L. Ron Hubbard report of engagement





USS PC-815


 


SERIAL 167


 


24 MAY 1943


 


ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP, REPORT OF


 


FORWARDS REPORT OF ACTION AND VARIOUS


OTHER REPORTS AND STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS


OF THE CREW, COVERING ACTION OF 19-21 


MAY 1943 WHILE EN ROUTE FROM ASTORIA


TO SAN DIEGO FOR SHAKE DOWN CRUISE –


FIRST CONTACT AT 0344 LCT IN LAT. 45, 28N,


LONG. 124.20 W. (CO LT L. RON HUBBARD,


USNR).


 


 


IN REPLY REFER


TO NO.


 


PC815/A16-3            U. S. S. PC-815


(167)


 


SECRET


 


c/o Fleet Post Office,


San Francisco, California, 


May 24, 1943.


 


From:  The Commanding Officer.


To :     The Commander in Chief, PACIFIC Fleet.


 


Via :    (1)            The Commanding Officer, Naval Station,


                        Astoria, Oregon.


 


(2) The Commander, NORTHWEST Sea Frontier.


 


Subject..            Battle Report - submission of.


 


Enclosures.      


 


(A)      Battle Report. – P.2


 


(B)       Chart of Area Marked With Attacks. – missing


 


(C)             Chemical Recorder Traces. – P.21


 


(D)            Executive Officer’s Report After Battle. – P.27


 


(E)       Copy of Gunnery Log of U.S.S. P.C. 815. - P.28


 


(F)       Radio Log of U.S.S. P.C. 815, - P.30


 


(G)      Copy of Radio Operator's Log, Naval Station, Astoria, Oregon. – P.56.


 


(H)            Statements from Members of the Crew of


            U.S.S. P.C. 815. - P.93


 


(I)        Series of Pictures Taken At Scene of Action. – P.105


 


1.         The Battle Report for the action which took place May 19-21, 1943 is 


respectfully submitted herewith.


 


 


L. RON HUBBARD


 


Copy to:


            CC NAVSTA., Astoria, Oregon


            COMNOWESTSEAFRON








SECRET


 


IN REPLY REFER


TO NO.


 


U. S. S. PC-815


 


AN ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION OFF CAPE LOOKOUT


 


Acting under the orders of the Commander of Operational Training Command, 


Pacific Fleet. 161909 of May, the U.S.S. PC815 got under weigh [sic] from 


Astoria at 2116 May 18, 1943 enroute [sic] to San Diego. California to undergo 


Shakedown.


 


At the time of departure this vessel was reasonably ready for action. officers 


and crew having been constantly drilled and taught since January 20, 1943 at 


which time, with a few exceptions, the complement had reported to Portland. 


Oregon for duty in connection with fitting out and construction.


 


Proceeding southward just inside the steamer track an echo ranging contact was 


made by the soundman then on duty, Grover, E.N., Soundman Third class. The 


Commanding Officer had the conn and immediately slowed all engines to ahead one 


third to better echo ranging conditions, and placed the contact dead ahead, 500 


yards away.


 


The first contact was very good. The target was moving left and away. The 


bearing was clear. The night was moonlit and the sea was flat calm. No ships of 


any kind were in sight or expected. Screw noises, fluttering and without 


pulsation, were distinct on the bearing and quite different from the pulsations 


of our own screws, The extent of bearing was about eighteen degrees with the 


mushiness of a wake to the right, The U.S.S. PC815 closed in to 360 yards, 


meanwhile sounding general quarters. Depth charge levers on the signal bridge 


were not used because contact was lost at 360 yards.


 


The range was quickly opened out and a search made of the area with echo ranging 


equipment. Contact was regained at 800 yards and was held on the starboard beam 


while further investigation was made. Screws were present and distinct as 


before. The bearing was still clear. Smoke signal identification was watched for 


closely and when none appeared it was concluded that the target must not be a 


friendly submarine. All engines were brought up to speed, fifteen knots and the 


target was brought dead ahead with ship on course 240 T.


 


- 2 -


 


The target turned away and a lead angle was applied at which time the movement 


of the target was ascertained. The ship swung back to an intercepting course, 


crossed over the target ahead of it and laid the first barrage. Structural 


firing-charges were in the K-guns and did not explode. The three charges rolled 


exploded at their settings two for 100 feet one for fifty feet. The contact was 


lost at 100 yards indicating a target depth of 100 feet.


 


Attack 1 concluded (see chart and chemical recorder trace).the range was opened 


well out on standard procedure and closed again on the side toward which the 


target had been turning, The depth charge boil was easily ranged upon but up to 


800 yards but difficulty was experienced in picking up the actual target. When 


screw noises and the metallic quality of the contact reestablished contact. the 


ship came up to attack speed and made a run. The target was found to be turning 


back toward the depth charge distance. Contact was lost at 200 yards indicating 


that the target had dived. A four charge pattern was laid, two from the racks 


set at 260 feet, two from the K-guns set at 150 feet. The time of this attack 


was 0357.


