Before entering upon the delineation of the partial phenomena p 57 which are found to be distributed in various groups, I would consider a few general questions intimately connected together, and bearing upon the nature of our knowledge of the external world and its different relations, in all epochs of history and in all phases of intellectual advancement. Under this head will be comprised the following considerations:
1. The precise limits of the physical description of the universe, considered as a distinct science.
2. A brief enumeration of the totality of natural phenomena, presented under the form of a 'general delineation of nature.'
3. The influence of the external world on the imagination and feelings, which has acted in modern times as a powerful impulse toward the study of natural science, by giving animation to the description of distant regions and to the delineation of natural scenery, as far as it is characterized by vegetable physiognomy and by the cultivation of exotic plants, and their arrangement in well-contrasted groups.
4. The history of the contemplation of nature, or the progressive development of the idea of the Cosmos, considered with reference to the historical and geographical facts that have led to the discovery of the connection of phenomena.
The higher the point of view from which natural phenomena may be considered, the more necessary it is to circumscribe the science within its just limits, and to distinguish it from all other analogous or auxiliary studies.
Physical cosmography is founded on the contemplation of all created things — all that exists in space, whether as substances or forces — that is, all the material beings that constitute the universe. The science which I would attempt to define presents itself, therefore, to man, as the inhabitant of the earth, under a two-fold form — as the earth itself and the regions of space. It is with a view of showing the actual character and the independence of the study of physical cosmography, and at the same time indicating the nature of its relations to 'general physics, descriptive natural history, geology, and comparative geography', that I will pause for a few moments to consider that portion of the science of the Cosmos which concerns the earth. As the history of philosophy does not consist of a mere material enumeration of the philosophical views entertained in different ages, neither should the physical description of the universe be a simple encyclopedic compilation of the sciences we have enumerated. The difficulty of defining the limits of intimately-connected studies has been increased, because for centuries it has been customary to designate various branches p 58 of empirical knowledge by terms which admit either of too wide or too limited a definition of the ideas which they were intended to convey, and are, besides, objectionable from having had a different signification in those classical languages of antiquity from thish chey have been borrowed. The terms physiology, physics, natural history, geology and geography arose, and were commonly used, long before clear ideas were entertained of the diversity of objects embraced by these sciences, and consequently of their reciprocal limitation. Such is the influence of long habit upon language, that by one of the nations of Europe most advanced in civilization the word "physic" is applied to medicine, while in a society of justly deserved universal reputation, technical chemistry, geology and astronomy (purely experimental sciences) are comprised under the head of "Philosophical Transactions."
An attempt has often been made, and almost always in vain, to substitute new and more appropriate terms for these ancient designations, which, notwithstanding their undoubted vagueness, are now generally understood. These changes have been proposed, for the most part, by those who have occupied themselves with the general classification of the various branches of knowledge, from the first appearance of the great encyclopedia ('Margarita Philosophica') of Gregory Reisch,* prior of the Chartreuse at Freiburg, toward the close of the fifteenth century, to Lord Bacon, and from Bacon to D'Alembert; and in recent times to an eminent physicist, Andre Marie Ampere.**
[footnote] *The 'Margarita Philosophica' of Gregory Reisch, prior of the Chartreuse at Freiburg, first appeared under the following title: Aepitome omnis Philosophiæ, alias Margarita Philosophica, tractans de omni generi scibili. The Heidelberg edition (1486), and that of Strasburg (1504), both bear this title, but the first part was suppressed in the Freiburg edition of the same year, as well as in the twelve subsequent editions, which succeeded one another, at short intervals, till 1535. This work exercised a great influence on the diffusion of mathematical and physical sciences toward the beginning of the sixteenth century, and Crasles, the learned author of 'L'Aperçu Historique des Methodes en Géometrica' (1837) has shown the great importance of Reisch's 'Encyclopedia' in the history of mathematics in the Middle Ages. I have had recourse to a passage in the 'Margarita Philosophica', found only in the edition of 1513, to elucidate the important question of the relations between the statements of the geographer of Saint-Die, Hylacomilus (Martin Waldseemuller), the first who gave the name of America to the New Continent, and those of Amerigo Vespucci, Rene, King of Jerusalem and Duke of Lorraine, as also those contained in the celebrated editions of Ptolemy of 1513 and 1522. See my 'Examen Critique de la Gegraphie du Nouveau Continent, et des Progres de l'Astronomie Nautique aux 15e et 16e Siecles', t. iv., p. 99-125.
[footnote] II Ampère, 'Essai sur la Phil. des Sciences', 1834, p. 25. Whewell, 'Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences', vol. ii., p. 277. Park, 'Pantology', p. 87.
p 59 The selection of an inappropriate Greek nomenclature has perhaps been even more prejudicial to the last of these attempts than the injudicious use of binary divisions and the excessive multiplication of groups.
The physical description of the world, considering the universe as an object of the external senses, does undoubtedly require the aid of general physics and of descriptive natural history, but thecontemplation of all created things, which are linked together, and form one 'whole', animated by internal forces, given to the science we are considering a peculiar character. Phyical science considers only the general properties of bodies; it is the product of abstraction — a generalization of perceptible phenomena; and even in the work in which were laid the first foundations of general physics, in the eight books on physics of Aristotle,* all the phenomena of nature are considered as depending upon the primitive and vital action of one sole force, from which emaate all the movements of the universe.
[footnote] * All changes in the physical world may be reduced to motion. Aristot., 'Phys. Ausc.', iii., 1 and 4, p. 200, 201. Bekker, viii., 1, 8, and 9, p. 250, 262, 265. 'De Genere et Corr.', ii., 10, p. 336. Pseudo-Aristot., 'De Mundo.' cap. vi., p. 398.
The terrestrial portion of physical cosmography, for which I would willingly retain the expressive designation of 'physical geography', treats of the distribution of magnetism in our planet with relation to its intensity and direction, but does not enter into a consideration of the laws of attraction or repulsion of the poles, or the means of eliciting either permanent or transitory electro-magnetic currents. Physical geography depicts in broad outlines the even or irregular configuration of continents, the relations of superficial area, and the distribution of continental masses in the two hemispheres, a distribution which exercises a powerful influence on the diversity of climate and the meteorological modifications of the atmosphere; this science defines the character of mountain chains, which, having been elevated at different epochs, constitute distinct systems, whether they run in parallel lines or intersect one another; determines the mean height of continents above the level of the sea, the position of the center of gravity of their volume, and the relation of the highest summits of mountain chains to the mean elevation of their crests, or to their proximity with the sea-shore. It depicts the eruptive rocks as principles of movement, acting upon the sedimentary rocks by traversing, uplifting, and inclining them at various angles; it p 60 considers volcanoes either as isolated, or ranged in single or in double series, and extending their sphere of action to various distances, either by raising long and narrow lines of rocks, or by means of circles of commotion, which expand or diminish in diameter in the course of ages. This terrestrial portion of the science of the Cosmos describes the strife of the liquid element with the solid land; it indicates the features possessed in common by all great rivers in the upper and lower portion of their course, and in their mode of bifurcation when their basins are unclosed; and shows us rivers breaking through the highest mountain chains, or following for a long time a course parallel to them, either at their base, or at a considerable distance, where the elevation of the strata of the mountain system and the direction of their inclination correspond to the configuration of the table-land. It is only the general results of comparative orography and hydrography that belong to the science whose true limits I am desirous of determining, and not the special enumeration of the greatest elevations of our globe, of active volcanoes, of rivers, and the number of their tributaries, these details falliing rather within the domain of geography, properly so called. We would here only consider phenomena in their mutual connection, and in their relations to different zones of our planet, and to its physical constitution generally. The specialties both of inorganic and organized matter, classed according to analogy of form and composition, undoubtedly constitute a most interesting branch of study, but they appertain to a sphere of ideas having no affinity with the subject of this work.
