on the border and nowhere else. The great evil of squatter sovereignty days was now epidemic in its most malignant form. Those days had bred intense hatred between Missourian and Kansan and had developed a disregard of the value of human life and a ruthlessness and brutality in fighting, concomitant with it, that the East, in its most primitive times, had never been called upon to experience. Granted that the spirit of the crusader had inspired many a free-soiler to venture into the trans-Missouri region after the Kansas-Nebraska bill had become law and that real exaltation of soul had transformed some very mercenary and altogether mundane characters unexpectedly into martyrs; granted, also, that the pro-slavery man honestly felt that his cause was just and that his sacred rights of property, under the constitution, were being violated, his preserves encroached upon, it yet remains true that great crimes were committed in the name of great causes and that villains stalked where only saints should have trod. The irregular warfare of the border, from fifty-four on, while it may, to military history as a whole, be as unimportant as the quarrels of kites and crows, was yet a big part of the life of the frontiersman and frightful in its possibilities. Sherman's march to the sea or through the Carolinas, disgraceful to modern civilization as each undeniably was, lacked the sickening phase, guerrilla atrocities, that made the Civil War in the West, to those at least who were in line to experience it at close range, an awful nightmare. Union and Confederate soldiers might well fraternize in eastern camps because there they so rarely had any cause for personal hostility towards each other, but not in western. The fight on the border was constant and to the death.
The leaders in the West or many of them, on both sides, were men of ungovernable tempers, of violent and unrestrained passions, sometimes of distressingly base proclivities, although, in the matter of both vices and virtues, there was considerable difference of degree among them. Lane and Shelby and Montgomery and Quantrill were hardly types, rather should it be said they were extreme cases. They seem never to have taken chances on each other's inactivity. Their motto invariably was, to be prepared for the worst, and their practice, retaliation.
It was scarcely to be supposed that a man like Lane, who had never known moderation in the course of the long struggle for Kansas or been over scrupulous about anything would, in the event of his adopted state's being exposed anew to her old enemy, the Missourian, be able to pose contentedly as a legislator or stay quietly in Washington, his role of guardian of the White House being finished.89 The anticipated danger to Kansas visibly threatened in the summer of 1861 and the critical moment saw Lane again in the West, energetic beyond precedent. He took up his position at Fort Scott, it being his conviction that, from that point and from the line of the Little Osage, the entire eastern section of the state, inclusive of Fort Leavenworth, could best be protected.90
Footnote 89: (return)As Villard tells us [Memoirs, vol. i, 169], Lane was in command of the "Frontier Guards," one of the two special patrols that protected the White House in the early days of the war. There were those, however, who resented his presence there. For example, note the diary entry of Hay, "Going to my room, I met the Captain. He was a little boozy and very eloquent. He dilated on the troubles of the time and bewailed the existence of a garrison in the White House 'to give éclat to Jim Lane.'"—Thayer, op. cit., vol. i, 94. The White House guard was in reality under General Hunter [Report of the Military Services of General David Hunter, 8].
Fort Scott was the ranking town among the few Federal strongholds in the middle Southwest. It was within convenient, if not easy, distance of Crawford Seminary which, situated to the southward in the Quapaw Nation, was the headquarters of the Neosho Agency; but no more perturbed place could be imagined than was that same Neosho Agency at the opening of the Civil War. Bad white men, always in evidence at moments of crisis, were known to be interfering with the Osages, exciting them by their own marauding to deviltry and mischief of the worst description.91 As a
Footnote 91: (return)A letter from Superintendent W.G. Coffin of date, July, 30, 1861 [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, Schools, C. 1275 of 1861] bears evidence of this as bear also the following letters, the one, private in character, from Augustus Wattles, the other, without specific date, from William Brooks:
PRIVATE
MONEKA, KANSAS, May 20, 1861.
MR. DOLEDear Sir, A messenger has this moment left me, who came up from the Osages yesterday—a distance of about forty miles. The gentleman lives on the line joining the Osage Indians, and has, since my acquaintance with him about three years.
A short time ago, perhaps three weeks, a number of lawless white men went into the Nation and stole a number of ponies. The Indians made chase, had a fight and killed several, reported from three to five, and retook their ponies.
A company of men is now getting up here and in other counties, to go and fight the Indians. I am appealed to by the Indians to act as their friend.
