Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective for its appeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in international law. On the same day that Lewis' memorandum was circulated, there appeared a communication in the Times by "Historicus," on "The International Doctrine of Recognition," outlining in briefer form exactly those international law arguments presented by Lewis, and advocating a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality. "Historicus" was William Vernon Harcourt, husband of Lewis' stepdaughter who was also the niece of Clarendon. Evidently the family guns were all trained on Russell[816]. "Historicus" drove home the fact that premature action by a neutral was a "hostile act" and ought to be resented by the "Sovereign State" as a "breach of neutrality and friendship[817]."
Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon's proposal the Cabinet crisis was renewed and even more sharply than on October 23. The French offer was not actually presented until November 10[818]. On the next two days the answer to be made received long discussion in the Cabinet. Lewis described this to Clarendon, prefacing his account by stating that Russell had heard by telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg to the effect that Russia would not join but would support English-French proposals through her Minister at Washington, "provided it would not cause irritation[819]."
"Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to explain his views on the question. These were, briefly, that the recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen their hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France, Russia would reconsider her decision, act directly with France, and thus accomplish her favourite purpose of separating France and England. He therefore advised that the proposal of France should be accepted. Palmerston followed Lord John, and supported him, but did not say a great deal. His principal argument was the necessity for showing sympathy with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any chance of mitigating it [sic].
"The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who proceeded to pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a stone at it of greater or less size, except Gladstone, who supported it, and the Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who expressed no opinion. The principal objection was that the proposed armistice of six months by sea and land, involving a suspension of the commercial blockade, was so grossly unequal--so decidedly in favour of the South, that there was no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time, Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was against being a party to the representation, and he capitulated. I do not think his support was very sincere: it certainly was not hearty ... I ought to add that, after the Cabinet had come to a decision and the outline of a draft had been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular sentences on the danger of refusing the French invitation, and gave a strong support to Lord John. His support came rather late ... I proposed that we should tater le terrain at Washington and ascertain whether there was any chance of the proposal being accepted. Lord John refused this. He admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from Washington. I think his principal motive was a fear of displeasing France, and that Palmerston's principal motive was a wish to seem to support him. There is a useful article in to-day's Times throwing cold water on the invitation. I take for granted that Delane was informed of the result of the Cabinet[820]."
Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more brief account:
"Nov. 11. We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again to-morrow. I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the business of America. But I will send you definite intelligence. Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are right. Nov. 12. The United States affair has ended and not well. Lord Russell rather turned tail. He gave way without resolutely fighting out his battle. However, though we decline for the moment, the answer is put upon grounds and in terms which leave the matter very open for the future. Nov. 13. I think the French will make our answer about America public; at least it is very possible. But I hope they may not take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may themselves act in the matter. It will be clear that we concur with them, that the war should cease. Palmerston gave to Russell's proposal a feeble and half-hearted support[821]."
The reply to France was in fact immediately made public both in France and in England. It was complimentary to the Emperor's "benevolent views and humane intentions," agreed that "if the steps proposed were to be taken, the concurrence of Russia would be extremely desirable" but remarked that as yet Great Britain had not been informed that Russia wished to co-operate, and concluded that since there was no ground to hope the North was ready for the proposal it seemed best to postpone any overture until there was a "greater prospect than now exists of its being accepted by the two contending parties[822]." The argument of Russell in the Cabinet had been for acceptance without Russia though earlier he had stipulated her assistance as essential. This was due to the knowledge already at hand through a telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg, November 8, that Russia would refuse[823]. But in the answer to France it is the attitude of Russia that becomes an important reason for British refusal as, indeed, it was the basis for harmonious decision within the British Cabinet. This is not to say that had Russia acceded England also would have done so, for the weight of Cabinet opinion, adroitly encouraged by Palmerston, was against Russell and the result reached was that which the Premier wished. More important in his view than any other matter was the preservation of a united Ministry and at the conclusion of the American debate even Gladstone could write: "As to the state of matters generally in the Cabinet, I have never seen it smoother[824]."