 


Using standard procedure a relocation of the target was accomplished and the 


target again developed for Screws, target width doppler and change of bearing, 


The ship, sleepy and skeptical had come to their guns swiftly and without error. 


No one, including the Commanding Officer could readily credit the existence of 


an enemy submarine here on the steamer track and all soundmen, now on the 


bridge, were attempting to argue the echo ranging equipment and chemical out of 


such a fantastic idea.  Testing and evaluating the contact, the ship swept back 


and forth, keeping the contact in range on either bow and beam. Sound conditions 


were good and there was not any great interference.


 


When the Commanding Officer and the soundmen had finally completed 


investigation, a third attack was made. A run of 700 yards at attack speed was 


complicated by the failure of the chemical recorder. Stop watch range rates were 


being kept and it was found that the attack was a quarter attack with a rate of 


eight knots. Due to the rapid exhaustion of charges, only two were used with 


settings of 200 feet.


 


Standard procedure failed to regain contact. Circling 


 


- 3 -


 


area with a sharp lookout. At 0450, with dawn breaking over a glassy sea, a 


lookout sighted a dark object about 700 yards from the ship on the starboard 


beam. When inspected the object seemed to be moving. No definite conclusion 


could be reached as to the identity of the object and the range was closed. 


Although very probably this object was a floating log no chances were taken and 


the target was used to test the guns which had not been heretofore fired 


structurally. The gunners, most of whom were men of experience, displayed an 


astonishing accuracy, bursts and shells converging on the target.


 


The target disappeared for several minutes and then, to test guns not brought to 


bear on the first burst, the ship was turned in case the object reappeared. The 


object appeared again closer to the ship. Once more fire was opened and the 


target vanished.


 


It is stressed that no conclusion was reached by the Commanding Officer 


concerning this target and it is thought likely that it was merely drift. The 


effect upon morale was good and the ship was now assured that its newly 


installed guns could work if needed.


 


Only three depth charges wore now left to the ship. The chemical recorder was 


being  repaired by the sound technician. The next three attacks were therefore 


parsimonious.


 


The fourth, fifth and sixth attacks were made in rapid succession with an eye to 


harrass [sic] the submarine into surfacing, where it could be worked on with the 


guns.


 


The fourth attack was started from a range of 800 yards. This was a beam attack 


turning into a quarter (right moving) attacks. The range rate was eleven knots 


when the quarter of the turning submarine was targeted. Suspecting an entire 


reversement [sic] of the submarine course, the ship used slightly opposite lead 


angle and then shifted rudder to lay the charge ahead and to the left of the 


submarine, setting 150 feet. The contact was maintained throughout all but one 


hundred yards of the run and was regained quickly, the submarine cutting back 


and toward the explosion point.


 


- 4 -


 


Having maintained contact. the ship swerved back widely immediately after the 


depth charge explosion and six minutes later laid its next charge, having 


started its run from 600 yards. The submarine evidently attempted to turn in 


toward the ship for the range rate jumped from a bow to a head on attack in a 


very short distances. The one charge, set at 150 feet, was fired early to 


anticipate the advance. This charge, however, missed by a good seventy-five 


yards owing to the continued turning and speeding up of the submarine, as 


established by quickly regained contact. Screw noises were very loud.


 


A standard sweep was used to lengthen the range and a 1200 yard run was 


attempted but It was discovered owing to the depth (about 96 fathoms or slightly 


less) or to some other sound condition that contact at this distance was 


difficult to maintain. The range was closed back to 900 when good contact was 


regained. The target was drawing right. The range rate was about twelve knots at 


first. The submarine turned during the run and the range rate dropped to about 


eight knots with the submarine's wake interfering considerably In the operation. 


One charge was fired with a setting of 150 feet. This was our last charge.


 


Since out first establishment of the target as a submarine we had been sending 


for help and ammunition. No reply was given us from anyone except "Roger". As 


"Roger" could not be rolled off our racks the ship was forced to maintain 


contact as best it could and hope for reinforcements. Sound conditions began to 


grow poor.


 


At 0906 (see radio log) two U.S.N. anti-submarine blimps appeared, K-39 and 


K-33. While we held contact they investigated and announced to us that they had 


a magnetic contact where we were holding a sound contact. We tried to conn them 


into a run but their conception of distance below them was often in error as 


much as 500 yards. They continually confirmed our bearings.


 


At 1306 SC536 was sighted and was immediately informed of the situation. The USS 


PC815 regained contact at 900 yards and took SC536 astern of her. With the 


bullnose of the SC nearly against our flagstaff we came to attack course, 


instructing the SC to lay her pattern on a signal from our whistle. Attacking 


due north we found the submarine had been lying to. It started off and we heard 


screw noises. Target width at 500 was about 15 degrees.


 


- 5 -


 


Target gave off screw noises for a moment and then screw noises ceased. The 


attack was made, therefore, without lead angle. Allowance was made for the 


distance between the PC projector of the sound head and the racks of the SC. The 


whistle was blown and a five-charge pattern was laid.


