FOOTNOTES:
[1197] Dodd, Jefferson Davis, p. 233.
[1198] See ante, p. 192.
[1199] Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 22, 1864.
[1200] The Index, Feb. 18, 1864, p. 105.
[1201] The Index, March 24, 1864, p. 189, quoting the Reader for March 19.
[1202] The first Southern meeting in England I have found record of was one reported in the Spectator, Nov. 16, 1861, to honour Yancey on his arrival. It was held by the Fishmongers of London. Yancey was warmly received and appealed to his hosts on the ground that the South was the best buyer of English goods.
[1203] The 134 meetings here listed represent by no means all held, for Goldwin Smith estimated at least 500 after the beginning of 1862. (The Civil War in America, London, 1866.) The list may be regarded as an analysis of the more important, attracting the attention of The Liberator and of Adams.
[1204] At a banquet given to Thompson in 1863 he was declared by Bright to have been the "real liberator of the slaves in the English colonies," and by P.A. Taylor as, by his courage "when social obloquy and personal danger had to be incurred for the truth's sake," having rendered great services "to the cause of Abolition in America."
[1205] The Liberator, Jan. 15, 1864. Letter to James Buffum, of Lynn, Dec. 10, 1863.
[1206] Goldwin Smith's pamphlet: "The Civil War in America: An Address read at the last meeting of the Manchester Union and Emancipation Society" (held on January 26, 1866), pays especial tribute to Thomas Bayley Potter, M.P., stating "you boldly allied yourself with the working-men in forming this association." Smith gives a five-page list of other leading members, among whom, in addition to some Northern friends already named, are to be noted Thomas Hughes, Duncan McLaren, John Stuart Mill. There are eleven noted "Professors," among them Cairnes, Thorold Rogers, and Fawcett. The publicity committee of this society during three years had issued and circulated "upwards of four hundred thousand books, pamphlets, and tracts." Here, as previously, the activities of Americans in England are not included. Thus George Francis Train, correspondent of the New York Herald, made twenty-three speeches between January, 1861, and March, 1862. ("Union Speeches in England.")
[1207] For text of Lincoln's pardon see Trevelyan, Bright, p. 296. Lincoln gave the pardon "especially as a public mark of the esteem held by the United States of America for the high character and steady friendship of the said John Bright...." The names of leading friends of the South have been given in Chapter XV.
[1208] This was a commonplace of American writing at the time and long after. A Rev. C.B. Boynton published a book devoted to the thesis that England and France had united in a "policy" of repressing the development of America and Russia (English and French Neutrality and the Anglo-French Alliance in their relations to the United States and Russia, Cincinnati, C.F. Vest & Co., 1864). Boynton wrote: "You have not come to the bottom of the conduct of Great Britain, until you have touched that delicate and real foundation cause--we are too large and strong a nation" (Preface, p. 3). The work has no historical importance except that it was thought worth publication in 1864.
[1209] Lyons Papers. July 16, 1864. Copy.
[1210] Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 23, 1864.
[1211] June 3, 1864.
[1212] The Times, August 4, 1864. Letters dated June 27 and July 5, 1864.
[1213] A Cycle of Adams' Letters, II, p. 126. Henry Adams to his brother, May 13, 1864. "The current is dead against us, and the atmosphere so uncongenial that the idea of the possibility of our success is not admitted."
[1214] Ibid., p. 136. Henry Adams to his brother, June 3, 1864.
[1215] The Index, Feb. 19, 1863, p. 265.
[1216] This was written immediately after the battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but the tone complained of was much more marked in 1864.
[1217] The Times average of editorials on the Civil War ran two in every three days until May, 1864, and thereafter one in every three days.