Public opinion in England in the main heartily supported the Cabinet decision. Hammond described it as "almost universal in this country against interference[825]," an estimate justified if the more important journals are taken into account but not true of all. The Times of November 13 declared:
"We are convinced that the present is not the moment for these strong measures. There is now great reason to hope that by means of their own internal action the Americans may themselves settle their own affairs even sooner than Europe could settle them for them. We have waited so long that it would be unpardonable in us to lose the merit of our self-denial at such a moment as this.... We quite agree with Mr. Cobden that it would be cheaper to keep all Lancashire on turtle and venison than to plunge into a desperate war with the Northern States of America, even with all Europe at our back. In a good cause, and as a necessity forced upon us in defence of our honour, or of our rightful interests, we are as ready to fight as we ever were; but we do not see our duty or our interest in going blindfold into an adventure such as this. We very much doubt, more over, whether, if Virginia belonged to France as Canada belongs to England, the Emperor of the French would be so active in beating up for recruits in this American mediation league."
This was followed up two days later by an assertion that no English statesman had at any time contemplated an offer of mediation made in such a way as to lead to actual conflict with the United States[826]. On the other hand the Herald, always intense in its pro-Southern utterances, and strongly anti-Palmerston in politics, professed itself unable to credit the rumoured Cabinet decision. "Until we are positively informed that our Ministers are guilty of the great crime attributed to them," the Herald declared, "we must hope against hope that they are innocent." If guilty they were responsible for the misery of Lancashire (depicted in lurid colours):
"A clear, a sacred, an all-important duty was imposed upon them; to perform that duty would have been the pride and delight of almost any other Englishmen; and they, with the task before them and the power to perform it in their hands--can it be that they have shrunk back in craven cowardice, deserted their ally, betrayed their country, dishonoured their own names to all eternity, that they might do the bidding of John Bright, and sustain for a while the infamous tyranny of a Butler, a Seward, and a Lincoln[827]?"
In the non-political Army and Navy Gazette the returned editor, W.H. Russell, but lately the Times correspondent in America, jeered at the American uproar that might now be expected against France instead of England: "Let the Emperor beware. The scarred veteran of the New York Scarrons of Plum Gut has set his sinister or dexter eye upon him, and threatens him with the loss of his throne," but the British public must expect no lasting change of Northern attitude toward England and must be ready for a war if the North were victorious[828]. Blackwood's for November, 1862, strongly censured the Government for its failure to act. The Edinburgh for January, 1863, as strongly supported the Ministry and expanded on the fixed determination of Great Britain to keep out of the war. The Index naturally frothed in angry disappointment, continuing its attacks, as if in hopes of a reversal of Ministerial decision, even into the next year. "Has it come to this? Is England, or the English Cabinet, afraid of the Northern States? Lord Russell might contrive so to choose his excuses as not to insult at once both his country and her ally[829]." An editorial from the Richmond (Virginia) Whig was quoted with approval characterizing Russell and Palmerston as "two old painted mummies," who secretly were rejoiced at the war in America as "threatening the complete annihilation" of both sides, and expressing the conviction that if the old Union were restored both North and South would eagerly turn on Great Britain[830]. The explanation, said The Index, of British supineness was simply the pusillanimous fear of war--and of a war that would not take place in spite of the bluster of Lincoln's "hangers-on[831]." Even as late as May of the year following, this explanation was still harped upon and Russell "a statesman" who belonged "rather to the past than to the present" was primarily responsible for British inaction. "The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display of these qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless[832]."
The Index never wavered from its assumption that in the Cabinet Russell was the chief enemy of the South. Slidell, better informed, wrote: "Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have been the only member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in favour of accepting the Emperor's proposition[833]?" He had information that Napoleon had been led to expect his proposal would be accepted and was much irritated--so much so that France would now probably act alone[834]. Gladstone's attitude was a sorrow to many of his friends. Bright believed he was at last weaned from desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answer to France[835], but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone on American affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman's mind was of offering Canada to the North if she would let the South go[836]--a plan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone's reputation for good judgment, save to his correspondent.
In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with the public and in the Government that England had made no adventure of new policy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly reinforced when the first reports were received from Lyons on his arrival in America. Reaching New York on November 8 he found that even the "Conservatives" were much opposed to an offer of mediation at present and thought it would only do harm until there was a change of Government in Washington--an event still remote. Lyons himself believed mediation useless unless intended to be followed by recognition of the South and that such recognition was likewise of no value without a raising of the blockade for which he thought the British Cabinet not prepared[837]. Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's reports, his cool judgment of conditions nowhere more clearly manifested than at this juncture in comparison with his subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southern arguments. Again on November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a single Northern paper that did not repudiate foreign intervention[838]. In the South, when it was learned that France had offered to act and England had refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British feeling[839].