 


The general conduct of the SC536 is here remarked upon. Her sound gear, WEA I 


was not in good operating condition and Lieutenant (jg) Kroepke, USNR, then in 


command (her assigned commanding officer did not arrive until several hours 


after the last attack of the last day) showed brilliant judgment and seamanship. 


The lag between blowing the whistle and his laying of the pattern was not more 


than four seconds and all charges exploded. Lieutenant (jg) Kroepke executed all 


orders with promptness and efficiency during formation steaming to sweep the 


area later in the attacks as well as in laying his charges at our command.


 


Attention is invited to the radio logs of this period, from 1330 LWT to 1900 


LWT. The observation blimps began to sight oil and air bubbles in the vicinity 


of the last attack and finally a periscope. This ship also sighted air bubbles.


 


At 1600 the eighth attack was made, again by taking the SC536 astern and 


bringing her over the target and signaling as before, The target was now very 


deep and charges were set on maximum settings. The depth of the water in the 


vicinity of these attacks was now about 90 fathoms. The target was moving right 


at about three knots. Two charges were dropped.


 


At 1606 oil was reported again and this ship saw oil. Great air boils were seen 


and the sound of blowing tanks was reported by the soundman.


 


During the action so far guns were all in a condition of readiness and at least 


one watch. Condition Two, on duty with the 40MM always bearing and the 3” 


usually. All guns were now manned with great attention as it was supposed that 


the sub was trying to surface. Everyone was very calm, gunners joking about who 


would get in the first shot.


 


- 6 -


 


At 1631, using the listening head (JK) to locate his target, the soundman on 


duty, Beers, P.A. SoM3/c established definite contact, the SC was brought astern 


once more and and [sic] a run was made. The chemical recorder was again in 


operation. (See chemical recorder trace for this, the Ninth Attack).


 


The target was still blowing tanks and the water around it disturbed by air 


bubbles. Two charges set for 200 feet were laid by the SC on our whistle signal.


 


About two hours earlier Beers, (above), had discovered a matter of interest by 


accident. Beers proved himself throughout to be an extraordinarily sensitive and 


interested soundman with great operational ability and was at the stack on 


nearly all runs while the sound technician (Welch, Lonnie, SoM2/c) operated the 


recorder and kept the equipment in a high state of repair/. [sic]


 


Beers had located a second contact. All our operation was on relative bearings 


due to a failure at the yard to install a gyro repeater in our sound stack. The 


steersman neglected to bring Beers ninety degrees right when the ship was turned 


and Beers found himself pinging on a moving target with screws when he had 


thought his target was blowing air and lying still. The Commanding Officer saw 


the difficulty and immediately remedied the train of the sound head. Returning 


to the first target which was motionless Beers examined it and found it to be as 


before. He then examined the new target, or contact, and found it to be drawing 


away at a speed of four knots. The extent of bearing was about nine degrees and 


the range 420 yards. Opening doppler.


 


When the ninth attack was concluded more blowing was heard and oil was seen 


coming to the surface and spreading.


 


Contact was sought on the new target but could not immediately be regained.


 


At 1646 the Coast Guard patrol boat 78302 came alongside with 23 depth charges 


and needed equipment for them.  Within seven minutes all charges were 


transferred and within nine minutes two were in our racks, set to be dropped. In 


twenty-three minutes all charges were ready. This is remarked as a gauge of the 


response of the PC’s crew.


 


While lying to, taking on these charges, echo ranging


 


- 7 -


 


was heard upon us. We were listening with the JK head and when we had located 


the source, the bearing was found to be clear. All other sources either had not 


arrived or could not operate sound gear.


 


About noon the Commanding Officer had concluded that the under submarine under 


attack was unable to launch torpedos [sic] for the sea was smooth and the PC was 


an excellent target.  Accordingly, lying to was no great concern.


 


When the QC head was directed toward the source of this pinging and the chemical 


recorder turned on, no reception was noted and our pings were all that 


registered upon the trace.  We were still in the water and the trace showed a 


range rate (see photostat of trace). Contact passed within 150 yards of our 


bows, from starboard to port.


 


At 1748, (see radio logs) the blimps reported sighting a periscope. This was 


where charges were dropped earlier in the afternoon. Air boils were reported in 


this spot and blowing tanks were again heard on our sound machine.


 


The final attack of the day was made on a non-sub target, the SC accompanying, 


both ships dropping one charge.  (It has not been ascertained if the SC 536 


dropped more, but only one was seen to explode). The charge was dropped near the 


non sub target.


 


At 2010 the SC537 arrived on scene. The USSCG Bonham (NRWB in the radio logs) 


had been on or around the scene since 1738. These two reinforcements seemed to 


be reluctant to close to contact range and were usually well outside it.  


Difficulty (see radio logs) was experienced with these two vessels either 


because of their inexperience or unwillingness.  During the night of the 21st 


when this vessel was attempting to make a routine sweep and search in the 


standard sweep formation, neither the SC537 nor the USSCG Bonham showed any 


understanding whatever and refused by their actions to cooperate.  It is later 


understood that the Bonham had a top speed of 9.2 although she reported her 


speed to us as 12 and that she was under the supposition that she would blow 


herself up if she dropped charges. The SC537 had one contact which she reported 


during the following day and failed to prosecute it.  The SC537 left the scene 


with her racks full of charges although the SC536 and the PC815 had exhausted 


all theirs.  Echo range was never more than about 900 yards in this shallow 


water and despite orders neither vessel would close in to this with one 


exception, as noted in the attacks as of the following morning.


