

Garden Bridge Trust

Discharge Application:
14/02792/FUL Condition 46 and
WCC 14/05095/FULL Condition 33

Garden Bridge Illegal Trading Anti-
social Behaviour Crowd Control and
General Enforcement Management
Plan

LBL Condition 46/WCC Condition 33

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1 Introduction

1.1 General

- 1.1.1** The Garden Bridge Trust (GBT) is leading the development of the Garden Bridge (the site), a new pedestrian bridge crossing the River Thames between Temple Underground Station and Queen's Walk in London.

1.2 Report Objectives

- 1.2.1** This document, including the appendices, outlines how the GBT will identify and address potential criminality including illegal trading, anti-social behaviour and similar nuisance activities, as well as key public safety issues including crowd control. The GBT, as the responsible organisation for the development, has also outlined in this plan its approach to enforcement to ensure unwanted behaviours are prohibited or eradicated.
- 1.2.2** This Illegal Trading, Anti-social Behaviour, Crowd Control and General Enforcement Management Plan has been prepared to meet the requirements of Condition 46 of the planning consent 14/02792/FUL, granted by the LBL; and Condition 33 of the planning consent 14/05095/FULL, granted by WCC.
- 1.2.3** LBL Condition 46 states “*no development works shall commence until such time as an 'Illegal Trading, Antisocial Behaviour, Crowd Control and General Enforcement Management Plan' has been submitted to and approved in writing by the Local Planning Authority. The Plan shall be inclusive of evidence about the skills and resources necessary for the management arrangements and the establishment of a high degree of cooperation and mutual understanding with other providers on the South Bank. The details approved in the Illegal Trading, Anti-social Behaviour, Crowd Control and General Enforcement Management Plan shall thereafter be fully reflected in the Operations Management Plan and the Operations and Maintenance Business Plan to be worked up and provided pursuant to condition 3 (the S106 Planning Agreement) of this planning permission*”.
- 1.2.4** WCC Condition 33 states “*You must apply to us for approval of an Illegal Trading, Antisocial Behaviour, Crowd Control and General Enforcement Management Plan. You must not open the bridge to the public until we have approved what you have sent us. The details in the Illegal Trading, Antisocial Behaviour, Crowd Control and General Enforcement Management Plan shall thereafter be fully reflected in the Operations Management Plan and the Operations and Maintenance Business Plan to be worked up and provided pursuant to condition 3 of this planning permission.*”
- 1.2.5** Notwithstanding these conditions, the GBT fully recognises its obligation to ensure that appropriate measures are in place to deal with visitor management, security, crime prevention and community safety

both on the Garden Bridge and in the vicinity, and to protect residential amenity in the immediate area. It is therefore an appropriate, proportionate and necessary measure by the GBT to ensure all reasonable steps are taken to develop an effective enforcement regime to address crime and anti-social behaviour associated with the Garden Bridge.

- 1.2.6** Given the scale of these broad topic areas, the GBT has developed three core plans on crime prevention, crowd management and enforcement. These separate plans are included as appendices to form a consolidated plan.
- 1.2.7** This document provides information on the aims, principles and approach of the plan as well as proposals for stakeholder involvement, management arrangements and measures to evaluate its success.

1.3 Context

- 1.3.1** The Illegal Trading, Anti-social Behaviour, Crowd Control and General Enforcement Management Plan forms part of the wider Garden Bridge operations and security planning as part of the overarching Operations Management Plan (OMP).
- 1.3.2** The plan comprises the following elements:
- Crime Prevention Statement;
 - Crowd Management Plan; and
 - Enforcement Management Plan.
- 1.3.3** The Crowd Management Plan has been developed to support the safe movement of pedestrians on the Garden Bridge. However, this plan recognises that the Garden Bridge does not operate in isolation, and therefore identifies the principles that will be adopted for the safe movement of all people on the Garden Bridge and around the landings.
- 1.3.4** The plan defines the operational crowd management approach to deliver a safe and enjoyable visitor experience for all using the Garden Bridge.
- 1.3.5** The aim of all our security planning is to develop safe and inclusive publicly accessible space, creating a bridge crossing and garden that is not only secure but also feels secure. The Crime Prevention Statement outlines how this aim is supported primarily through the design and construction of the Bridge.
- 1.3.6** The Enforcement Management Plan details the operational measures that will be taken to actively manage the environment, minimise crime and enhance community safety, focusing on the identified priorities of illegal trading, gambling and anti-social behaviour. The two plans operate together in a complementary fashion to collectively create the illegal trading, anti-social behaviour and general enforcement management plan.

1.3.7 The Crime Prevention Statement is the subject of a separate planning submission specifically prepared to meet the requirements of Condition 38, of planning consent 14/02792/FUL, London Borough of Lambeth (LBL); and Condition 29, of planning consent 14/05095/FULL, Westminster City Council (WCC). For ease of reference and because of their complementary nature, the crime prevention statement has been included as an appendix within enforcement management plan. Whilst the emphasis in this plan will be on enforcement, there are elements of it that are also specifically focused on crime prevention and deterrence as well as detection and response.

1.4 Consultation

1.4.1 This plan has been issued following consultation with the local community and stakeholders. The plan has been produced by the GBT, in consultation with LBL/WCC. The development of the document has also been informed by the Operations Reference Group, and the Security & Crowd Management Working Group (S&CMWG) set up by the GBT to provide the opportunity for the Trust to learn from existing operators, including the Metropolitan Police and British Transport Police services in the local area.

1.4.2 The GBT has consulted with the local community through a consultation leaflet, which included a summary of the key points and information about the GBT's crime prevention proposals. The GBT has also held a community forum during the consultation period, with representatives from local community groups and residents, in addition to three public drop-in events for the local community.

1.4.3 Following this process of consultation, a separate report has been prepared. Comments received during the consultation period have been summarised within that report together with an Issues and Comments Log. No specific comments relating to this Illegal Trading, Antisocial Behaviour, Crowd Control and General Enforcement Management Plan were received during the consultation.

2 Combined Plan

2.1 Overview

2.1.1 The consolidated plan comprises the following draft plans:

- Crime Prevention Statement;
- Crowd Management Plan; and
- Enforcement Management Plan

2.1.2 Although identified as separate elements, the aforementioned plans are sufficiently closely aligned to make the production of a single, over-arching management plan possible. In broad terms this consolidated plan identifies how crowds will be managed when the Bridge is experiencing high demand; noting that when crowds form the opportunity for crime will increase. Therefore the crime prevention statement and enforcement management plans detail how the GBT will tackle this.

2.1.3 To demonstrate the relationships between the plans Appendix A – Crime Prevention Statement, Part II, Section 3.1.4 discusses *Access and Movement* and Appendix B – Crowd Management Plan, Section 2.3 details our plans on *Pedestrian Flow Management*.

2.1.4 Factors such as a common profile for potential victims, parallels between offences, similarity in the type of offenders, and the very defined and consistent nature of the location of offending, all mean that the preventative and enforcement approaches being developed by the GBT can purposefully be designed to encompass a broad range of offending behaviour. In other words, as the plans describe, directed patrolling by the GBT Visitor Hosts and active monitoring of the CCTV system for example, will be equally effective as a tactic against illegal trading as it is in respect of illegal gambling.

2.1.5 For this reason the two security focused plans have been structured in a way that outlines the approach to be implemented to address the wider enforcement requirements inherent in the Bridge development as well as highlighting, where relevant, specific tactics to address illegal trading, gambling and anti-social behaviour. As a result identifying, prohibiting, and enforcing against anti-social behaviours and illegal activities such as gambling, are reoccurring themes throughout this document.

Appendix A

Crime Prevention Statement

A1 Crime Prevention Statement

1 Overview

1.1 Document Overview

1.1.1 The Garden Bridge Crime Prevention Statement is divided into three sections:

- Part I - The crime picture and crime related risk assessment
- Part II – Overview of crime prevention approaches
- Part III – Policy statement and review

1.1.2 The crime picture and crime related risk assessment provide the backdrop, context and rationale for the crime prevention design and construction measures implemented as part of the Garden Bridge development. These measures are specified in detail in Part II. This section demonstrates how the approaches adopted by the GBT comply with the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) and Secure by Design (SbD) and are consistent, as far as is practicable with the nationally recognised attributes of safer communities. The final section of the statement outlines the activity that the GBT will undertake to monitor the effectiveness of its crime prevention and crime reduction activities.

2 Part I – The Crime Picture and Crime Related Risk Assessment

2.1 The Crime Picture

2.1.1 The GBT has always recognised that the Garden Bridge development is taking place in a popular and busy part of the capital and that its creation would have an impact on a number of areas, including crime. To minimise situational criminality that might arise as a consequence of the bridge development, the design and specification of the Garden Bridge and its subsequent construction and operation will adhere to relevant industry standards, regulations and guidelines. These measures are a combination of generic, best practice approaches for designing-out crime that are required for all new builds and specific activity that has been tailored to reflect the particular types and methodology of crime prevalent in the development area.

2.1.2 The creation of these situational crime prevention measures has been informed by the completion of a crime related risk assessment. This analysis is part of the over-arching general security risk assessment (GSRA) (see Figure 1 above), which considers both crime and counter-terrorism (CT) risks. Approaches to designing out crime, which are the focus of this statement, are applicable to both CT as well as wider criminality and this statement encompasses both aspects. Additional information in respect of CT-related measures can be found in the Garden Bridge CT Strategy. The methodology employed to conduct the GSRA has been outlined in depth in the GBT CT Strategy, which is the subject of a separate submission, and for that reason it will not be covered in detail in this document. Key aspects relevant to the completion of the Crime Prevention Statement will be highlighted however.

2.2 Crime Related Risk Assessment

2.2.1 The crime related risk assessment has enabled the GBT to establish a better understanding of the prevailing patterns of offending in the locality and to use this information to help formulate the designing in and overlay of crime prevention measures.

2.2.2 The crime related risk assessment consisted of the following:

- The identification of potential threats
- The identification of Garden Bridge assets to be protected and
- The evaluation of vulnerabilities.

2.2.3 Identifying the Threats: The assessment has included an analysis of the nature of the crime and anti-social behaviour taking place in the immediate vicinity and wider surrounding area. This has focused on aspects such as the type of offending, frequency and methodology together with an understanding of the enforcement and crime prevention activity taken to address these issues. This work has been informed in part by the analysis undertaken by the Metropolitan Police

Service (MPS) Designing out Crime Officers (DOCO's) for Lambeth and Westminster whose submissions on behalf of LBL and WCC were part of the formal planning process. In addition, relevant information has been obtained from an evaluation of open source material and discussions with a range of stakeholders, including members of the GBT Security and Crowd Management Working Group.

2.2.4 Access to information and intelligence is a critical part of the threat identification process for this statement. The risk assessment has built upon initial work conducted by ARUP during the early part of 2014. Maintaining access to intelligence on current and emerging crime threat types is a complementary objective of this statement. To support the threat identification process the GBT will ensure that it is appropriately linked to all relevant sources of information and will actively seek to share intelligence with other agencies and organisations. The GBT will develop its evidence base on criminal activity by undertaking initiatives such as an Environmental Visual Audit (EVA) in the period before the bridge is open to the public in the areas immediately adjacent to the bridge construction site. Further information on this and other work to enhance the understanding of local criminality and crime patterns is outlined in the GBT Enforcement Plan.

2.2.5 Identify and Specifying the Assets to be Protected: Like threat definition, asset identification is critical to an estimate of risk. This strategy adopts a conventional approach to categorising assets that require protection and divides them into the areas of people, property and information. A full description of each of these areas is outlined in the GBT Security Plan and CT Strategy. The primary focus for this crime prevention statement is the protection of people and the measures undertaken to minimise the likelihood of their becoming victims of crime. This responsibility extends to guests and visitors to the Bridge as well as the traversing public. It also encompasses the GBT staff, contractors and others working on site, vendors, suppliers and delivery personnel and all other persons lawfully on the Bridge. This statement also addresses the need to protect property by preventing and reducing offences such as criminal damage and burglary.

2.2.6 Vulnerabilities: Use has been made of security modelling techniques to assess potential vulnerabilities on the bridge. This analysis has helped to inform the development of measures to reduce the incidence of crime and criminality. Details of these measures can be found in Part II below.

2.2.7 Risk Assessment: Having confirmed key assets, documented the threats and identified existing and potential vulnerabilities, a process has been followed to establish the crime-related risks that the Bridge faces and the results of this exercise are outlined in Table 1 below.

Crime Related Threat	Relative Risk (measured against London average)
Violence Against the Person	Low likelihood but high impact
Robbery	Low/Medium likelihood but high impact

Burglary	Low/medium likelihood and moderate impact
Theft	Medium/high likelihood and moderate impact
Indecent Assault	Low likelihood but high impact
Drug Associated Crime	Medium likelihood and moderate impact
Illegal Gambling	High likelihood and moderate impact
Aggressive Begging	High likelihood and moderate impact
Rough Sleeping	High likelihood and moderate impact
Public Drinking	Medium likelihood and moderate impact
Fear of Crime	Low likelihood but high impact if left unaddressed
Damage to Property	Low likelihood and moderate impact
Public Protest/Encampment	Medium likelihood and moderate/high impact
Anti-Social Behaviour	Medium likelihood and moderate impact
Illegal Trading	High likelihood and moderate impact
Cyber Related Crime	High likelihood and moderate impact

Table 1: Crime Related Risk Assessment in respect of the Garden Bridge

2.2.8 The GBT recognise that the development of the bridge may provide an opportunity for individuals intent on harming themselves to commit suicide. The preventative provisions outlined within this statement are equally applicable to this category of activity and the GBT undertakes to take whatever action it can, working in partnership, with for example Metropolitan Police Service to reduce this risk to an absolute minimum.

2.2.9 The results of the risk assessment process for CT related risks can be found within the GBT CT Strategy. Collectively these risk assessments form the context for the development of crime prevention measures related to the construction and operation of the bridge and these are outlined in Part II.

