at first he deprived of their horses and arms. Soon afterwards, however, he returned these to his prisoners, and even distributed some money among them, receiving their engagements upon oath to join him when required; but he hanged a few of them who were suspected of being particulary attached to De Toro. After this successful exploit, Lope returned in great haste to La Plata, in hope of being able to cut off Alfonzo de Mendoza and his small party, who still occupied that place. But Alfonzo had received intelligence of what had happened at Collao, and had already quitted La Plata in great haste, taking a different road from that pursued by Lope, by which means he got safe to Cuzco.

Centeno arrived soon afterwards at La Plata with the remainder of his troops, where he assembled all the force under his command, and where he made every possible preparation for continuing the war to advantage, and in particular caused a number of musquets to be made. De Toro continued his retreat to Cuzco, dreading much to be pursued, and lest Centeno might have acquired possession of Cuzco, which he might easily have accomplished in the present situation of affairs; but Centeno thought it more prudent to remain at La Plata, where he augmented the number of his troops and collected treasure which was found in great plenty in the province of Las Charcas.

The events which had taken place in Las Charcas were soon known at Lima; and as several of the soldiers in that city were attached to the party of the viceroy, they spoke almost openly of going away to join Centeno; and, from the small attention paid by Lorenzo de Aldana to repress these men, he was even suspected of favouring the same cause. Antonio de Ribera likewise, although the brother-in-law of Pizarro, was strongly suspected of being secretly devoted to the royal interest, as indeed his conduct in the sequel evinced; and several other persons of consideration lay under suspicions of the same nature. All this gave much uneasiness to the friends of Pizarro: Yet those persons at Lima who wished well to the interests of his majesty, did not think it prudent at this time to make any open attempt, being satisfied that it was better to wait a more favourable opportunity, and that De Aldana would prepare matters for that purpose, as he seemed clearly favourable to the same cause. His abilities were universally acknowledged, and his good intentions were not doubted, so that all were satisfied that he would conduct matters with much prudence to a favourable issue.

At this time it became known at Lima that the viceroy had retreated with a small body of troops into the province of Popayan; and that during his retreat he had put to death several of the officers and other persons of consideration in his army; among whom were Rodrigo de Ocampo, Jerom de la Cerna, Gaspard Gil Olivarez and Gomez Estacio; some of these because they were inclined to abandon him, and others for corresponding with Gonzalo Pizarro, and conspiring to put the viceroy to death. On the communication of this intelligence at Lima, it produced different effects according to the different inclinations and views of the inhabitants. It occasioned more reserve among those who were of loyal dispositions; whereas the partizans of the Pizarrian tyranny considered themselves more at liberty to avow their sentiments to Aldana. They went therefore to him in a body, and represented that there were many persons in Lima who were strongly suspected of being hostile to Gonzalo Pizarro, and only waited a favourable opportunity to take up arms against him; and that it was incumbent therefore on the lieutenant governor to punish these men for the scandalous freedoms in which they had indulged, or at least to banish them from the city. They offered to furnish sufficient proof of these facts, and urged him to exert his authority on the occasion. Aldana assured them that none of these things had ever come to his knowledge; and that if he knew who those were against whom they complained, he would take such measures as were necessary on the occasion.

The partizans of Pizarro became at length so bold that they arrested fifteen of those whom they most strongly suspected of attachment to the deposed viceroy, among whom was Diego Lopez de Zuniga. Having thrown these men into prison, the Pizarrians were inclined to have given them the torture to extort confession, and afterwards to have procured their condemnation by Pedro Martin the provost marshal of the city; so that they were in imminent danger of being put to death, if Lorenzo de Aldana had not exerted himself promptly and effectually to take them out of the hands of the Pizarrians. For this purpose, he caused them all to be brought to his own residence, on pretence that they would be there in more safe custody, and provided them with every thing of which they stood in need, even secretly furnishing them with a vessel in which they embarked and saved themselves from their enemies. This transaction gave much dissatisfaction to the friends of Pizarro, both on account of the escape of the prisoners, and because Aldana refused to allow of any formal investigation into the circumstances of their escape; on which account the Pizarrians firmly believed that Aldana was in secret league with the opposite party. They wrote therefore to Gonzalo Pizarro, giving him an account of all these events, and urging him to give proper orders on the occasion. But Gonzalo did not think it prudent at this time to make any change in affairs at Lima, or to attempt any thing against Aldana; because, as it has been reported, he was afraid of matters taking an unfavourable issue while he was at so great a distance.

