management of Indian affairs, particularly as those affairs might be concerned with the future attitude of the Cherokee Nation. The programme comprised instructions that emanated from both civil and military sources. The special Indian agents, Carruth and Martin, had been given suitable tasks to perform and the instructions handed them have already been commented upon. Personally, these two men were very much disposed to magnify the importance of their own position and to resent anything that looked like interference on the part of the military. As a matter of fact, the military men treated them with scant courtesy and made little or no provision for their comfort and convenience.342 Colonel Weer seems to have ignored, at times, their very existence. On more than one occasion, for instance, he deplored the absence of some official, accredited by the Indian Office, to take charge of what he contemptuously called "this Indian business,"343 which business, he felt, greatly complicated all military undertakings344 and was decidedly beyond the bounds of his peculiar province.345
Footnote 342: (return)Pretty good evidence of this appears in a letter, which Carruth and Martin jointly addressed to Coffin, September 4, 1862, in anticipation of the Second Indian Expedition, their idea being to guard against a repetition of some of the experiences of the first. "We wish to call your attention," wrote they, "to the necessity of our being allowed a wagon to haul our clothing, tents, etc. in the Southern expedition.
"In the last expedition we had much annoyance for the want of accommodations of our own. Unless we are always by at the moment of moving, our things are liable to be left behind, that room may be made for army baggage which sometimes accumulates amazingly....
"The cold nights of autumn and winter will overtake us in the next expedition and we ought to go prepared for them. We must carry many things, as clothing, blankets, etc."—General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862.
Footnote 345: (return)Weer, nevertheless, was not long in developing some very pronounced ideas on the subject of Indian relations. The earliest and best indication of (cont.)
The military instructions for the management of Indian affairs outlined a policy exceedingly liberal, a policy that proceeded upon the assumption that stress of circumstances had conditioned the Indian alliance with the Confederacy. This idea was explicitly conveyed in a communication from Weer, through his acting assistant adjutant-general, to John Ross, and again in the orders issued to Salomon and Judson. Ross and his people were to be given an opportunity to return to their allegiance, confident that the United States government would henceforth protect them.346 And the military commanders were invited to give their "careful attention to the delicate position" which the Indian Expedition would occupy
In its relation to the Indians. The evident desire of the government is to restore friendly intercourse with the tribes and return the loyal Indians that are with us to their homes. Great care must be observed that no unusual degree of vindictiveness be tolerated between Indian and Indian. Our policy toward the rebel portion must be a subject of anxious consideration, and its character will to a great degree be shaped by yourself (Judson) in conjunction with Colonel Salomon. No settled policy can at present be marked out. Give all questions their full share of investigation. No spirit of private vengeance should be tolerated.347
After the skirmish at Locust Grove, Colonel Weer deemed that the appropriate moment had come for approaching John Ross with suggestions that the Cherokee Nation abandon its Confederate ally and return to its allegiance to the United States government. From
Footnote 345: (return)(cont.) that is to be found in his letter of July twelfth, in which he gave his opinion of the negroes, whom he found very insolent. He proposed that the Cherokee Nation should abolish slavery by vote.
Footnote 347: (return)Phillips to Judson, June 28, 1862, ibid., 456. Orders, almost identically the same, were issued to Salomon. See Phillips to Salomon, June 27, 1862, ibid., 452.
his camp on Wolf Creek, therefore, he addressed a conciliatory communication348 to the Cherokee chief, begging the favor of an interview and offering to make full reparation for any outrages or reprisals that his men, in defiance of express orders to the contrary, might have made upon the Cherokee people through whose country they had passed.349 Weer had known for several days, indeed, ever since he first crossed the line, that the natives were thoroughly alarmed at the coming of the Indian Expedition. They feared reprisals and Indian revenge and, whenever possible, had fled out of reach of danger, many of them across the Arkansas River, taking with them what of their property they could.350 Weer had done his best to restrain his troops, especially the Indian, and had been very firm in insisting that no "outrages perpetrated after Indian fashion" should occur.351
Weer's message to Ross was sent, under a flag of truce, by Doctor Gillpatrick, a surgeon in the Indian Expedition, who had previously served under Lane.352 Ross's reply,353 although prompt, was scarcely satisfactory from Weer's standpoint. He refused pointblank the request for an interview and reminded Weer that the Cherokee Nation, "under the sanction and authority of the whole Cherokee people," had made a formal alliance with the Confederate government and
Footnote 349: (return)That there had been outrages and reprisals, Carruth and Martin admitted but they claimed that they had been committed by white men and wrongfully charged against Indians [Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 162-163].