3 Part II – Overview of Crime Prevention Approaches

3.1 Crime Prevention Approach

- 3.1.1** The aim of the security strategy has been to develop a safe and inclusive publicly accessible space on the garden, creating a bridge crossing and garden that is secure and feels secure. The principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), Secure by Design (SbD) and the attributes of sustainable and safer communities contained within the Home Office framework document, ‘Safer Places, The Planning System and Crime Prevention’ have been central to developing this strategy.
- 3.1.2** Secure by Design is the United Kingdom police flagship initiative supporting the principles of designing out crime. The scheme focuses on crime prevention of premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. The principles for the security strategy have been developed in consultation with the MPS, British Transport Police (BTP) and other relevant bodies, in accordance with SbD principles.
- 3.1.3** The document, “Safer Places, The Planning System and Crime Prevention” is a set of planning guidance issued by the Home Office. The police service supports the seven attributes defined by the guidance as integral to safer and sustainable communities. These attributes complement the CPTED principles of territoriality, natural surveillance, access control, target hardening, image maintenance and activity support and incorporate SbD requirements to create a comprehensive approach to crime prevention. In the following sections, the GBT will demonstrate how all of those attributes have been considered in the measures they have taken to design out crime and design in community safety in the operation of the Bridge to meet the objective of promoting a safe, sustainable and attractive environment.
- 3.1.4** It is worth emphasising that the guidance document points out that the seven attributes are general and descriptive and are not prescriptive. The GBT have applied them as the planning guideline has suggested, not as a set of rules to be applied to all situations but as prompts to inform the approach to crime prevention.

Access and Movement

- 3.1.5** The guide identifies that places should have routes, spaces and entrances that provide for free movement of people without compromising security. The bridge has been developed with well-defined routes, circulation spaces and bridge landings on both the north and south side that provide for convenient movement to avoid bottle-necks, promote clear way-finding and maximise the opportunity for natural surveillance.

- 3.1.6** The design of the bridge has emphasised access and egress points through the use of clear visual cues complementing the use of signage. This approach is intended to lead to easier orientation for visitors and reduce the likelihood of static groups of people forming whilst they confirm directions. Access routes have generally been designed to allow long sightlines on approach, creating the most intuitive movement onto the bridge possible. In the unlikely event that it is necessary to queue people on the north and south landings, these will be actively managed by personnel from the GBT and are likely to be free moving rather than stationary queues, minimising the opportunity for criminality.
- 3.1.7** Wayfinding will be provided at each landing point to direct visitors to stairs, lifts or ramps as required. All signage will comply with the recommendations of Legible London whilst maintaining a consistent and distinct identity to the bridge and the locality. Details of the measures to be adopted will be included within the wayfinding and signage strategy.
- 3.1.8** Once at bridge deck level, the direction of travel is clear, with step and obstacle free routes to the other side. During the hours of darkness, lighting of the pathways would clearly delineate the walking surface.
- 3.1.9** The routes around and across the bridge have been laid out to minimise the opportunities for potential offenders to have unnoticed access to potential targets or multiple escape routes. All pathways have been developed to ensure multiple routes are possible with minimal dead-end conditions.
- 3.1.10** The bridge will feature a number of balconies or viewing promontories. These are stand-alone spaces that are reached via subsidiary paths from the main routes across the bridge. Unlike the main pathways the promontories are not covered by video surveillance systems and these areas will need to be appropriately managed. At times the promontories will be constantly frequented by visitors and therefore will offer opportunities for natural surveillance to minimise the potential for crime. At other times, particularly outside peak hours, these areas are likely to be amongst the least frequented on the bridge and the GBT will ensure that additional protective security measures are developed (e.g. Visitor Host patrols, and lighting) to ensure the promontories are both secure and feel safe at all times.
- 3.1.11** The access and service routes to the landings (particularly on the south bank) have been arranged so as not to generate vulnerability to the rear of any 'owned' premises (e.g. rear access footpaths). The service alley at the rear of the south landing building will be enclosed and locked and access limited to staff from the GBT. Full details of the physical security measures used to secure this area are detailed in the section on physical protection below.

Structure

- 3.1.12** The guidance document indicates that well designed places should be laid out so that crime is discouraged and different uses do not cause conflict. Conflict is defined as a location that brings together people

who are likely to offend combined with suitable targets, when critically, there are no capable guardians present.

- 3.1.13** The bridge and the landing areas are predominantly open spaces where free movement of individuals is planned for and encouraged. All open space is clearly defined to support legitimate activity and to resist crime and anti-social behaviour. The development has been structured to ensure that all anticipated uses, e.g., visiting, viewing and traversing the bridge are compatible, by for example providing a range of complementary dwell and movement areas, minimising the chances for conflict.
- 3.1.14** Places where people can congregate and linger are limited to open areas, primarily on the north and south landings. These places generally fall within the scope of the video surveillance systems and all parts of the bridge are in any event encompassed by the patrol responsibility of the GBT Visitor Hosts, who with other personnel from the GBT, will constitute an effective ‘capable guardian’ resource. There are no commercial enterprises or outlets on the bridge or landings or any other type of premises that could act as a crime generator.
- 3.1.15** Whilst the promontories may be viewed as possible vulnerabilities because they are not covered by CCTV, they are equally likely to be unattractive to offenders as they are in effect cul-de-sacs and offer no obvious escape route. Other potential hot-spots, e.g. the area in the vicinity of drinking fountains (if installed) on the north and south landings have been subject to additional protective security measures.
- 3.1.16** In terms of additional furniture on the Bridge there will be approximately 70 benches on the bridge and landings. Seating for the bridge has yet to be finalised, however, in the interest of safety it would be constructed to discourage rough sleeping through the provision of an irregular top surface. Benches will be sited so that natural and video surveillance is supported and vision is not impeded. The seating design will also address the need to prevent explosives being concealed and would be shatter-proof (in the event of an explosion).
- 3.1.17** That part of the south landing building under the direction and control of the GBT will be appropriately secured both during the hours of operation and whilst the bridge is closed. Details of the protective security facilities can be found below.

Surveillance

- 3.1.18** The “Safer Places, The Planning System and Crime Prevention” document identifies that many of the other attributes within the guidance, particularly access and movement, ownership (see below) and structure are under pinned by the theory that most places are safer if they are overlooked. Whether it is ‘natural’ or electronic, facilitating effective surveillance is a core part of planning out crime and these principles have been incorporated into the design, construction and operation of the Garden Bridge.

- 3.1.19** Publicly accessible spaces on the bridge have been designed to be viewed and overlooked from other places. The bridge deck and garden areas are open and bright spaces and within the context of a ‘garden’ they have been designed to limit the number of potential hiding places and hence reduce the fear of crime. Lift and stair entrances have been designed to maintain lines of sight and ensure clear visibility of lift and stair access.
- 3.1.20** Those areas that might not be overlooked or are less likely to benefit from routine natural surveillance have been identified and appropriate protective security measures implemented. For example the areas on the north and south landings that are located beneath the bridge deck as well as the entire perimeter of both landings are all within the scope of the CCTV system.
- 3.1.21** The garden areas have been designed to provide a transparency of planting, rather than dense planting to minimise secluded areas where crime and anti-social behaviour could take place, as well as facilitating views from the bridge. This has been achieved by restricting the majority of low level planting to a nominal 1m height with tree canopies generally starting from 2m in height to create a visible clear band between. While there will be some elements of planting between these levels, this has been limited and the type of planting has been carefully chosen to preserve views. The GBT will ensure that an effective regime provided by a team of gardeners will be in place to ensure the above gaps are maintained especially during the growing season.
- 3.1.22** Lighting: The lighting system has been designed to provide enhanced levels of lighting in key areas for safety in terms of reducing the risk of crime, and to reduce the risk of trips and accidents. The Lighting Strategy must be submitted for approval by both local planning authorities prior to the installation of lighting on the bridge and landing decks to fulfil the requirements of London Borough of Lambeth’s planning condition 26 and Westminster City Council’s planning condition 18.
- 3.1.23** As the contract to construct the bridge has been awarded on a ‘design and build’ basis the full set of standards and specifications which the contractor will comply with is included at Appendix B of the crime prevention statement for reference purposes. This will satisfy point 18 within the Notes to Applicants section of LBL’s planning conditions, which states that, “The security lighting at the entrance decks, and along the bridge including the footpaths and the viewing stations should provide good levels of uniformity and meet the standards defined in BS 5489 -1;2013.” The following section provides an overview of the lighting strategy for the Garden Bridge.
- 3.1.24** Good lighting is an important component not only of the surveillance attribute of the “Safer Places, The Planning System and Crime Prevention” guideline but also of the implementation of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design strategies to promote, territoriality, natural surveillance, image maintenance and activity support. The lighting solution has been designed with these objectives

in mind and the results will mean that users of the bridge feel safe and that they are using/passing through a safe environment.

- 3.1.25** The lighting design guides used to determine the lighting scheme are The Code of Practice for the Design of Road Lighting, Parts I and II (BS 5489) and Lighting Against Crime, A Guide for Professionals.
- 3.1.26** Through these guides a balance has been struck between providing an energy efficient solution, which minimises light pollution and, which supports an acceptable level of uniformity and colour rendering. It will be the responsibility of the contractor to satisfy these guidelines and this will allow the form of luminaire to be varied to comprise combinations of overhead, indirect and low level bollard lighting. The proposed lighting scheme has been modelled and tested such that this combination has been achieved, allowing it to reflect the contemporary nature of the new bridge but also the heritage areas at the north landing point.
- 3.1.27** The approach has been to divide the bridge into zones to develop the lighting scheme, which are:
- the touchdown/arrival points
 - the transition zones onto the bridge
 - the primary routes on the bridge and viewing points (balconies/promontories)
 - cross paths in the central gardens
- 3.1.28** Within and outside of these zones, there will be areas of interest, which will have specific attention such as:
- undersides of stairs
 - dead zones that cannot be eliminated
 - wayfinding points
 - tree up-lighting and wall washing
- 3.1.29** The lighting against crime guide has been used to select the luminance levels, uniformity and colour rendering, in conjunction with BS EN 13201 and BS 5489. The threat assessment for this project indicates that high rates of crime could be experienced for certain types of offences on the bridge (see Table 1 above). Therefore a crime rate of high has been used from the guide in BS 5489. Pedestrian traffic flows have been assessed as normal to heavy and these factors combined with environmental considerations have informed both the level of vertical illumination required and ensured that any scheme complies with the obtrusive light limitations.
- 3.1.30** As the bridge will be lit throughout the hours of darkness, curfew considerations must be taken into account. Therefore, to reflect this, the scheme will be dimmable to allow the illumination levels to be dropped when the bridge is not open to the public. This way obtrusive light is minimised. The outcome of developing a scheme based on the application of these criteria is to achieve the illumination levels indicated in diagram 1 below. Measured in lux, the diagram gives an accurate representation of the lighting levels across the various zones of the bridge.




Figure 1: LUX Levels across the Garden Bridge & Landing Areas Prevention (Indicative)

3.1.31 CCTV: The operation of the CCTV system has been developed using the guidelines and principles set out in the Home Office publication, the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice 2013, as it would apply to a relevant authority as defined by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Although the Garden Bridge is not a relevant authority within the terms of this Act, the aforementioned publication represents best practice in the management of CCTV systems and the GBT believe its adoption is appropriate in this context..

3.1.32 In this instance the GBT will be the System Operator. The scheme proposed has been developed using the latest low light camera technology which ARUP, the consulting design engineers have trialled and tested on other recent projects. The aim has been to achieve useful CCTV images with a level of lighting, which is commensurate with that supported by CPTED and SbD principles and guidance and not for the CCTV to artificially enhance the requirements. Wherever possible the aim has been to integrate the cameras into the bridge and landing furniture or building fabric to provide a coordinated response.

3.1.33 As part of the planning approvals process details of the CCTV installed on the bridge, including the number, location and method of concealment are required by both WCC and LBL and additional information on the operation of the system will be supplied as part of that submission. The Garden Bridge Enforcement Plan also contains further information on the use of the CCTV system. The following sections therefore provide a broad overview of the scope and objectives of the scheme.

3.1.34 Significant enhancements have been made to the CCTV specification over the course of the planning and design of the garden bridge. The original proposals by ARUP have been influenced both by the

involvement of the Designing Out Crime Officer (DOCO) for Lambeth and Westminster and subsequently by on-going engagement between the GBT and ARUP. The net result is that the CCTV specification has migrated from a system designed to support a post incident response by way of forensic investigation and the “occasional proactive management when the need arises,” to a much enhanced capability that enables the GBT to:

- actively manage and oversee the bridge environment, landings and perimeter to identify and capture evidence of potential illegal activity,
- monitor identified vulnerabilities and potential hot-spots
- secure images of identification level quality at designated points for criminal justice purposes,
- support crowd monitoring at the base of the stairs for both north and south landings, and
- provide an integrated capability with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to detect and facilitate a response to breaches of the north and south landing perimeters.

3.1.35 The surveillance scheme has been developed to:

- meet the requirements outlined above,
- reflect the views expressed through the stakeholder engagement process, where the Design out Crime Officers requested that CCTV cameras were provided in a proportionate manner across the whole Garden Bridge to monitor and identify opportunist crime, and
- satisfy the subsequent planning informative for both WCC and LBL, which stipulated that ‘the Crime Prevention Design Advisor advises that there should be a monitored CCTV surveillance system that provides real time and post event images capable of being used for Criminal Justice Purposes and it may be appropriate for the images to be viewable real time at either Westminster or Lambeth council CCTV control rooms. Identification quality images are recommended at both entrance decks and at any other points designated as vulnerable’.

3.1.36 The CCTV scheme reflects the GBT’s response to these requirements and fully satisfies the conditions to provide an effective, proportionate and well-managed system capable of being used to proactively manage the bridge operating environment.

3.1.37 The CCTV design will be developed using low light lux sensitivity camera technology to achieve CCTV images that meet the operational requirements with a level of lighting matched to the lighting design. The CCTV system will comprise internal and external high resolution/ high definition day/night CCTV cameras, all of fixed installation position with fixed views. The CCTV transmission and power will be Internet Protocol (IP) based. CCTV images will be controlled and recorded by a video management system (VMS) suitable for the number of fixed cameras. CCTV signage in compliance with the

Information Commissioners Office recommendations will be provided.