[1218] Russell wrote to John Bigelow, March 8, 1865: "You know, perhaps, that, as I from the first maintained the North must win, I was tabooed from dealing with American questions in the Times even after my return to England, but en revanche I have had my say in the Army and Navy Gazette, which I have bought, every week, and if one could be weak and wicked enough to seek for a morbid gratification amid such ruins and blood, I might be proud of the persistence with which I maintained my opinions against adverse and unanimous sentiment" (Bigelow, Retrospections, Vol. II, p. 361). Also on June 5, 1865, Russell wrote in his diary: "...had the Times followed my advice, how different our position would be--not only that of the leading journal, but of England. If ever I did State service, it was in my letters from America." (Atkins, Life of W.H. Russell, Vol. II, p. 115.) See also Bigelow, Retrospections, I, pp. 344-45. Russell was editor of the Gazette on its first appearance as a weekly, January 6, 1860, but left it to go to America. On his return he settled down to his editorial task in November, 1862, and thereafter, throughout the war, the Gazette may be regarded as reflecting his views. His entire letters from America to the Times constitute a most valuable picture of the months preceding the outbreak of war, but the contempt poured on the Northern army for its defeat at Bull Run made Russell much disliked in the North. This dislike was bitterly displayed in a pamphlet by Andrew D. White ("A Letter to William Howard Russell, LL.D., on passages in his 'Diary North and South'"), published in London in 1863.
[1219] June 25, 1864.
[1220] The Army and Navy Gazette, July 30, 1864.
[1221] Ibid., June 25, 1864.
[1222] Ibid., July 16, 1864. Similar articles and editorials might be quoted from many of the more important papers, but the Times and the Gazette will suffice as furnishing the keynote. I have not examined in detail the files of the metropolitan press beyond determining their general attitude on the Civil War and for occasional special references. Such examination has been sufficient, however, to warrant the conclusion that the weight of the Times in influencing opinion was very great. Collating statistics given in:
(1) Grant's The Newspaper Press; (2) in a speech in
Parliament by Edward Banes in 1864 (Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXV,
p. 295); and (3) in Parliamentary Papers, 1861, Commons,
Vol. XXXIV, "Return of the Registered Newspapers in the
United Kingdom ... from 30 June, 1860, to 30 June, 1861," the
following facts of circulation are derived:
(A) Daily Papers:
(1) The Telegraph (evening), 150,000 (neutral).
(2) The Standard (morning and evening), 130,000 (Southern).
Under the same management was also The Herald (morning), but with
small circulation (Southern).
(3) The Times (morning), 70,000 (Southern). Grant says: "The
prestige of the Times was remarkable. The same articles appearing
in other papers would not produce the same effect as in the Times."
Of Delane, the editor, Grant declared "His name is just as well-known
... throughout the civilized world as that of any of our
European kings.... The Times may, indeed, be called the Monarch
of the Press." (Grant, II, p. 53.)
(4) The Morning Advertiser (circulation uncertain, probably 50,000),
but very largely taken in the trades, in public-houses, and in the
Clubs (neutral).
(5) The Daily News (morning), 6,000 (Northern).
(6) The Morning Star, 5,500 (but with evening edition 10,000)
(Northern). Grant says that contrary to general belief, John Bright
was never a shareholder but at times raised money to meet deficits.
The Star was regarded as an anti-British paper and was very unpopular.
(7) The Morning Post, 4,500 (Southern). It was regarded as
Palmerston's organ.
(8) The Morning Chronicle. Very small circulation in the 'sixties
(neutral).
(B) Weekly Papers.--No approximate circulation figures are available,
but these papers are placed by Grant in supposed order of subscribers.
(1) Reynolds' Weekly. Circulation upwards of 350,000. A penny
paper, extreme Liberal in politics, and very popular in the manufacturing
districts (Northern).
(2) John Bull (Southern). "The country squire's paper."
(3) The Spectator (Northern).
(4) The Saturday Review (Southern).
(5) The Economist (Neutral).
(6) The Press and St. James' Chronicle. Small circulation (Southern).
In addition to British newspapers listed above as Northern in sentiment
The Liberator names for Great Britain as a whole Westminster
Review, Nonconformist, British Standard, Birmingham Post, Manchester
Examiner, Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury, Belfast Whig, and some
few others of lesser importance. (Liberator, June 30, 1863.)
The attitude of the Manchester Guardian seemed to The Liberator to
be like that of the Times.
[1223] The Index, April 14, 1864, p. 231.
[1224] August 8, 1864.
[1225] Sept. 3, 1864.
[1226] Sept. 20 and 22, 1864.
[1227] Sept. 24, 1864.
[1228] Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Sept. 16, 1864.
