From johanna@coombs.anu.edu.au Tue Jul 22 22:53:59 1997 Received: from mx2.u.washington.edu (mx2.u.washington.edu [140.142.32.7]) by lists.u.washington.edu (8.8.4+UW97.07/8.8.4+UW97.05) with ESMTP id WAA25230 for ; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 22:51:16 -0700 Received: from cheops.anu.edu.au (johanna@cheops.anu.edu.au [150.203.76.24]) by mx2.u.washington.edu (8.8.4+UW97.07/8.8.4+UW97.04) with ESMTP id WAA06472 for ; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 22:51:13 -0700 Received: by cheops.anu.edu.au (1.37.109.16/16.2) id AA291516300; Wed, 23 Jul 1997 15:38:20 +1000 Date: Wed, 23 Jul 1997 15:38:18 +1000 (EST) From: Johanna Sutherland X-Sender: johanna@cheops.anu.edu.au To: Biodiversity List Cc: consbio@u.washington.edu, bene@straylight.tamu.edu Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Dear Subscribers The UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology and the negotiations for the development of a Biosafety Protocol under the Convention on Biological Diversity do not seem to be addressing export controls on the components of biological weapons (BW). One would have expected that BW are not environmentally sound applications of biotechnology (Art. 15(2)) and therefore amenable to export controls. The CBD Secretariat has established co-operative relationships with a range of other international institutions and Convention bodies but apparently not yet arms control bodies. Although the COP2 Ministerial Declaration did note a number of States' concerns about nuclear weapons testing and the need for a comprehensive test ban treaty. There are relevant Conventions, viz. the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (1972) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993). The potential of gene technology to increase the efficiency of biological and chemical weapon agents is discussed in E. Geissler ed., Stengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by Confidence-Building Measures, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp.18-21. Since 1985 an informal Australia Group has met to exchange information and improve control on the export of dual-use chemicals and biological material so as to minimise the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation, although the effectiveness of these measures has been questioned. The Australia group members have included Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slocak Repblic, Spain, Sewden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. It was formed in response to concerns about chemical attacks in the Iran-Iraq War. The group has agreed on lists of controlled potential chemical and biological weapons materials and equipment. The list of core biological agents includes 20 viruses, 4 rickettsiae, 13 bacteria, genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements, 11 toxins and subunits thereof. The warning list includes 8 viruses, 5 bacteria, GMOs and 7 toxins. 15 animal pathogens are listed for export controls, as is a bacteria and GMOs. On the list of dual-use biological equipment for export control there is listed containment facilities, fermenters, centrifugal separators, cross-flow filtration equipment, freeze drying equipment, aerosol inhalation chambers and other items. See: Australia Group Doc AG/Oct95/BW/Chair/36 and Australia Group Doc AG/Oct95/BW/Chair/34. Can subscribers please consider the need for the linking of these arms control measures with the biosafety measures being developed under the Convention on Biological Diversity? Johanna Sutherland Dept. International Relations Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies Australian National University CANBERRA 0200 .