The description of different countries certainly furnishes us with the most important materials for the composition of a physical geography; but the combination of these different descriptions, ranged in series, would as little give us a true image of the general conformation of the irregular surface of our globe, as a succession of all the floras of different regions would constitute that which I designate as a 'Geography of Plants.' It is by subjecting isolated observations to the process of thought, and by combining and comparing them, that we are enabled to discover the relations existing in common between the climatic distribution of beings and the individuality of organic forms (in the morphology or descriptive natural history of plants and animals); and it is by induction that we are led to comprehend numerical laws, the proportion of natural families to the whole number of species, and to designate the latitude or geographical position of the zones in whose p 61 plains each organic form attains the maximum of its development. Considerations of this nature, by their tendency to generalization, impress a nobler character on the physical description of the globe, and enable us to understand how the aspect of the scenery, that is to say, the impression produced upon the mind by the physiognomy of the vegetation, depends upon the local distribution, the number, and the luxuriance of growth of the vegetable forms predominating in the general mass. The catalogues of organized beings to which was formerly given the pompous title of 'Systems of Nature', present us with an admirably connected arrangement by analogies of structure, either in the perfected development of these beings, or in the different phases which, in accordance with the views of a spiral evolution, affect in vegetables the leaves, bracts, calyx, corolla and fructifying organs; and in animals, with more or less symmetrical regularity, the cellular and fibrous tissues, and their perfect or but obscurely developed articulations. But these pretended systems of nature, however ingenious their mode of classification may be, do not show us organic beings as they are distributed in groups throughout our planet, according to their different relations of latitude and elevation above the level of the sea, and to climatic influences, which are owing to general and often very remote causes. The ultimate aim of physical geography is, however, as we have already said, to recognise unity in the vast diversity of phenomena, and by the exercise of thought and the combination of observations, to discern the constancy of phenomena in the midst of apparent changes. In the exposition of the terrestrial portion of the Cosmos, it will occasionally be necessary to descend to very special facts; but this will only be in order to recall the connection existing between the actual distribution of organic beings over the globe, and the laws of the ideal classification by natural families, analogy of internal organization and progressive evolution.
It follows from these discussions on the limits of the various sciences, and more particularly from the distinction which must necessarily be made between descriptive botany (morphology of vegetables) and the geography of plants, that in the physical history of the globe, the innumerable multitude of organized bodies which embellish creation are considered rather according to 'zones of habitation' or 'stations', and to differently inflected 'isothermal bands', than with reference to the principles of gradation in the development of internal organism. Notwithstanding this, botany and zoology, which constitute p 62 the descriptive natural history of all organized beings, are the fruitful sources whence we draw the materials necessary to give a solid basis to the study of the mutual relations and connection of phenomena.
We will here subjoin one important observation by way of elucidating the connection of which we have spoken. The first general glance over the vegetation of a vast extent of a continent shows us forms the most dissimilar — Graminae and Orchideae, Coniferae and oaks, in local approximation to one another; while natural families and genera, instead of being locally associated, are dispersed as if by chance. This dispersion is, however, only apparent. The physical description of the globe teaches us that vegetation every where presents numerically constant relations in the development of its forms and types; that in the same climates, the species which are wanting in one country are replaced in a neighboring one by other species of the same family; and that this 'law of substitution', which seems to depend upon some inherent mysteries of the organism, considered with reference to its origin, maintains in contiguous regions a numerical relation between the species of various great families and the general mass of the phanerogamic plants constituting the two floras. We thus revealed in the multiplicity of the distinct organizations by which these regions are occupied; and we also discover in each zone, and diversified according to the families of plants, a slow but continuous action on the aerial ocean, depending upon the influence of light — the primary condition of all organic vitality — on the solid and liquid surface of our planet. It might be said, in accordance with a beautiful expression of Lavoisier, that the ancient marvel of the myth of Prometheus was incessantly renewed before our eyes.
If we extend the course which we have proposed, following in the exposition of the physical description of the earth to the sidereal part of the science of the Cosmos, the delineation of the regions of space and the bodies by which they are occupied, we shall find our task simplified in no common degree. If, according to ancient but unphilosophical forms of nomenclature, we would distinguish between 'physics', that is to say, general considerations on the essence of matter, and the forces by which it is actuated, and 'chemistry', which treats of the nature of substances, their elementary composition, and those attractions that are not determined solely by the relations of mass, we must admit that the description of the earth comprises at p 63 once 'physical' and 'chemical' actions. In addition to gravitation, which must be considered as a primitive force in nature, we observe that attractions of another kind are at work around us, both in the interior of our planet and on its surface. These forces, to which we apply the term 'chemical affinity', act upon molecules in contact, or at infinitely minute distances from one another,* and which, being differently modified by electricity, heat, condensation in porous bodies, or by the contact of an intermediate substance, animate equally the inorganic world and animal and vegetable tissues.
[footnote] * On the question already discussed by Newton, regarding the difference existing between the attraction of masses and molecular attraction, see Laplace, 'Exposition du Systeme du Monde', p. 384, and supplement to book x. of the 'Mecanique Celeste', p. 3, 4; Kant, 'Metaph. Anfangegrunde der Naturwissenschaft, Säm. Werke', 1839, bd. v., s. 309 (Metaphysical Principles of the Natural Sciences); Pectet, 'Physique', 1838, vol. i., p. 59-63.
If we except the small asteroids, which appear to us under the forms of aerolites and shooting stars, the regions of space have hitherto presented to our direct observation physical phenomena alone; and in the case of these, we know only with certainty the effects depending upon the quantitative relations of matter of the distribution of masses. The phenomena of the regions of space may consequently be considered as influenced by simple dynamical laws — the laws of motion.
The effects that may arise from the specific difference and the hererogeneous nature of matter have not hitherto entered into our calculations of the mechanism of the heavens. The only means by which the inhabitants of our planet can enter into relation with the matter contained within the regions of space, whether existing in scattered forms or united into large spheroids, is by the phenomena of light, the propagation of the force of gravitation or the attraction of masses. The existence of a periodical action of the sun and moon on the variations of terrestrial magnetism is even at the present day extremely problematical. We have no direct experimental knowledge regarding the properties and specific qualities of the masses circulating in space, or of the matter of which they are probably composed, if we except what may be derived from the fall of aerolites or meteoric stones, which, as we have already observed, enter within the limits of our terrestrial sphere. It will be sufficient here to remark, that the direction and the excessive velocity of projection (a velocity wholly planetary) manifested by these masses, render it more than probable that p 64 they are small celestial bodies, which, being attracted by our planet, are made to deviate from their original course, and thus reach the earth enveloped in vapors, and in a high state of actual incandescence. The familiar aspect of these asteroids, and the analogies which they present with the minerals composing the earth's crust, undoubtedly afford ample grounds for surprise,* but, in my opinion, the only conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that, in general, planets and other sidereal masses, which by the influence of a central body, have been agglomerated into rings of vapor, and subsequently into spheroids, being integrant parts of the same system, and having one common origin, may likewise be composed of substances chemically identical.
