within which Colonel Phillips had detected traitors to the Confederate cause,754 was, perhaps, the most incorrigible.755 From department headquarters came impassioned appeals756 for activity and for loyalty but
Footnote 753: (return)(cont.) danger of producing a collision with the people. The men are no doubt deserters, but we have no men to spare, to enforce the arrest at the present time" [Steele to Captain Randolph, July i, 1863, ibid., p. 116. See also Steele to Borland, July 1, 1863, ibid., no. 268, p. 117]. When West's Battery was ordered to report at Fort Smith it was discovered going in the opposite direction [Steele to J.E. Harrison, April 25, 1863, ibid., no. 270, p. 213; Duval to Harrison, May 1, 1863, ibid., p. 221; Steele to Anderson, May 9, 1863, ibid., p. 233; Steele to Cooper, May 11 1863, ibid., pp. 237-238].
One expedition to the plains that Steele distinctly encouraged was that organized by Captain Wells [Steele to Cooper, March 16, 1863, ibid., pp. 145-146]. It was designed that Wells's command should operate on the western frontier of Kansas and intercept trains on the Santa Fé trail [Steele to Anderson, April 17, 1863, ibid., p. 197].
Footnote 755: (return)For correspondence with Alexander objecting to further furloughing and urging the need of promptness, see Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 121-122, 163-164, 170, 178-179, 210-211.
Footnote 756: (return)The following are illustrations:
"... Every exertion is being made and the Gen'l feels confident that the means will be attained of embarking in an early spring campaign. It only remains for the officers and men to come forward to duty in a spirit of willingness and cheerfulness to render the result of operations in the Dept (or beyond it as the case may be) not only successful but to add fresh renown to the soldiers whom he has the honor to command ..."—CROSBY to Talliaferro, February 24, 1863, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 105-106.
"The Commanding Gen'l would be gratified to grant the within petition were it compatible with the interests of the service and the cause which petitioners 'Hold dearer than life.' He is fully aware of the many urgent reasons which a number of officers and men have for visiting their homes, providing for their families, etc., etc.
"The Enemy conscious of his superior strength is constantly threatening the small force that now holds him in check on the line of the Arkansas river. Speight's Brigade was sent to their present position—not because they were not needed here—but for the reason that it was an utter impossibility to subsist it in this region.
"Every consideration of patriotism and duty imperiously demands the presence of every officer and soldier belonging to this command. The season of active operations is at hand. The enemy in our front is actively employed in accumulating supplies and transportation and in massing, drilling, and disciplining his troops. His advance cannot be expected to be long (cont.)
without telling or lasting effect. The Confederate service in Indian Territory was honeycombed with fraud and corruption.757 Wastrels, desperadoes, scamps of every sort luxuriated at Indian expense. It was no wonder that false muster rolls had to be guarded against.758 The Texans showed throughout so great an aversion to the giving of themselves or of their worldly goods759 to the salvation of the country that
Footnote 756: (return)(cont.) delayed. This enemy is made up of Kansas Jayhawkers, 'Pin Indians,' and Traitors from Missouri, Arkansas and Texas. The ruin, devastation, oppression, and tyranny that has marked his progress has no parallel in history. The last official Report from your Brigade shews a sad state of weakness. Were the enemy informed on this point our line of defence would soon be transferred from the Arkansas to Red river. In the name of God, our country and all that is near and dear to us, let us discard from our minds every other consideration than that of a firm, fixed, and manly determination to do our duty and our whole duty to our country in her hour of peril and need. The season is propitious for an advance. Let not supineness, indifference and a lack of enthusiasm in a just and holy cause, compel a retreat Texas is the great Commissary Depot west of the Mississippi. The enemy must be kept as far from her rich fields and countless herds, as possible. Let us cheerfully, harmoniously, and in a spirit of manly sacrifice bend every energy mental and physical to preparations for a forward movement. The foregoing reasons for a refusal to grant leave of absence will serve as an answer in all similar cases and will be disseminated among the officers and men of the Brigade by the Commanders thereof."—CROSBY, by command of Steele, March 20, 1863, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 151-152.
Footnote 757: (return)J.A. Scales to Adair, April 12, 1863, Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, 821-822.