- 3.1.38** The GBT are currently examining the most effective means of monitoring the CCTV images and are considering the following options:
- Developing an active workstation on site within the south landing building
 - Remote monitoring via a facility managed through a third party arrangement
 - A hybrid solution using a flexible combination of both approaches
- 3.1.39** A process will be developed to ensure that only persons authorised to view the images are present and the access to the workstation is controlled. The CCTV system shall be capable of providing intelligent video analysis by providing an alert when predefined alarms are triggered.

Ownership

- 3.1.40** The GBT recognise that as the guidance within the “Safer Places, The Planning System and Crime Prevention” document outlines, encouraging those who visit or otherwise use the bridge to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for it will make an important contribution to crime prevention. The GBT will facilitate this not only by ensuring that physical and other security measures provide clarity about aspects such as territorial boundaries but also by their wider approach to managing the bridge as a community asset. Whilst the bridge will be a private space run by the GBT, the over-riding objective is to develop an inclusive facility where there is a sense of community ownership and shared responsibility for keeping the bridge safe and secure for those that visit it.
- 3.1.41** As a stand-alone structure the bridge will be clearly identifiable as a separate entity. Natural access control through the use of gates, walls, and other physical obstacles together with the use of other symbolic barriers such as signage will emphasise the reality of a Bridge boundary and draw a distinction with surrounding open spaces. During those periods when the bridge is closed, physical security measures (see below) will reinforce the fact that this is a protected environment that is being looked after for the wider benefit of those that use it.
- 3.1.42** The Bridge has been delineated into zones or areas to assist in the development of measures to help identify who is legitimately on the bridge and who is not, and to highlight areas of vulnerability where additional security measures can be implemented. These zones include areas such as the landings to the north and south of the river, the stairs, lifts, the access/egress ramp on the north landing, the new building at the south landing and of course the bridge decks themselves. Through the use of different surface materials, planting and lighting there will be a clear demarcation between different areas

of the bridge decks, which will assist in the management, control and running of the operating environment and also allow visitors to identify when they are moving from one area to another.

- 3.1.43** The GBT will ensure that the bridge will be available as a community resource and used as a means to involve as wide a section of local residents, schools and businesses as possible in a variety of activities and events. The planning approvals process requires the GBT to establish formal mechanisms for the involvement of young people and others in the immediate area and the objective is to establish the bridge as a community hub and location and through this approach develop a real sense of wider ownership. Indeed, the objective will be to make the bridge an iconic landmark that is collectively recognised as an important and valuable asset that is a source of pride for both London and the country as a whole.

Physical Protection

- 3.1.44** This attribute concerns ‘target hardening’ and other protective security measures that make it more difficult to commit offences and instil a feeling of safety in people who will be using the bridge. The bridge design includes physical protection developed in accordance with Secured by Design principles (particularly in the owned spaces on the south bank). Appendix A details the full list of relevant security standards and guidance that the contractor will be required to comply with in the design of the security systems and the construction of the bridge. Physical protection measures include:

Electronic Access Control Systems (EACS)

- 3.1.44.1** The EACS will be a networked on-line IP system and controlled via a central server providing communications and database hosting, with monitoring and alarm displayed. It will be primarily managed from the CCTV/EACS workstation in the south landing building. The system will be based on non-contact proximity readers and EACS cards for staff and contract staff. The EACS architecture shall have distributed intelligence such that the controller is located local to the door on the secure side of the door and in the event of data connection failure, the door shall continue to operate according to its last database communication. The EACS provides access upon presentation of authorised credentials to the following doors/areas: the welfare area, External Gates to Back of House Corridor, south landing plant room 1 and the north landing plant room. EACS doors/gates will comply with the lock and egress requirements of BS EN 1125 and BS EN 179. For external façade doors and full height external gates that are LPS 1175 security rated, the electric lock shall be equal and approved. If the portal (door or gate) is also used in public fire egress, a BS EN1125 compliant electric lock with push bar will be mandatory.
- 3.1.44.2** Local EACS door controllers and locks will be supplied with a 4-hour battery back-up to provide local door functionality in the event of a power failure. All EACS doors will have solenoid locks, which fail secure in the event of power failure, meaning that if the power fails to

the door, it will be in the locked position. Solenoid lock will have a monitored door handle opening action from the secure side (request upon handle). The EACS will manage permanent and temporary users, therefore access rights will be configurable such that the card can be granted or restricted or cancelled; and access rights will be provided for a period of time with a termination or renewal date. The EACS shall include a programmable calendar to set authorisation, termination and renew dates as part of the EACS enrolment.

Intruder Detection System

- 3.1.44.3** Consistent with the provisions of PD6662, the contractor will carry out a Risk Assessment of the project and known assets which in turn will provide an agreed assessment of the GBT's requirements. Notwithstanding the outcome of this assessment a PD6662 compliant solution will be provided within the South Landing Building to provide detection of unauthorised entry to the building when not in use and will be designed to allow a Police response to be initiated via an Alarm Receiving Centre. The IDS equipment shall consist of, but not limited to, IDS Keypad, IDS Contact Sets, and appropriate presence detection such as directional PIR and 360° PIR. The IDS shall have a RedCare provided to enable RedCare to call out to an Alarm Receiving Centre.

System Integration

- 3.1.44.4** The electronic security system shall be integrated such that the CCTV inputs shall monitor alarms from the EACS and the IDS outputs. The principle of the system integration is for groups of cameras to respond to a change of state from the security system. EACS and IDS shall have alarm outputs to CCTV inputs where upon the alarm shall trigger an associated group of cameras and the cause of the alarm output change shall affect the group of cameras compression rate (quality) and retention rates.

Physical Security

- 3.1.44.5** The construction work undertaken by the contractor will follow the Secure by Design (SbD) guidelines for Commercial 2015 and the following sections of the SbD guidelines shall be applied to these works, which will include but are not limited to:
- Commercial 2015, Section 50: Wall construction
 - Commercial 2015, Section 51: Glazed curtain walling and window walls
 - Commercial 2015, Section 52: Roller shutters and grills
 - Commercial 2015, Section 56: External doorset apertures
 - Commercial 2015, Section 57: Locking systems for doorset and gates
 - Commercial 2015, Section 60: Security glazing
 - Commercial 2015, Section 62: Protection of Window Apertures

3.1.44.6 The full envelope of the landing buildings will follow SbD. All new development works including walls, grills, louvres, windows, glazing, doors and gates etc. that provide demarcation between public and private spaces will be designed in compliance with the requirements of Secure by Design to ensure a general level of vandal resistance. The external doors in the external back of house corridor will be included in the full envelope of the South Landing building. The South Landing public toilets will use RADAR keys for mobility-impaired individuals during operational hours. The public toilets will have a secondary lock for securing out of hours as part of the operational lock and leave procedure. The public toilets will be included in the intruder detection zones.

3.1.44.7 The North Landing plant room door and store door will be LPS 1175 SR2 compliant with appropriate locking and walls equal to the door set rating. Where specified, the contractor will submit for approval a manufacturer's 'certificate of compliance' certifying that the installed product complies with this specification and the current Loss Prevention Council Loss Prevention Standard 1175 documentation. Tamper resistant fixings shall be used in public areas and sensitive entry points will be tagged with a security seal to provide a deterrent to potential intruders.

Roller Shutters

3.1.44.8 The stairs onto the South Landing Roof and the South Landing lift lobby will be closed off during out of hours. This shall be achieved by the installation of roller shutters which shall as a minimum follow SbD guidelines as well as:

- Electric Tube Motor, to conserve space
- Recessed into the ceiling, so that the roller shutter is not visible in its open position, as much as possible
- External grade contact set for position monitoring
- Each shutter shall be individually key operated, for health and safety purposes

External Gates

3.1.44.9 The south landing external gates provide access to the back of house external corridor and emergency egress for the public from the tenant space. It will not be possible to lift the gate from its hinges and the hinges and lock cylinder will be protected in such a way as to prevent their use as climbing aids. Similarly the cross section will not provide a climbing aid. It will not be possible to pass under the gate in its closed position.

3.1.44.10 The weld mesh gate gates will be:

- full height: the gate will be greater than the height of its adjacent fence, in this case ITV's perimeter fence
- either LPS 1175: Issue 7, Security Rating 2 or STS 202: Issue 3 BR2

- Electric lock and egress hardware that complies with BS EN 1125 and BS EN 179 in accordance with the fire egress strategy and the emergency egress strategy

3.1.44.11 If the gate requires an emergency release mechanism, i.e. release without the use of a key, this mechanism will be protected to prevent operation from outside of the gate. It should be noted that all emergency egress hardware will be subject to approval by the Approved Inspector.

3.1.44.12 The North Landing gate will have a manual, 2.4m height gate at the designated locations, which will be locked when the bridge is not open.

Internal Physical Security

3.1.44.13 In accordance with SbD principles, the following will apply to the south landing Landlord and Tenant space as a minimum:

- Standard timber or steel stud partition walls used to separate Landlord and Tenant space from each other or separate a tenant space from a common corridor are not acceptable.
- This type of wall will in accordance with requirements incorporate additional construction components, such as: timber sheathing, minimum 9mm thick, or expanded metal

Glazing Requirements

3.1.44.14 The glazing requirements have taken into consideration a range of factors including most critically the underlying threat picture in respect of a terrorist attack. The safety and well being of people using the bridge is of paramount concern and the GBT have taken effective and proportionate measures to address these issues.

3.1.44.15 To reduce the impact of secondary fragmentation the external glazing in public areas will have the following minimum requirement:

- Laminated with a Polyvinyl Butyral (PVB) interlayer
- Held in place in accordance with the requirements of SbD; and
- Supported on all four sides, where possible

3.1.44.16 It should be noted that the above hazard mitigation requirement will also apply to the north and south lift shaft glazing. Where both a physical security and hazard mitigation is required from the glazing installation, the contractor will provide a solution that complies with the hazard mitigation requirement, stated above, and SbD principles. All ground floor glazing on the landing that is accessible by the public out of hours shall have a glazing physical security requirement as described above.

Hostile Vehicle Mitigation

3.1.44.17 The risk assessment conducted in relation to the bridge development identified that Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) measures will be

required to address vulnerabilities on both the north and south sides of the bridge.

- 3.1.44.18** The HVM strategy is being prepared and will include all of the HVM measures. The HVM Strategy will be submitted in conjunction with other planning documents to fulfil the requirements of the S106 Planning Agreement required under London Borough of Lambeth's planning condition 3. This document will include all of the HVM measures. In summary, HVM will be provided at three locations on the North Landing and, in respect of the other side of the bridge, at two separate locations in the South Bank area.

Additional Physical Security Measures

- 3.1.44.19** The bridge development will also incorporate the following measures as part of the overall security requirements:
- Mechanical locks and suited keys
 - Anti tamper and vandal resistant measures to publically accessible switches/buttons, equipment and access hatches
 - Tamper seals
 - Anti-lift measures to gates
 - Street furniture will be fabricated of materials that do not fragment under blast conditions so far as is reasonably practicable
 - Anti-graffiti treatments will be provided/incorporated into finishes
 - A voids certification process shall be implemented

Activity

- 3.1.45** The "Safer Places, The Planning System and Crime Prevention" guide identifies that attracting a large number of law-abiding users to a location is a characteristic of good and safe places. The Garden Bridge is almost certain to become an iconic and popular destination for tourists in the capital as well as being used by a large number of the travelling public on a daily basis. A significant amount of work has been undertaken as part of the design and evaluation process to model anticipated crowd numbers. This identifies that there will be peak periods throughout the year when the bridge is particularly busy. This presents both opportunities and challenges. Crime can be deterred through the 'eyes on the street' of people going about their everyday business. However, too many people or too much activity in a particular area can lead to increases in the opportunity to commit certain types of crime.

- 3.1.46** The bridge will benefit from being a location where there is no fundamental incompatibility in the type of activities taking place. People will be on the bridge for the purposes of visiting and crossing. These uses are compatible and the way space on the bridge is designed will ensure they are also complementary. A regular turnover of people on the bridge will provide a residual level of natural surveillance and help to discourage opportunistic offending. The GBT will ensure that at peak periods and on those occasions when there are

very few people present, additional layers of security will minimise the opportunity for criminality.

Management and Maintenance Operation

3.1.47 The GBT recognise that places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind can discourage crime in the present and the future. Management and maintenance of the bridge will embrace both how it will look and how it will function over time. The GBT recognise that whilst getting the physical design and build of the bridge is paramount, management and maintenance are important factors in creating the right look and feel and addressing this at the outset when the bridge first opens and from there after is crucial.

3.1.48 The garden character proposed for the Garden Bridge is intended to have a relaxed aesthetic that is highly maintained. The garden will be looked after by a full-time team of experienced horticultural professionals with an understanding of plants, a special knowledge of the site, the perennial planting scheme and the particular climatic conditions of the bridge. Garden maintenance would ensure that the performance of protective security features such as lighting and CCTV would not be impeded by the presence of overgrown plants, shrubs and tress and this has been specifically included as part of the contract requirements. Appropriate storage of maintenance equipment and other materials in the south landing building will prevent offenders accessing what are often targets and tools for crime

3.1.49 The GBT will also employ a 'Clean Team' whose responsibility will encompass the prompt and regular removal of all litter and rubbish on the bridge decks and landings and whose duties will extend to the necessary remedial activity to deal with any graffiti or other acts of vandalism.

3.1.50 A primary maintenance mechanism will be the employment of a garden bridge security force capability. Known as Visitor Hosts, the GBT will employ personnel to undertake a range of security and stewarding functions. These are likely to include but are not limited to the following:

- control of entrances and general movement of pedestrians, including opening and closing the bridge
- person and property searches
- patrol of the Bridge and perimeters
- identification of hostile reconnaissance
- escort of material and personnel
- gathering of information and intelligence
- liaison and cooperation with neighbouring force resources and control room facilities
- inspection of security and fire exposures
- monitoring of assets from a central control facility either on site or remotely
- responding to a range of events and incidents including alarm activations

- actively monitoring crowd numbers through a GBT sourced crowd monitoring system and deploying measures to assist in the management of visitors on the bridge including emergency bridge closure and evacuation procedures.

