LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris, April 25, 1835.
His Excellency the DUC de BROGLIE, etc.,
Minister Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
SIR: About to return to my own country, I am unwilling to leave this without adding one more effort to the many I have heretofore made to restore to both that mutual good understanding which their best interests require, and which probable events may interrupt and perhaps permanently destroy.
From the correspondence and acts of His Majesty's Government since the message of the President of the United States was known at Paris it is evident that an idea is entertained of making the fulfillment of the treaty of 1831 dependent on explanations to be given of the terms used in the message, and withholding payment of an acknowledged debt until satisfaction be given for a supposed indecorum in demanding it. The bare possibility that this opinion might be entertained and acted upon by His Majesty's Government renders it incumbent on me to state explicitly what I understand to be the sentiments of mine on this subject.
Erroneous impressions, arising from the want of a proper attention to the structure of our Government, to the duties of its Chief Magistrate, to the principles it has adopted and its strict adherence to them in similar cases, might raise expectations which could never be realized and lead to measures destructive of all harmony between the parties. This communication is made in full confidence that it is the wish of His Majesty's Government, as it most sincerely is that of the President, to avoid all measures of that description; and it is hoped, therefore, that it will be received in the spirit by which it is dictated—that of conciliation and peace.
The form of our Government and the functions of the President as a component part of it have in their relation to this subject been sufficiently explained in my previous correspondence, especially in my letter to the Comte de Rigny of the 29th of January last. I have therefore little to add to that part of my representation which is drawn from the form of our Government and the duties of the President in administering it. If these are fully understood, the principles of action derived from them can not be mistaken.
The President, as the chief executive power, must have a free and entirely unfettered communication with the coordinate powers of Government. As the organ of intercourse with other nations, he is the only source from which a knowledge of our relations with them can be conveyed to the legislative branches. It results from this that the utmost freedom from all restraint in the details into which he is obliged to enter of international concerns and of the measures in relation to them is essential to the proper performance of this important part of his functions. He must exercise them without having continually before him the fear of offending the susceptibility of the powers whose conduct he is obliged to notice. In the performance of this duty he is subject to public opinion and his own sense of propriety for an indiscreet, to his constituents for a dangerous, and to his constitutional judges for an illegal, exercise of the power, but to no other censure, foreign or domestic. Were any foreign powers permitted to scan the communications of the Executive, their complaints, whether real or affected, would involve the country in continual controversies; for the right being acknowledged, it would be a duty to exercise it by demanding a disavowal of every phrase they might deem offensive and an explanation of every word to which an improper interpretation could be given. The principle, therefore, has been adopted that no foreign power has a right to ask for explanations of anything that the President, in the exercise of his functions, thinks proper to communicate to Congress, or of any course he may advise them to pursue. This rule is not applicable to the Government of the United States alone, but, in common with it, to all those in which the constitutional powers are distributed into different branches. No such nation desirous of avoiding foreign influence or foreign interference in its councils; no such nation possessing a due sense of its dignity and independence, can long submit to the consequences of this interference. When these are felt, as they soon will be, all must unite in repelling it, and acknowledge that the United States are contending in a cause common to them all, and more important to the liberal Governments of Europe than even to themselves; for it is too obvious to escape the slightest attention that the Monarchies of Europe by which they are surrounded will have all the advantage of this supervision of the domestic councils of their neighbors without being subject to it themselves. It is true that in the representative Governments of Europe executive communications to legislative bodies have not the extension that is given to them in the United States, and that they are therefore less liable to attack on that quarter; but they must not imagine themselves safe. In the opening address, guarded as it commonly is, every proposition made by the ministry, every resolution of either chamber, will offer occasions for the jealous interference of national punctilio, for all occupy the same grounds. No intercommunication of the different branches of Government will be safe, and even the courts of justice will afford no sanctuary for freedom of decision and of debate, and the susceptibility of foreign powers must be consulted in all the departments of Government. Occasions for intervention in the affairs of other countries are but too numerous at present, without opening another door to encroachments; and it is no answer to the argument to say that no complaints will be made but for reasonable cause, and that of this, the nation complained of being the judge, no evil can ensue. But this argument concedes the right of examining the communications in question, which is denied. Allow it and you will have frivolous as well as grave complaints to answer, and must not only heal the wounds of a just national pride, but apply a remedy to those of a morbid susceptibility. To show that my fear of the progressive nature of these encroachments is not imaginary, I pray leave to call your excellency's attention to the inclosed report from the Secretary of State to the President. It is offered for illustration, not for complaint; I am instructed to make none. Because the Government of France has taken exceptions to the President's opening message, the chargé d'affaires of France thinks it his duty to protest against a special communication, and to point out the particular passages in a correspondence of an American minister with his own Government to the publication of which he objects. If the principle I contest is just, the chargé d'affaires is right. He has done his duty as a vigilant supervisor of the President's correspondence. If the principle is admitted, every diplomatic agent at Washington will do the same, and we shall have twenty censors of the correspondence of the Government and of the public press. If the principle is correct, every communication which the President makes in relation to our foreign affairs, either to the Congress or to the public, ought in prudence to be previously submitted to these ministers, in order to avoid disputes and troublesome and humiliating explanations. If the principle be submitted to, neither dignity nor independence is left to the nation. To submit even to a discreet exercise of such a privilege would be troublesome and degrading, and the inevitable abuse of it could not be borne. It must therefore be resisted at the threshold, and its entrance forbidden into the sanctuary of domestic consultations. But whatever may be the principles of other governments, those of the United States are fixed; the right will never be acknowledged, and any attempt to enforce it will be repelled by the undivided energy of the nation.