They represent that they are loyal to the U.S. Government and will fight for their Great Father, at Washington, but must be protected from bad white men at home. The Government must not think them enemies when they only fight thieves and robbers.
Rob't B. Mitchell, who was recently appointed Maj. General of this State by Gov. Robinson, has resigned, and is now raising volunteers to fight the Indians. He has always been a Democrat in sympathy with the pro-slavery party, and his enlisting men now to take them away from the Missouri frontier, when we are daily threatened with an attack from that State, and union men are fleeing to us for protection from there, is certainly a very questionable policy. It could operate no worse against us, if it were gotten up by a traitor to draw our men off on purpose to give the Missourians a chance when we are unprepared. (cont.)
tribe, the Osages were not very dependable at the best of times and now that they saw confusion all around
Footnote 91: (return)(cont.) I presume you have it in your power to prevent any attack on the Indians in Kansas till such time as they can be treated with. And such order to the Commander of the Western Division of the U.S. Army would stop further proceedings.
I shall start to-morrow for Council Grove and meet the Kansas Indians before General Mitchell's force can get there. As the point of attack is secret, I fear it may be the Osages, for the purpose of creating a necessity for a treaty with himself by which he can secure a large quantity of land for himself and followers. He is acquainted with all the old Democratic schemes of swindling Indians.
The necessity for prompt action on the part of the Indian Department increases every day. The element of discord in the community here now, was once, the pro-slavery party. I see their intention to breed disturbances with the Indians is malicious and selfish. They are active and unscrupulous, and must be met promptly and decisively.
I hope you will excuse this, as it appears necessary for me to step a little out of my orders to notify you of current events. I am very respectfully Your Ob't Ser'vt AUGUSTUS WATTLES, Special Agent
[Indian Office Special Files, no. 201.]
GRAND FALLS, NEWTON CO., MO.
COM. INDIAN AFFAIRS
Washington, D.C.Hon. Sir: Permit me to inform you, by this means, of the efforts that have been and are now being made in Southern Kansas to arouse both the "Osages" and "Cherokees" to rebel, and bear arms against the U.S. Government—At a public meeting near the South E. corner of the "Osage Nation" called by the settlements for the devising of some means by which to protect themselves from "unlawful characters," Mr. John Mathis, who resides in the Osage Nation and has an Osage family, also Mr. "Robert Foster" who lives in the Cherokee Nation and has a Cherokee family endeavered by public speeches and otherwise to induce "Osages", "Cherokees", as well as Americans who live on the "Neutral Lands" to bear arms against the U.S. Government—aledging that there was no U.S. Government. There was 25 men who joined them and they proceeded to organise a "Secession Company" electing as Capt R.D. Foster and 1st Lieutenant James Patton—This meeting was held June 4th 1861—at "McGhees Residence"—The peace of this section of country requires the removal of these men from the Indian country, or some measures that will restrain them from exciting the Indians in Southern Kansas.
Yours Respectfully WM BROOKS.
You will understand why you are addressed by a private individual on this subject instead of the Agent, since A.J. Dorn, the present Indian Agent, is an avowed "Secessionist" and consequently would favor, rather than suppress the move. WM BROOKS.
[Ibid., Southern Superintendency, B567 of 1861]
them their most natural inclination was to pay back old scores and to make an alliance where such alliance could be most profitable to themselves. The "remnants" of tribes, Senecas, Shawnees, and Quapaws, associated with them in the agency, Neosho, that is, although not of evil disposition, were similarly agitated and with good reason. Rumors of dissensions among the Cherokees, not so very far away, were naturally having a disquieting effect upon the neighboring but less highly organized tribes as was also the unrest in Missouri, in the southwestern counties of which, however, Union sentiment thus far dominated.92 Its continuance would undoubtedly turn upon military success or failure and that, men like Lyon and Lane knew only too well.