3.1.51

As the garden bridge will be a private space, the GBT will develop a set of conditions of entry that will govern behaviour across the bridge and the visitor hosts will be responsible for enforcement. Appropriate signage will draw the attention of bridge users to those activities that are not allowed on the bridge and further details will be provided within the Signage and Wayfinding strategy, to be submitted for approval prior to opening.

4 Part III – Policy Statement and Review

4.1 Policy Statement and Review

- 4.1.1** The development of the Garden Bridge has taken into consideration the type of criminality in the area in which the bridge will be built. The bridge design has incorporated a significant number of approaches to eliminate as far as is possible the occurrence of these crimes. Additionally, the detailed specification to which the contractor must adhere will ensure that construction meets appropriate Secure by Design standards and guidelines for the creation of safe and secure places. This Crime Prevention Statement is written to reflect the attributes of safe and sustainable environments as outlined in the guidance document ‘Safer Places, The Planning System & Crime Prevention’.
- 4.1.2** The crime prevention measures contained within this statement address those risks identified in the current risk assessment profile for both CT and crime related activity. The GBT is committed to ensuring that as the development progresses through the construction phase and then into operation it will continue to review this risk assessment and adapt and add crime prevention measures considered to be appropriate, proportionate and necessary in conjunction with the contractor.
- 4.1.3** The GBT will undertake further work to continue to build the available evidence base with the objective of developing as full an understanding as possible of the prevailing and emerging crime trends and other risks in the immediate area. The GBT will also ensure that as far as is possible once the bridge is open an accurate record will be kept of all reported crimes, anti-social behaviour and nuisance events to provide the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of crime prevention measures and related enforcement measures. The GBT will also ensure these figures are made available for public inspection. In addition the GBT will:
- Conduct an annual Environmental Visual Audit (EVA) of the Bridge and its immediate vicinity to assess the extent to which the bridge is meeting its obligations to provide a safe and secure environment
 - Undertake regular surveys of bridge users to establish information about levels of fear and perceptions of crime and related nuisance matters
 - Complete an annual crime prevention statement addressing how activity in the previous twelve months and any proposed development for the forthcoming year meet its crime prevention principles and where appropriate Secure by Design guidelines

Crime Prevention Statement

Security Design Standards

Security Design Standards

A1.1 General

- a) ACPO Security systems policy & guidance notes standards.
- b) ACPO – Secured by Design Guidelines for Commercial Development
- c) Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure Guides - <http://www.cpm.gov.uk/Security-Planning/Standards-and-specifications>
- d) ACPO Lighting Against Crime - A Guide for Crime Reduction Professionals
- e) Home Office, The Surveillance Camera Code of Practice, June 2013
- f) Quality assurance system to ISO 9001 standards for services supplied, which shall have a current accreditation certificate in place awarded by either NSI or SSAIB.
- g) NSI (NACOSS) Gold standard, SSAIB equivalent or ACPO approved equivalent schemes.
- h) NFPA 730 : Guide for Premises Security
- i) NFPA 731 : Installation of Electronic Security Systems
- j) BS EN 62305

A1.2 DDA Compliance

- a) BS 8220-1 2000: Guide for the security of buildings against crime.
- b) BS 5619 and BS 5810: special requirements of disabled people
- c) BS 5940: dimensions of workstations, desks, tables and chairs for Control Space.
- d) BS 5979: 2000 Remote centres receiving signals from fire and security systems. Code of practice.
- e) BS 7799, ISO 27001 Suite of standards for security systems.
- f) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineering (IEEE), including IEEE802.3af and IEEE802.3at.

A1.3 CCTV

- a) BS 5979 - Remote centres receiving signals from fire and security systems. Code of practice.
- b) BS 7807 Code of practice for design, installation and servicing of integrated systems incorporating fire detection and alarm systems and/or other security systems for buildings other than dwellings.
- c) BS 7958 CCTV (Closed-circuit television) - Management and operation - Code of practice
- d) BS 8418 - Installation and remote monitoring of detector activated CCTV
- e) BS 8495 – Code of practice for digital CCTV recording systems.

- f) BS CP3 Chapter V Part 2 (1972) – Wind Loads
- g) BS6399 Part 2 (1997) Load for Buildings. Code of practice for wind loads.
- h) EN 50132-1 CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications: Part 1 System requirements
- i) EN 50132-2-1 CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications: Part 2-1. Black and white cameras
- j) EN 50132-4-1 CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications: Part 4-1 Black and white monitors
- k) EN 50132-4-3 CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications: Part 4-3 Recording equipment
- l) EN 50132-4-5 CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications: Part 4-5 Video motion
- m) EN 50132-5 CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications: Part 5 Video transmission, with specific reference to CCTV transmission for non-compressed and compressed CCTV transmission
- n) EN 50132-7 CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications - Part 7. Application guidelines
- o) BS EN 62676-1-1:2014 Video surveillance systems for use in security applications
- p) EMC Guidelines for Installers of Security Systems - Form no: 195
- q) HOSDB CCTV Operational Requirements Manual (Publication No. 55/06).
- r) UK Police Requirements for digital CCTV 09/05
- s) The system shall be designed to comply with the Data Protection Act 1998
- t) CCTV Systems to the requirements of NACP 20 or the equivalent SSAIB documents
- u) UK Police Requirements for Digital CCTV Systems. PSDB publication number 09/05.
- v) BSI Code of practice of legal admissibility and evidential weight of information stored electronically - BIP0008
- w) Code of Practice for Digital Recording Systems for the Purpose of Image Export to be used as Evidence – BSIA 2005.
- x) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineering (IEEE), including IEEE802.3af and IEEE802.3at.

A1.4 Electronic Access Control System

- a) BS EN 60839-11-1:2013 Alarm and electronic security systems Part 11-1: Electronic access control systems – System and component requirements
- b) BS ISO/IEC 15457-1:2001 Identification cards. Thin flexible cards. Physical characteristics.
- c) ISO 14443 A or B standard Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuit cards -- Proximity cards
- d) ISO 15693 Identification Cards – Contactless integrated circuit cards – Vicinity Cards

- e) ISO 7810, 7811 and 18555 Identification cards — Physical characteristics
- f) LFEPA Guidance Note 64 (determines colour, engraving and operation)
- g) NACP 30 – NSI code of practice for access control standards.
- h) NFPA series of guides with specific reference to emergency exit, panic exit and any delayed egress requirements. Where there is a conflict between the British standards and NFPA, then NFPA shall take precedence due to the fact that the fire system is being designed to be NFPA compliant with District Surveyor approval required.
- i) prEN 13633 - Building hardware – Electrically controlled panic exit systems for use on escape routes
- j) prEN 13637 – Electrically controlled emergency exit systems for use on escape routes
- k) EN 14846 - Building hardware. Locks and latches. Electromechanically operated locks and striking plates.
- l) BS EN 1125 - Building hardware - Panic exit devices operated by a horizontal bar, for use on escape routes
- m) BS EN 179 Building hardware. Emergency exit devices operated by a lever handle or push pad. Requirements and test methods.
- n) EN 1634-1 - Fire resistance and smoke control tests for door and shutter assemblies, openable windows and elements of building hardware

A1.5 Intruder Detection System

- a) PD6662 / BS EN 50131 – Suite of standards for Intrusion systems.
- b) EN 50131-1 Alarm systems - Intrusion systems - : Part 1. General requirements.
- c) EN 50131-6 Alarm systems - Intrusion systems - : Part 6. Power supplies.
- d) EN 50131-2-2 Alarm systems - Intrusion systems: Part 2-2 Detectors - passive infrared.
- e) EN 50131-2-3 Alarm systems - Intrusion systems: Part 2-3 Detectors – microwave.
- f) EN 50131-2-4 Alarm system - Intrusion systems: Part 2-4 Detectors - combined passive infrared and microwave.
- g) EN 50131-2-5 Alarm systems - Intrusion systems: Part 2.5 Detectors - combines passive infrared/ultrasonic.
- h) EN 50131-2-6 Alarm systems - Intrusion systems: Part 2-6 Detectors - opening contacts (magnetic).
- i) EN 50131-3 Alarm systems - Intrusion systems: Part 3 Control and indicating equipment.
- j) EN 50131-4 Alarm systems - Intrusion systems: Part 4 Warning devices
- k) EN 50131-5-3 Alarm systems - Intrusion systems: Part 5-3 Systems using wire-free interconnections.
- l) EN 50131-7 Alarm systems - Intrusion systems: Part 7 Application guidelines.
- m) BS 4737 Intruder alarm systems - Part 3: Specifications for components - Section 3.0 General requirements.

- n) The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) requires compliance on Intruder Alarms to DD243. This recommends that high priority is only given to alarms which are confirmed.
- o) DD CLC/TS 50131 - Suite of standards for Intrusion systems.
- p) Standards BS DD 242 – Code of practice for intruder alarms for High Security Areas (BS withdrawn but still in use by industry).
- q) BS 5979:2007 Remote centres receiving signals from fire and security systems. Code of practice.
- r) BS 8473:2006 – Intruder and hold-up alarm systems. Management of false alarms. Code of practice.
- s) BS6799 Class IV – wire free alarm systems.
- t) BS 7042 High security intruder alarm systems in buildings.
- u) LPS 1188 - Specification for combined technology intruder alarms movement detectors.
- v) LPS 1169 – Specification for passive IR intruder detectors.
- w) LPS 1200 – control & indicating equipment for intruder and hold up alarms.
- x) BS 7150 - intruder alarm systems with wiring communication systems.
- y) BS 7992 - code of practice for exterior deterrent systems standards.
- z) BSIA standard Commissioning and preventative maintenance of intruder alarm systems installed to BS EN 50131-1 - Form no: 134.
- aa) BSIA Guide to DD243
- bb) BSIA standard Remote Maintenance of Intruder Alarm Systems installed to BS 4737 - Form no: 146. cc) BSIA standard Guide for Fast Format Protocol for Intruder Alarm Reporting - Form no: 255.
- dd) BSIA standard Guide to EN50131-1; Alarm Systems: Part 1 General Requirements - Form no: 325.
- ee) BSIA standard Guidelines for Intruder Alarm Systems Incorporating Split Systems - Form no: 327.

A1.6 Hostile Vehicle Mitigation

- a) ISO/IWA 14-1:2013 Vehicle security barriers part 1: Performance requirement, vehicle impact test method and performance rating
- b) ISO/IWA 14-2:2013 Vehicle security barriers part 2: Application
- c) PAS 170-1 Vehicle security barriers -- Non-vehicle low energy impact testing -- Part 1: Linear impact test method for bollard, blocker, planter or street furniture
- d) Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guide (HVMG), UK Edition, CPNI
- e) Integrated Security, A Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation, 2011, v1.0 CPNI
- f) Chapter 11 Vehicle-borne threats and the principles of hostile vehicle mitigation "Blast effects on buildings (2nd edition)" Edited by D Cormie, G Mays, and P Smith, Thomas Telford Limited 2009

A1.7 Physical Security

- a) PAS 24:2012: Enhanced security performance requirements for door sets and windows in the UK
- b) BS EN 356:2000: Glass in buildings – Security glazing – Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack
- c) BS 6375: Performance of windows and doors. Classification for operation and strength characteristics and guidance on selection and specification (2009)
- d) LPS 1242: Issue 2: 2010 Building hardware. Cylinders for locks. Requirements and test methods
- e) LPS1270 - Requirements and testing procedures for the LPCB approval and listing of intruder resistant security glazing units
- f) LPS1175 Issue 7: 7 - Requirements and testing procedures for the Loss Prevention Certification Board (LPCB) approval and listing of intruder resistant building components, strongpoints, security enclosures and free-standing barriers
- g) LPS 2081 Issue 1: 2014
- h) STS 200 series: General Requirements for Certification of Enhanced Security Products including Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters
- i) BS 5516-1: 2004 Patent glazing and sloping glazing for buildings. Code of practice for design and installation of sloping and vertical patent glazing
- j) BS 5516-2: 2004 Patent glazing and sloping glazing for building. Code of practice for sloping glazing.
- k) Occupier's Liability Act 1984
- l) BS 6510: 2010 Steel framed windows and glazed doors
- m) BS 7412: 2007 Specification for windows and door sets made from plasticized polyvinyl chloride (PVCu) extruded hollow profiles.
- n) BS 644: 2012 Timber windows. Fully finished factory-assembled windows of various types. Specification
- o) BS 8529: 2010 Composite door sets. Domestic external door sets. Specification.
- p) BS 4873: 2009 Aluminium alloy windows and door sets. Specification.
- q) BS EN 1303: 2005 Building Hardware. Cylinders for locks. Requirements and test methods.
- r) BS 3621: 2007 + A2: 2012 Thief resistant lock assembly. Key Egress.
- s) BS 8621: 2007 + A2: 2012 Thief resistant lock assembly. Keyless Egress.
- t) BS 10621: 2007 + A2: 2012 Thief resistant dual-mode lock assembly.
- u) PAS 3621: 2011 Multipoint locking assemblies. Keyed egress. Performance requirements and test methods

- v) PAS 8621: 2011 Multipoint locking assemblies. Keyless egress. Performance requirements and test methods
- w) PAS 10621: 2011 Multipoint locking assemblies. Dual mode egress. Performance requirements and test methods
- x) BS EN 12209: 2003 Building hardware. Locks and latches. Mechanically operated locks, latches and locking plates. Requirements and test methods
- y) BS EN 1303: 2005 Building hardware. Cylinders for locks. Requirements and test methods.