 


- 8 -


 


During the afternoon of May 19 the SC536 had brought us orders from Astoria 


Naval Station to secure and proceed on our original orders. We sought to protest 


these when they were received but evidence seemed to point to plenty of people 


being on the scene and so we secured reluctantly. We had no more than started 


away when Comnowestseafron cancelled the Astoria Naval Station orders and 


ordered us to remain on scene. We ascertained responsibility and came back to 


the scene.


 


During the night vessels patrolled. The SC536 was ordered into an oil slick by 


the blimp and air bubbles were seen rising from this. (See radio log). This was 


in the scene of the final series of attacks of the day.


 


On May 20, 1943, at 1140 the blimp made contact with its magnetic gear and 


dropped a smoke bomb. The USS PC815 came to general quarters from Condition II 


and set out to cerify [sic] the blimp’s contact.


 


It may here be remarked that the coordination between surface ships and the 


blimps was excellent. No attack was made, after the arrival of the blimps, 


without verification of sound contact by magnetic or magnetic contact by sound. 


Because her sound gear was not working properly (which fact she reported to us 


several times) the SC536 stood by for us to verify. This teamwork, the blimp’s 


smoke flares, and the use of echo ranging gear saved us many times from losing 


contact.


 


Because we had three times found two sub targets on the previous day, we 


considered from her failure to surface that she had gone down in 90 fathoms.  


The other still had batteries well up for it made good speed in subsequent 


attacks (three to six knots).


 


The wide searching of the blimps and surface ships had ringed the area, 


blockading it.


 


An attack was made by the SC536 on a blimp magnetic contact about two hours 


before the USS PC815 started out as above. (See radio log). Having inoperative 


sound gear the SC536 used an oil slick and put charges to explode on the bottom, 


letting go six charges in all.


 


On the blimp’s magnetic contact and dropped smoke bombs, the USS PC815 relocated 


the contact and at 1305 made an attack on echo ranging equipment. This was 


Attack XI. The PC attacked on course 320 True


 


- 9 -


 


and found an extent of bearing of 14 degrees. The contact had been carefully 


investigated before attack and the submarine, evidently saving batteries, was 


awaiting our attack before it speeded up. (See Trace 11). It was moving directly 


away from our bows at a speed of about two knots during this long period of 


investigation while we kept bare steerage way behind it. When satisfied as to 


the identity of the target. having found screw noises. we came to attack speed 


as swiftly as possible and the submarine was also heard to speed up (about five 


seconds after we were ahead all engines flank.) The Commanding Officer has 


checked this closely with the soundmen. The monotonous fluttering noise was not 


to be confused with out own screws. We laid a five charge pattern while the 


submarine was coming up to speed. Target was lost at 150 yards - 150 feet deep.


 


At the last moment it was seen that the submarine had right rudder on. 


Accordingly we drew off, as part of this attack and closed again when the 


chemical recorder was cut off as not registering distinct pings, Something, not 


yet established, was wrong with this record until the following day and all 


attacks hereafter were made on indicator lights and sound. (An additional reason 


for this was the excellence of operation without recorder).


 


The PC815 swerved back. picked up contact. found the target going swiftly left 


(PC now on reverse to first attack course) and dropped two more charges act at 


300 feet from the racks.


 


Contact was lost at 350 yards. which seems to indicate that the target had dived 


to that depth. Only a short time had elapsed between the two phases of this 


attack, so short that the PC curved around one of her K-gun charges in getting 


back to roll two more. The first charges exploded. by rough calculation. about 


50 yards dead astern of the target, the next two probably came closer.


 


At 1342 another attack was made. Attack XIII. Ship was on a true course of 170. 


The target course was 160 True. A small lead angle was applied to the left and 


four charges were laid set at 300 feet.


 


The blimps were informed that the target, according to our sound data was 


heading inshore into shallower water. The destination was predicted and the 


blimp made magnetic contact in spot marked by explosion point for Attack XIV on 


chart.


 


- 10 -


 


It was at this time (1420, May 20, see PC radio log) that K-33 who was on the 


scene, gave command of all surface ships to the PC 815.


 


The PC approached the flare and smoke bomb where the blimp had made magnetic 


contact and confirmed blimp's contact.


 


At 2000 the PC found a target under the blimp’s flares (see Attack XIV). Screw 


noises were heard while PC lay to listening. The range was 400. Bottom noises 


made the contact blurred but by changing angle of search a clear contact was 


made. The blimp again confirmed magnetic contact.


 


At 2003, on true course 095 this vessel came to attack speed, range 500 yards, 


using indicator light, sound and stop watch. Sub's course was found to be about 


180 true, on which course the sub steadied. The shallowness of the water made it 


necessary to set charges for 75 feet. The PC came in and dropped charges ahead 


of the sub, then put her rudder hard right, pivoting around her starboard K-gun 


charge and rolled two from the racks set for 150 feet.


