


Tunnel-less VPN's with Group Encrypted Transport (GET) VPN



Siva Natarajan Product Manager, Security Technology Group GET VPN Now!

Presenter: Donovan Williams, Product Manager, Security Technology Group

Agenda

- Problem Statement
- Solution
- Benefits
- Main Use Cases
- Higher Level View: How does it work?
- Platform support and useful links

Problem Statement


- Today's Enterprise WAN technologies force a trade-off between QoS-enabled branch interconnectivity and transport security
 - Networked applications such as voice, video and web-based applications drive the need for instantaneous, branch interconnected, QoS-enabled WANs
 - Distributed nature of network applications result in increased demands for scalable branch to branch interconnectivity
 - Increased network security risks and regulatory compliance have driven the need for WAN transport security
 - Need for balanced control of security management between enterprises and service providers
- Service providers want to deliver security services on top of WANs such as MPLS without compromising their SLAs

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Cisco Group Encrypted Transport (GET) VPN – Solution for Tunnel-less VPNs

Cisco GET VPN delivers a revolutionary solution for tunnel-less, anyto-any branch confidential communications




- Large-scale any-to-any encrypted communications
- Native routing without tunnel overlay
- Optimal for QoS and Multicast support - improves application performance
- Transport agnostic private LAN/WAN, FR/AATM, IP, MPLS
- Offers flexible span of control among subscribers and providers
- Available on Cisco Integrated Services Routers; Cisco 7200 and Cisco 7301 with Cisco IOS 12.4(11)T

Tunnel-less VPN - A New Security Model

Any-to-Any encryption: Before and After GET VPN

Before: IPsec P2P Tunnels

- Scalability—an issue (N^2 problem)
- Overlay routing
- Any-to-any instant connectivity can't be done to scale
- Limited advanced QoS
- Multicast replication inefficient



- Scalable architecture for any-to-any connectivity and encryption
- No overlays native routing
- Any-to-any instant connectivity
- Advanced QoS
- Efficient Multicast replication

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Benefits of Cisco GET VPN

Previous Limitations	New Feature and Benefits
Multicast traffic encryption through IPsec tunnels: - Not scalable - Difficult to troubleshoot	Encryption supported for Native Multicast and Unicast traffic with GDOI - Allows higher scalability - Simplifies Troubleshooting - Extensible standards-based framework
Overlay VPN Network - Overlay Routing - Sub-optimal Multicast replication - Lack of Advanced QoS	 No Overlay Leverages Core network for Multicast replication via IP Header preservation Optimal Routing introduced in VPN Advanced QoS for encrypted traffic
 Full Mesh Connectivity – Hub and Spoke primary support – Spoke to Spoke not scalable 	 Any to Any Instant Enterprise Connectivity Leverages core for instant communication Optimal for Voice over VPN deployments

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Customer Deployment Scenarios

Customers for Group Encrypted Transport fall into two categories:

Enterprises (Enterprises Purchasing Private WAN (e.g. MPLS) Connectivity from SP but wanting to manage GET themselves)

- Meet security policy or regulatory requirements
- Provides data privacy via crypto while maintaining any-to-any connectivity and QoS
- Streamlines multicast across crypto

SP Managed CPE/Security Services (SP selling connectivity, security services to Enterprises, commercial etc). SP manages GET

- Meet security policy or regulatory requirements
- Provides data privacy via crypto while maintaining any-to-any connectivity and QoS
- Streamlines multicast across crypto

Additiona Value

For Enterprise IPSec VPNs (over public Internet)

Enhances DMVPN and GRE-based S-S VPNs by:

- Providing manageable, highly scalable meshing capability very cost-effectively
- Simplifies key management in larger deployments

Agenda

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- Main Use Cases
- Higher Level View: How does it work?