Crime Prevention Statement

Lighting Design Standards

Lighting Design Standards

A1.1 General

- a) BS 5489-1:2013: Code of Practice for the Design of Road Lighting – Lighting for Roads and Public Amenity Areas
- b) BS EN 13201-2:2003 Road Lighting – Performance Requirements
- c) BS EN 13201-4:2003 Road lighting. Methods of measuring lighting performance
- d) BS EN 40-2:2004 Lighting columns. General requirements and dimensions (2004)
- e) BS 5649-5:1982 Specification for lighting columns. Base compartments and cableways (1982)
- f) BS EN 60598-1: 2008 Luminaires, General requirements and tests
- g) BS EN 1838:2013 Lighting applications- emergency lighting
- h) BS 8300: 2009+A1:2010 Design of buildings and their approaches to meet the needs of disabled people – Code of practice
- i) BS EN 40-5:2002 Lighting columns. Requirements for steel lighting columns
- j) BS 5266-1:2011 Emergency lighting. Code of practice for the emergency escape lighting of premises
- k) Westminster Way- Public realm strategy Design principles and practice 2011
- l) Guide on the Limitation of the Effects of Obtrusive Light from Outdoor Lighting Installations (CIE Technical Report 150:2003)
- m) Society of Light and Lighting- Guide to limiting obtrusive light 2012
- n) Guidance Notes for the Reduction of Obtrusive Light (The Institution of Lighting Professionals, GN01:2011)
- o) CIBSE LG6 (1992)- The Outdoor Environment
- p) CIE TR 136-2000 : Guide to the Lighting of Urban Areas
- q) ILE (2005) The Outdoor Lighting Guide
- r) The Society of Light and Lighting- Fact file No.8- Lighting for people who are visually impaired (2012)
- s) CIE Technical Report: CIE guide to increasing accessibility in Light and Lighting
- t) ACPO Lighting Against Crime - A Guide for Crime Reduction Professionals

Appendix B

Crowd Management Plan

B1 Crowd Management Plan

1 Operational Scope

1.1 Overview

1.1.1 The safe and effective delivery of the Garden Bridge Crowd Management Plan will require:

- Pedestrian modelling and analysis
- Active and passive pedestrian flow management
- Understanding movement of visitors with mobility needs
- Crowd monitoring
- Wayfinding and signage
- Readiness and testing

1.1.2 Where required plans will be delivered in conjunction with:

- A police response (aligned to the Enforcement Management Plan and Evacuation Plan)
- Neighbouring operations (aligned to the Enforcement Management Plan, Maintenance & Servicing Plan, Event Management Plan and Evacuation Plan)

1.2 Principles

1.2.1 The operational principles of crowd management are:

- The safe movement of people is the primary priority and all plans and operational decisions will be underpinned by this principle.
- All pedestrians including commuters, visitors and leisure interest groups will be treated equally and there will be no distinction between these categories.
- All plans consider dominant and minor flows, recognising that people have a choice of where they want to go, though during peak crowd movements, choice must be provided at the safest point.
- Prioritisation of either dominant or minor flows may be required at certain times and in specific areas to maintain the overriding principle of safety.
- Planning and modelling assumptions for specific areas will be tested to ensure that they are adequately integrated with adjacent areas.
- Plans should aim, whenever possible, to achieve as seamless and consistent a journey for people as possible, and aim to achieve reasonably comfortable standards of crowd density throughout the journey.
- Decision-making will be effective, coordinated and timely within the agreed Command, Coordination and Communication (C3) arrangements.

- Emergency evacuation plans will be produced for each zone of the Garden Bridge, integrated as necessary with adjacent areas, and tested through a combined readiness programme.
- Plans will consist of ‘steady state activity’ with plans escalating through our operating models. Contingency plans will be produced for ‘reasonably foreseeable’ incidents.
- Behavioural assumptions for each type of user – commuters, leisure tourists and special interest groups (including transition assumptions and the requirements of disabled people) will be agreed.
- On the rare occasion crowd queuing is required in the designated areas it should be fair and transparent to all people.

1.3 Assumptions

1.3.1 The following assumptions have been made in developing the Crowd Management Plan:

- Plans have been developed to adequately manage the ‘maximum demand’ scenarios in visitor numbers.
- Majority of visitor demand even during the summer peak period will be self managing.
- The pedestrian flow data contained with the Transport Assessment (TA) submitted with the original planning application is an accurate reflection of the maximum demand scenario.
- Average dwell times will range between 15-25 minutes.

2 Crowd Management Planning

2.1 Pedestrian modelling

- 2.1.1** As part of the TA submitted during the planning application, pedestrian modelling was conducted to assess and analyse visitor demand, trip diversions, and the pedestrian comfort level of the bridge and approach routes. Fruin level assessments were also undertaken.
- 2.1.2** As would be expected the visitor demand is seasonal with peaks correlating to existing increases in demand during the summer months. Although the Garden Bridge Trust (GBT) is planning for the potential worst case scenario, this is not reflective of a consistent level of demand throughout a calendar year.
- 2.1.3** Outputs from the technical model suggest maximum visitor demand would equate to 5,000 visitors between 16:00 and 17:00 on a summer peak Saturday including a significant uplift in visitor numbers for the first year. By comparison on the same summer peak Saturday the Garden Bridge would see the same number of people over a 6-hour period from opening to midday. This illustrates the dynamic nature of visitor demand and crowd movement
- 2.1.4** It is also worth appreciating that with average dwell times expected to be 15-25 minutes, even with a visitor demand at 5,000 people per hour, a queuing system would not be required at either landing as the maximum capacity of the bridge deck is 2,500.
- 2.1.5** Since developing the TA, the GBT have pressure tested the model to ensure the crowd management plans will work should average dwell times increase to more than 15-25 minutes. The outcome of this modelling work provides confidence in the GBT's ability to ensure public safety even if visitor numbers or dwell times increase as result of factors beyond our influence or control.

2.2 Crowd density assessment

- 2.2.1** An initial static crowd density assessment was undertaken as part of the TA. The assessment used both Fruin's Walkway Level of Service (LoS) and TfL's Pedestrian Comfort Level (PCL) as industry standard measures for crowd density. Both systems used a letter grade to evaluate the volume of people, per meter of space every minute. It is important to note the letter grades from both systems do not equate directly equate to one another.
- 2.2.2** For a static assessment of the Summer Peak hour demand in the first year of opening, LoS A and PCL B/C was considered an appropriate density given the expected spike in visitor numbers in the first year. This level of service provides enough space for normal walking speed and some choice in routes taken in a primarily one-directional flow. Where there are bi-directional or crossing movement, minor conflicts may occur.

- 2.2.3** The Garden Bridge will provide a primary walkway at bridge deck level comprising a four metre wide pedestrian path at the north bridge neck, this path splits into two three metre wide pedestrian paths to follow the widening of the bridge deck over the north pier (north island).
- 2.2.4** Both paths reconnect and provide a four metre wide pedestrian path in the centre of the bridge (central connection). The path then splits into two three metre wide pedestrian paths that follow the widening of the bridge deck over the south pier (south island) and both paths reconnect and provide a four metre wide pedestrian path at the south bridge neck. Therefore a bridge width of 4 metres has been tested.
- 2.2.5** This target level of service (LoS B/C) provides enough space for normal walking speed and some choice in routes taken in a primarily one-directional flow. Where there are bi-directional or crossing movements, minor conflicts could occur.
- 2.2.6** The level of service assessment is based on an effective pathway width of 4 meters. It should be noted that the calculation assumes a clear width and even use of space. In reality, where path design includes irregular edges, seating, and garden room (promontories), pockets of higher density may occur, albeit for very short durations.

2.3 Pedestrian flow management

- 2.3.1** Safe crowd management defined as the safe movement of people on the Garden Bridge on a typical day is the primary objective of this plan.. If circumstances change, a multi-agency responses may be required.
- 2.3.2** Crowd management will be delivered and managed by appropriately trained GBT Visitor Hosts supported by the use of temporary event infrastructure (e.g. pedestrian barriers, signage etc.) as necessary. During exceptional but planned for peaks, the GBT's resources may also be supported by a contracted crowd stewarding company reporting into the GBT's standard operational team, as determined by the needs of specific events (e.g. Garden Bridge Opening, Lord Mayor's Show, London Marathon, Thames Festival, and New Years etc.)
- 2.3.3** Consideration has been given to possible conflict areas, changes in crowd flows, queuing in designated areas, dominant and minor flows as well as other significant activities that may influence movement , for example, the weather. It is recognised that people have choice of where they want to go, though during peak crowd movement choice must be provided at the safest point.
- 2.3.4** Crowd management operations are limited to the Garden Bridge itself, although the transitional zone where members of the public entering the Garden Bridge become the GBT's responsibility is also recognised. The GBT's aim is to deliver crowd management in a way

that ensures a consistent, joined-up visitor experience across the North and South banks through the various operational groups including the Operations Reference Group (ORG), Visitor Management Group (VMG) etc.

2.4 Crowd Monitoring

2.4.1 The GBT will monitor visitor numbers entering and exiting the bridge to ensure that the number of visitors does not exceed the evacuation capacity of the bridge (2,500 visitors at bridge deck level). A variety of options and technologies are available to provide this data. Subject to further testing and analysis, the GBT has selected a combination of the following solutions:

- HD Smart CCTV with crowd counting at entry/exit points
- Wi-Fi pedestrian counting and analysis
- Experienced operational staff

2.4.2 HD Smart CCTV crowd counting will use high definition cameras at the bridge entry and exit points supported by software to count pedestrian heads. The data from all the cameras is then compared to generate a visitor number profile. The system will trigger alerts to notify operational staff of increasing visitor numbers and provide the accurate data analytics for review. This data will support future revisions of the OMP and influence changes to resourcing levels to meet revised demands if required.

2.4.3 The Wi-Fi pedestrian tracking system utilises the anonymous data code emitted by Wi-Fi enabled devices such as mobile phones. This code is then tracked using a number of detector sensors located across the bridge deck and on both podiums. Current research shows that over 95% of people now carry one of these types of devices with Wi-Fi enabled and the system is calibrated to allow for user groups who may not carry a device such as young children. The system can be monitored in real-time by the GBT's operational staff and will include various trigger alerts to notify staff of increasing peaks in demand or large deviations from the expected levels of arrival and departure based on historic data.

2.4.4 Technology cannot replace the need for experienced operational staff. Staff from the GBT will be trained in crowd management and led by an experienced Duty Manager capable of assessing crowd movements, densities and developing situations and able to implement appropriate crowd management strategies as necessary.

2.5 Movement of visitors with mobility needs

2.5.1 As an initial assumption, the overall percentage of persons with restricted mobility (PRMs) visiting the Garden Bridge are considered to be similar to those using the key stations serving the bridge, e.g. London Underground stations or a major mainline hub station (e.g. Waterloo). The London Underground guidance document, Station

modeling with Legion – Best Practice Guideline 2009, notes the percentages for an average weekday and weekend for these types of station as 7.9% and 11.68% of the overall demand respectively, as shown in Table 1 below.

	Weekday	Weekend
A – Wheelchair	0.00	0.00
B – Physical mobility Impairment	0.27	0.28
C – Medium encumbrance	5.86	8.86
D – Large encumbrance	1.59	2.24
E – Buggy	0.18	0.31
Total	7.9	11.68

Table 2 – PRM percentages using LUL best practice guidelines.

2.5.2 Whilst the overall percentage of PRMs outlined above might be applicable to the Garden Bridge, certain PRM types are less likely to be present on the bridge taking into account the activities being undertaken, e.g. non-disabled passengers with large luggage (D); or in significantly less quantity than in a station environment, e.g. non-disabled passengers with heavy luggage (C). On the other hand, the Garden Bridge is likely to attract more people from other PRM types, e.g. wheelchair users (A) and adults with young children (E).

2.5.3 In view of the likely composition of PRM groups using the Garden Bridge and their routing preference, it is considered reasonable to assume that of the total number of PRMs, approximately half will require lift access during the busy periods on weekdays and at weekends. This equates to approximately 4% on weekdays and 5.8% at weekends.

2.5.4 While all routes on the bridge are designed to be accessible to all visitors, it is recognised that this may require additional resources at peak times to ensure service levels are maintained. Further work will be required to establish any additional requirements in consultation with the Strategic Access Panel at the GLA.

2.6 Wayfinding and signage:

2.6.1 A separate Wayfinding and Signage Strategy will be developed prior to the opening of the Garden Bridge to assist with the implementation of this plan.

2.6.2 The S106 agreement accompanying the planning permission requires the Garden Bridge Trust to make a financial contribution to enable the map content of all local Legible London signs to be refreshed to show the new bridge. The bridge will also have digital signage at the entry/exit points to provide members of the public with key information and to assist with enforcement, crowd management and emergency evacuation.

- 2.6.3** All operational staff will be trained to provide general tourist information, basic directional and transport planning information and to guide visitors to key services such as public toilets.

3 Crowd Management Operations

3.1 Overview

3.1.1 For the purposes of this plan the Garden Bridge has been zoned into the following four areas as shown in Figure 1 below:

- South Landing
- South Island
- North Landing
- North Island



Figure 2 Crowd Management Zone Plan

3.1.2 Careful monitoring of the crowd movement in primary dwelling locations such as promontories and the landing points will be required. During peaks in visitor demand, measures for minimising cross-flows in the landing areas will be implemented, particularly on the South Landing (e.g. encouragement of one-way movement through appropriate signage/resources) to result in a smoother pedestrian flow.

3.2 Operational States

3.2.1 The following Crowd Management Plans indicatively show the ingress and egress of visitors to the Garden Bridge under three operating conditions, these are:

- Normal
- Elevated

- Exceptional

3.2.2 Normal operations is the GBT's standard operating model and will be the default position for the vast majority of the time the Garden Bridge is open to the public. In this scenario, crowds will be generally self-managing, with the ability to flow easily.

3.2.3 The elevated operations state is reflective of an increase in the level of resources required to manage crowds effectively or the implementation of crowd management infrastructure. Elevated operations would be expected during periods of warmer weather, school holidays or when other large events are taking place locally. This is a planned for operating position.

3.2.4 Exceptional operations will only occur as a result of circumstances beyond our control or influence. Although we will have operational plans to mitigate their impact on users of the Garden Bridge, the timing or size of such events cannot be predicted and therefore this a reactive operating position.

3.3 South Landing

3.3.1 The South Landing is located on a strip of land that sits between the ITV building and the river front, on the Queen's Walk.

3.3.2 As identified in the TA, a large number of visitors are expected to arrive at the Garden Bridge from the South Bank attractions to the west. Lifts with a clear visible entrance, including weather protection, will be visible from this approach. The lifts will allow entry/exit at street level, the podium roof and bridge deck level.

3.3.3 The South Landing Building will have drop-down roller shutters that will prevent access from the Queen's Walk when the bridge is closed (e.g. over night). On the rare occasion that a crowd management/queuing system is required this will be facilitated on the South Landing building roof. A grid of tensor barrier connecting sockets will be provided to the east side of the landing roof space to allow different arrangements of queuing system to be installed as and when required.