Footnote 759: (return)Holmes, as early as March, warned Steele that he would have to get his supplies soon from Texas. It would not be possible to draw them much longer from the Arkansas River. He was told to prepare to get them in Texas "at all hazard," which instruction was construed by Steele to mean, "take it, if you cant buy it" [ibid., 145-146]. It was probably the prospect of having to use force or compulsion that made Steele so interested, late in May, in finding out definitely whether Hindman's acts in Arkansas had really been legalized [Steele to Blair, May 22, 1863, ibid., 34]. Appreciating that it was matter of vital concern that the grain crop in northern Texas should be harvested, Steele was at a loss to know how to deal with petitions that solicited furloughs for the purpose [Steele to Anderson, May 4, 1863, ibid., 227; Duval to Cabell, May 7, 1863, ibid., 230-231]. Perhaps, it was a concession to some such need that induced him, in June, to permit seven day furloughs [Duval to Cooper, June 27, 1863, ibid., no. 268, p. 100].
Steele in despair cried out, "... it does appear as if the Texas troops on this frontier were determined to tarnish the proud fame that Texans have won in other fields."760 The Arkansans were no better and no worse. The most fitting employment for many, the whole length and breadth of Steele's department, was the mere "ferreting out of jayhawkers and deserters."761
The Trans-Mississippi departmental change, effected in January, was of short duration, so short that it could never surely have been intended to be anything but transitional. In February the parts were re-united and Kirby Smith put in command of the whole,762 President Davis explaining, not very candidly, that no dissatisfaction with Holmes was thereby implied.763 Smith was the ranking officer and entitled to the first consideration. Moreover, Holmes had once implored that a substitute for himself be sent out. As a matter of fact, Holmes had become too much entangled with Hindman, too much identified with all that Arkansans objected to in Hindman,764 his intolerance, his arrogance, his illegalities, for him to be retained longer, with complacency, in chief command. Hindman and he were largely to blame for the necessity765 of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Arkansas and the adjacent Indian country, which had just been done. Strong
Footnote 760: (return)Steele to Alexander, April 23, 1863, Confederate Records, no. 270, pp. 210-211.
Footnote 763: (return)Davis to Holmes, February 26, 1863, Official Records, vol. liii, supplement, 849-850.
Footnote 765: (return)The necessity was exceedingly great. Take, for instance, the situation at Fort Smith, where the citizens themselves asked for the establishment of martial law in order that lives and property might be reasonably secure [Crosby to Mayor Joseph Bennett, January 10, 1863, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 33-34].
political pressure was exerted in Richmond766 and the Arkansas delegation in Congress demanded Hindman's recall,767 Holmes's displacement, and Kirby Smith's appointment. The loss of that historic fort, Arkansas Post,768 also a tardy appreciation of the economic value of the Arkansas Valley and, incidentally, of the entire Trans-Mississippi Department,769 had really determined matters; but, fortunately, the supersedure of Holmes by Smith did not affect the position of Steele.
Steele divined that the Federals would naturally make an early attempt to occupy in force the country north of the Arkansas River and beyond it to the southward in what had hitherto been a strictly Confederate stronghold. It was his intention to forestall them. The two Cherokee regiments constituted, for some little time, his best available troops and them he kept in almost constant motion.770 His great reliance, and well it might be, was upon Stand Watie, whom he had
Footnote 766: (return)Davis to Garland, March 28, 1863, Official Records, vol. liii, supplement, 861-863; Davis to the Arkansas delegation, March 30, 1863, ibid., 863-865.
Footnote 767: (return)Hindman was not immediately recalled; but he soon manifested an unwillingness to continue under Holmes [ibid., 848]. He had very pronounced opinions about some of his associates. Price he thought of as a breeder of factions and Holmes as an honest man but unsystematic. In the summer, he actually asked for an assignment to Indian Territory [ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 895].
Footnote 768: (return)Livermore, Story of the Civil War, part iii, book i, 85. Davis would fain have believed that so great a disaster had not befallen the Confederate arms [Letter to Holmes, January 28, 1863, Official Records, vol. liii, supplement, 847].