The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in rejection of European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling the war. It expressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy rather to animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be personally responsible. Since there had been no European offer made there was no cause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams specific instructions in case the emergency arose but there had been no reason to present these or to act upon them and the crisis once past Seward believed all danger of European meddling was over and permanently. He wrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be disturbed by Secession intrigues in Europe. They have had their day. We propose to forget them[840]." This was a wise and statesmanlike attitude and was shared by Adams in London. Whatever either man knew or guessed of the prelude to the answer to France, November 13, they were careful to accept that answer as fulfilment of Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, that Great Britain intended no change of policy[841].
So far removed was Seward's attitude toward England from that ascribed to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now up for immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally toward Lyons, that the British Minister became greatly alarmed when, shortly after his return to Washington, there developed a Cabinet controversy threatening the retirement of the Secretary of State. This was a quarrel brought on by the personal sensibilities of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and directed at Seward's conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by the tact and authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his resignation, secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refused both and in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential control which Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this controversy "I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr. Seward. We are much more likely to have a man less disposed to keep the peace than a man more disposed to do so. I should hardly have said this two years ago[842]." After the event of Seward's retention of office Russell wrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of it[843]." This is a remarkable reversal of former opinion. A better understanding of Seward had come, somewhat slowly, to British diplomats, but since his action in the Trent affair former suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone" being regarded as for home consumption, until now there was both belief in Seward's basic friendliness and respect for his abilities.
Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally dwindled to a polite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere suggestion of armistice left no open sores in the British relations with America. The projects were unknown; the refusal seemed final to Seward and was indeed destined to prove so. But of this there was no clear conception in the British Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet believed that reconquest of the South was even a remote possibility and this foretold that the day must some time come when European recognition would have to be given the Confederacy. It is this unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result of the war in America that should always be kept in mind in judging the attitude of British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Their sympathies were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in evidence during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon the expediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European nations now act in such a way as to bring to an early end a war whose result in separation was inevitable? It was the hope that such action promised good results which led Russell to enter upon his policy even though personally his sympathies were unquestionably with the North. It was, in the end, the conviction that now was not a favourable time which determined Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw his support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreover both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war and as the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers were brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's true policy was to await a return of sanity in the contestants[844].
For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most dangerous crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union. Had that plan been adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is little question that Lewis' forebodings would have been realized and war would have ensued between England and the North. But also whatever its results in other respects the independence of the South would have been established. Slavery, hated of Great Britain, would have received a new lease of life--and by British action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed that Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was but an incitement to servile war and it played no part in the final decision. Soon that proclamation was to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against any future efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was there serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American Civil War[845].
FOOTNOTES:
[734] Motley, Correspondence, II, 71. To his mother, March 16, 1862.
[735] Ibid., p. 81. Aug. 18, 1862.
[736] The Index first appeared on May 1, 1862. Nominally a purely British weekly it was soon recognized as the mouthpiece of the Confederacy.
[737] The Index, May 15, 29, June 19 and July 31, 1862.
[738] e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, contained a long report of a banquet in Sheffield attended by Palmerston and Roebuck. In his speech Roebuck asserted: "A divided America will be a benefit to England." He appealed to Palmerston to consider whether the time had not come to recognize the South. "The North will never be our friends. (Cheers.) Of the South you can make friends. They are Englishmen; they are not the scum and refuse of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don't say that; don't say that.') (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I am saying. They are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends."
[739] All American histories treat this incident at much length. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it is C.F. Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to light. See his Life of C.F. Adams, Ch. XV; Studies, Military and Diplomatic, pp. 400-412; Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity, pp. 97-106; A Crisis in Downing Street, Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, May, 1914, pp. 372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's motion of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering Ministerial policy.
[740] Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 388.
[741] U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3. Pt. I, pp. 165-168.
[742] Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 389. First printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in 1899.
[743] Ibid., p. 390.
[744] See ante, p. 32.
[745] Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 21, 1862.
[746] Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25, 1862.