[1229] General McClellan, the nominee of the convention, modified this in his letter of acceptance.
[1230] Oct. 10, 1864.
[1231] Nov. 10, 1864.
[1232] Nov. 12, 1864.
[1233] Ibid.
[1234] According to The Index, the French press was more divided than was the London press in portrayal of military events in America. The Siècle and the Opinion Nationale pictured Sherman as about to capture Atlanta. Readers of the Constitutionel, Patrie, Moniteur, and La France "know quite well that Sherman has neither occupied the centre, the circumference, nor, indeed, any part of the defences of Atlanta; and that he was completely defeated by General Hood on July 22." (Index, Aug. 18, 1864, p. 522.) The Paris correspondent wrote, October 19, after the news was received of Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley:
"The Siècle is triumphant. According to this humanitarian journal, whose sole policy consists in the expression of a double hatred, part of which it bestows on the priests, and part on the slave-dealers, the American contest has assumed its last phase, the Confederates are running in breathless haste to demand pardon, and true patriotism is at last to meet with its reward. This great and noble result will be due to the Northern generals, who have carried military glory to so high a pitch without at the same time compromising American Democracy!
"Your readers will doubtless consider that the writer of the above lines undertakes to speak on a subject of which he knows nothing; but what will they say of a writer who, in the same journal, thus expresses himself relative to the issues of the coming election?
'Lincoln being elected, the following will be the results: The South will lose courage and abandon the contest; the lands reduced to barrenness by servile labour will be again rendered productive by the labour of the freeman; the Confederates, who know only how to fight, and who are supported by the sweat of others, will purify and regenerate themselves by the exercise of their own brains and of their own hands....'
"These strange remarks conclude with words of encouragement to the robust-shouldered, iron-fronted, firm-lipped Lincoln, and prayers for the welfare of the American brethren.
"You will not easily credit it, but this article--a very masterpiece of delirium and absurdity--bears the signature of one of the most eminent writers of the day, M. Henri Martin, the celebrated historian of France. (Index, Oct. 20, 1864, p. 667.)
A week later The Index was vicious in comment upon the "men and money" pouring out of Germany in aid of the North. German financiers, under the guise of aiding emigration, were engaged in the prosperous business of "selling white-skinned Germans to cut Southern throats for the benefit, as they say, of the poor blacks." (Oct. 27, 1864, p. 685.) This bitter tone was indulged in even by the Confederate Secretary of State. Benjamin wrote to Slidell, September 20, 1864, that France was wilfully deceiving the South by professions of friendship. The President, he stated, "could not escape the painful conviction that the Emperor of the French, knowing that the utmost efforts of this people are engrossed in the defence of their homes against an atrocious warfare waged by greatly superior numbers, has thought the occasion opportune for promoting his own purposes, at no greater cost than a violation of his faith and duty toward us." (Richardson, II, p. 577.)
[1235] e.g., Meeting of Glasgow Union and Emancipation Society, Oct. 11, 1864. (The Liberator, Nov. 4, 1864.)
[1236] Russell Papers, Oct. 24, 1864.
[1237] Ibid., Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1864.
[1238] Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 19, 1864. Lyons reached London December 27, and never returned to his post in America. Lyons' services to the friendly relations of the United States and Great Britain were of the greatest. He upheld British dignity yet never gave offence to that of America; he guarded British interests but with a wise and generous recognition of the difficulties of the Northern Government. No doubt he was at heart so unneutral as to hope for Northern success, even though at first sharing in the view that there was small possibility of reunion, but this very hope--unquestionably known to Seward and to Lincoln--frequently eased dangerous moments in the relations with Great Britain, and was in the end a decided asset to the Government at home.
[1239] Nov. 26, 1864.
[1240] Nov. 22, 1864.
[1241] The gradual change in Punch's representation of a silly-faced Lincoln to one which bore the stamp of despotic ferocity is an interesting index of British opinion during the war. By 1864 those who watched his career had come to respect Lincoln's ability and power though as yet wholly unappreciative of his still greater qualities.
[1242] The Liberator, Sept. 23, 1864. Letter from T.H. Barker to Garrison, August 27, 1864.
[1243] Ibid., Nov. 4, 1864.
