he was disposed to keep the whole matter still under army regulations so as to "avoid increasing competition."881 The army exchequer could be subsequently reimbursed when specific appropriations for Indians should be made. Supplies of clothing had naturally to be otherwise provided for and for those he contracted882 in northern Texas. Steele's whole policy with regard to the indigents was subjected to the severest criticism;883 for it was based upon the idea that to be forewarned is to be forearmed. Disappointed speculators and grafters were chief among his critics and, in spite of all his precautions, they outwitted him. Peculation appeared on every hand, white sharpers abounded, and Indians, relatively affluent, subsisted at government expense.
Another source of embarrassment was developed by the application of war measures, primarily intended for the states only, to the Indian country. Indian property was impressed884 as occasion arose. Very
Footnote 882: (return)Steele to Bryan, November 9, 1863, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 267, p. 31. The Reserve Indians had all along been fed by contract [Steele to Scott, August 7, 1863, ibid., no. 268, pp. 179-180]. In the fall, Steele renewed the contract with Johnson and Grimes [Steele to S.A. Roberts, November 15, 1863, ibid., no. 267, p. 37] and detailed men from his command, from Martin's regiment, to assist in its execution [Steele to McCulloch, November 22, 1863, ibid., p. 41].
Footnote 883: (return)The Creeks were particularly dissatisfied. They claimed that food and raiment had been promised them, but the source of the promises Steele was powerless to determine [Steele to Vore, November 20, 1863, ibid., p. 39]. Indian soldiers on leave seemed to expect their usual allowances and Cooper, although disclaiming that he had any desire to "pander to the prejudices" of the natives, was always to be found on their side in any contention with Steele. To all appearances, the Indians had Cooper's support, in demanding all the privileges and profits of regular troops and "all the latitude of irregular, or partisan" [Steele to Cooper, November 24, 1863, ibid., pp. 44-45].
Footnote 884: (return)Concerning the request of Steele that cotton and teams be ordered exempt from impressment, see Steele to Bryan, November 9, 1863. Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 267, p. 31. The Choctaws had considerable cotton and the question was what was to be done with it in case of an advance of (cont.)
frequently was this the case in the matter of transportation facilities, in that also of negro labor. It was Steele's opinion that the impressment law and the grain tithe law were not operative as against the Indians885 but his necessities forced the practice, and execution by the army, under his orders, only intensified Indian opposition to him.
Indian opposition to Steele in tangible form took two directions, one of which, the advancement of Douglas H. Cooper, has already been frequently referred to. The other was the advancement of Stand Watie. During the summer, Stand Watie, as chief of the Confederate Cherokees, had authorized the formation of a Cherokee brigade,886 the object being, the dislodgment of the Federals from Fort Gibson and their consequent retirement from the Cherokee country. The brigade had not materialized; but all Stand Watie's subsequent efforts were directed towards the accomplishment of its patriotic object. Love of country best explains his whole military endeavor. The enemy in the Cherokee country he harassed, the enemy elsewhere, he left for others to deal with. Generally speaking, in consequence, the autumn months of 1863 found Watie hovering around the Arkansas, the Cherokees and their neighbors with him, while Cooper, almost equally particularistic because the Choctaws and Chickasaws were his main support, concerned himself with plans for the recovery of Fort Smith.
Footnote 884: (return)(cont.) the enemy. Was it to be burnt and the owners were they to be indemnified [Steele to Anderson, December 9, 1863, Confederate Records, p. 68]? Steele peremptorily forbade confiscation of Indian property and discouraged any interference "with the duties of agents, or with the National Council or government of the tribes" [Steele to Captain J.L. Randolph, enrolling officer, July 7, 1863, ibid., no. 268, p. 132].
The fervid patriotism of one leader and the overweening personal ambition of the other divided the Indians, then, into two camps and it was but natural that the idea should soon evolve that Indian interests could be best subserved by the formation of two distinct Indian brigades. To this idea General Smith, when appealed to, subscribed;887 but General Steele was dubious about the propriety of putting Stand Watie in charge of one of the brigades. "He appears to exercise," said Steele, "no restraint over his men in keeping them together, and his requisitions upon the depots seem to be made with utter disregard of the numbers present or even on his rolls."888 General Smith conceived it would be possible, by organizing the Indians into their own brigades and satisfying them that way, to draw off the white contingent and make of it a separate brigade, still operating, however, within the Indian country. To Cooper, the thought of a separate white brigade was most unwelcome. The Indians could be an effective force only in close conjunction with white troops. The separation of whites and Indians would inevitably mean, although not at present intended, the isolation of the latter and, perhaps, their ultimate abandonment.