[footnote] I[The analysis of an aerolite which fell a few years since in Maryland, United States, and was examined by Professor Silliman, of New Haven, Connecticut, gave the following results: Oxyd of iron, 24; oxyd of nickel, 1.25; silica, with earthy matter, 3.46; sulphur, a trace - 28.71. Dr. Mantell's 'Wonders of Geology', 1848, vol. i., p. 51.] — 'Tr.'
Again, experiments with the pendulum, particularly those prosecuted with such rare precision by Bessel, confirm the Newtonian axiom, that bodies the most heterogeneous in their nature (as water, gold, quartz, granular limestone, and different masses of aerolites) experience a perfectly similar degree of acceleration from the attraction of the earth. To the experiments of the pendulum may be added the proofs furnished by purely astronomical observations. The almost perfect identity of the mass of Jupiter, deduced from the influence exercised by this stupendous planet on its own satellites, on Enck's comet of short period, and on the small planets Vesta, Juno, Ceres, and Pallas, indicates with equal certainty that within the limits of actual observation attraction is determined solely by the quantity of matter.*
[footnote] *Poisson, 'Connaissances des Temps pour l'Anne' 1836, p. 64-66. Bessel, Poggendorf's 'Annalen', bd. xxv., s. 417. Encke, 'Abhandlungen der Berliner Academie' (Trans. of the Berlin Academy), 1826, s. 257. Mitscherlich, 'Lehrbuch der Chemie' (Manual of Chemistry), 1837 bd. i. s. 352.
This absence of any perceptible difference in the nature of matter, alike proved by direct observation and theoretical deductions, imparts a high degree of simplicity to the mechanism of the heavens. The immeasurable extent of the regions of space being subjected to laws of motion alone, the sidereal portion of the science of the Cosmos is based on the pure and abundant source of mathematical astronomy, as is the terrestrial portion on physics, chemistry, and organic morphology; but the domain of these three last-named sciences embraces p 65 the consideration of phenomena which are so complicated and have, up to the present time, been found so little susceptible of the application of rigorous method, that the physical science of the earth can not boast of the same certainty and simplicity in the exposition of facts and their mutual connection which characterize the celestial portion of the Cosmos. It is not improbable that the difference to which we allude may furnish an explanation of the cause which, in the earliest ages of intellectual culture among the Greeks, directed the natural philosophy of the Pythagoreans with more ardor to the heavenly bodies and the regions of space than to the earth and its productions, and how through Philolaus, and subsequently through the analogous views of Aristarchus of Samos, and of Seleucus of Erythrea, this science has been made more conducive to the attainment of a knowledge of the true system of the world than the natural philosophy of the Ionian school could ever be to the physical history of the earth. Giving but little attention to the properties and specific differences of matter filling space, the great Italian school, in its Doric gravity, turned by preference toward all that relates to measure, to the form of bodies, and to the number and distances of the planets,* while the Ionian physicists directed their attention to the qualities of matter, its true or supposed metamorphoses, and to relations of origin.
[footnote] *Compare Otfried Muller's 'Dorien', bd. i., s. 365.
It was reserved for the powerful genius of Aristotle, alike profoundly speculative and practical to sound with equal success the depths of abstraction and the inexhaustible resources of vital activity pervading the material world.
Several highly distinguished treatises on physical geography are prefaced by an introduction, whose purely astronomical sections are directed to the consideration of the earth in its planetary dependence, and as constituting a part of that great system which is animated by one central body, the sun. This course is diametrically opposed to the one which I propose following. In order adequately to estimate the dignity of the Cosmos, it is requisite that the sidereal portion, termed by Kant the 'natural history of the heavens', should not be made subordinate to the terrestrial. In the science of the Cosmos, according to the expression of Aristarchus of Samos, the pioneer of the Copernican system, the sun, with its satellites, was nothing more than one of the innumerable stars by which space is occupied. The physical history of the world must, therefore, begin with the description of the heavenly bodies, p 66 and with a geographical sketch of the universe, or, I would rather say, a true 'map of th world', such as was traced by the bold hand of the elder Herschel. If, notwithstanding the smallness of our planet, the most considerable space and the most attentive consideration be here afforded to that which exclusively concerns it, this arises solely from the disproportion in the extent of our knowledge of that which is accessible and of that which is closed to our observation. This subordination of the celestial to the terrestrial portion is met with in the great work of Bernard Varenius,* which appeared in the middle of the seventeenth century.
[Footnote] *'Geographia Generalis in qua affectiones generales telluris explicantur.' The oldest Elzevir edition bears date 1650, the second 1672, and the third 1681; these were published at Cambridge, under Newton's supervision. This excellent work by Varenius is, in the true sense of the words, a physical description of the earth. Since the work 'Historia Natural de las Indias', 1590, in which the Jesuit Joseph de Acosta sketched in so masterly a manner the delineation of the New Continent, questions relating to the physical history of the earth have never been considered with such admirable generality. Acosta is richer in original observations, while Varenius embraces a wider circle of ideas, since his sojourn in Holland, which was at that period the center of vast commercial relations, had brought him in contact with a great number of well-iinformed travelers. 'Generalis sive Universalis Geographia dictur quae tellurem in genere considerat atque affectiones explicat, non habita particularium regionum ratione.' The general description of the earth by Varenius ('Pars Absoluta', cap. i.-xxii.) may be considered as a treatise of comparative geography, if we adopt the term used by the author himself ('Geographia Comparativa', cap. xxxiii.-xl.), although this must be understood in a limited acceptation. We may cite the following among the most remarkable passages of this book: the enumeration of the systems of mountains; the examination of the relations existing between their directions and the general form of continents (p. 66, 76, ed. Cantab., 1681); a list of extinct volcanoes, and such as were still in a state of activity; the discussion of facts relative to the general distribution of islands and archipelagoes (p. 220); the depth of the ocean relatively to the height of neighboring coasts (p. 103); the uniformity of level observed in all open seas (p. 97); the dependence of currents on the prevailing winds; the unequal saltness of the sea; the configuration of shores (p. 139); the direction of the winds as the result of differences of temperature, etc. We may further instance the remarkable considerations of Varenius regarding the equinoctial current from east to west, to which he attributes the origin of the Gulf Stream, beginning at Cape St. Augustin, and issuing forth between Cuba and Florida (p. 140). Nothing can be more accurate than his description of the current which skirts the western coast of Africa, between Cape Verde and the island of Fernando Po in the Gulf of Guinea. Varenius explains the formation of sporadic islands by supposing them to be "the raised bottom of the sea:" 'magna spirituum inclusorum vi, sicut aliquando montes e terra protusos esse quidam scribunt' (p. 225). The edition published by Newton in 1681 ('auctior et emendatior' unfortunately contains no additions from this great authority; and there is not even mention made of the polar compression of the globe, although the experiments on the pendulum by Richer had been made nine years prior to the appearance of the Cambridge edition. Newton's 'Principia Mathematica Philosophie Naturalis' were not communicated in manuscript to the Royal Society until April, 1686. Much uncertainty seems to prevail regarding the birth-place of Varenius. Jaecher says it was England, while, according to 'La Biographie Universelle' (b.xlvii., p. 495), he is stated to have been born at Amsterdam; but it would appear, from the dedicatory address to the burgomaster of that city (see his 'Geographia Comparativa', that both suppositions are false. Varenius expressly says that he had sought refuge in Amsterdam, "because his native city had been burned and completely destroyed during a long war," words which appear to apply to the north of Germany, and to the devastations of the Thirty Years' War. In his dedication of another work, 'Descriptio regni Japoniae' (Amst., 1649), to the Senate of Hamburgh, Varenius says that he prosecuted his elementary mathematical studies in the gymnasium of that city. There is, therefore, every reason to believe that this admirable geographer was a native of Germany, and was probably born at Luneburg ('Witten. Mem. Theol.', 1685, p. 2142; Zedler, 'Universal Lexicon', vol. xlvi., 1745, p. 187).