 


The blimp X-33 then dropped into the explosion pattern. This vessel having 


stretched other ships into line, attack was then made by them in rotation on 


their sound contact. It is not known how accurate were their contacts. The 


Bonham dropped on what she termed a poor contact. No record is available at this 


writing for the positions of the vessels occupied in line or how many charges 


they dropped. The SC536 seems to have gotten her WEA I into operation for a 


short period here.


 


- 11 -


 


At 2034, when other vessels had cleared the attack area this vessel approached 


the area and carefully sought to regain contact despite the disturbed water. 


Just northwest of the depth charge slicks, at a distance of several hundred 


yards, a contact with loud screw noises was regained. All other vessels were to 


the south and west, most of the with engines stopped. E-33 dropped a flare to 


mark his magnetic contact which concurred with our sound contact. This vessel 


then took an attack course of 335 True and found herself on the port quarter of 


the submarine which was making about 3 knots. A lead angle of five degrees was 


applied and the charges dropped five seconds after the calculated time.


 


Blimps, and all surface vessels, searched the area without further contact.


 


The weather was still good but a slight wind had begun to spring up.


 


All during the following night, the USS PC815 kept the area swept as well as it 


could. The moonlight showed up an oil slick which we investigated, though the 


slick was too thin for samples.


 


It was very difficult trying to make the Bonham and the SC537 understand that 


the area must be patrolled with sound gear in an orderly fashion to blockade it. 


 The patrol went from just south of Haystack Rock to north of Cape Lookout and 


back again. The SC536 was placed all the way to seaward where the sub might be 


expected to surface.


 


A report that the submarine had surfaced off Sand Lake (see Chart) caused all 


vessels except the Bonham to go flying off to that position.  But before flank 


speed was attained the reported “sub” was reported as a fishing vessel.  The 


SC536 was detached to investigate, the Bonham assigned a lower area where she 


would be out of the way and the patrol proceeded. For some time the SC537 was 


remote from us and it has not been established why she had difficulty with this 


ordered patrol.


 


At 0700, May 21,1943, being near the area of the attacks the night before, this 


ship stopped to search. (See Chart for Attack XV).


 


- 12 -


 


At 0704 no contact had been made. This was due to having lately maneuvered here 


to pick up a strange object, a small round ball laced with a line netting, which 


was floating here. Turbulence caused by our screws prevented echo ranging.


 


Suddenly a boil of orange colored oil, very thick, came to the surface 


immediately on our port bow. The Commanding Officer was aft where he had been 


trying to get the strange marker aboard with the help of his men.


 


The watch had been piped down for chow and due to the quietness of the area the 


opportunity had been taken to ease the barrel springs on the port 20MM and cock 


the starboard 20MM.


 


Ensign Wiemers, USNR, was Officer of the Deck., the Commanding Officer having 


had the conn since the beginning of the action on the morning of May 19th. 


Ensign Wiemers instantly sighted the oil boil and sounded General Quarters, 


shouting to gunners to get guns ready to fire.


 


The Commanding Officer came forward on the double and saw a second boil of 


orange oil rising on the other side of the first.


 


The soundman was loudly reporting that he heard tanks being blown on the port 


bow.


 


Every man on the bridge and flying bridge then saw the periscope, moving from 


right to left to a height of about two feet. The barrel and lense [sic] of the 


instrument were unmistakable.


 


By efficient and swift work. Coates, C.C, SC2/c had gotten the forward 20MM 


loaded and Lacey, W.K., GM2/c had the Port 20MM ready to fire. This in some 


fifteen to twenty seconds. Both are expert gunners.


 


On the appearance of the periscope both gunners, Lacey and Coates, fired 


straight into the periscope, range about fifty yards. The periscope vanished in 


an explosion of 20MM bullets. It cannot be ascertained if the periscope was hit.


 


As the ship was dead in the water, charges could not be immediately dropped. The 


sub had been turning as if to get back under the ship. Only two charges were 


left to us, one loaded in a K-gun on the wrong side.


 


- 13 -


 


We called ships to the area. There were so few charges left to any of us that we 


wished the next attack to be final and concerted.


 


The appearance of another orange oil boil ahead of us caused us to open out the 


range and gather speed and then search back for the contact. We could not 


establish contact though we searched the area in wide sweeps.


 


It was then reported to the Commanding Officer that both main engines would have 


to be stopped to replace relief valves. This was not unusual for depth charging 


and unaccustomed stress had showed up much slackness in the installation. 


Permission was granted to shut down one engine at a time for no longer than ten 


minutes.


 


During this period 20 minutes after all engines had been stopped, the soundman 


on duty, Beers, requested search orders and was given 360 degrees by way of 


novelty.  His first ping found contact dead astern of us. The wind drifted us to 


starboard and the contact remained stationary. We examined the contact and 


developed it. It was the submarine lying to, evidently having followed hard in 


our wake. The main engines were reported repaired.