When Gonzalo Pizarro was informed of what had been done by Centeno in the province of Las Charcas against his interest and authority, he believed it necessary to use prompt measures for reducing that country to subjection, and not to give his enemies time and opportunity for strengthening themselves and increasing the number of their partizans; as he flattered himself that he would become absolute master of the whole kingdom of Peru, if he were able to get rid of Centeno. After several consultations with the principal officers of his army, on the measures necessary to be pursued on this emergency, in which Gonzalo could not act in person as he had still to oppose the viceroy in the north, it was determined to confide the care of an expedition against Centeno to the lieutenant-general Carvajal. For this purpose all the necessary orders and commissions were made out immediately in the name of Gonzalo Pizarro, by which Carvajal was authorized to levy what men and money he might deem necessary. This employment was very acceptable to Carvajal, as he believed he might derive considerable profit to himself in its execution; and he set out from Quito accompanied only by twenty persons, in whom he had great confidence. The council of Gonzalo Pizarro had other and secret motives for recommending the employment of Carvajal on this occasion, besides those which they publickly avowed. Some were desirous of acquiring by his absence a greater share in the management of affairs; while others were anxious to send him to a distance, from the terror inspired by his cruel and ferocious conduct, and his passionate temper, owing to which he used often to put people to death on the most trifling offences or the slightest suspicions. But all the leaders in the army disguised their real sentiments on this occasion, pretending that the importance of the affair required the talents and experience of Carvajal to bring it to a successful issue.

Leaving Quito, Carvajal went, directly to San Miguel, where the principal inhabitants went out to meet him, and conducted him with much respect to the house which was prepared for his reception. On arriving there, he desired six of the most considerable persons belonging to the city to dismount and accompany him into the house, under pretence that he had something of importance to communicate to them from the governor. Having caused the doors to be shut, and posted centinels to prevent any communication with the rest of the inhabitants, he represented to these men, that Gonzalo was much incensed against them for having always taken part with his enemies, and more especially on account of having received and favoured the deposed viceroy, and of having readily supplied his army with every thing of which they stood in need. On this account it had been his first intention to have destroyed the city with fire and sword, without sparing a single inhabitant. But, on reflecting that the magistrates and principal inhabitants only were to blame, the people at large having been constrained by force or fear, he was now determined to punish only the most guilty and to pardon the rest. Yet, having certain private reasons for dissembling for the present with some of the principal persons of the place, he had selected the six who were now present, as principal inhabitants, to punish them as they richly deserved, that they might serve as a warning to all Peru. For this reason, therefore, he desired them to confess their sins in preparation for death, as he was resolved to have them all executed immediately.

They used every argument to exculpate themselves from the crimes kid to their charge, but all they could say was without avail; and Carvajal even caused one of them to be strangled, against whom he was particularly incensed, as he had been principally instrumental in constructing the royal seal which the viceroy employed in his dispatches. In the mean time, a rumour of what was going forward at the residence of Carvajal spread over the city, and came to the knowledge of the wives of the prisoners. These ladies immediately implored the priests and monks who dwelt in San Miguel to accompany them to the place where their husbands were in so great danger. They all went there accordingly, and got in by a private door which had not been noticed by the people belonging to Carvajal, and which had consequently been omitted to be guarded. Coming into the presence of Carvajal, the wives of the prisoners threw themselves at his feet, and implored mercy for their husbands. He pretended to be softened, and granted pardon to the prisoners, so far as their lives; yet reserving to himself to punish them in such other manner as he might see fit. Accordingly, he banished them from the province, depriving them of their lands and Indians, and condemned them in the payment of heavy fines towards defraying the expences of the war.

From San Miguel Carvajal went to Truxillo, collecting every where on his route all the soldiers, horses, arms, and money he could find. Carvajal had resolved to have put one Melchior Verdugo to death, who dwelt in Truxillo; but as Verdugo got intimation of this intention, he fled to the province of Caxamarca, where his repartimiento of Indians was situated. The bussiness on which Carvajal was engaged was of too great importance to admit of pursuing Verdugo; wherefore, after having got possession of as much money as possible under pretence of a loan, he went on to Lima, always collecting all the soldiers he could procure. He gave no money to his recruits, only supplying them with horses and arms, which he took wherever they could be found. He kept all the money he could find for his own use, every where pillaging the royal coffers and public funds, and even searching for treasure among the ancient tombs. After arriving at Lima, he completed his military preparations, and departed for Cuzco by way of the mountain and the city of Guamanga, at the head of two hundred men well equipped, and carrying with him a great sum of money which he had collected during his march; and at Guamanga he conducted himself in the same rapacious manner as in other places.