p 67 He was the first to distinguish between 'general and special geography', the former of which he subdivides into an 'absolute', or, properly speaking, 'terrestrial' part, and a 'relative or planetary' portion, according to the mode of considering our planet either with reference to its surface in its different zones, or to its relations to the sun and moon. It redounds to the glory of Varenius that his work on 'General and Comparative Geography' should in so high a degree have arrested the attention of Newton. The imperfect state of many of the auxiliary sciences from which this writer was obliged to draw his materials prevented his work from corresponding to the greatness of the design, and it was reserved for the present age, and for my own country, to see the delineation of comparative geography, drawn in its full extent, and in all its relations with the history of man, by the skillful hand of Carl Ritter.*
[Footnote] *Carl Ritter's 'Erdkunde im Verhältniss zur Natur und zur
Geschichte des Menschen, oder allgemeine vergleichende Geographie'
(Geography in relation to Nature and the History of Man, or general
Comparative Geography).
The enumeration of the most important results of the astronomical and physical sciences which in the history of the Cosmos radiate toward one common focus, may perhaps, to a certain degree, justify the designation I have given to my work, and, considered within the circumscribed limits I have proposed to myself, the undertaking may be esteemed less adventurous than the title. The introduction of new terms, especially with reference to the general results of a science which p 68 ought to be accessible to all, has always been greatly in opposition to my own practice; and whenever I have enlarged upon the established nomenclature, it has only been in the specialities of descriptive botany and zoology, where the introduction of hitherto unknown objects rendered new names necessary. The denominations of physical descriptions of the universe, or physical cosmography, which I use indiscriminantely, have been modeled upon those of 'physical descriptions of the earth', that is to say, 'physical geography', terms that have long been in common use. Descartes, whose genius was one of the most powerful manifested in any age, has left us a few fragments of a great work, which he intended publishing under the title of 'Monde', and for which he had prepared hiimself by special studies, including even that of human anatomy. The uncommon, but definite expression of the 'science of the Cosmos' recalls to the mind of the inhabitant of the earth that we are treating of a more widely-extended horizon — of the assemblage of all things with which space is filled, from the remotest nebulae to the climatic distribution of those delicate tissues of vegetable matter which spread a variegated covering over the surface of our rocks.
The influence of narrow-minded views peculiar to the earlier ages of civilization led in all languages to a confusion of ideas in the synonymic use of the words 'earth' and 'world', while the common expressions 'voyages round the world', 'map of the world', and 'new world', afford further illustrations of the same confusion. The more noble and precisely-defined expressions of 'system of the world', 'the planetary world', and 'creation and age of the world', relate either to the totality of the substances by which space is filled, or to the origin of the whole universe.
It was natural that, in the midst of the extreme variability of phenomena presented by the surface of our globe, and the aerial ocean by which it is surrounded, man should have been impressed by the aspect of the vault of heaven, and the uniform and regular movements of the sun and planets. Thus the word Cosmos, which primitively, in the Homeric ages, indicated an idea of order and harmony, was subsequently adopted in scientific language, where it was gradually applied to the order observed in the movements of the heavenly bodies, to the whole universe, and then finally to the world in which this harmony was reflected to us. According to the assertion of Philolaus, whose fragmentary works have been so ably commented upon by Böckh, and conformably to the general testimony p 69 of antiquity, Pythagoras was the first who used the word Cosmos to designate the order that reigns in the universe, or entire world.*
[footnote] *[Greek word], in the most ancient, and at the same time most precise, definition of the word, signified 'ornament' (as an adornment for a man, a woman, or a horse); taken figuratively for [Greek word], it implied the order or adornment of a discourse. According to the testimony of all the ancients, it was Pythagoras who first used the word to designate the order in the universe, and the universe itself. Pythagoras left no writings; but ancient attestation to the truth of this assertion is to be found in several passages of the fragmentary works of Philolaus (Stob., 'Eclog.', p. 360 and 460, Heeren), p. 62, 90, in Bockh's German edition. I do not, according to the example of Nake, cite Timof Locris, since his authenticity is doubtful. Plutarch ('De plac. Phil.', ii., I) says, in the most express manner, that Pythatoras gave the name of Cosmos to the universe on account of the order which reigned throughout it; so likewise does Galen ('Hist. Phil.', p. 429). This word, together with its novel signification, passed from the schools of philosophy into the language of poets and prose writers. Plato designates the heavenly bodies by the name of 'Uranos', but the order pervading the regions of space he too terms the Cosmos, and in his 'Timus' (p. 30 a.) he says 'that the world is an animal endowed with a soul' [Greek words]. Compare Anaxag. Claz., ed. Schaubach, p. III, and Plut. ('De plac. Phil.', in Aristotle ('De Caelo', I, 9), 'Cosmos' signifies "the universe and the order pervading it," but it is likewise considered as divided in space into two parts — the sublunary world, and the world above the moon. ('Meteor.', I., w, 1, and I., 3, 13, p. 339, 'a', and 340, 'b', Bekk.) The definition of Cosmos, which I have already cited is taken from Pseudo-Aristoteles 'de Mundo', cap. ii. (p. 391); the passage referred to is as follows: [Greek words]. Most of the passages occurring in Greek writers on the word 'Cosmos' may be found collected together in the controversy between Richard Bentley and Charles Boyle ('Opuscula Philologica', 1781, p. 347, 445; 'Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris', 1817, p. 254); on the historical existence of Zaleucus, legislator of Leucris, in Nake's excellent work, 'Sched. Crit.', 1812, p. 9, 15; and, finally in Theophilus Schmidt, 'ad Cleom. Cycl. Theor.', met. I., 1, p. ix., 1 and 99. Taken in a more limited sense, the word Cosmos is also used in the plural (Plut., 1, 5), either to designate the stars (Stob., 1, p. 514; Plut., 11, 13) or the innumerable systems scattered like islands through the immensity of space, and each composed of a sun and a moon. (Anax. Claz., 'Fragm.', p. 89, 93, 120; Brandis, 'Gesch. der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie', b. i., s. 252 (History of the Greco-Roman Philosophy). Each of these groups forming thus a 'Cosmos', the universe, [Greek words], the word must be understood in a wider sense (Plut., ii., 1). It was not until long after the time of the Ptolemies that the word was applied to the earth. Bockh has made known inscriptions in praise of Trajan and Adrian ('Corpus Inscr. Graec.', I, n. 334 and 1036), in which [Greek word] occurs for [Greek word] in the same manner as we still use the term 'world' to signify the earth alone. We have already mentioned the singular division of the regions of space p 70 [Footnote continues] into three parts, the 'Olympus, Cosmos' and 'Ouranos' (Stob., i., p. 488; Philolaus, p. 95, 303); this division applies to the different regions surrounding that mysterious focus of the universe, the [Greek words] of the Pythagoreans. In the fragmentary passage in which this division is found, the term [Greek word] designates the innermost region, situated between the moon and earth; this is the domain of changing things. The middle region, where the planets circulate in an invariable and harmonious order, is, in accordance with the special conceptions entertained of the universe, exclusively termed 'Cosmos', while the word 'Olympus' is used to express the exterior or igneous region. Bopp, the profound philologist, has remarked that we may deduce, as Pott has done, 'Etymol. Forschungen', th.i., s. 39 and 252 ('Etymol. Researches'), the