3.3.4 Temporary overlay when required on the bridge deck and landings will be kept to a minimum to ensure the safe movement of pedestrians and to maintain clear routes for evacuation if required. The socket-based tensor barrier system temporarily fixed into the surface enables a quick and easy reconfiguration of the pedestrian flow.

3.4 North and South Islands Crowd Management Plan

3.4.1 The bridge deck is restricted to a maximum of 2,500 people at any one time to allow safe evacuation within 10 minutes. This number will be controlled from both landings.

3.4.2 The Garden Rooms (promontories) will be regularly monitored by both CCTV (where viewing angles permit) and by GBT operational staff on the bridge (including Gardeners, Visitor Hosts and the management team). Where particular hot spots are occurring, staff will be on hand to support messaging to reduce demands in the short term. The Wi-Fi pedestrian tracking system will also support post event analysis so

the GBT can understand what circumstances influence increase dwell times and crowd dynamics.

3.5 South Landing Crowd Management Plan

3.5.1 In Normal operations the bridge entry and exit points will operate in free flow with no restrictions on movement or how people arrive and depart from the podium levels, as indicated in Figure 2 below.

3.5.2 N.B. all arrows in the subsequent figures represent moving flows of visitors and do not represent static crowds or queuing.




Figure 3 Free flowing visitors in both directions under ‘Normal’ conditions – South

3.5.3 During Elevated operations the Duty Manager will implement a one-way flow system. Pedestrians will arrive at the South Landing roof level from the stairs at the east side of the building and depart from the western end. This will reduce multiple pedestrian cross flows on the Garden Bridge and on connecting routes including the Queen’s Walk.

3.5.4 As shown in Figure 3 below, the one-way flow system will be supported by a Visitor Host offering guidance to visitors arriving at the access point and directing those leaving via the west staircase. The digital signage at the entry point will be reflective of the operation displaying “Entry” and “No Entry” (e.g. a large Green Arrow or large Red Cross) and voice commands will be given at regular intervals for a short period as required by the operational team.




Figure 4 One-way Flow System – South

3.5.5

Exceptional operations are not envisaged to be a required operational state but the GBT have planned for the event should a situation arise. As indicatively shown in Figure 4 below the operational team could implement this plan at short notice. In this scenario a one-way flow would already be in operation. Pedestrians entering the podium level would then follow a short queuing system.

3.5.6

Additional lines in the queue would be opened in sequence as the demand requires it so that pedestrians are not walking through an unnecessary maze. This system would effectively further reduce the flow rate onto the bridge and also enable pulsing of pedestrians on to the bridge deck level at a rate of approximately 40-45 per minute. Well over 800 visitors could be safely queued on the South podium level if required.




Figure 5 One-way Flow and Queue Pedestrian Management – South

3.5.7 Our pressure tested pedestrian model indicates that a queuing system would only be required if visitor numbers significantly increased beyond the anticipated maximum demand or average dwell times begin to exceed 30 minutes.

3.5.8 During the summer peak period when visitor numbers are expected to be at their highest, the potential for active crowd management such as queuing systems will increase. If the Duty Manager determines a queuing system is required to maintain the safety of visitors, the queue could be formed to a maximum waiting time of 15 minutes. At this point new visitors would be actively encouraged by the Visitor Hosts to return later when the demand has reduced. Signage will also advise potential visitors of high demand and advise them to return at a later point in time. This message could also be reinforced on social media.

3.6 North Landing Crowd Management Plan

3.6.1 The North Landing is located on the roof of Temple Station, which provides a similar size landing point to the South Landing building roof. A, 4m wide ramp provides access to the Garden Bridge for pedestrians, accessible users and families with buggies.

3.6.2 Two through lifts will be situated at the southeastern corner of the Temple roof terrace, with weather protection and seating afforded beneath the adjacent bridge stairs. The lifts will carry passengers from roof terrace level to bridge deck level, avoiding the need for wheelchair users to turn around or back-out of lifts.

3.6.3 The new ramp and stairs are both designed with a central handrail separating two 1.6m widths which may be used for gyratory movement on and off the bridge if required. The existing staircase to the northwestern corner of the roof of Temple Station will provide an additional entry/exit point from the landing to street level. Gates will be located at the bottom of both ramp and stairs to restrict access. Gating could be used to restrict access but allow egress if a situation demanded.

3.6.4 Temporary overlay on the bridge deck and podiums will be kept to a minimum to ensure the safe movement of pedestrians and to maintain clear routes for evacuation if required.

3.6.5 The queuing system on the north will also be a tensor barrier system but modeling has indicated a significantly smaller demand for queuing on the North Landing. Tensor barriers enable quick and easy reconfiguration, as the pedestrian flow management requires.

3.6.6 In Normal operations pedestrian movement flows freely and will be facilitated on all staircases and the entry/exit ramp. It is not expected that the bridge operations on the north will ever go beyond this level based on the Summer Peak maximum demand scenario profiled visitor numbers. As shown in Figure 5 below all entry/exit points are freely accessible to all users in both directions.




Figure 6 Free flowing visitors in both directions under ‘normal’ conditions – North

3.6.7 During Elevated operations if visitor numbers are higher than profiled or dwell times are significantly increased, a one-way flow can be implemented. In the north, the primary purpose of this is to elongate the route of the majority of visitor ingressing and therefore reducing the flow rate, while maintaining the egressing flow rate. This will then reduce the number of pedestrians on the bridge deck.

3.6.8 Similar to the South Landing this operational state is not envisaged to be required for the majority of the time the bridge is open to the public. In this operational state the primary entry point will be the north-eastern staircase whilst those with accessibility requirements would not be prohibited from using the ramp in either direction.

3.6.9 Visitors leaving the bridge will have the shortest route down the east staircase as shown in Figure 6 facilitating their onward journey for example towards The Strand or on to the underground. It will also assist with removing conflicting pedestrian movements between the station and Temple Place.




Figure 7 One-way Flow System – North

3.6.10 Exceptional operations are a contingency operational state that although not expected to be required, could be implemented at short notice. At this stage a one-way flow would have already been in operation. Pedestrians entering the podium level would then follow a short queuing system. Lines would be opened in sequence as the demand requires.

3.6.11 This system would effectively further reduce the flow rate onto the bridge and also enable pulsing of pedestrians on to the bridge deck level at rate of approximately 40-45 per minute. Over 400 visitors could be safely queued on the North podium level if required, but visitor numbers would need to vastly exceed the anticipated maximum demand as a result of multiple contingency situations occurring. Figure 7 shows the directional flows onto the North Landing and into the queuing system.




Figure 8 One-way Flow and Disney Queue Pedestrian Management – North

3.6.12 Garden Bridge Trust is prepared for the scenario when areas around the North landing may become busy at peak times and where there is a cross over with commuter pedestrian flow. Due to the potential pedestrian pinch points in the area directly outside of Temple underground station and the footpath on Temple Place an

additional crowd management option is available to the Duty Manager as set out below.

3.6.13

To reduce pedestrian cross flows in these areas and subject to further crowd management planning and analysis, the Visitor Hosts could instigate a one way flow system which would direct visitors to the Garden Bridge right out of Temple station exit, along the Victoria Embankment, around Brunel Gardens then onto the Garden Bridge via the north-western staircase.




Figure 9 Pedestrian flow elongated around Brunel Gardens to the West

3.6.14

Visitors with accessibility needs will be able to use the ramp. This operation would only be implemented in collaboration with London Underground staff and hence the need for further discussion and development. The station may choose to configure the gate line to support this operation.

4 Training

4.1 Training and Qualifications

4.1.1 The GBT workforce will be a combination of paid staff, contractors and volunteers. All paid staff will be recruited through a robust recruitment and assessment process.

4.1.2 The GBT are committed to gaining CSAS accreditation for the operations team as a minimum standard requirement to support enforcement. This aligns with other landowners on the Southbank and is encouraged by the Northbank Business Improvement District (NBID).

4.1.3 In addition the GBT will ensure that all staff are appropriately trained to carry out the tasks under each role. This will include SIA trained stewards and/or NVQ Levels 2 – 4 in Spectator Safety (Level 2 Steward, Level 3 Supervisor, and Level 4 Event Safety Officer). This will ensure crowds are stewarded and managed in a professional and safe manner in line with best practice.

B1.1.1 A training programme will be developed to include a combination of general and visitor specific training such as supporting visitors with accessibility needs, and knowledge of the HOT (hidden, obvious, typical) principles to manage items of interest. The GBT will provide the training and tools they need to deliver a consistent level of service tailored to meet bridge-specific requirements. It will prepare all staff to deliver a safe and secure visitor experience for all, in line with the GBT's principals and values.

Appendix C

Enforcement Management Plan

C1 Enforcement Management Plan

1 Risk Assessment

1.1 Risk Assessment

- 1.1.1** The Garden Bridge Crime Prevention Statement contains details of the crime related risk assessment process that has been followed to identify the key priorities for enforcement purposes. These risks are reproduced in Table 1 below and include those areas identified as enforcement priorities by both WCC and LBL. The activities contained within this table form the focus for the enforcement measures contained within this plan.

Crime Related Threat	Relative Risk (measured against London average)
Violence Against the Person	Low likelihood but high impact
Robbery	Low/Medium likelihood but high impact
Theft	Medium/high likelihood and moderate impact
Burglary	Low/Medium Likelihood and moderate impact
Indecent Assault	Low likelihood but high impact
Drug Associated Crime	Medium likelihood and moderate impact
Illegal Gambling	High likelihood and moderate impact
Aggressive Begging	High likelihood and moderate impact
Rough Sleeping	High likelihood and moderate impact
Public Drinking	Medium likelihood and moderate impact
Fear of Crime	Low likelihood but high impact if left unaddressed
Damage to Property	Low likelihood and moderate impact
Public Protest/Encampment	Medium likelihood and moderate/high impact
Anti-Social Behaviour	Medium likelihood and moderate impact
Illegal Trading	High likelihood and moderate impact
Cyber Related Crime	High likelihood and moderate impact

Table 3: Crime Related & Nuisance Related Risk Assessment in respect of the Garden Bridge

- 1.1.2** The risks identified by the GBT include the WCC and LBL priorities of anti-social behaviour and illegal trading and/or gambling. Anti social behaviour is a broad term used to describe day-to-day incidents of nuisance and disorder that affects people's lives. This can cover everything from litter to aggressive dogs, vandalism to noisy neighbours and public drunkenness to noisy vehicles - but it generally falls into the following categories:

- **Personal** - behaviour that targets a particular individual or specific group or is aimed at having an impact on a particular individual or incident rather than a community at large.
- **Nuisance** - individuals or incidents that cause trouble, annoyance, inconvenience, offence or suffering to people in the local community in general, rather than targeted at an individual.

- **Environmental** - incidents and inconsiderate actions which impact on the surroundings including the natural, built and social environments

1.1.3 The type of behaviour that will be the focus of the GBT activity is likely to fall into the nuisance and environmental aspects. Some of the other risks in the above table fall within the broader definition of anti-social behaviour and the risk assessment process will ensure that the GBT will take a comprehensive approach to enforcement. The analysis conducted by the Designing Out Crime Officers for both Lambeth and Westminster and submitted as part of the planning application process identifies the enduring nature of some of these issues and has helped inform the GBT's response, which is detailed below.

1.1.4 Illegal trading and/or gambling is another persistent and significant challenge in this area and the GBT consultation with the Metropolitan Police Service within Lambeth and Westminster, along with other stakeholders has helped quantify the extent and scope of the problem. The GBT are aware of the potential risk caused by the Garden Bridge in generating another location for illegal activity and the operational measures, which are outlined below will collectively ensure that the bridge environment is managed in a way that robustly addresses this risk.

2 Principles & Approach

2.1 Enforcement Principles

2.1.1 The GBT will exercise its approach to enforcement in a way that is:

- Proportionate
- Targeted
- Accountable
- Consistent
- Transparent
- Collaborative
- Tailored

2.1.2 Proportionate: The GBT's activities will reflect the level of risk to the public and enforcement action taken will relate to the seriousness of the matter concerned. The GBT will keep enforcement actions under review to ensure interventions are fair and outputs and outcomes are not disproportionate.

2.1.3 Targeted: The GBT will focus enforcement resources on identified priorities reflecting local need and consultation with stakeholders, including the community. The GBT will target efforts and resources where they would be most effective and ensure that risk assessments to underpin activity are based on available, good-quality data and intelligence.

2.1.4 Accountable: The GBT will create consultation and feedback structures with relevant stakeholders including the local community to enable effective information exchange in relation to the development and operation of the GBT enforcement activity. The GBT will ensure that its employees provide a courteous, helpful and efficient service and will establish and publish a complaints procedure, which will be available to any aggrieved party.

2.1.5 Consistent: The GBT will draw up clear standards setting out the level of service and performance that the public can expect from enforcement services and the approach the GBT will adopt to check on compliance. The GBT will ensure it observes any requirements of national bodies and, where practicable, national good practice guidance. The GBT will also ensure that all personnel undertaking enforcement duties will be suitably trained and qualified so as to ensure that they are fully competent to undertake their enforcement activities. Staff will be mentored and shadowed to ensure that there is a consistent approach to enforcement.

2.1.6 Transparent: The GBT will make enforcement standards available to interested parties so that those who use the bridge will understand what is expected of them. The GBT will publish annual performance levels for agreed service areas and justify the choice of enforcement action to stakeholders.

2.1.7 Collaborative: The GBT will work closely with stakeholders, including the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and British

Transport Police (BTP) as well as other enforcement partners developing formal joint action plans and collaborative agreements as appropriate. Additionally, the GBT will ensure that informal and ad hoc cooperation with security resources from nearby organisations underpins routine operational activity.

- 2.1.8** Tailored: The GBT will ensure that where appropriate, enforcement advice and information is provided in accessible formats such as minority languages, large print, Braille and face to face.

2.2 Approach

- 2.2.1** The Garden Bridge Enforcement Management Plan will be based on the following:

- Intelligence led
- Effective Powers and Procedures
- Capable & Qualified Guard Force
- Layered Protective Security

- 2.2.2** Intelligence led: Operational tactics will be informed by establishing effective systems for gathering, sharing, analysing, and using intelligence and information. Interventions will be developed based on the victim, offender and location problem solving model.