[747] Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862. Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that the newspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, on consultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would only make matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the next spring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Aug. 9-21, 1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more emphatic; an offer of mediation would accomplish nothing unless backed up by force to open the Southern ports; this had always been Lyons' opinion also; before leaving for England, Lyons had told him "we ought not to venture on mediation unless we are ready to go to war." Mercier, however, was eager for action and believed that if France came forward, supported by the other Powers, especially Russia, the United States would be compelled to yield. To this Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right (Ibid., Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776).
[748] Ibid., Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was Stuart's informant.
[749] Ibid., Sept. 26, 1862. When issued on September 22, Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold, vindictive and entirely political."
[750] Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1862.
[751] The ignorance of other Cabinet members is shown by a letter from Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862, stating as if an accepted conclusion, that there should be no interference and that the war should be allowed to reach its "natural issue" (Gladstone Papers).
[752] Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Sept. 18, 1862, fixes the date of Russell's letter.
[753] Palmerston MS.
[754] Walpole, Russell, II, p. 360.
[755] Ibid., p. 361. Sept. 17, 1862.
[756] Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 18, 1862. This is the first reference by Cowley in over three months to mediation--evidence that Russell's instructions took him by surprise.
[757] Gladstone Papers.
[758] Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 22, 1862.
[759] Russell Papers.
[760] Walpole, Russell, II, p. 362. Sept. 23, 1862.
[761] Lyons Papers.
[762] Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23, 1862.
[763] Morley, Gladstone, II, p. 76.
[764] See ante, p. 40.
[765] Adams, A Crisis in Dooming Street, p. 393, giving the exact text paraphrased by Morley.
[766] Fitzmaurice, Granville, I, pp. 442-44, gives the entire letter. Sept. 27, 1862.
[767] Ibid., p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862. Fitzmaurice attributes much influence to Granville in the final decision and presumes that the Queen, also, was opposed to the plan. There is no evidence to show that she otherwise expressed herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion to Russell. As for Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would have counted for little.
[768] Russell Papers. A brief extract from this letter is printed in Walpole, Russell, II, p. 362.
[769] Palmerston MS.
[770] Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, as, summarized, (1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with England in offering good services to the United States looking towards peace. (2) Much importance attached to the adhesion of Russia. (3) Excellent chance of success. (4) Nevertheless a possible refusal by the United States, in which case, (5) recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed likely that this could be done without giving the United States a just ground of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might delay it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the political necessity of "doing something" before Parliament reassembled (Russian Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.). No. 1698.) Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to Stoeckl, together with a letter from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow expressed the opinion that one object of the British Government was to introduce at Washington a topic which would serve to accentuate the differences that were understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This seems very far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to Stoeckl was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of extreme friendship to the United States (Ibid., F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct. 3, 1862 (O.S.).)
[771] Thouvenel, Le Secret de l'Empereur, II, pp. 438-9.
[772] Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 30, 1862.
[773] Ibid., Cowley to Russell, Oct. 3, 1862.
[774] Even the Edinburgh Review for October, 1862, discussed recognition of the South as possibly near, though on the whole against such action.
[775] Palmerston MS. Walpole makes Palmerston responsible for the original plan and Russell acquiescent and readily agreeing to postpone. This study reverses the roles.
[776] Russell Papers. Also see ante p. 41. Stuart to Lyons. The letter to Russell was of exactly the same tenor.
[777] Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 6, 1862. Lyons' departure had been altered from October n to October 25.
[778] Morley, Gladstone, II, p. 79. Morley calls this utterance a great error which was long to embarrass Gladstone, who himself later so characterized it.
[779] Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 402.
[780] Bright to Sumner, October 10, 1862. Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, XLVI, p. 108. Bright was wholly in the dark as to a Ministerial project. Much of this letter is devoted to the emancipation proclamation which did not at first greatly appeal to Bright as a wise measure.
[781] The Times, October 9 and 10, while surprised that Gladstone and not Palmerston, was the spokesman, accepted the speech as equivalent to a governmental pronouncement. Then the Times makes no further comment of moment until November 13. The Morning Post (regarded as Palmerston's organ) reported the speech in full on October 9, but did not comment editorially until October 13, and then with much laudation of Gladstone's northern tour but with no mention whatever of his utterances on America.
[782] Gladstone wrote to Russell, October 17, explaining that he had intended no "official utterance," and pleaded that Spence, whom he had seen in Liverpool, did not put that construction on his words (Gladstone Papers). Russell replied, October 20. "... Still you must allow me to say that I think you went beyond the latitude which all speakers must be allowed when you said that Jeff Davis had made a nation. Negotiations would seem to follow, and for that step I think the Cabinet is not prepared. However we shall soon meet to discuss this very topic" (Ibid.)