As the days passed, the Cherokee troubles gained in intensity, so much so that the agent, John Crawford, even then a secessionist sympathiser, reported that internecine strife might at any hour be provoked.93 So confused was everything that in July the people of southeastern Kansas were generally apprehensive of an attack from the direction of either Indian Territory or Arkansas.94 Kansas troops had been called to Missouri; but, at the same time, Lyon was complaining that men from the West, where they were greatly needed, were being called by Scott to Virginia.95 On August 6 two emergency calls went forth, one from Frémont for a brigade from California that could be stationed at El Paso and moved as occasion might require, either upon San Antonio or into the Indian Territory,96
Footnote 92: (return)Branch to Mix, June 22, 1861, enclosing letter from Agent Elder, June 15, 1861 [Indian Office Files, Neosho, B 547 of 1861].
the other from Congressmen John S. Phelps and Francis P. Blair junior, who addressed Lincoln upon the subject of enlisting Missouri troops for an invasion of Arkansas in order to ward off any contemplated attack upon southwestern Missouri and to keep the Indians west of Arkansas in subjection.97 On August 10 came the disastrous Federal defeat at Wilson's Creek. It was immediately subsequent to that event and in anticipation of a Kansas invasion by Price and McCulloch that Lane resolved to take position at Fort Scott.98
The Battle of Wilson's Creek, lost to the Federals largely because of Frémont's failure to support Lyon, was an unmitigated disaster in more than one sense. The death of Lyon, which the battle caused, was of itself a severe blow to the Union side as represented in Missouri; but the moral effect of the Federal defeat upon the Indians was equally worthy of note. It was instantaneous and striking. It rallied the wavering Cherokees for the Confederacy99 and their defection was something that could not be easily counterbalanced and was certainly not counterbalanced by the almost coincident, cheap, disreputable, and very general Osage offer, made towards the end of August, of services to the United States in exchange for flour and whiskey.100
The disaster in its effect upon Lane was, however, little short of exhilarating. It brought him sympathy, understanding, and a fair measure of support from people who, not until the eleventh hour, had really comprehended their own danger and it inspired him to redouble his efforts to organize a brigade that should
adequately protect Kansas and recover ground lost. Prior to the battle, "scarcely a battalion had been recruited for each" of the five regiments, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Kansas, which he had been empowered by the War Department to raise.101 It was in the days of gathering reinforcements, for which he made an earnest plea on August 29,102 that he developed a disposition to utilize the loyal Indians in his undertaking. The Indians, in their turn, were looking to him for much needed assistance. About a month previous to the disaster of August 10, Agent Elder had been obliged to make Fort Scott, for the time being, the Neosho Agency headquarters, everything being desperately insecure at Crawford's Seminary.103
Footnote 103: (return)The following letter, an enclosure of a report from Branch to Dole, August 14, 1861, gives some slight indication of its insecurity:
OFFICE OF NEOSHO AGENCY
Fort Scott, July 27, 1861.Sir—I deem it important to inform the Department of the situation of this Agency at this time. After entering upon the duties of this office as per instructions—and attending to all the business that seemed to require my immediate attention—I repaired to Franklin Co. Kan. to remove my family to the Agency.
Leaving the Agency in care of James Killebrew Esq the Gov't Farmer for the Quapaw Nation. Soon after I left I was informed by him that the Agency had been surrounded by a band of armed men, and instituted an inquiry for "that Abolition Superintendent and Agent." After various interrogatories and answers they returned in the direction of Missouri and Arkansas lines from whence they were supposed to have come. He has since written me and Special Agent Whitney and Superintendent Coffin told me that it would be very unsafe for me to stay at that place under the present excited state of public feeling in that vicinity. I however started with my family on the 6th July and arrived at Fort Scott on the 9th intending to go direct to the Agency. Here I learned from Capt Jennison commanding a detachment of Kansas Militia, who had been scouting in that vicinity, that the country was full of marauding parties from Gov. Jackson's Camp in S.W. Mo. I therefore concluded to remain here and watch the course of events believing as I did the Federal troops (cont.)
Lane, conjecturing rightly that Price, moving northwestward from Springfield, which place he had left on the twenty-sixth of August, would threaten, if he did not actually attempt, an invasion of Kansas at the point of its greatest vulnerability, the extreme southeast, hastened his preparations for the defence and at the very end of the month appeared in person at Fort Scott, where all the forces he could muster, many of them refugee Missourians, had been rendezvousing. On the second of September, the two armies, if such be not too dignified a name for them, came into initiatory action at Dry Wood Creek,104 Missouri, a reconnoitering party of the Federals, in a venture across the line, having
Footnote 103: (return)(cont.) would soon repair thither and so quell the rebellion as to render my stay here no longer necessary. But as yet the Union forces have not penetrated that far south, and Jackson with a large force is quartered within 20 or 25 miles of the Agency—I was informed by Mr. Killebrew on the 23d inst. that everything at the Agency was safe—but the house and roads were guarded—Hence I have assumed the responsibility of establishing my office here temporarily until I can hear from the department.