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
How Cisco GET VPN Works

GET simplifies security policy and key distribution by using Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI)

GDOI:


- A key distribution mechanism
- Group Key Model
- Standards-based (RFC 3547)
- GET uses GDOI and adds:
 - Cooperative Key Servers for high availability & geographic distribution
 - Secure Unicast control/data plane via encryption
 - Unicast/Multicast key distribution

Key Server: Authenticates group members, distributes keys and policies; group member provisioning is minimized. Application traffic is encrypted by group members




Cisco Group Encrypted Transport (GET) VPN – Solution for Tunnel-less VPNs Security

- Crypto Map defines persistent Group SA attachment with any-to-any connectivity.
- Dormant control plane until rekey required



How GET VPN Prevents Overlay Routing

Cisco GET VPN uses IP header preservation to mitigate routing overlay and to preserve QoS and multicast capabilities



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
Scenarios Overview




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Application Scenarios: GET in the

Enterprise/SP WAN




Managed CPE with GET Encryption, with KS Managed by Enterprise




DMVPN (mGRE over IPSec) with GET

Key Server

Rekey




Hosted GET, with KS Managed by SP




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Application Scenario: Security for Multicast VPN



Application Scenario: : Secure PIM Control Traffic with IPSec



PIM Control Packets can be encrypted

- Session peer is set to 224.0.0.13 (PIM Control Messages)
- Supports Multiple IPSec options

Hash Functions: MD5, SHA1

Security Protocols: Authentication

Header(AH),

Encapsulating Security Payload

(ESP)

Encryption Algorithms: DES, 3DES,

AES

Recommended IPSec Mode: Transport

Recommended Key method: Manual

- IPSec AH is the recommended security protocol in the PIM-SM and PIM-Bidir IETF Drafts
- Initial IOS Release 12.4(6)T



Platform Support and Useful Links



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GET VPN IOS Platform Support

Platform	Group Member	Key Server
Software	Yes	Not recommended
850/870	Yes	Not recommended
1800/1841	Yes	Not recommended
2800	Yes	Not recommended
3800 (AIM-II/AIM-III-SSL)	Yes	Yes
7200 NPEG1, VAM2+	Yes	Yes
7300 NPEG1, VAM2+	Yes	Yes
7200 NPEG2, VAM2+	Yes	Yes
7300 NPEG2, VAM2+	Yes	Yes
7200 NPEG2, VSA	No	No
7300 NPEG2, VSA	No	No
6500/7600 VPN-SPA	No	No

Not Committed, but No known issues. Expected to be in pi4

Shipping in pi3



Not Committed, H/W Acceleration. Expected To be fixed in pi1

Not Committed, H/W Acceleration needs to be fixed. No plans

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For more information

http://www.cisco.com/go/getvpn/



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Backup



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Detailed Overview of GET VPN



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Group Encrypted Transport Enabled VPN Features

Key Management

- –GDOI Registration/Rekey
- -Unicast and/or Multicast Key Distribution
- -Cooperative Key Server for High Availability

Policy Management

- Centralized Policy Distribution from PRIMARY Group Controller Key Server
- -Group Member Policy Exception (e.g. local deny)
- -Group Member Policy Merge (concatenate KS policy with GM policy)

IPSec Data Plane

- -IPSec Tunnel Mode with IP Address Preservation
- Passive Security Associations for Graceful Roll-out (i.e. Receive Only SA)
- -Pseudo-time Synchronous Anti-Replay Protection

Enhanced Debugging (fault isolation)

What's a group?

- Three or more parties who send and receive the same data transmitted over a network.
- Transmission can be multicast, or unicast (identical data sent to multiple parties).
- Parties can be routers, PCs, telephones, any IP device.
- There are many different examples of group topologies.

Secure Groups

To secure a group you need:

- Data Encryption Protocol
 - IPSec
 - SRTP
- Key Management Protocol
 - Provides keys for data encryption.

IPSec Key Management

- Pair-wise Key Management
 - IKF
 - KINK
 - Manual IPSec Keys
- Group Key Management
 - Manual IPSec Keys
 - GDOI (Group Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP)

GDOI enables Native Multicast encryption

Relationship of GDOI to IKE: GDOI co-exists with IKE

- IKE Phase 1 is used to provide confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection.
 IKE Phase 1 is UNCHANGED.
- A newly defined phase 2 exchange (called GDOI registration) is run rather than IKE Phase 2.

IKE Phase 2 is **UNUSED** and **UNCHANGED**.