Footnote 353: (return)Ross to Weer, July 8, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 486-487; Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. v, 549.
proposed to remain true, as had ever been its custom, to its treaty obligations. To fortify his position, he submitted documents justifying his own and tribal actions since the beginning of the war.354 Weer was naturally much embarrassed. Apparently, he had had the notion that the Indians would rush into the arms of the Union with the first appearance of a Federal soldier; but he was grievously mistaken. None the less, verbal reports that reached his headquarters on Wolf Creek restored somewhat his equanimity and gave him the impression that Ross, thoroughly anti-secessionist at heart himself, was acting diplomatically and biding his time.355 Weer referred356 the matter to Blunt for instructions at the very moment when Blunt, ignorant that he had already had communication with Ross, was urging357 him to be expeditious, since it was "desirable to return the refugee Indians now in Kansas to their homes as soon as practicable."
There were other reasons, more purely military, why a certain haste was rather necessary. Some of those reasons inspired Colonel Weer to have the country around about him well reconnoitered. On the fourteenth of July, he sent out two detachments. One, led by Major W.T. Campbell, was to examine "the alleged position of the enemy south of the Arkansas," and the other, led by Captain H.S. Greeno, to repair to Tahlequah and Park Hill.358 Campbell, before he had advanced far, found out that there was a strong Confederate force at Fort Davis359 so he halted at Fort Gibson and was
Footnote 354: (return)Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 487. The documents are to be found accompanying Weer's letter, ibid., 489-505.
there joined by Weer. Meanwhile, Greeno with his detachment of one company of whites and fifty Cherokee Indians had reached Tahlequah and had gone into camp two and one-half miles to the southward.360 He was then not far from Park Hill, the residence of Chief Ross. All the way down he had been on the watch for news; but the only forces he could hear of were some Indian, who were believed to be friendly to the Union although ostensibly still serving the Confederacy. It was a time of crisis both with them and with him; for their leaders had just been summoned by Colonel Cooper, now in undisputed command north of the Canadian, to report immediately for duty at Fort Davis, his headquarters. Whatever was to be done would have to be done quickly. There was no time to lose and Greeno decided the matter for all concerned by resorting to what turned out to be a very clever expedient. He made the commissioned men all prisoners of war361 and then turned his attention to the Principal Chief, who was likewise in a dilemma, he having received a despatch from Cooper ordering him, under authority of treaty provisions and "in the name of President Davis, Confederate States of America, to issue a proclamation calling on all Cherokee Indians over 18 and under 35 to come forward and assist in protecting the country from invasion."362 Greeno thought the matter over and concluded there was nothing for him to do but to capture Ross also and to release him, subsequently, on parole. These things he did and there were many people who thought, both then and long
Footnote 360: (return)Greeno to Weer, July 15, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 473; Carruth and Martin to Coffin, July 19, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 158-160.
afterwards, that the whole affair had been arranged for beforehand and that victor and victim had been in collusion with each other all the way through.