The various proposals and counter-proposals all converged in an opposition to Steele. His presence in the Indian country seemed to block the advancement of everybody. Cooper resented his authority over himself and Stand Watie interpreted his waiting policy as due to inertness and ineptitude. So small a hold did the Federals really have on the Indian country that if Steele would only exert himself it could easily be
broken. But Steele was neither aggressive nor venturesome. His task was truly beyond him. Discouraged, he asked to be relieved and he was relieved, Brigadier-general Samuel B. Maxey being chosen as his successor.889 Again Cooper had been passed over, notwithstanding that his Indian friends had done everything they could for him. They had made allegations against Steele; in order that a major-generalship might be secured for Cooper and brigadier-generalships for some of themselves.890 Boudinot was believed by Steele to be at the bottom of the whole scheme; but it had been in process of concoction for a long time and Steele had few friends. General Smith was the stanchest of that few and even Holmes891 was not among them.
Obviously, with things in such a chaotic state, military operations in the Indian country, during the autumn and early winter were almost negligible.892 Steele expected that the Federals would attempt a drive from Fort Smith to the Red River and he collected what forces he could for that contingency. Little reliance was to be placed upon the Cherokees since they were intent upon recovering Fort Gibson; but the Choctaws through whose country the hostile force would proceed, were the drive made, aroused themselves as in the first days of the war. They recruited their regiments anew
Footnote 889: (return)Special Orders, no. 214, December 11, 1863, Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, 1094.
Footnote 892: (return)Steele contended that between the very natural fear that the Indians entertained that the white troops were going to be withdrawn from their country and Magruder's determination to get those same white troops, it was impossible to make any move upon military principles [Steele to Anderson, November 9, 1863, ibid., 1064-1065]. Steele refused to recognize Magruder's right to interfere with his command [Steele to Cooper, November 8, 1863, ibid., 1063-1064].
and they organized a militia; but the drive was never made.893
The only military activity anywhere was in the Cherokee country and it was almost too insignificant for mention. Towards the end of November, the Federal force there was greatly reduced in numbers, the white and negro contingents being called away to Fort Smith.894 The Indian Home Guards under Phillips were alone in occupation. With a detachment of the Third Indian, Watie had one lone skirmish, although about one half of Phillips's brigade was out scouting. The skirmish occurred on Barren Fork, a tributary of the Illinois, on the eighteenth of December.895 Late in November, Watie had planned a daring cavalry raid into the Neosho Valley.896 The skirmish on Barren Fork arrested him in his course somewhat; but, as the Federals, satisfied with a rather petty success, did not pursue him, he went on and succeeded in entering southwest Missouri. The raid did little damage and was only another of the disjointed individual undertakings that Steele deplored but that the Confederates were being more and more compelled to make.
Footnote 893: (return)Steele to Gov. Samuel Garland, Nov. 30, 1863, Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, 1082. Col. McCurtain of the Choctaw militia reported to Cooper that he expected to have fifteen hundred Choctaws assembled by December first [Steele to Cano, December 2, 1863, ibid., 1085]. The Second Choctaw regiment continued scattered and out of ammunition [Steele to Cooper, December 22, 1863, ibid., 1109]. The Seminole battalion was ordered to report to Bourland for frontier defence [Duval to Cooper, December 20, 1863, ibid., 1102].