Footnote 769: (return)Perhaps, it is scarcely fair to intimate that the Trans-Mississippi Department was regarded as unimportant at this stage. It was only relatively so. In proof of that, see Davis to Governor Flanagin, April 3, 1863, ibid., 865-866; Davis to Johnson, July 14, 1863, ibid., 879-880. When Kirby Smith tarried late in the assumption of his enlarged duties, Secretary Seddon pointed out the increasingly great significance of them [Letter to Smith, March 18, 1863, ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, pp. 802-803].
brought up betimes within convenient distance of Fort Smith771 and with whom, in April, Phillips's men had two successful encounters, on the fourteenth772 and the twenty-fifth. The one of the twenty-fifth was at Webber's Falls and especially noteworthy, since, as a Federal victory, it prevented a convening of the secessionist Cherokee Council,773 for which, so important did he deem it, Steele had planned an extra protection.774 The completeness of the Federal victory was marred by the loss of Dr. Gillpatrick,775 who had so excellently served the ends of diplomacy between the Indian Expedition and John Ross.
Through May and June, engagements, petty in themselves but contributing each its mite to ultimate success or failure, occupied detachments of the opposing Indian forces with considerable frequency.776 Two, devised by Cooper, those of the fourteenth777 and twentieth778 of May may be said to characterize the entire
Footnote 771: (return)"You will order Colonel Stand Watie to move his command down the Ark. River to some point in the vicinity of Fort Smith."—CROSBY to Cooper, February 14, 1863, ibid., p. 90.
Footnote 773: (return)Phillips to Curtis, April 26, 1863, Official Records, vol. xxii, part i, 314-315; Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. ii, 40-41. Mrs. Anderson, in her Life of General Stand Watie, denies categorically that the meeting of the council was interrupted on this occasion [p. 22] and cites the recollections of "living veterans" in proof.
Footnote 774: (return)"I am directed by the General Com'dg to say that he deems it advisable that you should move your Hd. Qrs. higher up the river, say in the vicinity of Webber's Falls or Pheasant Bluff. He is desirous that you should be somewhere near the Council when that body meets, so that any attempt of the enemy to interfere with their deliberations may be thwarted by you."—DUVAL to Cooper, April 22, 1863, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 209.
Footnote 778: (return)—Ibid., vol. xxii, part i, 337-338; Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 34.
series and were nothing but fruitless demonstrations to seize the Federal grazing herds. A brilliant cavalry raid, undertaken by Stand Watie and for the same purpose, a little later, was slightly more successful;779 but even its fair showing was reversed in the subsequent skirmish at Greenleaf Prairie, June 16.780 To the northward, something more serious was happening, since actions, having their impetus in Arkansas,781 were endangering Phillips's line of communication with Fort Scott, his base and his depot of supplies. In reality, Phillips was hard pressed and no one knew better than he how precarious his situation was. Among his minor troubles was the refusal of his Creeks to charge in the engagement of May 20.
The refusal of the Creeks to charge was not, however, indicative of any widespread disaffection.782 So
Footnote 779: (return)Anderson, 20-21. Interestingly enough, about this time Cooper reported that he could get plenty of beef where he was and at a comparatively low price, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 268, pp. 60-61.
Footnote 781: (return)Not all got their impetus there. The following letter although not sent, contains internal evidence that Cooper was concocting some of them:
"I learn unofficially that Gen'l Cooper, having received notice of the approach of a train of supplies for Gibson, was about crossing the Arkansas with the largest part of his force, to intercept it. It is reported that the train would have been in 15 miles of Gibson last night. If Gen'l Cooper succeeds Phillips will leave soon, if not he will probably remain some time longer. Be prepared to move in case he leaves."—STEELE to Cabell, June 24, 1863, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 96.
Footnote 782: (return)The following letter shows the nature of the Creek disaffection:
DEAR GREAT FATHER: Sir, The wicked rebellion in the United States has caused a division in the Nation. Some of our many loving leaders have joined the rebels merely for speculation and consequently divided our people and that brought ruin in our Nation. They had help near and ours was far so that our ruin was sure. We saw this plain beforehand. Therefore we concluded to go to you our great father, remembering the treaty that you have made with us long ago in which you promised us protection. This was the cause that made us to go and meet you in your white house about eighteen months ago and there laid our complaint before you, as a weaker brother wronged of his rights by a stronger brother and you promised us your protection; but before we got back to our people they were (cont.)
honorably had Phillips been conducting himself with reference to Indian affairs, so promptly and generously had he discharged his obligations to the refugees who had been harbored at Neosho—they had all returned now from exile783—so successfully had he everywhere encountered the foe that the Indians, far and wide, were beginning to look to him for succor,784 many of them to
Footnote 782: (return)(cont.) made to leave their humble and peaceful home and also all their property and traveled towards north in the woods without roads not only that but they were followed, so that they had to fight three battles so as to keep their families from being taken away from them. In the last fight they were overpowered by a superior force so they had to get away the best way they can and most every thing they had was taken away from them ... Now this was the way we left our country and this was the condition of our people when we entered within the bounds of the State of Kansas ...