Up to this point the Indian Expedition can be said to have met with more than a fair measure of success; but its troubles were now to begin or rather to assert themselves; for most of them had been present since the very beginning. Fundamental to everything else was the fact that it was summer-time and summer-time, too, in a prairie region. Troops from the north, from Wisconsin and from Ohio, were not acclimated and they found the heat of June and July almost insufferable. There were times when they lacked good drinking water, which made bad matters worse. The Germans were particularly discontented and came to despise the miserable company in which they found themselves. It was miserable, not so much because it was largely Indian, but because it was so ill-equipped and so disorderly. At Cowskin Prairie, the scouts had to be called in, not because their work was finished, but because they and their ponies were no longer equal to it.363 They had played out for the simple reason that they were not well fitted out. The country east of Grand River was "very broken and flinty and their ponies unshod." It has been claimed, although maybe with some exaggeration, that not "a single horse-shoe or nail" had been provided for Colonel Salomon's brigade.364
The supplies of the Indian Expedition were insufficient and, although at Spavinaw Creek Colonel Watie's entire commissary had been captured365 and Clarkson's at Locust Grove, there was great scarcity. Weer had
been cautioned again and again not to cut himself off from easy communication with Fort Scott.366 He had shown a disposition to wander widely from the straight road to Fort Gibson; but Blunt had insisted that he refrain altogether from making excursions into adjoining states.367 He had himself realized the shortness of his provisions and had made a desperate effort to get to the Grand Saline so as to replenish his supply of salt at the place where the Confederates had been manufacturing that article for many months. He had known also that for some things, such as ordnance stores, he would have to look even as far as Fort Leavenworth.368
The climax of all these affairs was reached July 18, 1862. On that day, Frederick Salomon, colonel of the First Brigade, took matters into his own hands and arrested his superior officer. It was undoubtedly a clear case of mutiny369 but there was much to be said in extenuation of Salomon's conduct. The reasons for his action, as stated in a pronunciamento370 to his associates in command and as submitted to General Blunt371 are here given. They speak for themselves.
Headquarters Indian Expedition,
Camp on Grand River, July 18, 1862.
To Commanders of the different Corps constituting Indian Expedition:
Sirs: In military as well as civil affairs great and violent wrongs need speedy and certain remedies. The time had arrived, in my judgment, in the history of this expedition when the greatest wrong ever perpetrated upon any troops was about
Footnote 366: (return)Consider, for example, Blunt's orders of July 14 [Official Records, vol. xiii, 472].
Footnote 369: (return)As such the Indian agents regarded it. See their communication on the subject, July 19, 1862, ibid., 478.
to fall with crushing weight upon the noble men composing the command. Some one must act, and that at once, or starvation and capture were the imminent hazards that looked us in the face.
As next in command to Colonel Weer, and upon his express refusal to move at all for the salvation of his troops, I felt the responsibility resting upon me.
I have arrested Colonel Weer and assumed command.
The causes leading to this arrest you all know. I need not reiterate them here. Suffice to say that we are 160 miles from the base of operations, almost entirely through an enemy's country, and without communication being left open behind us. We have been pushed forward thus far by forced and fatiguing marches under the violent southern sun without any adequate object. By Colonel Weer's orders we were forced to encamp where our famishing men were unable to obtain anything but putrid, stinking water. Our reports for disability and unfitness for duty were disregarded; our cries for help and complaints of unnecessary hardships and suffering were received with closed ears. Yesterday a council of war, convened by the order of Colonel Weer, decided that our only safety lay in falling back to some point from which we could reopen communication with our commissary depot. Colonel Weer overrides and annuls the decision of that council, and announces his determination not to move from this point. We have but three days' rations on hand and an order issued by him putting the command on half rations. For nearly two weeks we have no communication from our rear. We have no knowledge when supply trains will reach us, neither has Colonel Weer. Three sets of couriers, dispatched at different times to find these trains and report, have so far made no report. Reliable information has been received that large bodies of the enemy were moving to our rear, and yet we lay here idle. We are now and ever since our arrival here have been entirely without vegetables or healthy food for our troops. I have stood with arms folded and seen my men faint and fall away from me like the leaves of autumn because I thought myself powerless to save them.
I will look upon this scene no longer. I know the responsibility I have assumed. I have acted after careful thought
and deliberation. Give me your confidence for a few days, and all that man can do, and with a pure purpose and a firm faith that he is right, shall be done for the preservation of the troops.
F. Salomon, Colonel Ninth Wis. Vols.,
Comdg. Indian Expedition.
Headquarters Indian Expedition,
Camp on Wolf Creek, Cherokee Nation, July 20, 1862.
Brig. Gen. James G. Blunt,
Commanding Department of Kansas:
Sir: I have the honor to report that I have arrested Col. William Weer, commanding the Indian Expedition, and have assumed command. Among the numerous reasons for this step a few of the chief are as follows:
From the day of our first report to him we have found him a man abusive and violent in his intercourse with his fellow-officers, notoriously intemperate in habits, entirely disregarding military usages and discipline, always rash in speech, act, and orders, refusing to inferior officers and their reports that consideration which is due an officer of the U.S. Army.