 


We drew off, swiftly, and came to attack course, The first range was about 900 


yards. When we came up to speed we cut in the chemical recorder. (See trace 18) 


(See chart Attack XV). The submarine turned to the left and gave us her port 


quarter and then nearly her port beam.  Her screws were very plain. Change of 


bearing was to the left. Moderate doppler. A lead angle was applied (attack 


course 335 T,) to steady on 315 True. Charges set for 200 feet. Fired by 


recorder. Two charges. Contact lost at 250 yards.


 


A marked explosion met this attack concurrent with the depth charge explosions.


 


The target was then examined when regain contact procedure had been executed.


 


The blimp examined the target and confirmed. The SC536 was brought up to the 


scene and taken in behind us. We examined the target from a range of 520 yards.


 


At 1005 we started attack XVI. The SC536 was led astern of us. The first range 


at attack speed was 700. Attack speed 12 knots. The target was moving straight 


away from us on course C75. Her speed was very low.


- 14 -


 


Some difficulty was experienced in pinging through the sub wake and for this 


reason the chemical recorder was not cut in for this run.


 


There was no change of bearing. Target width was about six degrees. Moderate 


opening inclination.


 


On stop watch a range rate of 9 knots was established and the ship speed was 12 


knots.


 


On whistle signal the SC laid her charges. The Commanding Officer of the PC then 


swarmed up on the signal bridge and saw that the SC was nearly 75 yards behind. 


The Commanding Officer then blew another signal when seventy five yards had run 


on his atop watch which was still running. The SC then laid a second barrage.


 


The first barrage exploded. by calculation, just astern of the submarine. The 


second barrage exploded on its bow as nearly as could be judged.


 


All the charges of the SC and the PC 815 had then been expended.


 


A search formation was taken up and no sign of the submarine could be found 


through 360 degrees.


 


A patrol formation was organized. The CG Bonham was secured after transferring 


her charges to the 537. A long blockage was formed around the area when no 


further contact could be gained.


 


The weather was getting bad with low visibility and a moderate sea running. Rain 


was coming down Intermittently.


 


The PC ran up the coast on its sector and came upon the USS 778. The 778 had 


orders. according to Captain Barner, which permitted her to join the attack, but 


she protested very strongly against helping. She was finally brought into some 


sort of sweeping formation which she held raggedly, requesting continually to be 


allowed to be secured. She was led down to the spot of the last attack for she 


had fifty depth charges.


 


- 15 -


 


Contact was regained on a questionable target in the area of the last attack 


(See Attack XVI).


 


The contact was metallic, had a width of bearing of 15 degrees at 900 yards and 


was evidently on the bottom. There was a strong echo. The drifting of this ship 


made it appear for a moment that the target had a range rate of 11 knots but 


this was shortly established as an effect of wind and current. The contact, 


whatever it was, showed no inclination and change. But it narrowed to five 


degrees at 400 yards while we circled it and then widened to fifteen as we came 


around it, narrowed again and widened again.


 


We gave the PC778 explicit directions on the contact. We were motionless in the 


water. We tried to pass the contact over to the PC778. She failed to get the 


contact, mainly because she was over a thousand yards from it and did not come 


up.  At this depth (about thirty-two to thirty-six fathoms, with the rough sea) 


the contact could not be held at that distance. She failed to allow for drift 


and finally we recalled her to keep her from going aground and sent her on her 


away with her fifty charges. She would not part with any charges or any part of 


them although this presented no problem, the sea being calm enough her [sic] to 


allow an SC to take off an officer from her without the use of boats. Orders 


from Comnowestseafron came via another SC which said we could not have the 778.


 


In the late afternoon, just before sunset we ran a horizon patrol. The 


visibility was shutting down steadily but we wished to keep any sub, if any were 


left, from surfacing or running away.


 


Twelve hours after the last attack the area was still calm. The contact above 


mentioned was still there but we could do nothing about it.  [crossed out – The 


SC537 still had charges but evidently could not use her sound gear and would not 


close.]


 


At midnight we were secured by orders received from Comnowestseafron, and 


returned to Astoria, arriving at daylight the morning of the 22nd of May.


 


Total time in contact with submarines was 55 consecutive hours. (55 hours and 27 


minutes)


 


Total time in area searching was 68˝ hours. (68 hours and thirty-seven minutes).


 


- 16 -


 


Total depth charges expended by this vessel, 37.


 


Total casualties, 3, all very minor.


 


Materiel casualties, numerous, all minor, mainly to engines. The engines were 


repaired on the scene with the parts at hand whenever they broke down.


 


Failure on the part of a gunner to properly assemble the parallelogram of the 


starboard 20MM (he reversed it) caused this gun to go off when pointed at the 


zenith and expend a full magazine, cutting away our antennaes [sic].  The gun 


was not at the time manned.


 


PERONNEL CONDUCT REPORT


 


All personnel behaved with uniform attention to duty. Calmly and cheerfully, 


despite lack of sleep, all hands executed their required duties with efficiency.


 


No man is singled out for praise for to praise one would be to praise all.


 


No man is censured for no man required censure.