Now Great Father you have promised to help us in clearing out our country so that we could bring back our families to their homes and moreover we have enlisted as home guards to defend our country and it will be twelve months in a few weeks ... but there is nothing done as yet in our country. We have spent our time in the states of Mo. and Arks. and in the Cherokee Nation. We are here in Ft. Gibson over a month. Our enemies are just across the river and our pickets and theirs are fighting most every day ...
There is only three regts. of Indians and a few whites are here. Our enemy are gathering fast from all sides ...
A soldier's rights we know but little but it seems to us that our rations are getting shorter all the time but that may be on account of the teams for it have to be hauled a great ways.—CREEKS to the President of the United States, May 16, 1863, Office of Indian Affairs, General Files, Creek, 1860-1869, O 6 of 1863.
Footnote 783: (return)Britton's account of the return of the Cherokee exiles is recommended for perusal. It could scarcely be excelled. See, Civil War on the Border, vol. ii, 34-37.
Footnote 784: (return)Certain proceedings of Carruth and Martin would seem to suggest that they were endeavoring to reap the reward of Phillips's labors, by negotiating, somewhat prematurely, for an inter-tribal council. Coffin may have endorsed it, but Dole had not [Dole to Coffin, July 8, 1863, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 71, p. 116]. The pretext for calling such a council lay in fairly recent doings of the wild tribes. The subjoined letters and extracts of letters will elucidate the subject: February 7, Coffin reported to Dole [General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864] that the wild Indians had been raiding on the Verdigris and Fall Rivers into the Creek and Cherokee countries, "jayhawking property," and bringing it into Kansas and selling it to the settlers. Some of the cattle obtained in this way had been (cont.)
wonder, whether in joining the Confederacy, they had not made a terrible mistake, a miscalculation beyond all remedying.
To the Confederates, tragically enough, the Indian's tale of woe and of regret had a different meaning. The
Footnote 784: (return)(cont.) sold by a settler to the contractor and fed to the Indians. Jim Ned's band of wild Delawares, returning from such a jayhawking expedition, had stolen some Osage ponies and had become involved in a fight in which two Delawares had been killed [Coffin to Dole, February 12, 1863, ibid., Neosho, C 73 of 1863]. Coffin prevailed upon Jim Ned to stop the jayhawking excursions; inasmuch as "Considerable bad feeling exists on the part of the Cherokees in consequence of the bringing up ... a great many cattle, ponies, and mules, which they allege belong to the Cherokee refugees ..." [Coffin to Dole, February 24, 1863, Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1863-1864].
Feelings of hostility continued to exist, notwithstanding, between the civilized and uncivilized red men and "aided materially the emissaries of the Rebellion in fomenting discords and warlike raids upon whites as well as Indians ..." [Coffin to Dole, June 25, 1863, ibid., C 325]. It was under such circumstances that Carruth took it upon himself to arrange an inter-tribal council. This is his report [Carruth to Coffin, June 17, 1863, ibid.,]. His action was seconded by Martin [Martin to Coffin, June 18, 1863, ibid.,]:
"I left Belmont (the temporary Wichita agency) May 26th to hold a Council with the Indians of the Wichita Agency, who have not as yet reached Kansas ... I found ... upon reaching Fall River ... that the Wichitas alone had sent over 100 men. We reached the Ark. River May 31st. After having been compelled to purchase some provisions for the number of people, who have come, that were not provided for. The next day we were joined by the Kickapoos and Sacs, and here I was informed by the Kickapoos, that no runner had gone through to the Cadoes and Comanches from them, as we had heard at Belmont, yet I learned, that these tribes were then camped at the Big Bend, some sixty miles above and waiting at this point: I sent three Wichitas—among them the Chief—some Ionies, Wacoes, and Tawa Kuwus through to them calling on their Chiefs to come and have a 'talk.'