Starting from Cowskin Prairie on the 1st instant, we were pushed rapidly forward to the vicinity of Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas River, a distance of 160 miles from Fort Scott. No effort was made by him to keep communication open behind us. It seemed he desired none. We had but twenty-three days' rations on hand. As soon as he reached a position on Grand River 14 miles from Fort Gibson his movements suddenly ceased. We could then have crossed the Arkansas River, but it seemed there was no object to be attained in his judgment by such a move. There we lay entirely idle from the 9th to the 19th. We had at last reached the point when we had but three days' rations on hand. Something must be done. We were in a barren country, with a large force of the enemy in front of us, a large and now impassable river between us, and no news from our train or from our base of operations for twelve days. What were we to do? Colonel Weer called a council of war, at which he stated that the Arkansas River was now impassable to our forces; that a train containing commissary stores had been expected for three days; that three different sets of couriers sent out some time previous had
entirely failed to report; that he had been twelve days entirely without communication with or from the department, and that he had received reliable information that a large force of the enemy were moving to our rear via the Verdigris River for the purpose of cutting off our train.
Upon this and other information the council of war decided that our only safety lay in falling back to some point where we could reopen communication and learn the whereabouts of our train of subsistence. To this decision of the council he at the time assented, and said that he would arrange with the commanders of brigades the order of march. Subsequently he issued an order putting the command on half rations, declaring that he would not fall back, and refused utterly, upon my application, to take any steps for the safety or salvation of his command. I could but conclude that the man was either insane, premeditated treachery to his troops, or perhaps that his grossly intemperate habits long continued had produced idiocy or monomania. In either case the command was imperiled, and a military necessity demanded that something be done, and that without delay. I took the only step I believed available to save your troops. I arrested this man, have drawn charges against him, and now hold him subject to your orders.
On the morning of the 19th I commenced a retrograde march and have fallen back with my main force to this point.
You will see by General Orders, No. 1, herewith forwarded, that I have stationed the First and Second Regiments Indian Home Guards as a corps of observation along the Grand and Verdigris Rivers; also to guard the fords of the Arkansas. Yesterday evening a courier reached me at Prior Creek with dispatches saying that a commissary train was at Hudson's Crossing, 75 miles north of us, waiting for an additional force as an escort. Information also reaches me this morning that Colonel Watie, with a force of 1,200 men, passed up the east side of Grand River yesterday for the purpose of cutting off this train. I have sent out strong reconnoitering parties to the east of the river, and if the information proves reliable will take such further measures as I deem best for its security.
I design simply to hold the country we are now in, and will make no important moves except such as I may deem necessary for the preservation of this command until I receive specific
instructions from you. I send Major Burnett with a small escort to make his way through to you. He will give you more at length the position of this command, their condition, &c.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
F. Salomon, Colonel Ninth Wis. Vols.,
Comdg. Indian Expedition.
Salomon's insubordination brought the Indian Expedition in its original form to an abrupt end, much to the disgust and righteous indignation of the Indian service. The arrest of Colonel Weer threw the whole camp into confusion,372 and it was some hours before anything like order could be restored. A retrograde movement of the white troops had evidently been earlier resolved upon and was at once undertaken. Of such troops, Salomon assumed personal command and ordered them to begin a march northward at two o'clock on the morning of the nineteenth.373 At the same time, he established the troops, he was so brutally abandoning, as a corps of observation on or near the Verdigris and Grand Rivers. They were thus expected to cover his retreat, while he, unhampered, proceeded to Hudson's Crossing.374
With the departure of Salomon and subordinate commanders in sympathy with his retrograde movement, Robert W. Furnas, colonel of the First Indian, became the ranking officer in the field. Consequently it was his duty to direct the movements of the troops that remained. The troops were those of the three Indian regiments, the third of which had not yet been formally recognized and accepted by the government. Not all of these troops were in camp when the arrest of Weer took place. One of the last official acts of Weer as
Footnote 373: (return)Blocki, by order of Salomon, July 18, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 477.