Seven or eight days after the departure of Carvajal from Lima, a conspiracy was detected among those who were well affected to the royal cause, in consequence of which fifteen of the principal persons of that city were committed to prison. Among these were, Juan Velasquez, Vela Nunnez nephew to the viceroy, Francisco Giron another gentlemen of his household, and Francisco Rodriguez. By means of the torture, these unhappy persons were made to confess that they had concerted with Pedro Manxarres, an inhabitant of Las Charcas, to kill the lieutenant-governor Aldana, the provost marshall Pedro Martin, and other friends and partizans of Gonzalo Pizarro, after which they proposed to induce the citizens of Lima to declare for his majesty, confidently expecting that all those who now followed Carvajal by constraint would join their party; and they intended finally to have gone off with all the strength they could muster to join Centeno. Upon this forced confession, Giron and one other of these prisoners were strangled. By the intercession of several respectable persons the life of Juan Velasquez was spared, but his right hand was cut off. All the rest of these prisoners were so severely tortured that they continued lame for the rest of their lives. Manxarres saved himself by flight, and continued to conceal himself among the mountains for more than a year; but fell at last into the hands of one of the officers in the interest of Gonzalo, who caused him to be hanged.

As Pedro Martin, the provost-marshal, strongly suspected that some of those who accompanied Carvajal had participated in this plot; he endeavoured to discover this by torturing Francisco de Guzman, one of the prisoners. Finding that Guzman made no confession on this head, he interrogated him particularly respecting a soldier along with Carvajal named Perucho de Aguira, and some of his friends, demanding to know whether these men were in the secret. On purpose to free himself from the torture, Guzman said they were. After this confession, Guzman was formally condemned to become a monk in the convent belonging to the order of mercy, in which he accordingly assumed the habit. After this, Martin demanded from the registrar a certificate of the confession of Guzman, by which Aguira and others were implicated in the plot, and Martin immediately sent off this writing by an Indian messenger to Carvajal who was then at Guamanga. On the receipt of this paper, Carvajal ordered Aguira and five others to be hanged, without any further proof or examination. A short time afterwards, the registrar being sensible of the error he had committed in supplying the certificate, sent off a full copy of the confession made by Guzman, in which was an ample revocation of all he had said under torture, declaring that he had falsely charged Aguira and the others, merely to get free from torture. This was however of no avail, as it arrived too late, Aguira and the others having been already executed, although they asserted their innocence to the last moment of their lives, as was certified by the confessors who attended them at their execution; but Carvajal was inexorable.

Learning while at Guamanga, that Centeno had retired through the desert to Casabindo as he was unable to cope with Toro, Carvajal was satisfied that the affaire of the insurgent party were in a fair train in Las Charcas, where his presence was not now needed, and determined therefore to return to Lima. He was besides induced to take this step in consequence of a difference which subsisted between Toro and himself, occasioned by the charge of lieutenant general under Gonzalo having originally belonged to Toro, of which he had been deprived in favour of Carvajal. He feared therefore, lest Toro, on his victorious return from Las Charcas, being at the head of a much stronger force, might renew their former quarrel. Carvajal had likewise received letters from some inhabitants of Lima, remarking the lukewarmness of Aldana to the cause of Gonzalo Pizarro, and requesting his presence to place affairs at that city on a more secure footing. He returned therefore to Lima; but learning shortly afterwards the successful return of Centeno against De Toro, he again collected his troops and prepared to march against Centeno. With this view, he had his standards solemnly consecrated, not forgetting to impose fresh exactions on the inhabitants of Lima. On this occasion, he designated his army, The happy army of Liberty, against the Tyrant Centeno.