 


A report on the officers is submitted as follows:


 


USNR


 


Lieutenant T.S. Moulton USNR, Executive Officer, handled Communications and Fire 


Control for the guns during the action. He showed zeal and imagination in the 


execution of duty and displayed his ability to receive and carry out orders 


promptly.  He is considered a valuable officer, deserving of a command of his 


own.


 


Ensign D.E. Walker, USNR, Gunnery Officer, stayed hard by his post as Gunnery 


Officer and personally supervised the handling of depth charges. His feat of 


assembling 23 depth charges in 23 minutes, of having two ready in the racks two 


minutes after transfer was completely effected, deserves mention as a record. 


The firing lag of depth charges was cut down to a fractional amount by his 


timing and more than once his example caused such accurate dropping that two 


and, once, three charge, exploded simultaneously. There was no depth charge 


failure except for the structural firing charges which were already in the guns.


 


- 17 -


 


Ensign M.E. Wiemers., USNR, First Lieutenant, carried out all orders efficiently 


and promptly. He was diligent in maintaining the materiel condition Affirm 


throughout the action. He spent long stretches of duty as Officer of the Deck 


and in this respect was especially trusted. His performance of duty had no 


highlights. It was uniformly dependable and quietly effective. He has proved 


himself to be an able officer, a good ship handler and, in all, a valuable part 


of this ship. An early promotion to Lieutenant (junior grade) is recommended for 


this officer.


 


SUMMARY


 


When this ship returned to port under the orders of Comnowestseafron, she was 


received with considerable skepticism. Her records had not been examined, her 


crew had not been questioned and no qualified report had been made.


 


This ship was handicapped by the lack of outside aid from anti-submarine warfare 


officers. The only anti-submarine warfare officer present being Lieutenant 


(junior grade) Kroepke of the SC536. This officer, naturally able, and trained 


in ASW was our biggest help while in command of the SC536.  When the regular 


commanding officer of that ship was brought to it by the PC778, cooperation from 


that direction ceased.


 


The captains of K-39 and K-33 were diligent, particularly the latter whenever he 


assumed command, but they showed a deep blank on the usual knowledge of ASW one 


might expect of them.  They did, however, beautiful coordination work when 


cooperating with surface ships.


 


The radio intercepts from shore stations near the scene were garbled because the 


blimps operated on 5 watts and could not reach. Therefore only a fragment of 


their orders, confirmations. etc. reached shore stations, The garbled conditions 


of such logs seemed to be due to static.  This garble led to erroneous opinions.


 


The Astoria Naval Station did all possible to aid. Additional ammunition was not 


sent because the bar was running too high after the first load of 23 charges was 


delivered.


 


- 18 -


 


The U.S.S. PC815 was manned by S.C.T.C. trained officers and petty officers, 


experienced in handling ASW vessels or at least closely instructed.


 


The sound equipment of the U.S.S. PC815 is QCS and was easily the best, probably 


the only, efficient sound gear on the scene, well cared for and well-manned.


 


All attack conning was done by the Commanding Officer as well as all usual 


conning during the period of attacks, search and patrol. With due allowance for 


lack of rest, all attacks were conducted and operated on standard procedure on 


the doctrine of Fleet Sound School. Key West. Florida.


 


This vessel appreciates the favor of Comnowestseafron for allowing it to remain 


on the scene and later, for the interview.


 


CLAIM:


 


It is specifically claimed that one submarine, presumably Japanese, possibly a 


mine-layer, was damaged beyond ability to leave the scene and that one 


submarine, presumably Japanese, possibly a mine layer, was damaged beyond 


ability to return to its base.


 


This vessel has requested permission to search for possible wrecks on the bottom 


to bouy [sic] them to be swept for or dived for. It is the opinion of this 


vessel that at least one wreck may be found, near the scene of the last attacks 


or in the vicinity of attacks VII, VIII, and IX, in 92 fathoms of water. Due to 


stress of attack or later attempts to get away, these positions may not mark, 


exactly, the locality or any wreck.


 


This vessel wishes no credit for itself. It was built to hunt submarines. Its 


people were trained to hunt submarines. Although exceeding its orders in 


originally attacking the first contact, this vessel feels only that it has done 


the job for which it was intended and stands ready to do that job again.


 


L. Ron Hubbard


Lieutenant., D-V(S)., USNR


Commanding U.S.S. PC815


 


 


 


 


 


IN REPLY REFER 


TO NO.


 


 


U. S. S. PC-815


 


May 25, 1943.


 


 


From:  The Executive Officer.


To:      The Commanding Officer.


 


Subject:            Report, After Battle.


 


Reference: (a) Article 9480 U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920,


 


1.         In accordance with reference (a), the following is submitted.


 


2.         Details of the action. having been more than adequately covered in 


the battle report are not discussed., except to corroborate.


 


5.         From listening to sound gear, with which the Executive Officer has 


had considerable experience, from surface evidences seen personally, such as 


boils produced by blowing of tanks, quantities of oil, and the general character 


of the action itself, the following conclusions are drawn:


 


(1) During the period from 0300, Tuesday, April 18, 1943, until 2400, Friday, 


April 21, 1943, the U.S.S. P.C. 815 fought two submarines, presumably Japanese.


