From psnider@chass.utoronto.ca Sun Apr 30 11:59:16 2000 Received: from mxu1.u.washington.edu (mxu1.u.washington.edu [140.142.32.8]) by lists.u.washington.edu (8.9.3+UW99.09/8.9.3+UW99.09) with ESMTP id LAA25728 for ; Sun, 30 Apr 2000 11:59:15 -0700 Received: from artemis.chass.utoronto.ca (artemis.chass.utoronto.ca [128.100.160.6]) by mxu1.u.washington.edu (8.9.3+UW00.02/8.9.3+UW99.09) with ESMTP id LAA23772 for ; Sun, 30 Apr 2000 11:59:14 -0700 Received: from origin.chass.utoronto.ca (origin.chass.utoronto.ca [128.100.160.1]) by artemis.chass.utoronto.ca (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA13130 for <@artemis.chass.utoronto.ca:classics@u.washington.edu>; Sun, 30 Apr 2000 15:03:31 -0400 (EDT) Received: from localhost (psnider@localhost) by origin.chass.utoronto.ca (980427.SGI.8.8.8/980728.SGI.AUTOCF) via ESMTP id OAA99299 for ; Sun, 30 Apr 2000 14:28:00 -0400 (EDT) Date: Sun, 30 Apr 2000 14:28:00 -0400 From: Phillip Snider To: "'classics@u.washington.edu'" Subject: RE: Death and the military and 1945 and more.... In-Reply-To: <462F323275D6D311BA0200805F356C5250D269@lgcadev001.zycor.lgc.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII I don't think the question about the planned 1945 invasion was whether the Allies would have lost, but just how costly it would be. I think 2 000 000 was the dead and wounded that the Americans expected for themselves. Push that into much of the population of Japan in the worst case, and the death rates would have been astronomical. Yet, remember this was a worst case, based on the fanatical resistence on various Japanese held islands as well as the behavior of Japanese citizens on Okinawa. Since the Allies never tried it, we can't really know how bad would have been. I do think it would have been a costly, nasty campaign, but sooner or later (perhaps after the capture of the main island?), the Emperor and his government could not have continued it. Lack of food, lack of fuel, lack of war material and simply hideous civilian casualties would have forced surrender. As for 'just war' going back to Caesar, I think we really have to very careful with that. It is true that there was a law that did not allow a governor to lead his troops outside his province without senatorial approval. Caesar breached that and Cato wanted to prosecute him for it. As per usual, success paid for all and Caesar was shielded. Yet, I don't think we talk about this as a 'Just War' clause. It is more along the line of keeping governor with armies in line so that every provincial governor with troops doesn't go haring off to win a triumph, only to entangle Rome into a major war/disaster. I know several articles have been written on whether Caesar's attack on Ariovistus breached International law of the period, but I really can't buy into that. International law as commonly used really is an invention of the 20th century (okay, some beginnings in the nineteenth) and it is excessively anachronistic to apply it to the Roman period. Short of the commonly understood restrictions of killing embassies (which could and were breached fairly frequently), I don't see that there is anything like a body of international law with anything resembling a way of adjudicating disputes in place before the twentieth century. Without that, I can't see how we can speak of international law in its strict sense. On Sun, 30 Apr 2000, Steve Zoraster wrote: > > I suggest "Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire" by Richard B. > Frank (Random House, 1999, ISBN: 067941424X) for a different view of "This > stunningly successful creation of the mythology still widely accepted > today." > > One point Mr. Frank makes, is that while we were intercepting those famous > Japanese diplomatic messages to the USSR about a negotiated peace, we were > intercepting many, many more less famous Japanese military messages planning > for the battle against the anticipated American invasion. A battle the > Japanese expected to win! Sure, they were wrong, but nobody knew that at > the time. > > In fact, by August 1945, Frank reports that Admirals Nimitz and King of the > United States Navy worried that the planned invasion would end in a Japanese > victory. Truman, etc., can be forgiven for getting it wrong, if the Japanese > government itself also got it wrong! > > I know this particular topic is tangential to this list. I more relevant > discussion might be on the differences between what is and has been possible > in a democracy - however hypocritical - and an authoritarian state. For > example, doesn't the whole argument about what makes a "Just War" goes back > to the Romans? And didn't Caesar often claim to be fighting a "defense war" > in Gaul? Certainly the United States has no worse a record in using > rhetoric to disguise what they are really doing than a lot of other ancient > or modern countries? (Not that this makes it right to starve a bunch of > Iraqi kids for the sake of our access to Middle East petroleum.) > > Steven Zoraster > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Sipesprngs@aol.com [SMTP:Sipesprngs@aol.com] > > Certainly the most effective such effort began in March, 1945, with > the > scripting of news releases in anticipation of the "military" use, in > August > of that year, of atomic bombs to "shorten" the war and "save > lives." This > stunningly successful creation of the mythology still widely > accepted today > is detailed by Gar Alperovitz in "Managing History," Part IV of > his book, > "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" (Knopf, 1995). Alperovitz is > still > frequently dismissed as a "revisionist" historian. Actually, his > 850-page > book treats only one facet of the much larger public-relations > fabric > promulgated, e.g., by Arthur Compton's masterful "Atomic Quest" > (1956). > > J.W. Worthy > Sipe Springs, Texas > > .