[1244] The Index, Sept. 29, 1864, p. 618, describing the meeting at Ashton.
[1245] The Liberator, Nov. 4, 1864.
[1246] The Index, Nov. 3, 1864, p. 699.
[1247] The Liberator, Nov. 4, 1864.
[1248] The Index, Nov. 10, 1864, p. 713.
[1249] F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Slidell, Mason and Mann to Russell, Nov. 11, 1864, Paris. Replies were received from England, France, Sweden and the Papal States. (Mason Papers, Mason to Slidell, Jan. 4, 1865).
[1250] F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Draft. Russell to the "Commissioners of the so-called Confederate States," Nov. 25, 1864.
[1251] Dec. 1, 1864.
[1252] A Cycle of Adams' Letters, II, p. 207. Henry Adams to his brother, Oct. 21, 1864.
[1253] See ante, p. 233.
[1254] Nov. 12, 1864.
[1255] Dec. 22, 1864.
[1256] Dec. 26, 1864. But this was in reality a mere "keeping up courage" editorial. See Ch. XVIII, p. 300.
[1257] That this was very effective championship is shown by Henry Adams' letter to his brother, Dec. 16, 1864. (A Cycle of Adams' Letters, II, p. 232.) "Popular opinion here declares louder than ever that Sherman is lost. People are quite angry at his presumption in attempting such a wild project. The interest felt in his march is enormous, however, and if he arrives as successfully as I expect, at the sea, you may rely upon it that the moral effect of his demonstration on Europe will be greater than that of any other event of the war."
[1258] State Department, Eng, Adams to Seward, Dec. 16, 1864. Adams expressed to Seward doubts as to the propriety of his receiving such deputations and making replies to them. The Index (Dec. 22, 1864, p. 808) was "indignant" that Adams should presume to "hector and threaten" England through his replies. But Adams continued to receive deputations.
[1259] Delane's position on the Civil War and the reasons for the importance of Savannah to him, personally, are described in Ch. XVIII.
[1260] Jan. 9, 1865.
"I think you need not trouble yourself about England. At this moment opinion seems to have undergone a complete change, and our people and indeed our Government is more moderately disposed than I have ever before known it to be. I hear from a member of the Government that it is believed that the feeling between our Cabinet and the Washington Government has been steadily improving[1261]."
Thus wrote Bright to Sumner in the last week of January, 1865. Three weeks later he again wrote in reassurance against American rumours that Europe was still planning some form of intervention to save the South: "All parties and classes here are resolved on a strict neutrality[1262]...." This was a correct estimate. In spite of a temporary pause in the operations of Northern armies and of renewed assertions from the South that she "would never submit," British opinion was now very nearly unanimous that the end was near. This verdict was soon justified by events. In January, 1865, Wilmington, North Carolina, was at last captured by a combined sea and land attack. Grant, though since midsummer, 1864, held in check by Lee before Petersburg, was yet known to be constantly increasing the strength of his army, while his ability to strike when the time came was made evident by the freedom with which his cavalry scoured the country about the Confederate capital, Richmond--in one raid even completely encircling that city. Steadily Lee's army lost strength by the attrition of the siege, by illness and, what was worse, by desertion since no forces could be spared from the fighting front to recover and punish the deserters. Grant waited for the approach of spring, when, with the advance northwards of the army at Savannah, the pincers could be applied to Lee, to end, it was hoped, in writing finis to the war.
From December 20, 1864, to February 1, 1865, Sherman remained in Savannah, renewing by sea the strength of his army. On the latter date he moved north along the coast, meeting at first no resistance and easily overrunning the country. Columbia, capital of South Carolina, was burned. Charleston was evacuated, and it was not until March, in North Carolina, that any real opposition to the northward progress was encountered. Here on the sixteenth and the nineteenth, Johnston, in command of the weak Southern forces in North Carolina, made a desperate effort to stop Sherman, but without avail, and on March 23, Sherman was at Goldsboro, one hundred and sixty miles south of Richmond, prepared to cut off the retreat of Lee when Grant should at last take up an energetic offensive.