The assignment of General Maxey to the command of Indian Territory invigorated Confederate administration north of the Red River, the only part of the country in undisputed occupancy. Close upon the assumption of his new duties, came a project897 for sweeping reforms, involving army reorganization, camps of instruction for the Indian soldiery, a more general enlistment, virtually conscription, of Indians—this upon the theory that "Whosoever is not for us is against us"—the selection of more competent and reliable staff officers, and the adoption of such a plan of offensive operations as would mean the retaking of Forts Smith and Gibson.898 To Maxey, thoroughly familiar with the geography of the region, the surrender of those two places appeared as a gross error in military technique; for the Arkansas River was a natural line of defence, the Red was not. "If the Indian Territory gives way," argued he, "the granary of the Trans-Mississippi Department, the breadstuffs, and beef of this and the Arkansas army are gone, the left flank of Holmes' army is turned, and with it not only the meat and bread, but the salt and iron of what is left of the Trans-Mississippi Department."899
Footnote 897: (return)Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 856-858.
Footnote 898: (return)To this list might be added the proper fitting out of the troops, which was one of the first things that Maxey called to Smith's attention [ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1112-1113].
Army reorganization was an immense proposition and was bound to be a difficult undertaking under the most favorable of auspices, yet it stood as fundamental to everything else. Upon what lines ought it to proceed? One possibility was, the formation of the two brigades, with Stand Watie and Cooper individually in command, which had already been suggested to General Smith and favored by him; but which had recently been found incompatible with his latest recommendation that all the Indian troops should be commanded, in toto, by Cooper.900 One feature of great importance in its favor it had in that it did not ostensibly run counter to the Indian understanding of their treaties that white troops should be always associated with Indian in the guaranteed protection of the Indian country, which was all very well but scarcely enough to balance an insuperable objection, which Cooper, when consulted, pointed out.901 The Indians had a strong aversion to any military consolidation that involved the elimination of their separate tribal characters. They had allied themselves with the Confederacy as nations and as nations they wished to fight. Moreover, due regard ought always to be given, argued Cooper, to their tribal prejudices, their preferences, call them what one will, and to their historical neighborhood alliances. Choctaws and Chickasaws might well stay together and Creeks and Seminoles; but woe betide the contrivance that should attempt the amalgamation of Choctaws and Cherokees.
Footnote 900: (return)This is given upon the authority of Maxey [Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 857]. It seems slightly at variance with Smith's own official statements. Smith would appear to have entertained a deep distrust of Cooper, whose promotion he did not regard as either "wise or necessary" [ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1102].
It seems a little strange that the Indians should so emphasize their national individualism at this particular time, inasmuch as six of them, the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, and Caddo, professing to be still in strict alliance with the Southern States, had formed an Indian confederacy, had collectively re-asserted their allegiance, pledged their continued support, and made reciprocal demands. All these things they had done in a joint, or general, council, which had been held at Armstrong Academy the previous November. Resolutions of the council, embodying the collective pledges and demands, were even at this very moment under consideration by President Davis and were having not a little to do with his attitude toward the whole Maxey programme.
In the matter of army reorganization, Smith was prepared to concede to Maxey a large discretion.902 The brigading that would most comfortably fit in with the nationalistic feelings of the Indians and, at the same time, accord, in spirit, with treaty obligations and also make it possible for Cooper to have a supreme command of the Indian forces in the field was that which Cooper himself advocated, the same that Boudinot took occasion, at this juncture, to urge upon President Davis.903 It was a plan for three distinct Indian brigades, a Cherokee, a Creek-Seminole, and a Choctaw-Chickasaw. Maxey thought "it would be a fine recruiting order,"904 yet, notwithstanding, he gave his
Footnote 903: (return)Boudinot to Davis, January 4, 1864 [ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 920-921]. Boudinot also suggested other things, some good, some bad. He suggested, for instance, that Indian Territory be attached to Missouri and Price put in command. Seddon doubted if Price would care for the place [ibid., 921].
preference for the two brigade plan.905 The promotion of Cooper, implicit in the three brigade plan, was not at all pleasing to General Smith; for he thought of it as reflecting upon Steele, whom he loyally described as having "labored conscientiously and faithfully in the discharge of his duties."906 With Steele removed from the scene907—and he was soon removed for he had been retained in the Indian country only that Maxey might have for a brief season the benefit of his experience908—the case was altered and Boudinot again pressed his point,909 obtaining, finally, the assurance of the War Department that so soon as the number of Indian regiments justified the organization of three brigades they should be formed.910
The formation of brigades was only one of the Indian demands that had emanated from the general council. Another was, the establishment of Indian Territory as a military department, an arrangement altogether inadvisable and for better reasons than the one reason that Davis offered when he addressed the united nations through their principal chiefs on the twenty-second of February.911 Davis's reason was that
Footnote 905: (return)Maxey to Smith, January 15, 1864, Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 875.