word [Greek word] from the Sanscrit root 'sud', 'purificari', by assuming two conditions; first that the Greek letter 'kappa' in [Greek word] comes from the palatial 'epsilon', which Bopp represents by 's' and Pott by 'ç' (in the same manner as [Greek word], 'decem, taihun' in Gothic, comes from the Indian word 'dasan'), and, next, that the Indian 'd'' corresponds, as a general rule, with the Greek 'theta' ('Vergleichende Grammatik' 99 — Comparative Grammar), which shows the relation of [Greek word] (for [Greek word]) with the Sanscrit root 'sud', whence is also derived [Greek word]. Another Indian term for the world is 'gagat' (pronounced 'dschagat'), which is, properly speaking the present participle of the verb 'gagami' (I go), the root of which is 'ga.' In restricting ourselves to the circle of Hellenic etymologies, we find ('Etymol. M.', p. 532, 12) that [Greek word] is intimately associated with [Greek word] or rather with [Greek word], whence we have [Greek word] or [Greek word] Welcker ('Eine Kretische Col in Theben', s. 23 — A Cretan Colony in Thebes) combines with this the name [Greek word] , as in Hesychius [Greek word] signifies a Cretan suit of arms. When the scientific language of Greece was introduced among the Romans, the word 'mundus', which at first had only the primary meaning of [Greek word] (female ornament), was applied to designate the entire universe. Ennius seems to have been the first who ventured upon this innovation. In one of the fragments of this poet, preserved by Macrobius, on the occasion of his quarrel with Virgil, we find the word used in its novel mode of acceptation: "Mundus caeli vastus constitit silentio" (Sat., vi., 2). Cicero also says, "Quem nos lucentem mundum vocamus" (Timæus, 'S.de univer.', cap. x.) The Sanscrit root 'mand' from which Pott derives the Latin 'mundus' ('Etym. Forsch.', th. i., s. 240), combines the double signification of shining and adorning. 'Loka' designates in Sanscrit the world and people in general, in the same manner as the French word 'monde', and is derived according to Bopp, from 'lok' (to see and shine); it is the same with the Slavonic root 'swjet', which means both 'light' and 'world.' (Grimm, 'Deutsche Gramm.', b. iii., s. 394 — German Grammar.) The word 'welt', which the Germans make use of at the present day, and which was 'weralt' in old German, 'worold' in old Saxon, and 'weruld' in Anglo-Saxon, was, according to James Grimm's interpretation, a period of time, an age ('saeculum') rather than a term used for the world in space. The Etruscans figured to themselves 'mundus' as an inverted dome, symmetrically opposed to the celestial vault (Otfried Muller's 'Etrusken', th. ii., s. 96, etc.). Taken in a still more limited sense, the word appears to have signified among the Goths the terrestrial surface girded by seas ('marei, meri',) the 'merigard', literally, 'garden of seas.'
From the Italian school of philosophy, the expression passed, in this signification, into the language of those early poets p 71 of nature, Parmenides and Empedocles, and from thence into the works of prose writers. We will not here enter into a discussion of the manner in which, according to the Pythagorean views, Philolaus distinguishes between Olympus, Uranus, or the heavens, and Cosmos, or how the same word, used in a plural sense, could be applied to certain heavenly bodies (the planets) revolving round one central focus of the world, or to groups of stars. In this work I use the word Cosmos in conformity with the Hellenic usage of the term subsequently to the time of Pythagorus, and in accordance with the precise definition given of it in the treatise entitled 'De Mundo', which was long erroneously attributed to Aristotle. It is the assemblage of all things in heaven and earth, the universality of created things constituting the perceptible world. If scientific terms had not long been diverted from their true verbal signification, the present work ought rather to have borne the title of 'Cosmography', divided into 'Uranography' and 'Geography.' The Romans, in their feeble essays on philosophy, imitated the Greeks by applying to the universe the term 'mundus', which, in its primary meaning, indicated nothing more than ornament, and did not even imply order or regularity in the disposition of parts. It is probable that the introduction into the language of Latium of this technical term as an equivalent for Cosmos, in its double signification, is due to Ennius,* who was a follower of the Italian school, and the translator of the writings of Epicharmus and some of his pupils on the Pythagorean philosophy.
[footnote] *See, on Ennius, the ingenious researches of Leopold Krahner, in his 'Grundlinien zur Geschichte des Verfalls der Romischen Staats-Reigion', 1837, s. 41-45 (Outlines of the History of the Decay of the Established Religion among the Romans). In all probability, Ennius did not quote from writings of Epicharmus himself, but from poems composed in the name of that philosopher, and in accordance with his views.
We would first distinguish between the physical 'history' and the physical 'description' of the world. The former, conceived in the most general sense of the word, ought, if materials for writing it existed, to trace the variations experienced by the universe in the course of ages from the new stars which have suddenly appeared and disappeared in the vault of heaven, from nebulæ dissolving or condensing — to the first stratum of cryptogamic vegetation on the still imperfectly cooled surface of the earth, or on a reef of coral uplifted from the depths of ocean. 'The physical description of the world' presents a picture of all that exists in space — of the siimultaneous action of p 72 natural forces, together with the phenomena which they produce.
But if we would correctly comprehend nature, we must not entirely or absolutely separate the consideration of the present state of things from that of the successive phases through which they have passed. We can not form a just conception of their nature without looking back on the mode of their formation. It is not organic matter alone that is continually undergoing change, and being dissolved to form new combinations. The globe itself reveals at every phase of its existence the mystery of its former conditions.
We can not survey the crust of our planet without recognizing the traces of the prior existence and destruction of an organic world. The sedimentary rocks present a succession of organic forms, associated in groups, which have successively displaced and succeeded each other. The different super-imposed strata thus display to us the faunas and floras of different epochs. In this sense the description of nature is intimately connected with its history; and the geologist, who is guided by the connection existing among the facts observed, can not form a conception of the present without pursuing, through countless ages, the history of the past. In tracing the physical delineation of the globe, we behold the present and the past reciprocally incorporated, as it were, with one another; for the domain of nature is like that of languages, in which etymological research reveals a successive development, by showing us the primary condition of an idiom reflected in the forms of speech in use at the present day. The study of the material world renders this reflection of the past peculiarly manifest, by displaying in the process of formation rocks of eruption and sedimentary strata similar to those of former ages. If I may be allowed to borrow a striking illustration from the geological relations by which the physiognomy of a country is determined, I would say that domes of trachyte, cones of basalt, lava streams ('coules')of amygdaloid with elongated and parallel pores, and white deposits of pumice, intermixed with black scoriae, animate the scenery by the associations of the past which they awaken, acting upon the imagination of the enlightened observer like traditional records of an earlier world. Their form is their history.
The sense in which the Greeks and Romans originally employed the word 'history' proves that they too were intimately convinced that, to form a complete idea of the present state of the universe, it was necessary to consider it in its successive p 73 phases. It is not, however, in the definition given by Valerius Flaccus,* but in the zoological writings of Aristotle, that the word 'history' presents itself as an exposition of the results of experience and observation.
[Footnote] *Aul. Gell., 'Nect. Att.', v., 18.