I pray your excellency to observe that my argument does not deny a right to all foreign powers of taking proper exceptions to the governmental acts and language of another. It is to their interference in its consultations, in its proceedings while yet in an inchoate state, that we object. Should the President do an official executive act affecting a foreign power, or use exceptionable language in addressing it through his minister or through theirs; should a law be passed injurious to the dignity of another nation—in all these and other similar cases a demand for explanation would be respectfully received, and answered in the manner that justice and a regard to the dignity of the complaining nation would require.
After stating these principles, let me add that they have not only been theoretically adopted, but that they have been practically asserted. On two former occasions exceptions of the same nature were taken to the President's message by the Government of France, and in neither did they produce any other explanation than that derived from the nature of our Government, and this seems on those occasions to have been deemed sufficient, for in both cases the objections were virtually abandoned—one when Messrs. Marshall, Gerry, and Pinckney were refused to be received, and again in the negotiation between Prince Polignac and Mr. Rives. In the former case, although the message of the President was alleged as the cause of the refusal to receive the ministers, yet without any such explanation their successors were honorably accredited. In the latter case the allusion in the message to an apprehended collision was excepted to, but the reference made by Mr. Rives to the constitutional duties of the President seems to have removed the objection.
Having demonstrated that the United States can not in any case permit their Chief Magistrate to be questioned by any foreign government in relation to his communications with the coordinate branches of his own, it is scarcely necessary to consider the case of such an explanation being required as the condition on which the fulfillment of a treaty or any pecuniary advantage was to depend. The terms of such a proposition need only be stated to show that it would be not only inadmissible, but rejected as offensive to the nation to which it might be addressed. In this case it would be unnecessary as well as inadmissible. France has already received, by the voluntary act of the President, every explanation the nicest sense of national honor could desire. That which could not have been given to a demand, that which can never be given on the condition now under discussion, a fortunate succession of circumstances, as I shall proceed to shew, has brought about. Earnestly desirous of restoring the good understanding between the two nations, as soon as a dissatisfaction with the President's message was shewn I suppressed every feeling which the mode of expressing that dissatisfaction was calculated to produce, and without waiting for instructions I hastened on my own responsibility to make a communication to your predecessor in office on the subject. In this, under the reserve that the President could not be called on for an explanation, I did in fact give one that I thought would have removed all injurious impressions.
This is the first of the fortunate circumstances to which I have alluded—fortunate in being made before any demand implying a right to require it; fortunate in its containing, without any knowledge of the precise parts of the message which gave offense, answers to all that have since come to my knowledge. I can easily conceive that the communication of which I speak, made, as I expressly stated, without previous authority from my Government, might not have had the effect which its matter was intended to produce, but it has since (as I have now the honor to inform your excellency) received from the President his full and unqualified approbation; but it is necessary to add that this was given before he had any intimation of an intention to attach it as a condition to the payment of the indemnity due by the treaty, given not only when he was ignorant of any such intent, but when he was informed by France that she intended to execute the treaty and saw by the law which was introduced that it was not to be fettered by any such condition. Thus that is already done by a voluntary act which could not have been done when required as a right, still less when made, what will unquestionably in the United States be considered degrading, as a condition. At this time, sir, I would for no consideration enter into the details I then did. If I could now so far forget what under present circumstances would be due to the dignity of my country, I should be disavowed, and deservedly disavowed, by the President. It is happy, therefore, I repeat, that the good feeling of my country was evinced in the manner I have stated at the only time when it could be done with honor; and though present circumstances would forbid my making the communication I then did, they do not prevent my referring to it for the purpose of shewing that it contains, as I have stated it does, everything that ought to have been satisfactory. Actual circumstances enable me to do this now. Future events, which I need not explain, may hereafter render it improper, and it may be nugatory unless accepted as satisfactory before the occurrence of those events. Let it be examined with the care which the importance of giving it a true construction requires. The objections to the message, as far as I can understand, for they have never been specified, are:
First. That it impeaches the good faith of His Majesty's Government.