In the last week of March, Grant began cutting off supplies to Richmond, thus forcing Lee, if he wished still to protect the Southern capital, to come out of his lines at Petersburg and present an unfortified front. The result was the evacuation of Petersburg and the abandonment of Richmond, Jefferson Davis and his Government fleeing from the city on the night of April 2. Attempting to retreat southwards with the plan of joining Johnston's army, Lee, on April 9, found his forces surrounded at Appomattox and surrendered. Nine days later, on April 18, Johnston surrendered to Sherman at Durham, North Carolina. It was the end of the war and of the Confederacy.
THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS-HABET!
Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"
The rapidity with which Southern resistance in arms crumbled in 1865 when once Sherman and Grant were under way no doubt startled foreign observers, but in British opinion, at least, the end had been foreseen from the moment Sherman reached the sea at Savannah. The desperate courage of the South was admired, but regarded as futile. Equally desperate and futile was the last diplomatic effort of the Confederate agents in Europe, taking the form of an offer to abolish slavery in return for recognition. The plan originated with Benjamin, Southern Secretary of State, was hesitatingly approved by Davis[1263], and was committed to Mason for negotiation with Great Britain. Mason, after his withdrawal from London, had been given duplicate powers in blank for any point to which emergencies might send him, thus becoming a sort of Confederate Commissioner at Large to Europe. Less than any other representative abroad inclined to admit that slavery was other than a beneficent and humane institution, it was felt advisable at Richmond not only to instruct Mason by written despatch, but by personal messenger also of the urgency of presenting the offer of abolition promptly and with full assurance of carrying it into effect. The instruction was therefore entrusted to Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana, and he arrived in Paris early in March, 1865, overcame Mason's unwillingness to carry such an offer to England, and accompanied the latter to London.
The time was certainly not propitious, for on the day Mason reached London there came the news of the burning of Columbia and the evacuation of Charleston. Mason hesitated to approach Palmerston, but was pressed by Kenner who urged action on the theory that Great Britain did not wish to see a reconstruction of the Union[1264]. Slidell, in Paris, on receiving Mason's doubts, advised waiting until the Emperor had been consulted, was granted an interview and reported Napoleon III as ready as ever to act if England would act also, but as advising delay until more favourable news was received from America[1265]. But Mason's instructions did not permit delay; he must either carry them out or resign--and Kenner was at his elbow pressing for action. On March 13, therefore, Mason wrote to Palmerston asking for a private interview and was promptly granted one for the day following.
Both personal disinclination to the proposal of abolition and judgment that nothing would come of it made Mason cautious in expressing himself to Palmerston. Mason felt that he was stultifying his country in condemning slavery. Hence in roundabout language, "with such form of allusion to the concession we held in reserve, as would make him necessarily comprehend it[1266]," and turning again and again to a supposed "latent, undisclosed obstacle[1267]" to British recognition, Mason yet made clear the object of his visit. The word slavery was not mentioned by him, but Palmerston promptly denied that slavery in the South had ever been, or was now, a barrier to recognition; British objections to recognition were those which had long since been stated, and there was nothing "underlying" them. On March 26, Mason called on the Earl of Donoughmore, a Tory friend of the South with whom he had long been in close touch, and asked whether he thought Palmerston's Government could be induced by a Southern abolition of slavery to recognize the Confederacy. The reply was "that the time had gone by now...." This time the words "slavery" and "abolition" were spoken boldly[1268], and Donoughmore was positive that if, in the midsummer of 1863, when Lee was invading Pennsylvania, the South had made its present overture, nothing could have prevented British recognition. The opinion clashed with Mason's own conviction, but in any case no more was to be hoped, now, from his overture. Only a favourable turn in the war could help the South.