[783] Palmerston MS. Appended to the Memorandum were the texts of the emancipation proclamation, Seward's circular letter of September 22, and an extract from the National Intelligencer of September 26, giving Lincoln's answer to Chicago abolitionists.
[784] Morley, Gladstone, II, 80, narrates the "tradition." Walpole, Twenty-five Years, II, 57, states it as a fact. Also Education of Henry Adams, pp. 136, 140. Over forty years later an anonymous writer in the Daily Telegraph, Oct. 24, 1908, gave exact details of the "instruction" to Lewis, and of those present. (Cited in Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, pp. 404-5.) C.F. Adams, Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity, Ch. III, repeats the tradition, but in A Crisis in Downing Street he completely refutes his earlier opinion and the entire tradition. The further narrative in this chapter, especially the letters of Clarendon to Lewis, show that Lewis acted solely on his own initiative.
[785] Anonymously, in the Edinburgh, for April, 1861, Lewis had written of the Civil War in a pro-Northern sense, and appears never to have accepted fully the theory that it was impossible to reconquer the South.
[786] Cited in Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 407.
[787] Derby, in conversation with Clarendon, had characterized Gladstone's speech as an offence against tradition and best practice. Palmerston agreed, but added that the same objection could be made to Lewis' speech. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 267. Palmerston to Clarendon, Oct. 20, 1862. Clarendon wrote Lewis, Oct. 24, that he did not think this called for any explanation by Lewis to Palmerston, further proof of the falsity of Palmerston's initiative. Ibid., p. 267.
[788] The Index, Oct. 16, 1862, warned against acceptance of Gladstone's Newcastle utterances as indicating Government policy, asserted that the bulk of English opinion was with him, but ignorantly interpreted Cabinet hesitation to the "favour of the North and bitter enmity to the South, which has animated the diplomatic career of Lord Russell...." Throughout the war, Russell, to The Index, was the evil genius of the Government.
[789] Palmerston MS.
[790] Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 279.
[791] Palmerston MS.
[792] Parliamentary Papers, 1863. Commons, Vol. I XII. "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America." Nos. 33 and 37. Two reports received Oct. 13 and 18, 1862. Anderson's mission was to report on the alleged drafting of British subjects into the Northern Army.
[793] Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1862.
[794] Russell Papers. Clarendon to Russell, Oct. 19, 1862.
[795] Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 20, 1862.
[796] Russell Papers. It is significant that Palmerston's organ, the Morning Post, after a long silence came out on Oct. 21 with a sharp attack on Gladstone for his presumption. Lewis was also reflected upon, but less severely.
[797] Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 265.
[798] U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 223. Adams to Seward, Oct. 24, 1862. C.F. Adams in A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 417, makes Russell state that the Government's intention was "to adhere to the rule of perfect neutrality"--seemingly a more positive assurance, and so understood by the American Minister.
[799] The Index, Oct. 23, 1862. "... while our people are starving, our commerce interrupted, our industry paralysed, our Ministry have no plan, no idea, no intention to do anything but fold their hands, talk of strict neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, and wait, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up."
[800] Russell Papers. To Russell.
[801] Ibid., To Russell, Oct. 24, 1862.
[802] Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 24, 1862.
[803] Palmerston MS. Marked: "Printed Oct. 24, 1862."
[804] Morley, Gladstone, II, 84. Morley was the first to make clear that no final decision was reached on October 23, a date hitherto accepted as the end of the Cabinet crisis. Rhodes, IV, 337-348, gives a résumé of talk and correspondence on mediation, etc., and places October 23 as the date when "the policy of non-intervention was informally agreed upon" (p. 343), Russell's "change of opinion" being also "complete" (p. 342). Curiously the dictum of Rhodes and others depends in some degree on a mistake in copying a date. Slidell had an important interview with Napoleon on October 28 bearing on an armistice, but this was copied as October 22 in Bigelow's France and the Confederate Navy, p. 126, and so came to be written into narratives of mediation proposals. Richardson, II, 345, gives the correct date. Rhodes' supposition that Seward's instructions of August 2 became known to Russell and were the determining factor in altering his intentions is evidently erroneous.