"They reached us on the 8th of June, and after furnishing the presents I had taken to them all the different tribes were called to Council. Present were, Arapahoes, Lipans, Comanches, Kioways, Sac and Foxes, Kickapoos and Cadoes besides the Indians who went out with me.
"All of them are true to the Government of the United States, but some are at war with each other. I proposed to them to make peace with all the tribes friendly to our Government, so that their 'Great Father' might view all of them alike.
"To this they agreed, and a Council was called to which the Osages, Potawatomies, Shians, Sac and Foxes, in fact all the tribes at variance, are (cont.)
tale had been told many times of late and every time with a new emphasis upon that part of it that recounted delusion and betrayal. For quite a while now the Indians had been feeling themselves neglected. Steele was aware of the fact but helpless. When told of treaty rights he had to plead ignorance; for he had never seen the treaties and had no official knowledge of their contents. He was exercising the functions of superintendent ex officio, not because the post had ever been specifically conferred upon him or instructions sent, but because he had come to his command to find it, in nearly every aspect, Indian and no agent or superintendent at hand to take charge 785 of affairs that were
Footnote 784: (return)(cont.) to be invited, to hold a grand peace Council near the mouth of the Little Arkansas River within six weeks. Meanwhile they are to send runners to notify these tribes to gather on the Arkansas, sixty miles above, that they may be within reach of our call when we get to the Council ground. Subsistence will have to be provided for at least 10000 Indians at that time. They will expect something from the Government to convince them of its power to carry through its promises. Some of the Cadoes and Comanches connected with this Agency, after coming to the Arkansas, returned to Fort Cobb. These will all come back to this Council. Their desire is to be subsisted on the Little Arkansas, some 70 miles from Emporia until the war closes.
"They argue like this, 'The Government once sent us our provisions to Fort Cobb over 300 miles from Fort Smith. We do not want to live near the whites, because of troubles between them and us in regard to ponies, timber, fields, green corn, etc. Our subsistence can be hauled to the mouth of the Little Arkansas, easier by far, than it was formerly from Fort Smith, and by being at this point we shall be removed from the abodes of the whites, so they cannot steal our ponies, nor can our people trouble them.'
"I believe they are right. I have had more trouble the past winter in settling difficulties between the Indians and whites on account of trades, stolen horses, broken fences, etc. than from all other causes combined.
"I cannot get all the Indians of this Agency together this side of the Little Arkansas. That point will be near enough the Texan frontier for the Indians to go home easily when the war closes. It is on the direct route to Fort Cobb. They are opposed to going via Fort Gibson ..."
Footnote 785: (return)Without legislating on the subject, and without intending it, the Confederacy had virtually put into effect, a recommendation of Hindman's that "The superintendencies, agencies, etc., should be abolished, and a purely military establishment substituted ..." [Official Records, vol. xiii, p. 51.].
ordinarily not strictly within the range of military cognizance.
General Steele, like many another, was inclined to think that the red men greatly over-estimated their own importance; for they failed to "see and understand how small a portion of the field"786 they really occupied. To Steele, it was not Indian Territory that was valuable but Texas. For him the Indian country, barren by reason of the drouth, denuded of its live stock, a prey to jayhawker, famine, and pestilence, did nothing more than measure the distance between the Federals and the rich Texan grain-fields, from whence he fondly hoped an inexhaustible supply of flour787 for the Confederates was to come. In short, the great and wonderful expanse that had been given to the Indian for a perpetual home was a mere buffer.
But it was a buffer, throbbing with life, and that was something Steele dared not ignore and could not if he would. With such a consciousness, when the secessionist Cherokees were making arrangements for their council at Webber's Falls in April, he hastened to propitiate them ahead of time by addressing them "through the medium of their wants" for he feared what might be their action788 should they assemble with a
Footnote 786: (return)Steele to Wigfall, April 15, 1863, Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, 820.
Footnote 787: (return)Steele's letter books furnish much evidence on this score. A large portion has been published in the Official Records. During the period covered by this chapter, he was drawing his supply of flour from Riddle's Station, "on the Fort Smith and Boggy Road" [Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 252] in charge of which was Captain Hardin of Bass's Texas Cavalry. He expected to draw from Arkansas likewise [Steele to Major S.J. Lee, June 9, 1863, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 268, pp. 70-71; Duval to Hardin, June 16, 1863, ibid., p. 81; Steele to Lee, June 17, 1863, ibid., pp. 87-88].