Secondly. That it contains a menace of enforcing the performance of the treaty by reprisals.
On the first head, were I now discussing the terms of the message itself, it would be easy to shew that it contains no such charge. The allegation that the stipulations of a treaty have not been complied with, that engagements made by ministers have not been fulfilled, couched in respectful terms, can never be deemed offensive, even when expressly directed to the party whose infractions are complained of, and consequently can never give cause for a demand of explanation; otherwise it is evident that no consideration of national injuries could ever take place. The message, critically examined on this point, contains nothing more than such an enumeration of the causes of complaint. As to its terms, the most fastidious disposition can not fasten on one that could be excepted to. The first refusal and subsequent delay are complained of, but no unworthy motives for either are charged or insinuated. On the whole, if I were commissioned to explain and defend this part of the message, I should say with the conviction of truth that it is impossible to urge a complaint in milder or more temperate terms; but I am not so commissioned. I am endeavoring to shew not only that every proper explanation is given in my letter to M. de Rigny of the 29th of January last, but that in express terms it declares that the sincerity of His Majesty's Government in their desire to execute the treaty was not doubted. Suffer me to draw your excellency's attention to the passages alluded to. In discussing the nature of M. Sérurier's engagement I say:
"It is clear, therefore, that more was required than the expression of a desire on the part of His Majesty's ministers to execute the treaty, a desire the sincerity of which was never doubted, but which might be unavailing, as its accomplishment depended on the vote of the Chambers."
Again, in speaking of the delay which occurred in the month of December, I say:
"It is referred to, I presume, in order to shew that it was produced by a desire on the part of His Majesty's ministers the better to assure the passage of the law. Of this, sir, I never had a doubt, and immediately so advised my Government, and informed it, as was the fact, that I perfectly acquiesced in the delay."
Thus it must be evident, not only that no offensive charge of ill faith is made in the message, but that, as is expressly stated in the first extract, full justice was done at Washington to the intentions of the French Government. While the delay is complained of us a wrong, no improper motives are attributed to the Government in causing it. Again, sir, the whole tenor of that part of my letter which relates to the inexecution of the promise made by M. Sérurier, while it asserts the construction put upon it by the President to be the true one, and appeals to facts and circumstances to support that construction, yet it avoids charging the French Government with any intentional violation, by attributing their delay to an erroneous construction only; for in the letter (I again quote literally) I say:
"I have entered into this detail with the object of showing that although the ministers of the King, under the interpretation they seem to have given to M. Sérurier's promise, may have considered themselves at liberty to defer the presentation of the law until the period which they thought would best secure its success, yet the President, interpreting that promise differently, feeling that in consequence of it he had forborne to do what might be strictly called a duty, and seeing that its performance had not taken place, could not avoid stating the whole case clearly and distinctly to Congress."
Thus, sir, the President, in stating the acts of which he thought his country had reason to complain, does not make a single imputation of improper motive, and to avoid all misconstruction he offers a voluntary declaration that none such were entertained.