Before leaving Lima, he sent off messengers to Cuzco by way of the mountain, but chose to march by the route of the plain or low country of Peru to Arequipa, exacting money from the inhabitants wherever he passed. At Arequipa he received letters from the magistrates of Cuzco and De Toro, earnestly requesting his immediate presence in that city; whence, as being the capital of the kingdom, it was proper that the army should march against the rebels. They assured him of being there provided with considerable reinforcements of men arms and horses, and that all the principal persons of the city were ready to accompany him on the expedition: adding, that being himself a citizen of Cuzco it seemed reasonable he should honour that city by his presence. By these and other considerations he was induced to march for Cuzco, though still entertaining some distrust and even fear of Toro, who he was informed had often spoken against him in his absence. When De Toro was informed of the approach of Carvajal to Cuzco, he made every necessary preparation for reinforcing the army, and providing for the intended expedition against Centeno; yet could not conceal his dissatisfaction, that he who had begun the war, and had already suffered great fatigues, and even had gained material advantages, should be superseded by another commander whom he must now obey, and more especially that it should be Carvajal who was put over him, with whom he had been already engaged in disputes. He dissembled however as much as possible, and concealed his resentment, saying publickly that his only wish was for the fortunate management of affairs, whoever might command. Yet with all his caution, he could not so carefully conceal his sentiments, but that he occasionally dropped expressions of resentment.

The discontent of De Toro was well known to the inhabitants of Cuzco, yet they were in hopes that Carvajal would set every thing to rights on his arrival. Carvajal having arrived in the neighbourhood of the city, which he was to enter next day at the head of two hundred men, part cavalry and part musqueteers, De Toro was very anxious to muster all that were able to carry arms; and from this measure, and the precautions he took that every one should be in the most perfect equipment, and the troops steady in their ranks, it was suspected that he entertained some evil design. De Toro was thus posted with his troops, as if in ambush, in the way by which Carvajal had to march into the city. As these circumstances were made known to Carvajal, he ordered his troops to march in close array, and even ordered their arms to be loaded with ball, prepared for whatever might happen. On entering the city, De Toro and his troops were seen on one side, as if ready to dispute the passage. Carvajal halted his men, and the two parties remained for some time observing each other with mutual distrust. At length, as neither side seemed inclined to commence hostilities, both parties broke their ranks, and intermingled as friends.

Carvajal was exceedingly irritated against De Toro for his conduct on this occasion, but dissembled till he had entered into Cuzco, where he was received in the most honourable manner. A few days afterwards, he caused four of the principal inhabitants to be arrested, and ordered them to instant execution, without consulting De Toro, or even assigning any reason for this cruel and arbitrary proceeding. Some of those whom he put to death were among the most intimate friends of De Toro, who deemed it prudent and necessary to be silent on the occasion. The unexpected cruelty of Carvajal occasioned much astonishment and consternation among the inhabitants of Cuzco, insomuch that none of them dared to refuse accompanying him on the expedition, and he was enabled to leave Cuzco at the head of three hundred well appointed soldiers with which he marched by Collao in the way towards the province of Las Charcas in search of Centeno. As the latter had a considerably stronger force, it was believed by many that Carvajal would be unsuccessful in this expedition, more especially as most of his followers acted more from force than good will, because he allowed them no pay and treated them with much severity. In his whole conduct and deportment Carvajal acted in a brutal and passionate manner, evincing himself on all occasions the enemy of good men; for he was a bad Christian, constantly addicted to blasphemy, and of a cruel and tyrannical disposition, insomuch that it was generally expected his own people would put him to death to rid themselves of his tyrannous and oppressive conduct. Besides all this, it was obvious to many, that right and justice were on the side of Centeno, who was a man of honour and probity, and, being exceedingly rich, had both the power and inclination to reward his followers. It is necessary to quit Carvajal and his expedition for the present, that we may relate the events which took place at Quito.

We have already mentioned that Gonzalo Pizarro pursued the viceroy from San Miguel to Quito, a distance of 150 leagues or 600 miles, with much perseverance and rapidity, insomuch that almost every day the light armed men belonging to the two armies had opportunities of speaking with each other. During the whole of that long march, neither party had an opportunity to unsaddle their horses. Those belonging to the viceroy, owing to the necessity they were under of escaping from a force so much superior, were even more alert than their pursuers. When at any time they stopped to take a short rest during the night, they slept on the ground in their clothes, holding their horses by the halters, without wasting time in fixing up piquets, or making any of the usual preparations for accommodating themselves and horses during the night. It is true that piquets are seldom used in the sands of Peru for the horses, as it would be necessary to drive these very deep to take sufficient hold; and as there are no trees to be met with in many parts of that country for making piquets, necessity has introduced a substitute in some measure equivalent: For this purpose each horseman has a small bag, which he fills with sand and burries in a hole of sufficient depth, having one end of the halter fixed to the bag, the hole being afterwards filled up and pressed well down to prevent the bag from being drawn up by the efforts of the horse. But on this urgent occasion, the troops of the viceroy did not take time for this measure, but held the halters in their hands, that they might be ready to mount and set out the moment it was necessary by the approach of their pursuers.