The physical description of the word by Pliny the elder bears the title of 'Natural History', while in the letters of his nephew it is designated by the nobler term of 'History of Nature.' The earlier Greek historians did not separate the description of countries from the narrative of events of which they had been the theater. With these writers, physical geography and history were long intimately associated, and remained simply but elegantly blended until the period of the development of political interests, when the agitation in which the lives of men were passed caused the geographical portion to be banished from the history of nations, and raised into an independent science.
It remains to be considered whether by the operation of thought, we may hope to reduce the immense diversity of phenomena comprised by the Cosmos to the unity of a principle, and the evidence afforded by rational truths. In the present state of empirical knowledge, we can scarcely flatter ourselves with such a hope. Experimental sciences, based on the observation of the external world, can not aspire to completeness; the nature of things, and the imperfection of our organs, are alike opposed to it. We shall never succeed in exhausting the immeasurable riches of nature; and no generation of men will ever have cause to boast of having comprehended the total aggregation of phenomena. It is only by distributing them into groups that we have been able, in the case of a few, to discover the empire of certain natural laws, grand and simple as nature itself. The extent of this empire will no doubt increase in proportion as physical sciences are more perfectly developed. Striking proofs of this advancement have been made manifest in our own day, in the phenomena of electro-magnetism, the propagation of luminous waves and radiating heat. In the same manner, the fruitful doctrine of evolution shows us how, in organic development, all that is formed is sketched out beforehand, and how the tissues of vegetable and animal matter uniformly arise from the multiplication and transformation of cells.
The generalization of laws, which, being at first bounded by narrow limits, had been applied solely to isolated groups of phenomena, acquires in time more marked gradations, and gains in extent and certainty as long as the process of reasoning p 74 is applied strictly to analogous phenomena; but as soon as dynamical views prove insufficient where the specific properties and heterogeneous nature of matter come into play; it is to be feared that, by persisting in the pursuit of laws, we may find our course suddenly arrested by an impassible chasm. The principle of unity is lost sight of, and the guiding clew is rent asunder whenever any specific and peculiar kind of action manifests itself amid the active forces of nature. The law of equivalents and the numerical proportions of composition, so happily recognized by modern chemists, and proclaimed under the ancient form of atomic symbols, still remains isolated and independent of mathematicl laws of motion and gravitation.
Those productions of nature which are objects of direct observation may be logically distributed in classes, orders, and families. This form of distribution undoubtedly sheds some light on descriptive natural history, but the study of organized bodies, considered in their linear connection, although it may impart a greater degree of unity and simplicity to the distribution of groups, can not rise to the height of a classification based on one sole principle of composition and internal organization. As different gradations are presented by the laws of nature according to the extent of the horizon, or the limits of the phenomena to be considered, so there are likewise differently graduated phases in the investigation of the external world. Empiricism originates in isolated views, which are subsequently grouped according to their analogy or dissimilarity. To direct observation succeeds, although long afterward, the wish to prosecute experiments; that is to say, to evoke phenomena under different determined conditions. The rational experimentalist does not proceed at hazard, but acts under the guidance of hypotheses, founded on a half indistinct and more or less just intuition of the connection existing among natural objects or forces. That which has been conquered by observation or by means of experiments, leads, by analysis and induction, to the discovery of empirical laws. These are the phases in human intellect that have marked the different epochs in the life of nations, and by means of which that great mass of facts has been accumulated which constitutes at the present day the solid basis of the natural sciences.
Two forms of abstraction conjointly regulate our knowledge, namely, relations of 'quantity', comprising ideas of number and size, and relations of 'quality', embracing the consideration of the specific properties and the heterogeneous nature p 75 of matter. The former, as being more accessible to the exercise of thought, appertains to mathematics; the latter, from the apparent mysteries and greater difficulties, falls under the domain of the chemical sciences. In order to submit phenomena to calculation, recourse is had to a hypothetical construction of matter by a combination of molecules and atoms, whose number, form, position, and polarity determine, modify, or vary phenomena.
The mythical ideas long entertained of the imponderable substances and vital forces peculiar to each mode of organization, have complicated our views generally, and shed an uncertain light on the path we ought to pursue.
The most various forms of intuition have thus, age after age, aided in augmenting the prodigious mass of empirical knowledge, which, in our own day has been enlarged with ever-increasing rapidity. The investigating spirit of man strives from time to time, with varying success, to break through those ancient forms and symbols invented, to subject rebellious matter to rules of mechanical construction.
We are still very far from the time when it will be possible for us to reduce, by the operation of thought, all that we perceive by the senses, to the unity of a rational principle. It may even be doubted if such a victory could ever be achieved in the field of natural philosophy. The complication of phenomena, and of the vast extent of the Cosmos, would seem to oppose such a result; but even a partial solution of the problem — the tendency toward a comprehension of the phenomena of the universe — will not the less remain the eternal and sublime aim of every investigation of nature.
In conformity with the character of my former writings, as well as with the labors in which I have been engaged during my scientific career, in measurements, experiments, and the investigation of facts, I limit myself to the domain of empirical ideas.
The exposition of mutually connected facts does not exclude the classification of phenomena according to their rational connection, the generalization of many specialities in the great mass of observations, or the attempt to discover laws. Conceptions of the universe solely based upon reason, and the principles of speculative philosophy, would no doubt assign a still more exalted aim to the science of the Cosmos. I am far from blaming the efforts of others solely because their success has hitherto remained very doubtful. Contrary to the wishes and counsel of of those profound and powerful thinkers who p 76 have given new life to speculations which were already familiar to the ancients, systems of natural philosophy have in our own country for some time past turned aside the minds of men from the graver study of mathematical and physical sciences. The abuse of better powers, which has led many of our noble but ill-judging youth into the saturnalia of a purely ideal science of nature, has been signalized by the intoxication of pretended conquests, by a novel and fantastically symbolical phraseology, and by a predilection for the formulae of a scholastic rationalism, more contracted in its views than any known to the Middle Ages. I use the expression "abuse of better powers," because superior intellects devoted to philosophical pursuits and experimental sciences have remained strangers to these saturnalia. The results yielded by an earnest investigation in the path of experiment can not be at variance with a true philosophy of nature. If there be any contradiction, the fault must lie either in the unsoundness of speculation, or in the exaggerated pretensions of empiricism, which thinks that more is proved by experiment than is actually derivable from it.
External nature may be opposed to the intellectual world, as if the latter were not comprised within the limits of the former, or nature may be opposed to art when the latter is defined as a manifestation of the intellectual power of man; but these contrasts, which we find reflected in the most cultivated languages, must not lead us to separate the sphere of nature from that of mind, since such a separation would reduce the physical science of the world to a mere aggregation of empirical specialities. Science does not present itself to man until mind conquers matter in striving to subject the result of experimental investigation to rational combinations. Science is the labor of mind applied to nature, but the external world has no real existence for us beyond the image reflected within ourselves through the medium of the senses. As intelligence and forms of speech, thought and its verbal symbols, are united by secret and indissoluble links, so does the external world blend almost unconsciously to ourselves with our ideas and feelings. "External phenomena," says Hegel, in his 'Philosophy of History', "are in some degree translated in our inner representations." The objective world, conceived and reflected within us by thought, is subjected to the eternal and necessary conditions of our intellectual being. The activity of the mind exercises itself on the elements furnished to it by the perceptions of the senses. Thus, in the p 77 early ages of mankind, there manifests itself in the simple intuition of natural facts, and in the efforts made to comprehend them, the germ of the philosophy of nature. These ideal tendencies vary, and are more or less powerful, according to the individual characteristics and moral dispositions of nations, and to the degrees of their mental culture, whether attained amid scenes of nature that excite or chill the imagination.