The part of the message which seems to have caused the greatest sensation in France is that in which, after a statement of the causes of complaint, it enters into a consideration of the measures to obtain redress which in similar cases are sanctioned by the laws of nations. The complaint seems to be that, in a discussion it was impossible to avoid, of the efficacy and convenience of each, a preference was given to reprisals, considered as a remedial, not as a hostile, measure, and this has been construed into a menace. If any explanations were necessary on this head, they are given in the message itself. It is there expressly disavowed, and the power and high character of France are appealed to to shew that it never could be induced by threats to do what its sense of justice denied. If the measure to which I have more than once alluded should be resorted to, and the humiliation attending a compliance with it could be endured; if it were possible under such circumstances to give an explanation, what more could be required than that which is contained in the message itself that it was not intended as a menace? If the measure to which I alluded should be adopted and submitted to, what would His Majesty's Government require? The disavowal of any intent to influence the councils of France by threats? They have it already. It forms a part of the very instrument which caused the offense, and I will not do them the injustice to think that they could form the offensive idea of requiring more. The necessity of discussing the nature of the remedies for the nonexecution of the treaty, the character and spirit in which it was done, are explained in my letter so often referred to, and I pray your excellency to consider the concluding part of it, beginning with the quotation I have last made. But if I wanted any argument to shew that no explanation of this part of the message was necessary or could be required, I should find it in the opinion—certainly a just one—expressed by His Majesty's ministers, that the recommendation of the President not having been adopted by the other branches of the Government it was not a national act, and could not be complained of as such. Nay, in the note presented by M. Sérurier to the Government at Washington and the measures which it announces (his recall and the offer of my passports) the Government of His Majesty seem to have done all that they thought its dignity required, for they at the same time declare that the law providing for the payment will be presented, but give no intimation of any previous condition and annex none to the bill which they present. The account of dignity being thus declared by this demonstration to be settled, it can not be supposed that it will again be introduced as a set-off against an acknowledged pecuniary balance. Before I conclude my observations on this part of the subject it will be well to inquire in what light exceptions are taken to this part of the message, whether as a menace generally or to the particular measure proposed. In the first view, if every measure that a Government having claims on another declares it must pursue if those claims are not allowed (whatever may be the terms employed) is a menace, it is necessary, and not objectionable unless couched in offensive language; it is a fair declaration of what course the party making it intends to pursue, and except in cases where pretexts were wanted for a rupture have rarely been objected to, even when avowedly the act of the nation, not, as in this case, a proposal made by one branch of its Government to another. Instances of this are not wanting, but need not be here enumerated. One, however, ought to be mentioned, because it is intimately connected with the subject now under discussion. While the commerce of the United States was suffering under the aggressions of the two most powerful nations of the world the American Government, in this sense of the word, menaced them both. It passed a law in express terms declaring to them that unless they ceased their aggressions America would hold no intercourse with them; that their ships would be seized if they ventured into American ports; that the productions of their soil or industry should be forfeited. Here was an undisguised menace in clear, unequivocal terms, and of course, according to the argument against which I contend, neither France nor England could deliberate under its pressure without dishonor. Yet the Emperor of France, certainly an unexceptionable judge of what the dignity of his country required, did deliberate, did accept the condition, did repeal the Berlin and Milan decrees, did not make any complaint of the act as a threat, though he called it an injury. Great Britain, too, although at that time on not very friendly terms with the United States, made no complaint that her pride was offended. Her minister on the spot even made a declaration that the obnoxious orders were repealed. It is true he was disavowed, but the disavowal was accompanied by no objections to the law as a threat. Should the objection be to the nature of the remedy proposed, and that the recommendation of reprisals is the offensive part, it would be easy to show that it stands on the same ground with any other remedy; that it is not hostile in its nature; that it has been resorted to by France to procure redress from other powers, and by them against her, without producing war. But such an argument is not necessary. This is not the case of a national measure, either of menace or action; it is a recommendation only of one branch of Government to another, and France has itself shown that a proposal of this nature could not be noticed as an offense. In the year 1808 the Senate of the United States annexed to the bill of nonintercourse a section which not only advised but actually authorized the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal against both France and England, if the one did not repeal the Berlin and Milan decrees and the other did not revoke the orders in council. This clause was not acceded to by the Representatives, but it was complete as the act of the Senate; yet neither France nor England complained of it as an indignity. Both powers had ministers on the spot, and the dignity of neither seems to have been offended.
If the view I have now taken of the subject be correct; if I have succeeded in conveying to His Majesty's ministers the conviction I myself feel that no right exists in any foreign nation to ask explanations of or even to notice any communications between the different branches of our Government; that to admit it even in a single instance would be a dangerous precedent and a derogation from national dignity, and that in the present instance an explanation that ought to be satisfactory has been voluntarily given, I have then demonstrated that any measure founded on such supposed right is not only inadmissible, but is totally unnecessary, and consequently that His Majesty's ministers may at once declare that previous explanations given by the minister of the United States, and subsequently approved by the President, had satisfied them on the subject of the message.
The motives of my Government during the whole course of this controversy have been misunderstood or not properly appreciated, and the question is daily changing its character. A negotiation entered into for procuring compensation to individuals involved no positive obligation on their Governments to prosecute it to extremities. A solemn treaty, ratified by the constitutional organs of the two powers, changed the private into a public right. The Government acquires by it a perfect right to insist on its stipulations. All doubts as to their justice seem now to have been removed, and every objection to the payment of a debt acknowledged to be just will be severely scrutinized by the impartial world. What character will be given to a refusal to pay such a debt on the allegation, whether well or ill founded, of an offense to national honor it does not become me to say. The French nation are the last that would ever appreciate national honor by any number of millions it could withhold as a compensation for an injury offered to it. The United States, commercial as they are, are the last that would settle such an account. The proposition I allude to would be unworthy of both, and it is sincerely to be hoped that it will never be made.