And I most sincerely hope the course I have thus been compelled to pursue will receive the approval of the department.
I desire instructions relative to the papers and a valuable safe (being the only moveables there of value) which can only be moved at present under the protection of a guard. And also instructions as to the course I am to pursue relative to the locality of the Agency.
I feel confident that the difficulty now attending the locality at Crawford Seminary will not continue long—if not then I shall move directly there unless instructions arrive of a different character.
All mail matter should be directed to Fort Scott for the Mail Carrier has been repeatedly arrested and the mails may be robbed—Very respectfully your Obedient Servant
PETER P. ELDER, U.S. Neosho Agent.
H.B. BRANCH Esq, Superintendent of Ind. Affairs C.S.
St. Joseph, Mo.
[Indian Office Files, Neosho, B 719 of 1861].
Footnote 104: (return)For additional information about the Dry Wood Creek affair and about the events leading up to and succeeding it, see Official Records, vol. liii, supplement, 436; Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, chapter x; Connelley, Quantrill and the Border Wars, 199.
fallen in with the advance of the Confederates and, being numerically outmatched, having been compelled to beat a retreat. In its later stages, Lane personally conducted that retreat, which, taken as a whole, did not end even with the recrossing of the state boundary, although the pursuit did not continue beyond it. Confident that Price would follow up his victory and attack Fort Scott, Lane resolved to abandon the place, leaving a detachment to collect the stores and ammunition and to follow him later. He then hurried on himself to Fort Lincoln on the north bank of the Little Osage, fourteen miles northwest. There he halted and hastily erected breastworks of a certain sort105. Meanwhile, the citizens of Fort Scott, finding themselves left in the lurch, vacated their homes and followed in the wake of the army106. Then came a period, luckily short, of direful confusion. Home guards were drafted in and other preparations made to meet the emergency of Price's coming. Humboldt was now suggested as suitable and safe headquarters for the Neosho Agency107; but, most opportunely, as the narrative will soon show, the change had to wait upon the approval of the Indian Office, which could not be had for some days and, in the meantime, events proved that Price was not the menace and Fort Scott not the target.
It soon transpired that Price had no immediate intention of invading Kansas108. For the present, it was
Footnote 106: (return)As soon as the citizens, panic-stricken, were gone, the detachment which Lane had left in charge, under Colonel C.R. Jennison, commenced pillaging their homes [Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 130.]
Footnote 107: (return)H.C. Whitney to Mix, September 6, 1861, Indian Office Consolidated Files, Neosho, W 455 of 1861.
Footnote 108: (return)By the fifth of September, Lane had credible information that Price had broken camp at Dry Wood and was moving towards Lexington [Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 144].
enough for his purpose to have struck terror into the hearts of the people of Union sentiments inhabiting the Cherokee Neutral Lands, where, indeed, intense excitement continued to prevail until there was no longer any room to doubt that Price was really gone from the near vicinity and was heading for the Missouri River. Yet his departure was far from meaning the complete removal of all cause for anxiety, since marauding bands infested the country roundabout and were constantly setting forth, from some well concealed lair, on expeditions of robbery, devastation, and murder. It was one of those marauding bands that in this same month of September, 1861, sacked and in part burnt Humboldt, for which dastardly and quite unwarrantable deed, James G. Blunt, acting under orders from Lane, took speedy vengeance; and the world was soon well rid of the instigator and leader of the outrage, the desperado, John Matthews.109
Footnote 109: (return)(a)
FT. LINCOLN, SOUTHERN KANSAS.
Sept. 25, 1861.HON. WM.P. DOLE, Com. of Ind. Af'rs
Dear Sir, We have just returned from a successful expedition into the Indian Country, And I thought you would be glad to hear the news.
Probably you know that Mathews, formerly an Indian Trader amongst the Osages has been committing depredations at the head of a band of half breed Cherokees, all summer.
He has killed a number of settlers and taken their property; but as most of them were on the Cherokee neuteral lands I could not tell whether to blame him much or not, as I did not understand the condition of those lands.