[805] Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 265.
[806] Ibid., p. 266.
[807] Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, Oct. 24, 1862. Palmerston was here writing of Italian and American affairs.
[808] Palmerston MS. Oct. 25, 1862.
[809] Russell Papers. To Russell.
[810] F.O., France, Vol. 1446. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 28, 1862. Cowley, like Lyons, was against action. He approved Drouyn de Lhuys' "hesitation." It appears from the Russian archives that France approached Russia. On October 31, D'Oubril, at Paris, was instructed that while Russia had always been anxious to forward peace in America, she stood in peculiarly friendly relations with the United States, and was against any appearance of pressure. It would have the contrary effect from that hoped for. If England and France should offer mediation Russia, "being too far away," would not join, but might give her moral support. (Russian Archives, F.O. to D'Oubril, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.). No. 320.) On the same date Stoeckl was informed of the French overtures, and was instructed not to take a stand with France and Great Britain, but to limit his efforts to approval of any agreement by the North and South to end the war. Yet Stoeckl was given liberty of action if (as Gortchakoff did not believe) the time had assuredly come when both North and South were ready for peace, and it needed but the influence of some friendly hand to soothe raging passions and to lead the contending parties themselves to begin direct negotiations (Ibid., F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.).)
[811] Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Oct. 29, 1862. Slidell's full report to Benjamin is in Richardson, II, 345.
[812] F.O., France, Vol. 1446, No. 1236. Cowley thought neither party would consent unless it saw some military advantage. (Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 31, 1862.) Morley, Gladstone, II, 84-5, speaks of the French offer as "renewed proposals of mediation." There was no renewal for this was the first proposal, and it was not one of mediation though that was an implied result.
[813] Russell Papers, Nov. 2, 1862. Monday, November 1862, was the 10th not the 11th as Palmerston wrote.
[814] Palmerston MS. Nov. 3, 1862.
[815] Gladstone Papers. The memorandum here preserved has the additional interest of frequent marginal comments by Gladstone.
[816] The letters of "Historicus" early attracted, in the case of the Trent, favourable attention and respect. As early as 1863 they were put out in book form to satisfy a public demand: Letters by Historicus on some questions of International Law, London, 1863.
[817] The Times, Nov. 7, 1862. The letter was dated Nov. 4.
[818] Parliamentary Papers, 1863, Lords, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley, Nov. 13, 1862.
[819] For substance of the Russian answer to France see ante, p. 59, note 4. D'Oubril reported Drouyn de Lhuys as unconvinced that the time was inopportune but as stating he had not expected Russia to join. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs was irritated at an article on his overtures that had appeared in the Journal de Petersbourg, and thought himself unfairly treated by the Russian Government. (Russian Archives. D'Oubril to F.O., Nov. 15, 1862 (N.S.), Nos. 1908 and 1912.)
[820] Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 268. The letter, as printed, is dated Nov. 11, and speaks of the Cabinet of "yesterday." This appears to be an error. Gladstone's account is of a two-days' discussion on Nov. 11 and 12, with the decision reached and draft of reply to France outlined on the latter date. The article in the Times, referred to by Lewis, appeared on Nov. 13.
[821] Morley, Gladstone, II, 85.
[822] Parliamentary Papers, 1863, Lords, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley, Nov. 13, 1862.
[823] F.O., Russia, Vol. 609, No. 407. Napier to Russell. The same day Napier wrote giving an account of an interview between the French Minister and Prince Gortchakoff in which the latter stated Russia would take no chances of offending the North. Ibid., No. 408.
[824] Morley, Gladstone, II ,85. To his wife, Nov. 13, 1862. Even after the answer to France there was some agitation in the Ministry due to the receipt from Stuart of a letter dated Oct. 31, in which it was urged that this was the most opportune moment for mediation because of Democratic successes in the elections. He enclosed also an account of a "horrible military reprisal" by the Federals in Missouri alleging that ten Southerners had been executed because of one Northerner seized by Southern guerillas. (Russell Papers.) The Russell Papers contain a series of signed or initialled notes in comment, all dated Nov. 14. "W." (Westbury?) refers to the "horrible atrocities," and urges that, if Russia will join, the French offer should be accepted. Gladstone wrote, "I had supposed the question to be closed." "C.W." (Charles Wood), "This is horrible; but does not change my opinion of the course to be pursued." "C.P.V." (C.P. Villiers) wrote against accepting the French proposal, and commented that Stuart had always been a strong partisan of the South.