History has preserved the record of the numerous attempts that have been made to form a rational conception of the whole world of phenomena, and to recognize in the universe the action of one sole active force by which matter is penetrated, transformed, and animated. These attempts are traced in classical antiquity in those treatises on the principles of things which emanated from the Ionian school, and in which all the phenomena of nature were subjected to hazardous speculations, based upon a small number of observations. By degrees, as the influence of great historical events has favored the development of every branch of science supported by observation, that ardor has cooled which formerly led men to seek the essential nature and connection of things by ideal construction and in purely rational principles. In recent times, the mathematical portion of natural philosophy has been most remarkably and admirably enlarged. The method and the instrument (analysis) have been simultaneously perfected. That which has been acquired by means so different — by the ingenious application of atomic suppositions, by the more general and intimate study of phenomena, and by the improved construction of new apparatus — is the common property of mankind, and shouldnot, in our opinion, now, more than in ancient times, be withdrawn from the free exercise of speculative thought.
It can not be denied that in this process of thought, the results of experience have had to contend with many disadvantages; we must not, therefore, be surprised if, in the perpetual vicissitude of theoretical views, as is ingeniously expressed by the author of 'Giordano Bruno', "most men see nothing in philosophy but a succession of passing meteors, while even the grander forms in which she has revealed herself share the fate of comets, bodies that do not rank in popular opinion among the eternal and permanent works of nature, p 78 but are regarded as mere fugitive apparitions of igncor vapor."
[Footnote] *Schelling's Bruno, 'eber das Gottliche und Naturaliche Princip. der Dinge', 181 (Bruno, on the 'Divine and Natural Principle of Things')
We would here remark that the abuse of thought, and the false track it too often pursues, ought not to sanction an opinion derogatory to the intellect, which would imply that the domain of mind is essentially a world of vague fantastic illusions, and that the treasures accumulated by laborious observations in philosophy are powers hostile to its own empire. It does not become the spirit which characterizes the present age distrustfully to reject every generalization of views and every attempt to examine into the nature of things by the process of reason and induction. It would be a denial of the dignity of human nature and the relative importance of the faculties with which we are endowed, were we to condemn at one time austere reason engaged in investigating causes and their natural connections, and at another that exercise of the imagination which prompts and excites discoveries by its creative powers.
This material taken from pages 79 to 111
COSMOS: A Sketch of the Physical Description of the Universe, Vol. 1 by Alexander von Humboldt
Translated by E C Otte
from the 1858 Harper & Brothers edition of Cosmos, volume 1 —————————————————————————
p 79
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WHEN the human mind first attempts to subject to its control the world of physical phenomena, and strives by meditative contemplation to penetrate the rich luxuriance of living nature, and the mingled web of free and restricted natural forces, man feels himself raised to a height from whence, as he embraces the vast horizon, individual things blend together in varied groups, and appear as if shrouded in a vapory vail. These figurative expressions are used in order to illustrate the point of view from whence we would consider the universe both in its celestial and terrestrial sphere. I am not insensible of the boldness of such an undertaking. Among all the forms of exposition to which these pages are devoted, there is none more difficult than the general delineation of nature, which we purpose sketching, since we must not allow ourselves to be overpowered by a sense of the stupendous richness and variety of the forms presented to us, but must dwell only on the consideration of masses either possessing actual magnitude, or borrowing its semblance from the associations awakened within the subjective sphere of ideas. It is by a separation and classification of phenomena by an intuitive insight into the play of obscure forces, and by animated expressions, in which the perceptible spectacle is reflected with vivid truthfulness, that we may hope to comprehend and describe the 'universal all' [Greek words] in a manner worthy of the dignity of the word 'Cosmos' in its signification of 'universe, order of the world', and 'adornment' of this universal order. May the immeasurable diversity of phenomena which crowd into the picture of nature in no way detract from that harmonious impression of rest and unity which is the ultimate object of every literary or purely artistical composition.
Beginning with the depths of space and the regions of remotest nebulae, we will gradually descend through the starry zone to which our solar system belongs, to our own terrestrial spheroid, circled by air and ocean, there to direct our attention p 80 to its form, temperature, and magnetic tension, and to consider the fullness of organic life unfolding itself upon its surface beneath the vivifying influence of light. In this manner a picture of the world may, with a few strokes, be made to include the realms of infinity no less than the minute microscopic animal and vegetable organisms which exist in standing waters and on the weather-beaten surface of our rocks. All that can be perceived by the senses, and all that has been accumulated up to the present day by an attentive and variously directed study of nature, constitute the materials from which this representation is to be drawn, whose character is an evidence of its fidelity and truth. But the descriptive picture of nature which we purpose drawing must not enter too fully into detail, since a minute enumeration of all vital forms, natural objects, and processes is not requisite to the completeness of the undertaking. The delineator of nature must resist the tendency toward endless division, in order to avoid the dangers presented by the very abundance of our empirical knowledge. A considerable portion of the qualitative properties of matter — or, to speak more in accordance with the language of natural philosophy, of the qualitative expression of forces — is doubtlessly still unknown to us, and the attempt perfectly to represent unity in diversity must therefore necessarily prove unsuccessful. Thus, besides the pleasure derived and tinged with a shade of sadness, an unsatisfied longing for something beyond the present — a striving toward regions yet unknown and unopened. Such a sense of longing binds still faster the links which, in accordance with the supreme laws of our being, connect the material with the ideal world, and animates the mysterious relation existing between that which the mind receives from without, and that which it reflects from its own depths to the external world. If, then, nature (understanding by the term all natural objects and phenomena) be illimitable in extent and contents, it likewise presents itself to the human intellect as a problem which can not be grasped, and whose solution is impossible, since it requires a knowledge of the combined action of all natural forces. Such an acknowledgement is due where the actual state and prospective development of phenomena constitute the sole objects of direct investigation, which does not venture to depart from the strict rules of induction. But, although the incessant effort to embrace nature in its universality may remain unsatisfied, the history of the contemplation of the universe (which p 81 will be considered in another part of this work) will teach us how, in the course of ages, mankind has gradually attained to a partial insight into the relative dependence of phenomena. My duty is to depict the results of our knowledge in all their bearings with reference to the present. In all that is subject to motion and change in space, the ultimate aim, the very expression of physical laws, depend upon 'mean numerical values', which show us the constant amid change, and the stable amid apparent fluctuations of phenomena. Thus the progress of modern physical science is especially characterized by the attainment and the rectification of the mean values of certain quantities by means of the processes of weighing and measuring; and it may be said, that the only remaining and widely-diffused hieroglyphic characters still in our writing — 'numbers' — appear to us again, as powers of the Cosmos, although in a wider sense than that applied to them by the Italian School.