- 2.2.3** Effective Powers and Procedures: The GBT will maximise the opportunity provided by the status of the bridge as private land with permitted access, by introducing a set of conditions prior to opening to help manage the bridge environment. These conditions of entry will be supported by enforcement provisions in addition to powers available under the Community Safety Accreditation Scheme (CSAS); both will help maintain the agreed look and feel of the bridge. The GBT will also develop a proactive but proportionate approach to prosecution to ensure that clear messages are delivered about the consequences of offending

- 2.2.4** Capable & qualified guard force: Appropriate GBT staff, designated as Visitor Hosts, will be trained to perform a guard force function and will be equipped with suitable powers to take enforcement action in relation to minor criminal offences as defined by the CSAS scheme as well enforcing the Garden Bridge Conditions of Entry. The Visitor Host personnel will be structured and managed to discharge their responsibilities effectively, providing a flexible, tailored and accountable resource.

- 2.2.5** Layered protective security: The GBT will develop and deploy a range of physical security approaches to support the prevention and detection of offences as well as the detention of offenders. The GBT will ensure that local operating systems provide full support to law enforcement colleagues, for example, by capturing high quality CCTV images suitable for criminal justice purposes.

- 2.2.6** The following sections explain in detail how the above approaches will be deployed.

3 Intelligence

3.1 Intelligence Led Plan

- 3.1.1** The GBT recognise the crucial importance of developing an accurate, evidence based analysis of crime, anti-social behaviour and nuisance related activities that are likely to be associated with the operation of the bridge; this includes anti-social behaviour and illegal trading and/or gambling.
- 3.1.2** The need to establish effective systems to obtain, manage and share intelligence has been a consistent and recurring theme in other elements of the GBT security planning (e.g., CT Strategy, Crime Prevention Statement). The GBT has already committed to ensuring that it will be an active and participating member of existing information sharing groups and organisations. This will include membership of:
- Lambeth Business Crime Reduction Partnership
 - Safer West End – Westminster Business Crime Reduction Partnership
 - South Bank Business Watch
 - Northbank Business Improvement District
 - Cross-Sector Safety and Security Communications Group
- 3.1.3** The GBT will also ensure that as part of the process to understand local crime concerns, especially relating to perceptions of offending and fear of crime, consultative mechanisms will be established where gaps are identified; or preferably the GBT will integrate with existing approaches to consult with regular users of the bridge and the surrounding residential and business communities.
- 3.1.4** This information will help inform the risk assessment to determine priorities for crime prevention and enforcement and will ensure that the GBT draws upon the views of those individuals and groups who will be most affected by crime, anti-social behaviour, illegal trading and/or gambling and nuisance activities both on and in the vicinity of the bridge.
- 3.1.5** Through these consultative arrangements, the GBT would actively seek views on issues that should be addressed and will report back on measures undertaken and their impact. The GBT will also link with existing consultative arrangements and if these prove to be a sufficient source of relevant feedback the need for new structures will be reviewed.
- 3.1.6** An accurate evidence base is important in helping to inform the development of crime reduction measures and approaches to enforcement. As mentioned previously, the Designing Out Crime Officers for both Westminster and Lambeth have undertaken analysis of the type and frequency of crime and nuisance related behaviour in the vicinity and the surrounding area of where the bridge will be built. This is useful as background contextual information but the GBT will

establish its own database of reported activity to be able to reflect much more accurately the nature of offending and the success or otherwise of enforcement measures on the bridge. It will therefore be a priority, particularly during year one for the GBT to capture, record and publish information detailing the following:

- Number of recorded offences, (to be sub-divided into offence types)
- Location, date, time
- Victim profile – (e.g., male, female, age, nationality)
- Nature of property stolen
- When arrests have been made, appropriate subject details

3.1.7 Whilst this information will help inform crime prevention and enforcement activities once the bridge is up and running, the GBT will continue to make the best use of current and emerging intelligence sources in preparation for opening. The GBT will review the plan in light of such feedback to ensure it remains comprehensive and relevant when the bridge commences operations. Information and intelligence will be developed in the following three areas to support the development of problem solving approaches:

- Victim
- Offender
- Location

3.2 Victim

3.2.1 The GBT will use intelligence sources to develop a profile of potential victims and focus crime prevention messaging and activity at these groups or individuals. Awareness activity will address all types of offending but will be particularly targeted at local priorities including anti-social behaviour, illegal trading and/or gambling. Amongst a range of objectives, messaging will be designed to overcome any cultural misunderstanding about participating in illegal gaming for example as well as communicating warnings about opportunist crime associated with these activities.

3.2.2 A variety of proactive approaches will be adopted that will include signage, leafleting, personal approaches by Visitor Host staff, liaison with tour/coach operators, etc. The GBT will ensure that messaging is adapted to overcome language difficulties.

3.2.3 Once the bridge is open, the GBT will gather detailed information about individuals who have been victims of crime on the bridge and will look to develop protocols with the MPS and BTP to ensure this is as complete a picture as possible. This data will be used to focus crime prevention and enforcement activity.

3.3 Offenders

3.3.1 The GBT will develop its existing knowledge base to build up a picture of individuals and groups who will seek to exploit the bridge for unlawful or inappropriate purposes. Primarily, this will be

supported through access to circulated information, including CCTV images of persons who have been prosecuted or who are wanted or have been otherwise dealt with for relevant criminal matters.

3.3.2 The GBT will ensure that its handling of CCTV images and related data is subject to a robust local policy and is fully compliant with the Data Protection Act (DPA), the requirements of the Information Commissioners Office, the principles contained within the Home Office publication, the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice 2013 and other relevant standards and guidelines. The GBT will undertake a Privacy Impact Assessment as part of the development of its CCTV capability.

3.3.3 The garden bridge CCTV system (see below) will be proactively monitored on a real-time basis to identify individuals believed to be committing offences, and this includes those engaged in anti-social behaviour, illegal trading and/or gambling. Visitor Host personnel will be directed to intervene and take appropriate action as necessary. Images of suspected offenders will be captured for criminal justice purposes and stored in accordance with DPA requirements.

3.3.4 The GBT will make sure that through its formal links with the MPS, BTP and other crime prevention partners, it remains sighted on emerging crime, anti-social behaviour and other nuisance related issues that might impact the bridge and also on any initiatives or operations that might displace offenders onto the Garden Bridge. The GBT will also ensure that it adopts best practice from other approaches to tackle offences and perpetrators.

3.4 Location

3.4.1 The Garden Bridge Crime Prevention Statement has addressed the design, construction and maintenance procedures adopted to reduce crime on the bridge and reference should be made to this document for a full consideration of these issues.

3.4.2 Potential points of vulnerability on the bridge that could develop into hotspots have been identified within that document. These risks will be managed through additional layered security provisions including for example, on both the north and south landings and the promontories where individuals might attempt to engage in illegal trading and/or gambling.

3.4.3 Data on reported crime and other nuisance related activity that is available once the bridge is opened will be used to target prevention and enforcement activity including, for example, directed Visitor Hosts patrol.

4 Effective Powers and Procedures

4.1 Conditions of Entry

- 4.1.1** The Garden Bridge is private land that will be open to the public to enable people to cross the bridge or visit the gardens. The GBT have examined how this private land might be best operated to develop an appropriate look and feel, underpinned by a set of entry conditions to establish expectations for behaviour and conduct. A summary of the Conditions of Entry can be found in the annex at the end of this plan.
- 4.1.2** These conditions of entry provide the basis for enforcement activity and are a useful mechanism for addressing conduct and behaviour that falls short of criminal activity but nonetheless might be the source of alarm, fear or distress to users of the bridge. The conditions help to set the tone for how the bridge will operate and how it will feel for people who are using it.
- 4.1.3** The GBT will ensure that discretion is used in the enforcement of these conditions, with guidelines provided for staff. The primary objective remains to establish an inclusive, welcoming and in particular, a safe environment on the bridge. The conditions of entry will provide the GBT with the means to tackle a range of behaviours such as illegal trading and gaming without recourse to formal criminal investigation and prosecution.
- 4.1.4** People will be allowed to use the bridge for the express or implied purpose of visiting the gardens or crossing the bridge. Outside of these primary uses, individuals engaging in any other conduct, including acts or activity preparatory to illegal trading and/or gambling will be regarded as trespassers and dealt with as outlined in the sections below.
- 4.1.5** The GBT will explore the use of innovative approaches to pre-emptively tackle such behaviour. This would include for example examining how the use of interventions such as ‘Withdrawal of Implied Permission’ notices currently being used by British Transport Police to deal with persistent offences of anti-social behaviour, might be used on the bridge.

4.2 Enforcement Options

- 4.2.1** The objective of the GBT will be to quickly establish an appropriate look and feel to the bridge and to reinforce this through its approach to enforcement. The GBT will invest in a commensurate level of resourcing to ensure that the correct tone is established and reinforced through enforcement as necessary. The GBT recognises the importance of achieving and maintaining consistency in the approach to enforcement. Instructions will be developed for the GBT staff based on available national guidelines and when making enforcement decisions, personnel must have regard to these as well as the

provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998, Equalities Act 2010 and this enforcement plan.

4.3 Prevention

4.3.1 The GBT will adopt an initial approach that seeks to ensure compliance with the conditions of entry by raising awareness through appropriate signage and by encouraging appropriate behaviour through the visible presence of the Visitor Host personnel and other capable guardians.

4.4 Informal Action

4.4.1 The GBT would prefer to avoid unnecessary enforcement action for breaches of its conditions of entry and will therefore use its best efforts to resolve situations without taking formal action. Informal action would be considered when for example, the contravention is not serious enough to warrant immediate formal action and there is no demonstrable harm to the amenity of the area. Such an approach will involve offering words of advice or a warning and recording details of the incident, but not taking the name and address of the person concerned. In these circumstances it is unlikely that the individual would be asked to leave the bridge. This approach might be considered appropriate to advise persons suspected of preparing to engage in illegal trading and/or gambling before substantive acts have occurred.

4.5 Formal Action

4.5.1 The Garden Bridge conditions outline the powers that will be available to the GBT staff to take the details of the person or persons who is/are believed to have committed a breach and when they might also be asked to leave the bridge environment. Formal action would be considered when:

- There is a significant contravention of the conditions of entry
- An informal approach has failed
- There is a history of non-compliance with informal action
- There is a lack of confidence in the successful outcome of an informal approach
- There is demonstrable harm to the amenity of the area

4.5.2 In this situation, individuals who are suspected of being involved in illegal gaming and or trading and who have not responded to informal action, or where insufficient evidence exists to support a prosecution, would be asked to leave the bridge.

4.6 Prosecution:

4.6.1 The GBT recognise that the decision to prosecute is significant and the Executive Director or nominee with support of the Board of Trustees will normally take the decision. All relevant evidence and information

will be considered before deciding upon a prosecution in order to enable a consistent, fair and objective decision. In reaching a decision the Chief Executive will have regard to the following criteria:

- Whether the standard of evidence is sufficient for there to be a realistic prospect of conviction
- Whether the prosecution is in the public interest

4.6.2 To determine the public interest test the following questions should be considered:

- How serious is the offence committed?
- What is the level of culpability of the suspect?
- What are the circumstances of and the harm/damage caused?
- Was the suspect under the age of 18 at the time of the offence?
- What is the impact on the community?
- Is prosecution a proportionate response
- Is the matter concerned an identified local priority, e.g., anti-social behaviour and illegal trading and/or gambling?

4.6.3 The GBT are currently exploring how constructive use can be made of the bridge's status as private land to develop civil remedies to tackle not only a breach of the conditions of entry but also as a means of dealing with crime, anti-social behaviour, illegal trading and/or gambling and other nuisance related matters. For example, this might include obtaining an injunction against a person engaged in illegal gaming who has persistently been removed from the bridge, or committed a criminal offence for which he/she has been arrested and/or prosecuted. It could also encompass other approaches to address civil trespass that would allow the GBT to prevent a person returning to the bridge having previously been removed for a specified period of time.

4.6.4 As outlined above, people will be invited onto the bridge for the purpose of crossing it or visiting the gardens. A person on the Garden Bridge for any reason other than these can be regarded as a trespasser and civil options are available in certain circumstances to remove trespassing individuals. The GBT will ensure that any such provision is used proportionately and also recognise the need to coordinate this activity with neighbouring security resources to ensure an issue is simply not displaced.

4.7 Criminal Offences

4.7.1 The GBT will actively explore the use that can be made of criminal powers such as The Anti Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and whether the use of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBO's), Community Protection Notices and Public Spaces Protection Orders might be appropriate methods for dealing with offending

4.7.2 Primacy for decision making in respect of dealing with criminal offences must rest with the MPS and where appropriate BTP. That said, the GBT recognise that in the context of a private space, they will take all action available to them to prevent offences taking place,

secure relevant information when an offence has been disclosed and take the necessary steps to ensure matters are reported to the police.

- 4.7.3** The GBT will develop a protocol with the MPS and BTP to ensure that victims of crime who identify themselves to a member of the GBT staff are appropriately and sensitively dealt with. In cases involving less serious offences where immediate police attendance is unnecessary or unlikely, this will include ensuring that the victim is given the relevant advice and assistance to formally report the matter to police.
- 4.7.4** The GBT will consider becoming part of the Facewatch Scheme to assist police in dealing with lower level crime reports. In other circumstances, where police have indicated they will attend the scene, the GBT personnel will take all necessary action to provide assistance to the victim, including obtaining medical help if required, securing witnesses and safeguarding evidence. The Welfare Area in the South Landing building will be used to temporarily house victims and witnesses and to facilitate statement taking and investigation by police if required.
- 4.7.5** The GBT will ensure that reciprocal arrangements are in place with security resources from neighbouring organisations to enable ‘real-time’ details of offences and those persons responsible to be circulated for information and action. This will include of course individuals engaged in anti-social behaviour and illegal trading and/or gaming. The primary focus for this activity will be through the South Bank Employers Group (SBEG) security patrols and communications network on the south side of the river and corresponding arrangements on the north side. The GBT will ensure that they have standard operating procedures in place to receive and act upon such intelligence in the event that it is passed to them. The GBT personnel and structures will play a key role in establishing an active link between crime prevention and enforcement activity on either side of the river, which will be of benefit to all stakeholders.
- 4.7.6** The GBT will also examine what opportunities there might be for working collaboratively with other enforcement partners such as the local authority to tackle for example, issues of illegal trading and to develop joint enforcement operations. Initial discussions would indicate that local authorities would be unlikely to involve themselves directly in tackling any unlawful activity taking place on the bridge because of its status as private land. However, the GBT will ensure they are able to benefit from best practice approaches undertaken by enforcement partners and also recognise the need to support enforcement operations taking place in respect of illegal trading or other similar activity in the immediate vicinity of the bridge.

