(DIR) « Home
 (DIR) « Research
       
         _                    __                 _                 
        /_` _/_ _     _   _/  /    _  _   _/    /_`/_  _  ._  _  _ 
       /_,/_// / //_// //_/  /|/|//_'/_'/_//_/ /  //_|/ ///_//_|/ /
                                           _/             _/       
       
       ------------------------------------------------------------------
       The Small Improvement Argument, Epistemicism, and Incomparability
       With John Halstead
       ------------------------------------------------------------------
       
       Economics & Philosophy, Vol 34, iss. 2, pp. 199-219. 
       DOI: 10.1017/S0266267118000019
       
       ABSTRACT
       The Small Improvement Argument (SIA) is the leading argument
       for value incomparability. All vagueness-based accounts of the
       SIA have hitherto assumed the truth of supervaluationism, but
       supervaluationism has some well-known problems. This paper explores
       the implications of epistemicism, a leading rival theory. We
       argue that if epistemicism is true, then options are comparable
       in small improvement cases. Moreover, even if SIAs do not exploit
       vagueness, if epistemicism is true, then options cannot be on a
       par. The epistemicist account of the SIA has an advantage over
       leading existing rival accounts of the SIA because it accounts for
       higher-order hard cases.
       
       DOWNLOADS
 (DIR) ..                                                                
 (TXT) small_improvements.bib                2026-Jan-23 17:03     1.1 KB
 (HTM) small_improvements.html               2026-Jan-23 17:03    61.6 KB
 (BIN) small_improvements.pdf                2026-Jan-23 17:03   385.6 KB
 (BIN) small_improvements.ps                 2026-Jan-23 17:03     1.0 MB
 (TXT) small_improvements.txt                2026-Feb-27 17:34    55.4 KB