Footnote 908: (return)So Smith explained [ibid., 845, when Steele objected to staying in the Indian Territory in a subordinate capacity [ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1108]. Steele was transferred to the District of Texas [ibid., vol. xxxiv, part ii, 961]. The withdrawal of Steele left Cooper the ranking officer and the person on whom such a command, if created, would fall [ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 968-969].
Footnote 911: (return)Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, vol. i, 477-479; Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part iii, 824-825. Davis addressed the chiefs and not the delegation that had brought the resolutions [ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 1030-1031]. John Jumper, Seminole principal chief, was a member of the delegation.
as a separate department Indian Territory could not count upon the protection of the forces belonging to the Trans-Mississippi Department that was assured to her while she remained one of its integral parts. A distinct military district she should certainly be.
When Davis wrote, the ambition of Cooper had, in a measure, been satisfied; for he had been put in command of all "the Indian troops in the Trans-Mississippi Department on the borders of Arkansas."912 It was by no means all he wanted or all that he felt himself entitled to and he soon let it be known that such was the state of affairs. He tried to presume upon the fact that his commission as superintendent of Indian affairs had issued from the government, although never actually delivered to him, and, in virtue of it, he was in military command.913 The quietus came from General Smith, who informed Cooper that his new command and he himself were under Maxey.914
It was hoped that prospective Indian brigades would be a powerful incentive to Indian enlistment and so they proved. Moreover, much was expected in that direction from the reassembling of the general council at Armstrong Academy, and much had to be; for the times were critical. Maxey's position was not likely to be a sinecure. As a friend wrote him,
Northern Texas and the Indian Department have been neglected so long that they have become the most difficult and the most responsible commands in the Trans-Mississippi Department. I tremble for you. A great name is in store for you or you fall into the rank of failures; the latter may be your
Footnote 912: (return)Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 848; Special Orders of the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, 1864, Confederate Records, no. 7, p. 15.
Footnote 913: (return)Cooper to Davis, February 29, 1864, Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 1007.
fate, and might be the fate of any man, even after an entire and perfect devotion of all one's time and talent, for want of the proper means. In military matters these things are never considered. Success is the only criterion—a good rule, upon the whole, though in many instances it works great injustice. Good and deserving men fall, and accidental heroes rise in the scale, kicking their less fortunate brothers from the platform.915
With a view to strengthening the Indian alliance and accomplishing all that was necessary to make it effective, Commissioner Scott was ordered by Seddon to attend the meeting of the general council.916 Unfortunately, he did not arrive at Armstrong Academy in time, most unfortunately, in fact, since he was expected to bring funds with him and funds were sadly needed. Maxey attended and delivered an address917 that rallied the Indians in spite of themselves. In council meeting they had many things to consider, whether or no they should insist upon confining their operations henceforth to their own country. Some were for making a raid into Kansas, some for forming an alliance with the Indians of the Plains,918 who, during this year of 1864, were to prove a veritable thorn in the flesh to Kansas and Colorado.919 As regarded some of the work of the general council, Samuel Garland, the principal chief of the Choctaws, proved a huge stumbling block,
Footnote 915: (return)S.A. Roberts to Maxey, February 1, 1864, Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 936-937.
Footnote 917: (return)Moty Kanard, late principal chief of the Creek Nation, spoke of it as a noble address and begged for a copy [ibid., 960].
Footnote 918: (return)Vore to Maxey, January 29, 1864, ibid., 928; Maxey to Anderson, February 9, 1864, ibid., 958; same to same, February 7, 1864, ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 963-966.