To avoid the possibility of misapprehension, I repeat that this communication is made with the single view of apprising His Majesty's Government of the consequences attending a measure which without such notice they might be inclined to pursue; that although I am not authorized to state what measures will be taken by the United States, yet I speak confidently of the principles they have adopted, and have no doubt they will never be abandoned.
This is the last communication I shall have the honor to make. It is dictated by a sincere desire to restore a good intelligence, which seems to be endangered by the very measure intended to consolidate it. Whatever be the result, the United States may appeal to the world to bear witness that in the assertion of the rights of their citizens and the dignity of their Government they have never swerved from the respect due to themselves and from that which they owe to the Government of France.
I pray your excellency to receive the assurance of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,
EDW. LIVINGSTON.
WASHINGTON, June 29, 1835.
Hon. JOHN FORSYTH,
Secretary of State, etc.
SIR: After having by my note to the Duke de Broglie dated the 25th April last made a final effort to preserve a good understanding between the United States and France by suggesting such means of accommodation as I thought were consistent with the honor of the one country to offer and of the other to accept, I determined to avail myself of the leave to return which was given by your dispatch, No,—, rather than to remain, as I had desired to do, in England waiting the result of my last communication. This step having been approved by the President, I need not here refer to the reasons which induced me to take it. Having received my passports, I left Paris on the 29th of April. At the time of my departure the note, of which a copy has been transmitted to you, asking an explanation of the terms used in Mr. Sérurier's communication to the Department remained unanswered, but I have reason to believe that the answer when given will be satisfactory.
The principal business with which I was charged having thus been brought to a close, I presume that my services can no longer be useful to my country, and I therefore pray that the President will be pleased to accept my resignation of the trust with which I have been honored. I shall terminate it by transmitting to the Department some papers relating to matters of minor importance which I soon expect to receive, and will add the explanations which may yet be wanting to give a full view of the affairs of the mission up to the time of my leaving France.
I have the honor to be, sir, with perfect respect, your most obedient servant,
EDW. LIVINGSTON.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 30, 1835.
EDWARD LIVINGSTON, Esq.,
Washington.
SIR: Your letter of the 29th instant has been laid before the President, and I am directed to reply that the President can not allow you, who have been so long and usefully employed in the public service, to leave the trust last confided to you without an expression of his regard and respect, the result of many years of intimate association in peace and war. Although differing on some points of general policy, your singleness of purpose, perfect integrity, and devotion to your country have been always known to him. In the embarrassing and delicate position you have lately occupied your conduct, and especially your last official note in closing your correspondence with the French Government, has met his entire approbation, exhibiting as it does, with truth, the anxious desire of the Government and the people of the United States to maintain the most liberal and pacific relations with the nation to which you were accredited, and a sincere effort to remove ill-founded impressions and to soothe the feelings of national susceptibility, even when they have been unexpectedly excited, while at the same time it discourages with a proper firmness any expectation that the American Government can ever be brought to allow an interference inconsistent with the spirit of its institutions or make concessions incompatible with its self-respect. The President is persuaded that he will be sustained in these opinions by the undivided sentiment of the American people, and that you will carry into a retirement which he trusts may be temporary the consciousness not only of having performed your duty, but of having realized the anticipations of your fellow-citizens and secured for yourself and your country the just appreciation of the world.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN FORSYTH.
WASHINGTON CITY, December 8, 1835.
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, exhibiting certain transfers of appropriations that have been made in that Department in pursuance of the power vested in the President by the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1809, entitled "An act further to amend the several acts for the establishment and regulation of the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments."
ANDREW JACKSON.
WASHINGTON, December 9, 1835.
To the Senate and House of Representatives.
GENTLEMEN: I herewith communicate, for the information of Congress, a report of the Secretary of War, with accompanying documents, showing the progress made during the present year in the astronomical observations made under the act of the 14th of July, 1832, relative to the northern boundary of the State of Ohio.
The controversy between the authorities of the State of Ohio and those of the Territory of Michigan in respect to this boundary assumed about the time of the termination of the last session of Congress a very threatening aspect, and much care and exertion were necessary to preserve the jurisdiction of the Territorial government under the acts of Congress and to prevent a forcible collision between the parties. The nature and course of the dispute and the measures taken by the Executive for the purpose of composing it will fully appear in the accompanying report from the Secretary of State and the documents therein referred to.
The formation of a State government by the inhabitants of the Territory of Michigan and their application, now pending, to be admitted into the Union give additional force to the many important reasons which call for the settlement of this question by Congress at their present session.
ANDREW JACKSON.
WASHINGTON, December 9, 1835.
To the Senate and House of Representatives.