A few days ago he came up to Humbolt and pillaged the town. Gen. Lane ordered the home guards, composed mostly of old men, too old for regular service, to go down and take or disperse this company under Mathews.
He detailed Lieut. Col. Blunt of Montgomery's regiment to the command, and we started about 200 strong. We went to Humbolt and followed down through the Osage as far as the Quapaw Agency where we came up with them, about 60 strong.
Mathews and 10 men were killed at the first fire, the others (cont.)
As soon as Lane had definite knowledge that Price had turned away from the border and was moving northward, he determined to follow after and attack
Footnote 109: (return)(cont.) retreated. We found on Mathews a Commission from Ben. McCulloch, authorizing him to enlist the Quapaw and other Indians and operate on the Kansas frontier.
The Osage Indians are loyal, and I think most of the others would be if your Agents were always ready to speak a word of confidence for our Government, and on hand to counteract the influence of the Secession Agents.
There is no more danger in doing this than in any of the Army service. If an Agent is killed in the discharge of his duty, another can be appointed the same as in any other service. A few prompt Agents, might save a vast amount of plundering which it is now contemplated to do in Kansas.
Ben. McCulloch promises his rangers, and the Indians that he will winter them in Kansas and expel the settlers.
I can see the Indians gain confidence in him precisely as they loose it in us. It need somebody amongst them to represent our power and strength and purposes, and to give them courage and confidence in the U.S. Government.
There is another view which some take and you may take the same, i.e. let them go—fight and conquer them—take their lands and stop their annuities.
I can only say that whatever the Government determines on the people here will sustain. The President was never more popular. He is the President of the Constitution and the laws. And notwithstanding what the papers say about his difference with Frémont, every heart reposes confidence in the President.
So far as I can learn from personal inquiry, the Indians are not yet committed to active efforts against the Gov. AUG. WATTLES.
[Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, Central Superintendency, W 474 of 1861.
(b)
SACK AND FOX AGENCY, Dec. 17th 1861.
HON.W.P. DOLE, Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Dear Sir: After receiving the cattle and making arrangements for their keeping at Leroy I went and paid a visit to the Ruins of Humboldt which certainly present a gloomy appearance. All the best part of the town was burnt. Thurstons House that I had rented for an office tho near half a mile from town was burnt tho his dwelling and mill near by were spared. All my books and papers that were there were lost. My trunk and what little me and my son had left after the sacking were all burnt including to Land Warrents one 160 acres and one 120. Our Minne Rifle and ammunition Saddle bridle, etc.... About 4 or 5 Hundred Sacks of Whitney's Corn were burnt. As soon as I can I will try to make out a list of the Papers from the (cont.)
him, if possible, in the rear. Governor Robinson was much opposed110 to any such provocative and apparently purposeless action, no one knowing better than he Lane's vindictive mercilessness. Lane persisted notwithstanding Robinson's objections and, for the time being, found his policies actually endorsed by Prince at Fort Leavenworth.111 The attack upon Humboldt, having revealed the exposed condition of the settlements north of the Osage lands, necessitated his leaving a much larger force in his own rear than he had intended.112 It also made it seem advisable for him to order the building of a series of stockades, the one of most immediate interest being at Leroy.113 By the fourteenth of September, Lane found himself within twenty-four miles of Harrisonville but Price still far ahead. On the twenty-second, having made a detour for the purpose of destroying some of his opponent's stores, he performed the atrocious and downright inexcusable exploit of burning Osceola.114 Lexington, besieged, had fallen into Price's hands two days before. Thus had the foolish Federal practice of acting in
Footnote 109: (return)(cont.) Department [that] were burnt. As I had some at Leavenworth I cannot do so til I see what is there. As Mr. Hutchinson is not here I leave this morning for the Kaw Agency to endeavour to carry out your Instructions there and will return here as soon as I get through there. They are building some stone houses here and I am much pleased with the result. The difference in cost is not near so much as we expected but I will write you fully on a careful examination as you requested. Very respectfully your obedient Servant
W.G. COFFIN, Superintendent of Indian Affairs
Southern Superintendency[Indian Office Files, Southern Superintendency, C 1432 of 1861]
Footnote 114: (return)—Ibid., 196; vol. liii, supplement, 743; Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 147-148; Connelley, Quantrill and the Border Wars, 208-209, 295.