There was no public knowledge in London of this "last card" Southern effort in diplomacy, though there were newspaper rumours that some such move was on foot, but with a primary motive of restoring Southern fighting power by putting the negroes in arms. British public attention was fixed rather upon a possible last-moment reconciliation of North and South and a restored Union which should forget its domestic troubles in a foreign war. Momentarily somewhat of a panic overcame London society and gloomy were the forebodings that Great Britain would be the chosen enemy of America. Like rumours were afloat at Washington also. The Russian Minister, Stoeckl, reported to his Government that he had learned from "a sure source" of representations made to Jefferson Davis by Blair, a prominent Unionist and politician of the border state of Maryland, looking to reconstruction and to the sending by Lincoln of armies into Canada and Mexico. Stoeckl believed such a war would be popular, but commented that "Lincoln might change his mind[1269] to-morrow." In London the Army and Navy Gazette declared that Davis could not consent to reunion and that Lincoln could not offer any other terms of peace, but that a truce might be patched up on the basis of a common aggression against supposed foreign enemies[1270]. Adams pictured all British society as now convinced that the end of the war was near, and bitter against the previous tone and policy of such leaders of public opinion as the Times, adding that it was being "whispered about that if the feud is reconciled and the Union restored, and a great army left on our hands, the next manifestation will be one of hostility to this country[1271]."
The basis of all this rumour was Blair's attempt to play the mediator. He so far succeeded that on January 31, 1865, Lincoln instructed Seward to go to Fortress Monroe to meet "commissioners" appointed by Davis. But Lincoln made positive in his instructions three points:
(1) Complete restoration of the Union.
(2) No receding on emancipation.
(3) No cessation of hostilities "short of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government."
A few days later the President decided that his own presence was desirable and joined his Secretary of State in the "Hampton Roads Conference" of February 3. It quickly appeared that the Confederates did indeed hope to draw the North into a foreign war for a "traditional American object," using the argument that after such a war restoration of the Union would be easily accomplished. The enemy proposed was not Great Britain but France, and the place of operations Mexico. There was much discussion of this plan between Seward and Stephens, the leading Southern Commissioner, but Lincoln merely listened, and when pressed for comment stuck fast to his decision that no agreement whatever would be entered into until the South had laid down its arms. The Southerners urged that there was precedent for an agreement in advance of cessation of hostilities in the negotiations between Charles I and the Roundheads. Lincoln's reply was pithy: "I do not profess to be posted in history. On all such matters I turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I is that he lost his head in the end[1272]."
When news of the holding of this conference reached England there occurred a panic on the Stock Exchange due to the uncertainty created by the prospect of an immediate end of the American War. "The consternation," wrote Adams, "was extraordinary[1273]." What did the United States intend to do? "The impression is now very general that peace and restoration at home are synonymous with war with this country." There existed an "extraordinary uneasiness and indefinite apprehension as to the future." So reported Adams to Seward; and he advised that it might be well for the United States "to consider the question how far its policy may be adapted to quiet this disturbance"; due allowance should be made for the mortification of those leaders who had been so confident of Southern victory and for expressions that might now fall from their lips; it was possible that reassurances given by the United States might aid in the coming elections in retaining the Government in power--evidently, in Adams' opinion, a result to be desired[1274].
Adams' advice as to the forthcoming elections was but repetition of that given earlier and with more emphasis[1275]. Apparently Seward was then in no mood to act on it, for his reply was distinctly belligerent in tone, recapitulating British and Canadian offences in permitting the enemy to use their shores, and asserting that the measures now proposed of abrogating the reciprocity treaty of 1854 with Canada and the agreement of 1817 prohibiting armaments on the Great Lakes, were but defensive measures required to protect American soil[1276]. These matters Adams had been instructed to take up with Russell, but with discretion as to time and he had ventured to postpone them as inopportune. Professing entire agreement with the justice of Seward's complaints he nevertheless wrote that to press them "at this moment would be only playing into the hands of the mischief-makers, and disarming our own friends[1277]." The day before this was written home Seward, at Washington, on March 8, recalled his instruction as to the agreement of 1817, stating that Russell might be informed the United States had no intention of increasing its armaments on the Great Lakes[1278].