GENTLEMEN: By the act of the 11th of January, 1805, all that part of the Indiana Territory lying north of a line drawn due "east from the southerly bend or extreme of Lake Michigan until it shall intersect Lake Erie, and east of a line drawn from the said southerly bend through the middle of said lake to its northern extremity, and thence due north to the northern boundary of the United States," was erected into a separate Territory by the name of Michigan.
The territory comprised within these limits being part of the district of country described in the ordinance of the 13th of July, 1787, which provides that whenever any of the States into which the same should be divided should have 60,000 free inhabitants such State should be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State government, provided the constitution and State government so to be formed shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles, etc., the inhabitants thereof have during the present year, in pursuance of the right secured by the ordinance, formed a constitution and State government. That instrument, together with various other documents connected therewith, has been transmitted to me for the purpose of being laid before Congress, to whom the power and duty of admitting new States into the Union exclusively appertains; and the whole are herewith communicated for your early decision.
ANDREW JACKSON.
WASHINGTON, December 17, 1835.
The VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE:
I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate with a view to its ratification, a convention between the United States and the United Mexican States, concluded and signed by the plenipotentiaries of the respective parties at the City of Mexico on the 3d of April, 1835, and the object of which is to extend the time for the appointment of their commissioners and surveyors provided for by the third article of the treaty of limits between them of the 12th of January, 1835.
ANDREW JACKSON.
WASHINGTON, December 17, 1835.
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
I transmit to Congress a report from the Secretary of State, accompanying copies of certain papers relating to a bequest to the United States by Mr. James Smithson, of London, for the purpose of founding "at Washington an establishment under the name of the Smithsonian Institution, for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men." The Executive having no authority to take any steps for accepting the trust and obtaining the funds, the papers are communicated with a view to such measures as Congress may deem necessary.
ANDREW JACKSON.
WASHINGTON, December 22, 1835.
To the Congress of the United States:
I transmit herewith, for the information of Congress, a report from the War Department, on the condition of the Cumberland road in the States of Illinois and Indiana.
ANDREW JACKSON.
WASHINGTON, December 22, 1835.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit to the Senate, for their consideration and advice with regard to its ratification, a convention signed at Paris by the plenipotentiaries of the United States and the Swiss Confederation on the 6th of March last. A copy of the convention is also transmitted for the convenience of the Senate.
ANDREW JACKSON.
DECEMBER 23, 1835.
To the Senate of the United States:
I hereby submit, for the advice and sanction of the Senate, the inclosed proposal of the Secretary of the Treasury for the investment of the proceeds of the sales of public lands in behalf of the Chickasaw Indians under the treaties therein mentioned.
ANDREW JACKSON.
WASHINGTON, January 11, 1836.
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
Having laid before Congress on the 9th ultimo the correspondence which had previously taken place relative to the controversy between Ohio and Michigan on the question of boundary between that State and Territory, I now transmit reports from the Secretaries of State and War on the subject, with the papers therein referred to.
ANDREW JACKSON.
WASHINGTON, January 12, 1836.
To the Senate:
I transmit herewith, for the consideration and advice of the Senate as to the ratification of the same, the two treaties concluded with the Carmanchee Indians and with the Caddo Indians referred to in the accompanying communication from the War Department.
ANDREW JACKSON.
WASHINGTON, January 15, 1836.
To the Senate and House of Representatives.
GENTLEMEN: In my message at the opening of your session I informed you that our chargé d'affaires at Paris had been instructed to ask for the final determination of the French Government in relation to the payment of the indemnification secured by the treaty of the 4th of July, 1831, and that when advices of the result should be received it would be made the subject of a special communication.
In execution of this design I now transmit to you the papers numbered from 1 to 13, inclusive, containing among other things the correspondence on this subject between our chargé d'affaires and the French minister of foreign affairs, from which it will be seen that France requires as a condition precedent to the execution of a treaty unconditionally ratified and to the payment of a debt acknowledged by all the branches of her Government to be due that certain explanations shall be made of which she dictates the terms. These terms are such as that Government has already been officially informed can not be complied with, and if persisted in they must be considered as a deliberate refusal on the part of France to fulfill engagements binding by the laws of nations and held sacred by the whole civilized world. The nature of the act which France requires from this Government is clearly set forth in the letter of the French minister marked No. 4. We will pay the money, says he, when "the Government of the United States is ready on its part to declare to us, by addressing its claim to us officially in writing, that it regrets the misunderstanding which has arisen between the two countries; that this misunderstanding is founded on a mistake; that it never entered into its intention to call in question the good faith of the French Government nor to take a menacing attitude toward France." And he adds: "If the Government of the United States does not give this assurance we shall be obliged to think that this misunderstanding is not the result of an error." In the letter marked No. 6 the French minister also remarks that "the Government of the United States knows that upon itself depends henceforward the execution of the treaty of July 4, 1831."