detachments instead of in force produced its own calamitous result. There had never been any appreciable coördination among the parts of Frémont's army. Each worked upon a campaign of its own. To some extent, the same criticism might be held applicable to the opposing Confederate force also, especially when the friction between Price and McCulloch be taken fully into account; but Price's energy was far in excess of Frémont's and he, having once made a plan, invariably saw to its accomplishment. Lincoln viewed Frémont's supineness with increasing apprehension and finally after the fall of Lexington directed Scott to instruct for greater activity. Presumably, Frémont had already aroused himself somewhat; for, on the eighteenth, he had ordered Lane to proceed to Kansas City and from thence to coöperate with Sturgis,115 Lane slowly obeyed116 but managed, while obeying, to do considerable marauding, which worked greatly to the general detestation and lasting discredit of his brigade. For a man, temperamentally constituted as Lane was, warfare had no terrors and its votaries, no scruples. The grim chieftain as he has been somewhat fantastically called, was cruel, indomitable, and disgustingly licentious, a person who would have hesitated at nothing to accomplish his purpose. It was to be expected, then, that he would see nothing terrible in the letting loose of the bad white man, the half-civilized Indian, or the wholly barbarous negro upon society. He believed that the institution of slavery should look out for itself117 and, like Governor Robinson,118 Senator Pomeroy, Secretary Cameron, John
Cochrane,119 Thaddeus Stevens120 and many another, fully endorsed the principle underlying Frémont's abortive Emancipation Proclamation. He advocated immediate emancipation both as a political and a military measure.121
There was no doubt by this time that Lane had it in mind to utilize the Indians. In the dog days of August, when he was desperately marshaling his brigade, the Indians presented themselves, in idea, as a likely military contingent. The various Indian agents in Kansas were accordingly communicated with and Special Agent Augustus Wattles authorized to make the needful preparations for Indian enlistment.122 Not much could be done in furtherance of the scheme while Lane was engaged in Missouri but, in October, when he was back in Kansas, his interest again manifested itself. He was then recruiting among all kinds of people, the more hot-blooded the better. His energy was likened to frenzy and the more sober-minded took alarm. It was the moment for his political opponents to interpose and Governor Robinson from among them did interpose, being firmly convinced that Lane, by his intemperate zeal and by his guerrilla-like fighting was provoking Missouri to reprisals and thus precipitating upon Kansas the very troubles that he professed to wish to ward off. Incidentally, Robinson, unlike Frémont, was vehemently opposed to Indian enlistment.
Feeling between Robinson and Lane became exceedingly tense in October. Price was again moving
Footnote 121: (return)Lane's speech at Springfield, November 7, 1861 [Daily Conservative, November 17, 1861].
Footnote 122: (return)For a full discussion of the progress of the movement, see Abel, American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, 227 ff.
suspiciously near to Kansas. On the third he was known to have left Warrensburg, ostensibly to join McCulloch in Bates County123 and, on the eighth, he was reported as still proceeding in a southwestwardly direction, possibly to attack Fort Scott.124 His movements gave opportunity for a popular expression of opinion among Lane's adherents. On the evening of the eighth, a large meeting was held in Stockton's Hall to consider the whole situation and, amidst great enthusiasm, Lane was importuned to go to Washington,125 there to lay the case of the piteous need of Kansas, in actuality more imaginary than real, before the president. Nothing loath to assume such responsibility but not finding it convenient to leave his military task just then, Lane resorted to letter-writing. On the ninth, he complained126 to Lincoln that Robinson was attempting to break up his brigade and had secured the coöperation of Prince to that end.127 The anti-Robinson press128 went farther and accused Robinson and Prince of not being big enough, in the face of grave danger to the commonwealth, to forget old scores.129 As a solution of the problem before them, Lane suggested to Lincoln the establishment of a new military district that should include Kansas, Indian Territory, and Arkansas, and be under his command.130 So anxious was Lane to be
Footnote 128: (return)Chief among the papers against Robinson, in the matter of his longstanding feud with Lane, was the Daily Conservative with D.W. Wilder as its editor. Another anti-Robinson paper was the Lawrence Republican. The Cincinnati Gazette was decidedly friendly to Lane.
Footnote 130: (return)Official Records, vol. iii, 529-530. Lane outlined his plan for a separate department in his speech in Stockton's Hall [Daily Conservative, October 9, 1861]. (cont.)