5 Capable Guard Force

5.1 Objectives

5.1.1 The primary mechanism for enforcement across the Garden Bridge and landings will be via suitably trained, qualified and accountable guard force activity, designated as the GBT Visitor Hosts. The Visitor Hosts will fulfil the following objectives:

- **Deter** a would-be offender by providing a physical presence through a visible, targeted and systematic patrol regime
- **Detect** a potential or actual offence or intrusion through proactive management of the environment either in person and/or by the use of CCTV and other electronic security measures
- **Respond** to a crime related, anti-social behaviour, incidence of trading and/or gambling or nuisance event and take appropriate action to deal with the incident, including where appropriate by arranging for the attendance of the emergency services.

5.2 Requirements

5.2.1 The GBT consider that to achieve these objectives the Visitor Host personnel will need to be able to meet the following requirements:

- A mixture of Community Safety Accreditation Scheme (CSAS) and crowd management/steward capabilities. The GBT will ensure that the guard force it employs can make full use of delegated authority to issue Fixed Penalty Notices, require a name and address as well as confiscate alcohol and tobacco (if appropriate). The GBT will ensure that full use will be made of CSAS powers to tackle anti-social behaviour and related nuisance offences.
- SIA compliant and Griffin/Argus enabled
- Primarily public safety not public order focus but with the capability to deal with the initial response to public protest, take action to contain the incident and liaise with the emergency services
- Knowledge and experience of enforcement activity and the proven ability to balance enforcement with maintaining the look and feel of an environment
- The ability to provide real time monitoring of CCTV images and to direct, control and manage Visitor Host deployment to people, incidents and locations on the bridge (this monitoring could be either on-site or remotely or a hybrid solution where both options are available).
- The proactive identification and engaging of individuals/groups who are known or otherwise suspected of being on the bridge for unlawful or inappropriate purposes. The means of identification may be CCTV led or as a result of recognition by a member of the Visitor Hosts or other capable guardian

- The ability to provide an effective first response to a full range of incidents (e.g., crime, anti-social behaviour and CT (bomb threat, searching, suspicious packages, etc.)

5.2.2 The GBT will ensure that there is a nucleus of permanent Visitor Host staff that would be familiar with the operating environment. Additional personnel would supplement these staff at busier times and peak periods of demand (see below).

5.2.3 There will be other GBT staff working on the bridge at the same time including gardeners and a ‘clean team.’ Work is on-going to establish the extent to which these additional capable guardians could undertake a limited security/public safety function.

5.3 Management Structure

5.3.1 Currently the GBT’s preferred option is to have an in-house security manager overseeing a contracted workforce. The configuration of the security management and Visitor Host team will be reviewed prior to appointment.

5.3.2 The Garden Bridge will be run by a General Manager and an operations and management team to provide a layered and resilient approach to the direction and control of activity and decision making. In summary, the Duty Manager and their team will manage the daily operations of the bridge. They will work closely with all disciplines including the safety and security team, clean team, events management and maintenance etc.

5.4 Guard Force Deployment Profile

5.4.1 A key principle in the appointment of any guard force with an enforcement role on the bridge will be that it is flexible and scalable based on an agreed demand profile and the underlying risk assessment. Crowd modelling has identified that the bridge is likely to be much busier at key periods during the year (e.g., summertime, school holidays, special events taking place in London) and more staff would obviously be required at these times.

5.4.2 Resourcing profiles will be developed to reflect the variation in visitor and crowd numbers but will also include an agreed minimum staffing level to ensure there is sufficient resilience in place to tackle criminality and anti-social behaviour. The GBT are committed to providing 24-hour security cover as a minimum for the first 12 months of operation. This decision will be reviewed in line with the OMP at the end of the first year of operation.

5.4.3 Alternative responses will be explored in relation to how the bridge might be managed during the hours of closure in the long-term, but if this includes a remote monitoring option it will be supported by the capability to provide a fast-time deployment to a suspected intrusion or other incident. The strong preference of the GBT at this stage however, is to ensure that there is an actual presence on site for 24 hours a day.

- 5.4.4** The resource profile will also address the potential necessity to deal with a sudden and unexpected increase in crowd numbers or an increase in demand as a result of a spike in criminality and will include the flexibility to deploy additional personnel promptly. This would include for example, during peak periods of demand when there is an unplanned increase in the level of people using the bridge, when short-term (perhaps just a matter of hours) additional resourcing is required.
- 5.4.5** This flexibility of deployment, the commitment to providing a permanent resource on the bridge, complemented by clearly defined Visitor Host roles and responsibilities, together with well-defined and effective local enforcement powers, will collectively provide a comprehensive set of measures to manage the bridge environment. These will be further reinforced by a well designed and professionally managed set of physical and electronic security capabilities as set out in the following section.

6 Layered Protective Security

6.1 Overview

6.1.1 The GBT Crime Prevention Statement contains a comprehensive overview of the technical specifications and operational capability of the full range of protective security measures that will be utilised on the Garden Bridge. These include electronic access control systems (EACS), intrusion detection systems (IDS), CCTV and lighting as well as physical security measures such as gates, roller shutters, locks, glazing and Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM). The enforcement plan outlines how CCTV will be used as an aide to enforcement, addressing issues including anti-social behaviour and illegal trading and/or gambling when the bridge is open and how the use of IDS will complement the wider capability at times when the bridge is closed.

6.1.2 CCTV: Significant enhancements have been made to the CCTV specification over the course of the planning and design of the Garden Bridge. The original proposals by ARUP have been influenced both by the involvement of the DOCO's for Lambeth and Westminster and subsequently by on-going engagement between the GBT and ARUP. The net result is that the CCTV specification has migrated from a system designed to support a post incident response by way of forensic investigation and the "occasional proactive management when the need arises," to a much enhanced capability that enables the GBT to:

- actively manage and oversee the bridge environment, landings and perimeter to identify and capture evidence of potential illegal activity, including anti-social behaviour and illegal trading and/or gambling
- monitor identified vulnerabilities and potential hot-spots
- secure images of identification level quality at designated points for criminal justice purposes
- support crowd monitoring at the base of the stairs for both north and south landings
- provide an integrated capability with IDS to detect and facilitate a response to breaches of the north and south landing perimeters

6.1.3 The number of CCTV cameras provides the GBT with comprehensive coverage of key areas across the bridge and the capability to actively manage significant areas of the bridge decks and all of the north and south landings.

6.1.4 CCTV coverage will complement Visitor Host patrols and provide the means to target deployments, capture evidence to support investigations and prosecutions as well as securing intelligence of potential and actual criminality including anti-social behaviour and illegal trading and/or gambling.

6.1.5 At times when the bridge is closed to the public, the GBT will have the capability to operate an IDS facility in conjunction with CCTV to help detect intrusions into the internal boundary of the bridge and

landings. This will enable the identification of a range of potential incursions, extending from drunken ‘horseplay’, individuals who might be looking for a place to rough sleep, or an organised public protest and occupation of the bridge. An appropriate Visitor Host response to these incidents will then be deployed.

- 6.1.6** The GBT are currently examining the most effective means of monitoring the CCTV images and are considering the following options:
- Developing an active workstation on site within the south landing building
 - Remote monitoring via a facility managed through a third party arrangement
 - A hybrid solution using a flexible combination of both approaches.
- 6.1.7** The GBT will ensure that the workstation in the south landing building will meet appropriate standards for the design of control centres, arrangement and layout of control suites and dimensions of desks, tables, chairs etc. (BS EN ISO 11064, BS 5490). The effective management of the workstation area and the proper direction, control and use of the CCTV system is a key priority for the GBT and effective supervisory arrangements will be in place to ensure these objectives are met.
- 6.1.8** The GBT is also making provision for Visitor Host staff to make use of a smart tablet whilst on patrol to monitor and respond to alarms with CCTV images to enhance patrol capability. The GBT have not yet determined whether Visitor Host personnel should use a body worn camera capability and this issue will remain under consideration.

7 Evaluation

7.1 Evaluation of Enforcement Activity

7.1.1 This plan provides an overview of how the GBT will approach the task of dealing with crime, anti-social behaviour, illegal trading and/or gambling and nuisance related activity associated with the operation of the Garden Bridge. The measures within this plan will continue to be developed between the date of submission of this document and the actual opening of the bridge. They represent however, a guaranteed level of activity that will be built upon and refined once they have been operationalised in a live environment.

7.1.2 Quantifying operational success is a complex process but the GBT will develop and publish a range of indicators giving an overall summary of how safe the bridge is, how safe it feels for the people using it and the impact of enforcement and other crime reduction activity. These measures will include but are not limited to the following:

- Number and type of recorded offences
- Location of Offences (i.e., which zone on the bridge)
- No of informal actions, formal actions and FPN's issued
- No of Arrests
- No of Enforcement Operations
- No and type of Civil Actions taken
- Crime Surveys (to include, feelings of safety and/or confidence, level of satisfaction with service provided)

7.1.3 Subsequent sets of similar data will facilitate comparative analysis as well as providing the basis for reviewing enforcement planning and delivery. The GBT will ensure this information is published on at least an annual basis.

Enforcement Management Plan Conditions of Entry (Draft)

Conditions of Entry (Draft)

Citation, commencement and interpretation

1. (1) These conditions may be cited as the Garden Bridge Conditions of Entry and shall come into force on [*date to be inserted*].

(2) In these conditions:

“Garden Bridge” includes all land, buildings and planting that together constitute the north and south landings and main bridge decks

“Garden Bridge Visitor Host” means a member of the Garden Bridge staff security force who is properly part of the Community Safety Accreditation Scheme (CSAS)

“relevant authority” means any of the following:

- (a) a Minister of the Crown or a government department; or
- (b) the Greater London Authority
- (c) Westminster City Council or the London Borough of Lambeth.

Restriction on use of the Garden Bridge

2. No person, without the written permission of the Garden Bridge Trust shall be on the Garden Bridge or any part thereof, at a time when the Garden Bridge or part thereof is not open to the public.

Prohibited Acts

3. No person using the Garden Bridge shall:

- (1) Intentionally or recklessly interfere with the safety, comfort, or convenience of any person using the Garden Bridge;
- (2) Drop or leave litter or refuse except in a receptacle provided for the purpose;
- (3) Consume any alcohol;
- (4) Be in possession of a dog that is not under control and on a lead at all times;
- (5) Use a pedal cycle, roller skate, skateboard or other foot-propelled device, although pedal cycles may be pushed across the bridge;
- (6) Drive or ride any vehicle, except those for aiding mobility;
- (7) Play any game or engage in any form of sport or exercise, except running or jogging across the bridge;
- (8) Collect or solicit money or any other gift;
- (9) Conduct or carry on any trade or business;
- (10) Play or cause to be played a musical instrument;
- (11) Operate any amplified noise equipment on the Garden Bridge except for the purposes of aiding hearing or personal headphones;
- (12) Make or give a speech or address;
- (13) Interfere with navigational aids of passing vessels;
- (14) Drop from the bridge any item with the exception of devices intended for the purpose of saving lives
- (15) Use any equipment for the purposes of catching fish;
- (16) Use any kite, model aircraft or drone;
- (17) Erect any tent or other structure;
- (18) Place any equipment on the Garden Bridge for the purpose of sleeping;
- (19) Interfere with any plant or enter onto any flower bed or into any shrubbery;
- (20) Attach any article to, climb, or otherwise interfere with the Garden Bridge;
- (21) Interfere with any notice or sign;

- (22) Use language which publicly intimates that any article, commodity, facility or service can be obtained on the Garden Bridge or elsewhere;
- (23) Exhibit any notice or advertisement or any other written or pictorial matter;
- (24) Organise or take part in any assembly, performance, rally, procession or gathering of any kind;
- (25) Take photographs or film for the purposes of commercial, professional or business use;
- (26) Intentionally obstruct free passage on any walkway or other area of the Garden Bridge;
- (27) Scatter ashes;
- (28) Release balloons or animals;
- (28) Cause any fire to be lit including the use of a barbeque;
- (29) Bring any flammable material including fireworks onto the Garden Bridge; or
- (30) Bring onto the Garden Bridge any weapons including firearms within the meaning of section 57 of the Firearms Act 1968, or project any missile manually or by artificial means.

3A. An act is not a Prohibited Act under paragraph 3 if it is done:

- (a) for police, fire and rescue authority or ambulance purposes;
- (b) by or on behalf of a relevant authority;
- (c) by a person so far as that person has the prior written permission of the Garden Bridge Trust; or
- (d) by Garden Bridge Trust staff and contractors who are acting in the performance of their duty to secure the proper management of the Garden Bridge or the preservation of order and prevention of abuses therein.

4 Directions by a Garden Bridge Visitor Host

- (1) A Garden Bridge Visitor Host who has reasonable grounds for believing that a person is doing, or is about to do a Prohibited Activity (as listed in paragraph 3), or who has entered or is about to enter onto the Garden Bridge in contravention of paragraph 4, may direct the person:
 - (a) to cease doing that activity;
 - (b) not to start doing that activity;
 - (c) to leave the Garden Bridge or part thereof; and/or
 - (d) to give on demand his name and address to that Garden Bridge Visitor Host.
- (2) A direction under paragraph 4(1) may be:
 - (a) given orally;
 - (b) given to any person individually or to two or more persons together, and
 - (c) withdrawn or varied by a Garden Bridge Visitor Host.

5 Seizure, retention, disposal and forfeiture of property

Where a Garden Bridge Visitor Host has reasonable grounds for belief that a person has contravened a condition, a Garden Bridge Visitor Host may seize and dispose of that property in line with CSAS enforcement powers.