Footnote 788: (return)"Enclosed please find a letter to Col. Adair, and a note from him forwarding it. I send it for the consideration of General Holmes. The (cont.)
grievance789 against the Confederacy in their hearts. Protection against the oncoming enemy and relief from want were the things the Indians craved, so, short though his own supplies were, Steele had to make provision for the helpless and indigent natives, the feeding of whom became a fruitful and constantly increasing source of embarrassment.790
Just and generous as General Steele endeavored to
Footnote 788: (return)(cont.) subject is one of grave importance. If a regiment of infantry could be spared to take post at this place and General Cabell could be permitted to include it in his command, I would go more into the nation and would be able soon to give the required protection. The troops from Red River have been ordered up and should be some distance on the way before this. I fear the meeting of the Cherokee Council which takes place on the 20th ... unless more troops arrive before they act."—STEELE to Anderson, April 15, 1863, Confederate Records, no. 270, p. 194.
This was not the first time Steele had expressed a wish to go into the Nation. March 20th, when writing to Anderson [ibid., p. 150], he had thought it of "paramount importance" that he visit all parts of his command. Concerning his apprehension about the prospective work of the Cherokee Council, he wrote quite candidly to Wigfall [Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, 821].
Footnote 789: (return)The letter to Colonel W.P. Adair, written by one of his adjutants, J.A. Scales, April 12, 1863 [ibid., 821-822], is a creditable presentation of the Cherokee grievance.
Footnote 790: (return)Steele here presents certain phases of the embarrassment,
"... The matter of feeding destitute Indians has been all through a vexatious one, the greatest trouble being to find in each neighborhood a reliable person to receive the quota for that neighborhood. These people seem more indifferent to the wants of others than any I have seen; they are not willing to do the least thing to assist in helping their own people who are destitute. I have, in many instances, been unable to get wagons to haul the flour given them. I have incurred a great responsibility in using army rations in this way and to the extent that I have. I have endeavored to give to all destitute and to sell at cost to those who are able to purchase. In this matter the Nation has been more favored than the adjacent States. I am told by Mr. Boudinot that a bill was passed by the Cherokee Council, taking the matter into their own hands. I hope it is so. In which case I shall cease issuing to others who have not, like them, been driven from their homes. Dr. Walker was appointed to superintend this matter, some system being necessary to prevent the same persons from drawing from different commissaries ..."—STEELE to D.H. Cooper, June 15, 1863, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 268, pp. 80-81.
be in the matter of attention to Indian necessities, his efforts were unappreciated largely because of evil influences at work to undermine him and to advance Douglas H. Cooper. Steele had his points of vulnerability, his inability to check the Federal advance and his remoteness from the scene of action, his headquarters being at Fort Smith. Connected with the second point and charged against him were all the bad practices of those men who, in their political or military control of Indian Territory, had allowed Arkansas to be their chief concern. Such practices became the foundation stone of a general Indian dissatisfaction and, concomitantry, Douglas H. Cooper, of insatiable ambition, posed as the exponent of the idea that the safety of Indian Territory was an end in itself.
The kind of separate military organization that constituted Steele's command was not enough for the Indians. Seemingly, they desired the restoration of the old Pike department, but not such as it had been in the days of the controversy with Hindman but such as it always was in Pike's imagination. The Creeks were among the first to declare that this was their desire. They addressed791 themselves to President Davis792 and
Footnote 791: (return)Mory Kanard and Echo Harjo to President Davis, May 18, 1863, Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, 1118-1119.
Footnote 792: (return)Davis, in his message of January 12, 1863 [Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, vol. i, 295] had revealed an acquaintance with some Indian dissatisfaction but intimated that it had been dispelled, it having arisen "from a misapprehension of the intentions of the Government ..." It was undoubtedly to allay apprehension on the part of the Indians that Miles, in the house of Representatives, offered the following resolution, February 17, 1863:
"Resolved, That the Government of the Confederate States has witnessed with feelings of no ordinary gratification the loyalty and good faith of the larger portion of its Indian allies west of the State of Arkansas.
"Resolved further, That no effort of the Confederate Government shall be spared to protect them fully in all their rights and to assist them in defending their country against the encroachments of all enemies." [Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States, vol. vi, 113].