The earnest investigator delights in the simplicity of numerical relations, indicating the dimensions of the celestial regions, the magnitudes and periodical disturbances of the heavenly bodies, the triple elements of terrestrial magnetism, the mean pressure of the atmosphere, and the quantity of heat which the sun imparts in each year, and in every season of the year, to all points of the solid and liquid surface of our planet. These sources of enjoyment do not, however, satisfy the poet of Nature, or the mind of the inquiring many. To both of these the present state of science appears as a blank, now that she answers doubtingly, or wholly rejects as unanswerable, questions to which former ages deemed they could furnish satisfactory replies. In her severer aspect, and clothed with less luxuriance, she shows herself deprived of that seductive charm with which a dogmatizing and symbolizing physical philosophy knew how to deceive the understanding and give the rein to imagination. Long before the discovery of the New World, it was believed that new lands in the Far West might be seen from the shores of the Canaries and the Azores. These illusive images were owing, not to any extraordinary refraction of the rays of light, but produced by an eager longing for the distant and the unattained. The philosophy of the Greeks, the physical views of the Middle Ages, and even those of a more recent period, have been eminently imbued with the charm springing from similar illusive phantoms of the imagination. At the limits of circumscribed knowledge, as from some lofty island shore, the eye delights to penetrate p 82 to distant regions. The belief in the uncommon and the wonderful lends a definite outline to every manifestation of ideal creation; and the realm of fancy — a fairy-land of cosmological, geognostical, and magnetic visions — becomes thus involuntarily blended with the domain of reality.
Nature, in the manifold signification of the word — whether considered as the universality of all that is and ever will be — as the inner moving force of all phenomena, or as their mysterious prototype — reveals itself to the simple mind and feelings of man as something earthly, and closely allied to himself. It is only within the animated circles of organic structure that we feel ourselves peculiarly at home. Thus, wherever the earth unfolds her fruits and flowers, and gives food to countless tribes of animals, there the image of nature impresses itself most vividly upon our senses. The impression thus produced upon our minds limits itself almost exclusively to the reflection of the earthly. The starry vault and the wide expanse of the heavens belong to a picture of the universe, in which the magnitude of masses, the number of congregated suns and faintly glimmering nebulae, although they excite our wonder and astonishment, manifest themselves to us in apparent isolation, and as utterly devoid of all evidence of their being the scenes of organic life. Thus, even in the earliest physical views of mankind, heaven and earth have been separated and opposed to one another as an upper and lower portion of space. If, then, a picture of nature were to correspond to the requirements of contemplation by the senses, it ought to begin with a delineation of our native earth. It should depict, first, the terrestrial planet as to its size and form; its increasing density and heat at increasing depths in its superimposed solid and liquid strate; the separation of sea and land, and the vital forms animating both, developed in the cellular tissues of plants and animals; the atmospheric ocean, with its waves and currents, through which pierce the forest-crowned summits of our mountain chains. After this delineation of purely telluric relations, the eye would rise to the celestial regions, and the Earth would then, as the well-known seat of organic development, be considered as a planet, occupying a place in the series of those heavenly bodies which circle round one of the innumerable host of self-luminous stars. This succession of ideas indicates the course pursued in the earliest stages of perceptive contemplation, and reminds us of the ancient conception of the "sea-girt disk of earth," supporting the vault of heaven. It begins to exercise in action p 83 at the spot where it originated, and passes from the consideration of the known to the unknown, of the near to the distant. It corresponds with the method pursued in our elementary works on astronomy (and which is so admirable in a mathematical point of view), of proceeding from the apparent to the real movements of the heavenly bodies.
Another course of ideas must, however, be pursued in a work which proposes merely to give an exposition of what is known — of what may in the present state of our knowledge be regarded as certain, or as merely probable in a greater or lesser degree — and does not enter into a consideration of the proofs on which such results have been based. Here, therefore, we do not proceed from the subjective point of view of human interests. The terrestrial must be treated only as grand and free, uninfluenced by motives of proximity, social sympathy, or relative utility. A physical cosmography — a picture of the universe — does not begin, therefore, with the picture of the universe — does not begin, therefore, with the terrestrial, but with that which fills the regions of space. But as the sphere of contemplation contracts in dimension our perception of the richness of individual parts, the fullness of physical phenomena, and of the heterogeneous properties of matter becomes enlarged. From the regions in which we recognize ony the dominion of the laws of attraction, we descend to our own planet, and to the intricate play of terrestrial forces. The method here described for the delineation of nature is opposed to that which mst be pursued in establishing conclusive results. The one enumerates what the other demonstrates.
Man learns to know the external world through the organs of the senses. Phenomena of light proclaim the existence of matter in remotest space, and the eye is thus made the medium through which we may contemplate the universe. The discovery of telescopic vision more than two centuries ago, has transmitted to latest generations a power whose limits are as yet unattained.
The first and most general consideration of the Cosmos is that of the 'contents of space' — the distribution of matter, or of creation, as we are wont to designate the assemblage of all that is and ever will be developed. We see matter either agglomerated into rotating, revolving spheres of different density and size, or scattered through space in the form of self-luminous vapor. If we consider first the cosmical vapor dispersed in definite nebulous spots, its state of aggregation will p 84 appear constantly to vary, sometimes appearing separated into round or elliptical disks, single or in pairs, occasionally connected by a thread of light; while, at another time, these nebulae occur in forms of larger dimensions, and are either elongated, or variously branched or fan-shaped or appear like well-defined rings, including a dark interior. It is conjectured that these bodies are undergoing variously developed formative processes, as the cosmical vapor becomes condensed in conformity with the laws of attraction, either round one or more of the nuclei. Between two and three thousand of such unresolvable nebulae, in which the most powerful telescopes have hitherto been unable to distinguish the presence of stars, have been counted, and their positions determined.
The genetic evolution — that perpetual state of development which seems to affect this portion of the regions of space — has led philosophical observers to the discovery of the analogy existing among organic phenomena. As in our forests we see the same kind of tree in all the various stages of its growth, and are thus enabled to form an idea of progressive, vital development, so do we also in the great garden of the universe, recognise the most different phases of sidereal formation. The process of condensation, which formed a part of the doctrines of Anaximenes and of the Ionian School, appears to be going on before our eyes. This subject of investigation and conjecture is especially attractive to the imagination, for in the study of the animated circles of nature, and of the action of all the moving forces of the universe, the charm that exercises the most powerful influence on the mind is derived less from a knowledge of that which 'is' than from a perception of that which 'will be', even though the latter be nothing more than a new condition of a known material existence; for of actual creation, of origin, the beginning of existence from non-existence, we have no experience, and can therefore form no conception.
A comparison of the various causes influencing the development manifested by the greater or less degree of condensation in the interior of nebulae, no less than a successive course of direct observations, have led to the belief that changes of form have been recognized first in Andromeda, next in the constallation Argo, and in the isolated filamentous portion of the nebula in Orion. But want of uniformity in the power of the instruments employed, different conditions of our atmosphere, and other optical relations, render a part of the results invalid as historical evidence.
p 85 'Nebulous stars' must not be confounded either with irregularly-shaped nebulous spots, properly so called, whose separate parts have an unequal degree of brightness (and which may, perhaps, become concentrated into stars as their circumference contracts), nor with the so-called planetary nebulae, whose circular or slightly oval disks manifest in all their parts a perfectly uniform degree of faint light. 'Nebulous stars' are not merely accidental bodies projected upon a nebulous ground, but are a part of the nebulous matter constituting one mass with the body which it surrounds. The not unfrequently considerable magnitude of their apparent diameter, and the remote distance from which they are revealed to us, show that both the planetary nebulae and the nebulous stars must be of enormous dimensions. New and ingenious considerations of the different influence exercised by distance* on the intensity of light of a disk of appreciable diameter, and of a single self-luminous point, render it not improbable that the planetary nebulae are very remote nebulous stars, in which the difference between the central body and the surrounding nebulous covering can no longer be detected by our telescopic instruments.