In this long march, both the pursuers and the pursued suffered exceedingly from want of provisions; more especially the Pizarrians, as the viceroy used the precaution of removing the curacas and Indians from all the country through which he passed, that his enemy might find every part of the country deserted and unprovided with any means of subsistence. During this precipitate retreat, the viceroy carried along with him eight or ten of the best horses he had been able to procure, which were led by Indians for his own particular use; and when any of these became so tired as to be unable to proceed, he ordered them to be hamstrung, to prevent them from being useful to the enemy. While on this march in pursuit of the viceroy, Gonzalo Pizarro was joined by Captain Bachicao, who now returned from Tierra Firma with a reinforcement of three hundred and fifty men and a large quantity of artillery, having disembarked, from twenty vessels which he had procured, on a part of the coast as near as possible to Quito, and had made his way in such a manner across the mountains that he got to Quito rather before Gonzalo. On the junction of Bachicao, Gonzalo found himself at the head of more than eight hundred men, among whom were many of the principal people in South America, both townsmen or burgesses, planters, and soldiers. Owing to this large reinforcement, Gonzalo Pizarro found himself in such a state of tranquil security at Quito as hardly any usurper or tyrant had ever before enjoyed; as besides that this province abounded in provisions of every kind, several rich mines of gold had been recently discovered; and as most of the principal people of the province were either now along with the viceroy, or had attached themselves to him while at Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro appropriated all their Indians to himself, employing them in the collection of gold. From the Indians belonging to the treasurer, Rodrigo Nunnez de Bonilla, he procured about 800 marks [17] of gold in the course of eight months; besides that there were other repartimientos of greater value, and that he appropriated all the revenues and rights belonging to the crown, and even pillaged the tombs of the ancient sovereigns of Quito in search of treasure.

[Footnote 17: Eight hundred marks of gold, or 6400 ounces, at L.4 an ounce; are worth L.25,600: and at six for one, the value put upon bullion in those days by the Historian of America, are now worth at least L.153,600, perhaps a quarter of a million. As there were other repartimientos of more value than those of the treasurer, besides others not so valuable, it is not beyond bounds to suppose that Gonzalo may have acquired as much treasure at Quito as was equal to a million of our present money: A prodigious sum, considering that his army did not exceed 800 men; being equal to L.1250 for each soldier.--E.]

After a short stay at Quito, Gonzalo learnt that the viceroy had halted at the city of Parto, about forty leagues from thence, at the frontiers of the government of Benalcazar. Resolving to follow him, Gonzalo pushed on as he had done from San Miguel, and the light troops of the hostile parties had some interference at a place called Rio Caliente. When the viceroy was informed of the approach of Gonzalo, he hastily quitted Parto and retired to the city of Popayan at a greater distance from Quito, and was pursued by Gonzalo for twenty leagues beyond Parto. As Gonzalo found that he would have to march through a desert country, altogether destitute of provisions, he here discontinued the pursuit, and returned to Quito. Perhaps this was the longest and hottest pursuit ever made in war; as, counting from La Plata whence Gonzalo first set out, to Parto where the pursuit was discontinued, the distance is not less than 700 large Spanish leagues, or 2800 miles.

On his return to Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro was so puffed up with the success which had hitherto attended him, that he frequently spoke of his majesty with much disrespect; alleging that the king would be reduced to the necessity of granting him the government of Peru, and even went so far as to say, if this favour were denied him, he would throw off his allegiance. For the most part indeed, he concealed these ambitious sentiments, pretending that he was always ready to submit to the orders of his majesty; but all his officers were satisfied that he meant to assert an independent dominion, and publickly avowed these absurd and criminal pretensions. On returning from Parto, he remained a long while at Quito, continually feasting and rejoicing; he and his adherents abandoning themselves to every degree of licence and debauchery, particularly in regard to the sex. It is even asserted that Gonzalo caused a citizen of Quito to be assassinated, whose wife he publickly lived with, and that he hired a Hungarian soldier, named Vincente Pablo to execute this infamous deed. This man was afterwards hanged at Valladolid, in the year 1551, by a sentence of the royal council of the Indies.