[825] Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons, Nov. 15, 1862.
[826] The Times, Nov. 15, 1862.
[827] The Herald, Nov. 14, 1862. This paper was listed by Hotze of The Index, as on his "pay roll." Someone evidently was trying to earn his salary.
[828] Nov. 15, 1862. It is difficult to reconcile Russell's editorials either with his later protestations of early conviction that the North would win or with the belief expressed by Americans that he was constantly pro-Northern in sentiment, e.g., Henry Adams, in A Cycle of Adams' Letters, I, 14l.
[829] The Index, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 56.
[830] Ibid., Jan. 15, 1863, p. 191.
[831] Ibid., Jan. 22, 1863, p. 201.
[832] Ibid., May 28, 1863, p. 72.
[833] Mason Papers. To Mason, Nov. 28, 1862.
[834] Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, Nov. 29, 1862. This despatch is not in Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, and illustrates the gaps in that publication.
[835] Rhodes, IV, 347. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.
[836] Goldwin Smith told of this plan in 1904, in a speech at a banquet in Ottawa. He had destroyed Gladstone's letter outlining it. The Ottawa Sun, Nov. 16, 1904.
[837] Almost immediately after Lyons' return to Washington, Stoeckl learned from him, and from Mercier, also, that England and France planned to offer mediation and that if this were refused the South would be recognized. Stoeckl commented to the Foreign Office: "What good will this do?" It would not procure cotton unless the ports were forced open and a clear rupture made with the North. He thought England understood this, and still hesitated. Stoeckl went on to urge that if all European Powers joined England and France they would be merely tails to the kite and that Russia would be one of the tails. This would weaken the Russian position in Europe as well as forfeit her special relationship with the United States. He was against any joint European action. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 5-17, 1862, No. 2002.) Gortchakoff wrote on the margin of this despatch: "Je trouve son opinion très sage." If Stoeckl understood Lyons correctly then the latter had left England still believing that his arguments with Russell had been of no effect. When the news reached Washington of England's refusal of the French offer, Stoeckl reported Lyons as much surprised (Ibid., to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2170).
[838] Parliamentary Papers, 1832, Commons, Vol. LXXII, "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America." Nos. 47 and 50. Received Nov. 30 and Dec. 11. Mercier, who had been Stuart's informant about political conditions in New York, felt that he had been deceived by the Democrats. F.O., Am., Vol. 784, No. 38. Confidential, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 13, 1863.
[839] F.O., Am., Vol. 840, No. 518. Moore (Richmond) to Lyons, Dec. 4, 1862. Also F.O., Am., Vol. 844, No. 135. Bunch (Charleston) to Russell, Dec. 13, 1862. Bunch wrote of the "Constitutional hatred and jealousy of England, which are as strongly developed here as at the North. Indeed, our known antipathy to Slavery adds another element to Southern dislike."
[840] Bigelow, Retrospections, I, 579, Dec. 2, 1862. Bigelow was Consul-General at Paris, and was the most active of the Northern confidential agents abroad. A journalist himself, he had close contacts with the foreign press. It is interesting that he reported the Continental press as largely dependent for its American news and judgments upon the British press which specialized in that field, so that Continental tone was but a reflection of the British tone. Ibid., p. 443. Bigelow to Seward, Jan. 7, 1862.
[841] Lyons placed a high estimate on Adams' abilities. He wrote: "Mr. Adams shows more calmness and good sense than any of the American Ministers abroad." (Russell Papers. To Russell, Dec. 12, 1862.)
[842] Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 22. 1862.
[843] Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Jan. 3, 1863.
[844] December 1, Brunow related an interview in which Russell expressed his "satisfaction" that England and Russia were in agreement that the moment was not opportune for a joint offer to the United States. Russell also stated that it was unfortunate France had pressed her proposal without a preliminary confidential sounding and understanding between the Powers; the British Government saw no reason for changing its attitude. (Russian Archives. Brunow to F.O., Dec. 1, 1862 (N.S.), No. 1998.) There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunow knew of Russell's preliminary "soundings" of France.
[845] Various writers have treated Roebuck's motion in 1863 as the "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the error of this will be shown.