 


(2) That one of them was definitely sunk, beyond doubt.


 


(3) That the second was damaged beyond repair and may therefore be considered as 


not capable of returning to Japanese territory.


 


4.         It is recommended that each officer, junior to myself, and each 


enlisted man, have placed in his record a letter of commendation for his conduct 


in this action; considering coolness, stamina and general ability. The Executive 


Officer feels no particular person is outstanding beyond any other.


 


5. No comments of a censuring nature are made.


 


 


THOMAS S. MOULTON.


 


 


 


 


 


IN REPLY REFER


TO NO.


 


U. S. S. PC-815


 


GUNNERY LOG


 


L.W.T.            Wednesday, 19 May, 1943


 


0344  - Fired both X-guns setting 75 feet


Rolled three from racks - settings were 2 at 100 feet and one at 50 feet


 


0357  - Fired both K-guns - setting 150 feet


 


Rolled two from racks - settings at 200 feet


 


0422  - Fired both X-guns -settings at 200 feet


 


0450  - Fired all guns at object on surface


 


0500  - Fired all guns at object on surface


 


0520  - Rolled one from racks – settings at 150 feet


 


0526  - Rolled one from racks - setting at 150 feet


 


0545  - Rolled one from racks - setting at 150 feet


            This expended all our depth charges.


 


1700  - C. G. C. 78-302 came alongside to give us 23 complete depth charges


 


1850  - Rolled one from racks-setting at 150 feet


 


THURSDAY, 20 May 1943


 


1305  - Fired two from K-guns - setting at 300 feet


            Rolled four from racks - settings at 300 feet


 


1342  - Fired two from K-guns - settings at 300 feet


            Rolled two from racks - settings at 3X feet


 


1601  - Fired two from K-guns - settings at 75 feet


            Rolled one from racks - setting at 75 feet


 


2003    Fired two from K-guns - settings at 75 feet


            Rolled one from racks - setting at 75 feet


 


2006    Rolled two from racks - setting at 150 feet


 


2034    Fired two from K-guns - setting at 150 feet


 


 


IN REPLY REFER


TO NO.


 


U. S. S. PC-815


 


GUNNERY LOG


 


 


L.W.T.            FRIDAY, 21 May, 1943


 


0704  -            Opened fire from all guns at periscope in the center of oil 


boil.


Continued firing until the periscope disappeared.


 


0805  - Fired port K-gun – settings at 200 feet


            Rolled one from racks - setting at 200 feet


 


AMMUNITION INVENTORY


 


A full allowance of ammunition was on hand when this vessel sailed from Astoria 


on May 18, 1943 in all respects except depth charges.


 


This vessel had strongly requested its full allowance of depth charges but 


received only fourteen, two of which were structural firing charges. It is 


believed that this was no fault of this naval station but came about through a 


lack of supply from Navy Yard Puget Sound or wherever this naval station 


receives it [sic] charges and ordnance. There were no more depth charges than 


this to be given to this vessel. This station was most generous with arbors.


 


 


D.E. Walker


Ensign, USNR


Gunnery Officer, USS PC815


 


 


 


 


 


 


HEADQUARTERS


NORTHWEST SEA FRONTIER


SEATTLE, WASHINGTON


 


A16-3(3)/PC815


(R1-s)


Serial F223026


8 June 1943


SECRET


 


SECOND ENDORSEMENT on


CO USS PC815 ltr PC815/


A16-3(167) dated 24 May 1943.


 


From:            Commander Northwest Sea Frontier


To:            Commander in Chief., Pacific Fleet


Via:            Commander Fleet Operational Training Command., Pacific


 


Subject:            Battle Report - Submission of.


 


1. At the time of the incident reported herein PC 815 was enroute [sic] to San 


Diego, California, in accordance with orders of Commander Fleet Operational 


Training Command, Pacific.


 


2. It is noted that the report of PC 815 is not in accordance with 


“Anti-Submarine Action by Surface Ship" (ASW-1) which should be submitted to 


Commander In Chief, U.S. Fleet.


 


3. SC’s 536 and 537, CGC’s BONHAM and 78302, and blimps K-33 and K-39 engaged in 


this submarine search. Reports have been received from the Commanding Officer of 


each of these ships in writing and in personal interviews. An oral report has 


also been received from Lieutenant Commander E. J. Sullivan U.S.N., Commander 


Airship Squadron 33, who made a trip to the area during the search on one of the 


blimps.


 


4. There is a known magnetic deposit in the area in which depth charges were 


dropped.


 


5. An analysis of all reports convinces me that there was no submarine in the 


area. Lieutenant Commander Sullivan states that he was unable to obtain any 


evidence of a submarine except one bubble of air which is unexplained except by 


turbulence of water due to a depth charge explosion. The Commanding Officers of 


all ships except the PC 815 state they had no evidence of a submarine and do not 


think a submarine was in the area.


 


6. Transmission of this letter by registered mail is necessary and is 


authorized.


 


FRANK JACK FLETCHER