Footnote 919: (return)Inasmuch as the alliance with the Indians of the Plains was never fully consummated and inasmuch as these Indians harassed and devastated the frontier states for reasons quite foreign to the causes of the Civil War, the subject of their depredations and outrages is not considered as within the scope of the present volume.
and Cooper was forced, so he said, to "put the members of the grand council to work on" him.920 It was Cooper's wish, evidently, that the council would "insist under the Indian compact that all Choctaw troops shall be put at once in the field as regular Confederate troops for the redemption and defense of the whole Indian Territory." The obstinacy of the Choctaw principal chief had to be overcome in order "to bring out the Third Choctaw Regiment speedily and on the proper basis." In general, the council reiterated its recommendations of November previous and so Boudinot informed President Davis,921 it being with him the opportunity he coveted of urging, as already noted, the promotion of Cooper to a major-generalship.
In January and so anterior to most of the foregoing incidents, the shaking of the political dice in Washington, D.C., had brought again into existence the old Department of Kansas, Curtis in command.922 Its limits were peculiar for they included Indian Territory923 and the military post of Fort Smith as well as Kansas and the territories of Nebraska and Colorado. The status of Fort Smith was a question for the future to decide; but, in the meantime, it was to be a bone of contention between Curtis and his colleague, Frederick Steele, in command of the sister Department of
Footnote 920: (return)Cooper to Maxey, February, 1864, Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 959. The report reached Phillips that the Choctaws wanted a confederacy quite independent of the southern [ibid., part i, 107].
Footnote 921: (return)Although Davis's address of February 22 could well, in point of chronology, have been an answer to the applications and recommendations of the second session of the general council, it has been dealt with in connection with those of the first session, notwithstanding that Boudinot made his appeal less than a fortnight before Davis wrote. In his address, Davis specifically mentioned the work of the first session and made no reference whatsoever to that of the second.
Arkansas; for Steele had control over all Federal forces within the political and geographical boundaries of the state that gave the name to his department except the Fort Smith garrison.924 The termination of Schofield's career in Missouri925 was another result of political dice-throwing, so also was the call for Blunt to repair to the national capital for a conference.926
But politics had nothing whatever to do with an event more notable still. With the first of February began one of the most remarkable expeditions that had yet been undertaken in the Indian country. It was an expedition conducted by Colonel William A. Phillips and it was remarkable because, while it professed to have for its object the cleaning out of Indian Territory,927 its incidents were as much diplomatic and pacific as military. Its course was only feebly obstructed and might have been extended into northern Texas had Moonlight of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry chosen to coöperate.928 As it was, the course was southward almost to Fort Washita. Phillips carried with him copies of President Lincoln's Amnesty Proclamation929 and he distributed them freely. His interpretation of the proclamation was his own and perhaps not strictly warranted by the phraseology but justice and generosity debarred his seeing why magnanimity and forgiveness should not be extended betimes to the poor deluded red man as much as to the deliberately rebellious white. To various prominent chiefs
Footnote 926: (return)Lane, Wilder, and Dole, requested that Blunt be summoned to Washington [ibid., 52].
of secessionist persuasion he sent messages of encouragement and good-will.930 More sanguine than circumstances really justified, he returned to report that, for some of the tribes at least, the war was virtually over.931 What his peace mission may have accomplished, the future would reveal; but there was no doubting what his raid had done. It had produced consternation among the weaker elements. The Creeks, the Seminoles, and the Chickasaws had widely dispersed, some into the fastnesses of the mountains. Only the Choctaws continued obdurate and defiant. It was strange that Phillips should have arrived at conclusions so sweeping; for his course932 had led him within hearing range of the general council in session at Armstrong Academy and there the division of sentiment was not so much along tribal lines as along individual. Strong personalities triumphed; for, as Maxey so truly divined, the Indian nations were after all aristocracies. The minority really ruled. At Armstrong Academy, in spite of tendencies toward an isolation that, in effect, would have been neutrality and, on the part of a few, toward a definite retracing of steps, the southern Indians renewed their pledges of loyalty to the Confederacy. Phillips's olive branch was in their hands and they threw it aside. Months before they might have been secured for the North but not now. For them the hour of wavering was past. Maxey's vigor was stimulating.
Footnote 930: (return)To Governor Colbert of the Chickasaw Nation [Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part i, 109-110], to the Council of the Choctaw Nation [ibid., 110], to John Jumper of the Seminole Nation [ibid., 111], to McIntosh, possibly D.N. [ibid., part ii, 997]. For Maxey's comments upon Phillips and his letters, see Maxey to Smith, February 26, 1864, ibid., 994-997.