Thus there were incidents offering ground for a British excitement over a prospective war with America, even though no such intention was seriously entertained by the North. The British Government did not share this fear, but Delane, of the Times, kept it alive in the public mind, and indeed was sincere in efforts to arouse his readers to the danger. "I do not know what grounds Delane has for it," wrote W.H. Russell to his American friend Bigelow, "but he is quite sure Uncle Samuel is about to finish off the dreadful Civil War with another war with us scarcely less horrible[1279]." Governmental circles, however, belittled the agitation. Burnley, temporarily representing England at Washington, was assured by Seward, and so reported, that all these rumours of a foreign war were of Southern origin, had in fact been actually elaborated at the Hampton Roads Conference, but were perfectly understood by the North as but part of the Southern game, and that the Southern offer had been flatly refused[1280]. In a parliamentary debate in the Commons on March 13, arising out of governmental estimates for military expenditures in Canada, opportunity was given for a discussion of relations with America. A few Members gave voice to the fear of war, but the general tone of the debate was one of confidence in the continuance of peaceful relations. Bright, in a vigorous and witty speech, threw right and left criticisms of Parliament, the Press, and individuals, not sparing members of the Government, but expressed the utmost confidence in the pacific policy of Lincoln. As one known to be in close touch with America his words carried weight[1281]. Palmerston gave assurances that the present relations between the two Governments were perfectly friendly and satisfactory. The effect of the debate, reported Adams, was to quiet the panic[1282], yet at the same time England was now awake to and somewhat alarmed by, America's "prodigious development of physical power during the war." To quiet this, Adams recommended "prudence and moderation in tone[1283]."
Thus the actual cessation of hostilities in America and the possible effect of this event on foreign relations had been for some time anticipated and estimated in Great Britain[1284]. The news of Lee's surrender, therefore, caused no great surprise since the Times and other papers had been preparing the public for it[1285]. Newspaper comment on the event followed closely that of the Times, rendering honour to the militant qualities of the South and to Lee, but writing finis to the war:
"Such is the end of the great army which, organized by the extraordinary genius of one man, aided by several other commanders of eminent ability, has done such wonders in this war. Not even the Grand Army of Napoleon himself could count a series of more brilliant victories than the force which, raised chiefly from the high-spirited population of Virginia, has defeated so many invasions of the State, and crushed the hopes of so many Northern generals. Chief and soldiers have now failed for the first and last time. They were victorious until victory was no longer to be achieved by human valour, and then they fell with honour[1286]."
The people of the North, also, were complimented for their slowly developed but ultimate ability in war, and especially for "a patience, a fortitude, and an energy which entitle them to rank among the very first of military nations[1287]." No one remained to uphold the Southern banner in Europe save the Confederate agents, and, privately, even they were hopeless. Mason, it is true, asserted, as if bolstering his own courage, that "this morning's" news did not mean an overwhelming disaster; it could not be wholly true; even if true it must mean peace on the basis of separation; finally, "5th. I know that no terms of peace would be accepted that did not embrace independence." But at the conclusion of this letter he acknowledged:
"I confess that all this speculation rests on, what I assume, that Lee surrendered only in expectation of a peace derived from his interview with Grant--and that no terms of peace would be entertained that did not rest on independence[1288]."
But Slidell saw more clearly. He replied:
"I cannot share your hopefulness. We have seen the beginning of the end. I, for my part, am prepared for the worst. With Lee's surrender there will soon be an end to our regular organized armies and I can see no possible good to result from a protracted guerilla warfare. We are crushed and must submit to the yoke. Our children must bide their time for vengeance, but you and I will never revisit our homes under our glorious flag. For myself I shall never put my foot on a soil from which flaunts the hated Stars and Stripes.... I am sick, sick at heart[1289]."
The news of Lee's surrender arrived at the same moment with that of a serious injury to Seward in a runaway accident, and in its editorial on the end of the war the Times took occasion to pay a tribute to the statesman whom it had been accustomed to berate.
"There seems to be on the part of President Lincoln a desire to conciliate vanquished fellow-citizens. Under the guidance of Mr. Seward, who has creditably distinguished himself in the Cabinet by his moderate counsels, and whose life will, we trust, be spared at this crisis to the Union, he may by gentle measures restore tranquillity, and perhaps, before his term of office expires, calm in some degree the animosities which have been raised by these years of war[1290]."
Nor was this insincere, for Seward had, first in the estimate of British statesmen, more slowly in the press and with the public, come to be regarded in an aspect far different from that with which he was generally viewed in 1861. There was real anxiety at the reports of Seward's accident, but when, in less than a week, there was received also the news of the assassination of Lincoln and of the brutal attack on Seward, all England united in expressions of sympathy and horror. "Few events of the present century," wrote Adams, "have created such general consternation and indignation[1291]."