Obliged by the precise language thus used by the French minister to view it as a peremptory refusal to execute the treaty except on terms incompatible with the honor and independence of the United States, and persuaded that on considering the correspondence now submitted to you you can regard it in no other light, it becomes my duty to call your attention to such measures as the exigency of the case demands if the claim of interfering in the communications between the different branches of our Government shall be persisted in. This pretension is rendered the more unreasonable by the fact that the substance of the required explanation has been repeatedly and voluntarily given before it was insisted on as a condition—a condition the more humiliating because it is demanded as the equivalent of a pecuniary consideration. Does France desire only a declaration that we had no intention to obtain our rights by an address to her fears rather than to her justice? She has already had it, frankly and explicitly given by our minister accredited to her Government, his act ratified by me, and my confirmation of it officially communicated by him in his letter to the French minister of foreign affairs of the 25th of April, 1835, and repeated by my published approval of that letter after the passage of the bill of indemnification. Does France want a degrading, servile repetition of this act, in terms which she shall dictate and which will involve an acknowledgment of her assumed right to interfere in our domestic councils? She will never obtain it. The spirit of the American people, the dignity of the Legislature, and the firm resolve of their executive government forbid it.
As the answer of the French minister to our chargé d'affaires at Paris contains an allusion to a letter addressed by him to the representative of France at this place, it now becomes proper to lay before you the correspondence had between that functionary and the Secretary of State relative to that letter, and to accompany the same with such explanations as will enable you to understand the course of the Executive in regard to it. Recurring to the historical statement made at the commencement of your session, of the origin and progress of our difficulties with France, it will be recollected that on the return of our minister to the United States I caused my official approval of the explanations he had given to the French minister of foreign affairs to be made public. As the French Government had noticed the message without its being officially communicated, it was not doubted that if they were disposed to pay the money due to us they would notice any public explanation of the Government of the United States in the same way. But, contrary to these well-founded expectations, the French ministry did not take this fair opportunity to relieve themselves from their unfortunate position and to do justice to the United States.
Whilst, however, the Government of the United States was awaiting the movements of the French Government in perfect confidence that the difficulty was at an end, the Secretary of State received a call from the French chargé d'affaires in Washington, who desired to read to him a letter he had received from the French minister of foreign affairs. He was asked whether he was instructed or directed to make any official communication, and replied that he was only authorized to read the letter and furnish a copy if requested. The substance of its contents, it is presumed, may be gathered from Nos. 4 and 6, herewith transmitted. It was an attempt to make known to the Government of the United States privately in what manner it could make explanations, apparently voluntary, but really dictated by France, acceptable to her, and thus obtain payment of the 25,000,000 francs. No exception was taken to this mode of communication, which is often used to prepare the way for official intercourse, but the suggestions made in it were in their substance wholly inadmissible. Not being in the shape of an official communication to this Government, it did not admit of reply or official notice, nor could it safely be made the basis of any action by the Executive or the Legislature, and the Secretary of State did not think proper to ask a copy, because he could have no use for it. Copies of papers marked Nos. 9, 10, and 11 shew an attempt on the part of the French chargé d'affaires to place a copy of this letter among the archives of this Government, which for obvious reasons was not allowed to be done; but the assurance before given was repeated, that any official communication which he might be authorized to make in the accustomed form would receive a prompt and just consideration. The indiscretion of this attempt was made more manifest by the subsequent avowal of the French chargé d'affaires that the object was to bring this letter before Congress and the American people. If foreign agents, on a subject of disagreement between their government and this, wish to prefer an appeal to the American people, they will hereafter, it is hoped, better appreciate their own rights and the respect due to others than to attempt to use the Executive as the passive organ of their communications.
It is due to the character of our institutions that the diplomatic intercourse of this Government should be conducted with the utmost directness and simplicity, and that in all cases of importance the communications received or made by the Executive should assume the accustomed official form. It is only by insisting on this form that foreign powers can be held to full responsibility, that their communications can be officially replied to, or that the advice or interference of the Legislature can with propriety be invited by the President. This course is also best calculated, on the one hand, to shield that officer from unjust suspicions, and on the other to subject this portion of his acts to public scrutiny, and, if occasion shall require it, to constitutional animadversion. It was the more necessary to adhere to these principles in the instance in question inasmuch as, in addition to other important interests, it very intimately concerned the national honor—a matter in my judgment much too sacred to be made the subject of private and unofficial negotiation.