commander of the Indian Expedition had been to order the First Indian to proceed to the Verdigris River and to take position "in the vicinity of Vann's Ford." Only a detachment of about two hundred men had as yet gone there, however, and they were there in charge of Lieutenant A.C. Ellithorpe. A like detachment of the Third Indian, under John A. Foreman, major, had been posted at Fort Gibson.375 Salomon's pronunciamento and his order, placing the Indian regiments as a corps of observation on the Verdigris and Grand Rivers, were not communicated to the regimental commanders of the Indian Home Guard until July 22;376 but they had already met, had conferred among themselves, and had decided that it would be bad policy to take the Indians out of the Territory.377 They, therefore agreed to consolidate the three regiments into a brigade, Furnas in command, and to establish camp and headquarters on the Verdigris, about twelve miles directly west of the old camp on the Grand.378
The brigading took place as agreed upon and Furnas, brigade commander, retained his colonelcy of the First Indian, while Lieutenant-colonel David B. Corwin took command of the Second and Colonel William A. Phillips of the Third. Colonel Ritchie had, prior to recent happenings, been detached from his command in order to conduct a party of prisoners to Fort Leavenworth, also to arrange for the mustering in of Indian recruits.379 But two days' rations were on hand, so jerked beef was accepted as the chief article of diet until other supplies could be obtained.380 There was likely to be plenty of
Footnote 378: (return)Official Records, vol. xii, 512; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 163.
that; for, as Weer had once reported, cattle were a drug on the market in the Cherokee country, the prairies "covered with thousands of them."381 The encampment on the Verdigris was made forthwith; but it was a failure from the start.
The Indians of the First Regiment showed signs of serious demoralization and became unmanageable, while a large number of the Second deserted.382 It was thought that deprivation in the midst of plenty, the lack of good water and of the restraining influence of white troops had had much to do with the upheaval, although there had been much less plundering since they left than when they were present. With much of truth back of possible hatred and malice, the special agents reported that such protection as the white men had recently given Indian Territory "would ruin any country on earth."383
With the hope that the morale of the men would be restored were they to be more widely distributed and their physical conditions improved, Colonel Furnas concluded to break camp on the Verdigris and return to the Grand. He accordingly marched the Third Indian to Pryor Creek384 but had scarcely done so when orders came from Salomon, under cover of his usurped authority as commander of the Indian Expedition, for him to cross the Grand and advance northeastward to Horse Creek and vicinity, there to pitch his tents. The new camp was christened Camp Wattles. It extended from Horse to Wolf Creek and constituted a point from which the component parts of the Indian Brigade did
Footnote 384: (return)Named in honor of Nathaniel Pryor of the Lewis and Clark expedition and of general frontier fame, and, therefore, incorrectly called Prior Creek in Furnas's report.
extensive scouting for another brief period. In reality, Furnas was endeavoring to hold the whole of the Indian country north of the Arkansas and south of the border.385
Meanwhile, Salomon had established himself in the neighborhood of Hudson's Crossing, at what he called, Camp Quapaw. The camp was on Quapaw land. His idea was, and he so communicated to Blunt, that he had selected "the most commanding point in this (the trans-Missouri) country not only from a military view as a key to the valleys of Spring River, Shoal Creek, Neosho, and Grand River, but also as the only point in this country now where an army could be sustained with a limited supply of forage and subsistence, offering ample grazing386 and good water."387 No regular investigation into his conduct touching the retrograde movement, such as justice to Weer would seem to have demanded, was made.388 He submitted the facts to Blunt and Blunt, at first alarmed389 lest a complete abandonment of Indian Territory would result, acquiesced390 when, he found that the Indian regiments were holding their own there.391 Salomon, indeed, so far strengthened Furnas's hand as to supply him with ten days rations and a section of Allen's battery.
Footnote 385: (return)For accounts of the movements of the Indian Expedition after the occurrence of Salomon's retrograde movement, see the Daily Conservative, August 16, 21, 26, 1862.
Footnote 386: (return)On the subject of grazing, see Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 308.
Footnote 391: (return)In November, Dole reported to Smith that Salomon's retrograde movement had caused about fifteen hundred or two thousand additional refugees to flee into Kansas. Dole urged that the Indian Expedition should be reenforced and strengthened [Indian Office Report Book, no. 12, 503-504].