- A new DOI number is used to differentiate GDOI exchanges from IKE Phase 2.
 At the end of IKE Phase 1 a state machine looks at the DOI number to determine next exchange.
- A GDOI service must listen on a port other than port 500 (IKE).

Quick Comparison of IKEv1, IKEv2 vs. GDOI

	IKEv1	IKEv2	GDOI
RFC Documents	2407/2408/ 2409	RFC 4306	RFC 3547
UDP port	500, 4500	500, 4500	848
Phases	2, Ph. 1 (6/3	2, Ph. 1 (4	2, Ph. 1 (6/3 messages),
	messages), Ph. 2 (3 messages)	messages), Ph. 2 (2 messages)	Ph. 2 (4 messages)
Authentication Type	Signature, PSK, PKI	Signature, PSK, PKI	Signature, PSK, PKI
SA Negotiation	Responder selects Initiator's Proposal	Same as IKEV1, proposal structure simplified	Not negotiated, GDOI is used to push keys and policies
Identity Hiding	Yes in MM, No in AM	Yes	Yes in MM, No in AM
Keep-alives	No	Yes	No
Anti-DoS	No	Yes*	Yes*
UDP/NAT	No	Yes	No
Reliability	No	Yes	Yes
PFS	Yes	Yes	Yes
EAP/CP	No	Yes	No

GDOI Registration


Key Distribution



- Each router registers with the Key Server.
- Key Server authenticates the router, performs an authorization check.
- Key Server downloads the encryption policy and keys to the router

GDOI Rekey

Key Distribution




- The key server generates and pushes new IPsec keys and policy to the routers when necessary
- Re-key messages can also cause group members to be ejected from the group
- Rekeys can be sent either using multicast or unicast

Cooperative Key Server Key Distribution

- Primary Key Server Designated Per Group
- Multiple Secondary Key Servers Per Group
- Synchronization of Policy Database for Graceful Failover


Synchronized - Group Policy, Active Group Members, Key Encryption Key, Traffic Encryption Key



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Policy Management


- Local Policy Configured by Group Member
- Global Policy Configured and Distributed by Key Server
- Global Policy Appended to Local Policy



Pseudo-Synchronous Anti-Replay

- Replay Based on Synchronization of Pseudo-time Across Group Members
- Key Server Manages Relative Clock Time (not Universal Clock Time)
- Group Members Periodically Resync Pseudo-time with every Rekey
- No Existing Fields in IPSec
 Header are Viable for Pseudo-time
 (while maintaining IPSec
 compliance)

Example



 If Sender's Pseudo Time falls in the below Receiver window, packet accepted else packet is discarded


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Fault Isolation

- Show and Debugging capabilities for Key server show crypto gdoi ks, debug crypto gdoi ks
- Show and Debugging capabilities for Group Member show crypto gdoi gm, debug crypto gdoi gm etc
- Multi-level Debug/Fault Isolation capabilities for various user roles e.g.


debug crypto gdoi error debug crypto gdoi terse debug crypto gdoi customer debug crypto gdoi engineer debug crypto gdoi packet

GM Configuration



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GKCS Configuration



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GKCS Configuration (cont.)

crypto gdoi group dgvpn1 **GDOI Group ID** identity number 101 **Rekey Address** server local mapping to ACL 150 rekey address ipv4 150 Lifetime for Key rekey lifetime seconds 1800 rekev retransmit 10 number 3 **Encryption Key** rekey authentication mypubkey rsa dgvpn1 **Rekey Retransmission** rekey transport unicast **RSA** Key to authenticate sa ipsec 1 rekeys profile gdoi1 match address ipv4 160 **Unicast Rekey** replay counter window-size 64 address ipv4 130.23.1.1 **Encryption ACL** redundancy Source address for rekeys local priority 10 peer address ipv4 130.1.2.1 **Coop Server Config Coop Server priority Coop Server address**

IPSec VPN Features in IOS 12.2(18)SXF2

- Encrypted Multicast over GRE for IPSec VPN SPA
 - IPSec SPA Only, no VPNSM
 - Up to 500 tunnels
 - Limited broadcast sources
 - VRF-Aware IPSec
 - GRE Tunnel Protection (TP)
- Sup32 support for IPSec VPN SPA and VPNSM
- IOS Sup2 Image available