It will be perceived that this letter of the French minister of foreign affairs was read to the Secretary of State on the 11th of September last. This was the first authentic indication of the specific views of the French Government received by the Government of the United States after the passage of the bill of indemnification. Inasmuch as the letter had been written before the official notice of my approval of Mr. Livingston's last explanation and remonstrance could have reached Paris, just ground of hope was left, as has been before stated, that the French Government, on receiving that information in the same manner as the alleged offensive message had reached them, would desist from their extraordinary demand and pay the money at once. To give them an opportunity to do so, and, at all events, to elicit their final determination and the ground they intended to occupy, the instructions were given to our chargé d'affaires which were adverted to at the commencement of the present session of Congress. The result, as you have seen, is a demand of an official written expression of regrets and a direct explanation addressed to France with a distinct intimation that this is a sine qua non.
Mr. Barton having, in pursuance of his instructions, returned to the United States and the chargé d'affaires of France having been recalled, all diplomatic intercourse between the two countries is suspended, a state of things originating in an unreasonable susceptibility on the part of the French Government and rendered necessary on our part by their refusal to perform engagements contained in a treaty from the faithful performance of which by us they are to this day enjoying many important commercial advantages.
It is time that this unequal position of affairs should cease, and that legislative action should be brought to sustain Executive exertion in such measures as the case requires. While France persists in her refusal to comply with the terms of a treaty the object of which was, by removing all causes of mutual complaint, to renew ancient feelings of friendship and to unite the two nations in the bonds of amity and of a mutually beneficial commerce, she can not justly complain if we adopt such peaceful remedies as the law of nations and the circumstances of the case may authorize and demand. Of the nature of these remedies I have heretofore had occasion to speak, and, in reference to a particular contingency, to express my conviction that reprisals would be best adapted to the emergency then contemplated. Since that period France, by all the departments of her Government, has acknowledged the validity of our claims and the obligations of the treaty, and has appropriated the moneys which are necessary to its execution; and though payment is withheld on grounds vitally important to our existence as an independent nation, it is not to be believed that she can have determined permanently to retain a position so utterly indefensible. In the altered state of the questions in controversy, and under all existing circumstances, it appears to me that until such a determination shall have become evident it will be proper and sufficient to retaliate her present refusal to comply with her engagements by prohibiting the introduction of French products and the entry of French vessels into our ports. Between this and the interdiction of all commercial intercourse, or other remedies, you, as the representatives of the people, must determine. I recommend the former in the present posture of our affairs as being the least injurious to our commerce, and as attended with the least difficulty of returning to the usual state of friendly intercourse if the Government of France shall render us the justice that is due, and also as a proper preliminary step to stronger measures should their adoption be rendered necessary by subsequent events.
The return of our chargé d'affaires is attended with public notices of naval preparations on the part of France destined for our seas. Of the cause and intent of these armaments I have no authentic information, nor any other means of judging except such as are common to yourselves and to the public; but whatever may be their object, we are not at liberty to regard them as unconnected with the measures which hostile movements on the part of France may compel us to pursue. They at least deserve to be met by adequate preparation on our part, and I therefore strongly urge large and speedy appropriations for the increase of the Navy and the completion of our coast defenses.
If this array of military force be really designed to affect the action of the Government and people of the United States on the questions now pending between the two nations, then indeed would it be dishonorable to pause a moment on the alternative which such a state of things would present to us. Come what may, the explanation which France demands can never be accorded, and no armament, however powerful and imposing, at a distance or on our coast, will, I trust, deter us from discharging the high duties which we owe to our constituents, our national character, and to the world.
The House of Representatives at the close of the last session of Congress unanimously resolved that the treaty of the 4th of July, 1831, should be maintained and its execution insisted on by the United States. It is due to the welfare of the human race not less than to our own interests and honor that this resolution should at all hazards be adhered to. If after so signal an example as that given by the American people during their long-protracted difficulties with France of forbearance under accumulated wrongs and of generous confidence in her ultimate return to justice she shall now be permitted to withhold from us the tardy and imperfect indemnification which after years of remonstrance and discussion had at length been solemnly agreed on by the treaty of 1831 and to set at naught the obligations it imposes, the United States will not be the only sufferers. The efforts of humanity and religion to substitute the appeals of justice and the arbitrament of reason for the coercive measures usually resorted to by injured nations will receive little encouragement from such an issue. By the selection and enforcement of such lawful and expedient measures as may be necessary to prevent a result so injurious to ourselves and so fatal to the hopes of the philanthropist we shall therefore not only preserve the pecuniary interests of our citizens, the independence of our Government, and the honor of our country, but do much, it may be hoped, to vindicate the faith of treaties and to promote the general interests of peace, civilization, and improvement.
ANDREW JACKSON.