From owner-comp-bio@hgmp.mrc.ac.uk Tue Feb 26 03:59:34 2002 Return-Path: Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.hgmp.mrc.ac.uk (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08DFD17ABA for ; Tue, 26 Feb 2002 03:59:32 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.hgmp.mrc.ac.uk (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E63317AF2 for ; Tue, 26 Feb 2002 03:59:30 +0000 (GMT) Received: by mercury.hgmp.mrc.ac.uk (Postfix, from userid 6023) id EFB5717ABA; Tue, 26 Feb 2002 03:59:21 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.hgmp.mrc.ac.uk (Postfix) with ESMTP id ABE1E17ABE for ; Mon, 25 Feb 2002 03:51:41 +0000 (GMT) Received: from smtp27.wxs.nl (smtp27.wxs.nl [195.121.6.56]) by mercury.hgmp.mrc.ac.uk (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27E0317ABB for ; Mon, 25 Feb 2002 03:51:29 +0000 (GMT) Received: from reader08.wxs.nl (reader08.wxs.nl [195.121.6.67]) by smtp27.wxs.nl (8.12.1/8.12.1) with ESMTP id g1P3pStZ015749 for ; Mon, 25 Feb 2002 04:51:28 +0100 Received: (from news@localhost) by reader08.wxs.nl (8.10.2+Sun/8.10.2) id g1P3pSa13372 for bionet-biology-computational@net.bio.net; Mon, 25 Feb 2002 04:51:28 +0100 (MET) To: bionet-biology-computational@net.bio.net From: "Frans van der Walle" Newsgroups: bionet.biology.computational Subject: Modelling the human brain by modelling its evolutionary emergence Organization: Novoware Message-ID: X-Trace: reader08.wxs.nl 1014609087 13370 195.121.163.47 (25 Feb 2002 03:51:27 GMT) X-Complaints-To: abuse@planet.nl NNTP-Posting-Date: 25 Feb 2002 03:51:27 GMT X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2002 03:59:21 +0000 (GMT) X-Spam-Status: No, hits=0.0 required=5.0 tests= version=2.01 Sender: owner-comp-bio@hgmp.mrc.ac.uk Precedence: bulk I would like to receive comments on the recent results of a multi-year research effort, aimed at modelling the human brain, seen as an information handling system. Below I will sketch an outline of it. Summary The strategy of that research project has been formulated as follows: * 'Modelling the information system 'Man' by modelling its evolutionary emergence'. This strategy was deemed to be necessary as the system 'Man' has become such complex, because of its long evolutionary history and of its 'trial & error' emergence procedure, that any modelling of that 'Information System Man' can only be done in an effective way if the evolution of that information system is considered at the same time. As a consequence, the modelling procedure involved not only the information system 'Man' but also the evolutionary process that created successive life forms. My modelling involves therefore both the evolution of the information system and the end result, the information system of Homo sapiens sapiens. It has resulted in a (admittedly ambitious) research project, which aim is to define a modelling for the information handling aspects of the system 'Man', in which all aspects of human behaviour are considered, comprising emotional-, irrational- and rational/cognitive behaviour patterns, in both awake- and dream states, for individual and social behaviour. It is stated that this, one, information system 'Man' handles all human activities. The involved modelling comprises: not only the functional aspects, Man's mind, i.e. how that system observes, and reacts to, the environment and how it builds up, and uses via recalls, an internal database from these observations and from genetically transferred preferences for such behaviour, but also: how the involved information items are stored and transferred in Man's brain structure; the transfer taking place, in general, from the sensory input towards the motor output. Historical Overview In the initial years of our research effort, it became clear that a completely different approach, than is usually followed, is necessary to solve the involved modelling problems. I may illustrate this by the following statements of respected authors: Patricia Churchland (1988)stated in her book 'Neurophilosophy': ' our present day knowledge of the functioning of the human brain and mind demonstrates clearly the lack of some unifying theory for the information handling processes in the human brain and mind.' A similar statement, be it within another context, was made already in the 1930's by Vygotsky (1934/1986): 'The atomistic and functional modes of analyses prevalent during the past decade (1934) treated psychic processes in isolation. Methods of research were developed and perfected with a view to studying separate functions, while their interdependence and their organization in the structure of consciousness as a whole remained outside the field of investigation.' 'There are so many psychologies precisely because there is no one psychology'. These very early remarks are still valid according to me. Such a theory for 'neuro informatics' has to complement the already extensive knowledge that has been built up in the fields of: the topographical structure of the brain according to the distribution of functional centres; the detailed communication processes on neuron level and the psychological aspects of human behaviour. Somewhat exaggerated, one could state that nearly all research effort has been spent sofar on trying to understand the information handling processes in the human brain/mind by studying on a very detailed level the physical carrier (the brain) of these processes and by studying outside human behaviour. The equivalent in computer science would be by trying to understand the functionality of an application program by studying the bitstreams through the communication channels of a computer system and by inspecting the printed output. It is evident that in both cases a higher/ more global (information) viewpoint of an abstract nature is primarily required in order to really understand the overall concept of such a system. We may further state that evolution is a tinkerer, not an engineer; phylogenesis acts on what is there, not on what the optimal design of a new life form should be. We may (justly) admire the brain's functionality but from an 'information handling design' point of view, one can raise many question marks on its logical structure. Freud identified this 'design error' by an 'internal conflict' in the human brain. Two other indications of this troublesome 'information system design' are to be found in the following literature references: Lawrence (1992; page 38), in which the detailed genetic development procedure in the creation of a fruitfly from a fertilized egg is presented. The shaping information is derived from concentration gradients in the egg and larva of certain proteins that are being produced at the instruction of certain genes. At specific concentration levels other genes are activated etc., leading to different developments in the various body parts. At some development stage a previously activated gene is being blocked by the later activation of another gene that directs the further development in another direction. The following statement in that publication is worth noting in the present context: 'It seems perverse that the fly should have a specific genetic system to clear up the unwanted expression of another gene. Would it not be simpler to switch of hunchback [i.e. the troublesome gene!] in the mother? This result illustrates a general principle and delivers a chastening lesson; the principle is that evolution works on what is there [emphasis by author], it tinkers, it does not look at the whole system and devise a logical or economical solution.' A similar statement is to be found in Litman (1996), in which the evolutionary development of the immune system is traced over a period of hundreds of millions of years. It appears that there also the development has not been 'aimed' at some specific goal but appears to wander. Litman states: 'The idiosyncratic nature of this ancient immune system illustrates well the twists and turns that occurred during the evolution of immunity. This sinuous course, moreover, suggests that evolution, at least where the immune system is concerned, may not have always proceeded in the inexorable, successive way in which it is often portrayed'. These design problems lead, unavoidably, to a 'modelling nightmare' if you concentrate only on the 'status quo', i.e. the present characteristics of Homo sapiens sapiens. We came therefore to the conclusion that we have to model primarily the evolutionary procedure, starting from initial multi-cell life forms, some 700 million years ago, with, initially, only some broad, global, information handling concept. In order to judge whether such a more global modelling definition could be possible, at least in principle, via some 'packaging' of an extensive set of highly interlinked, often very detailed, information handling data, it will be necessary first to: determine whether this complex system is indeed structured in some hierarchical way, linking detailed characteristics, as some subsets, to more global characteristics, and if yes: understand how this hierarchical structure has been 'designed' by evolution. Our evolutionary analyses reveal sufficient justifications for the first question to be answered in an affirmitive way. One might even conclude from these analyses that evolution had to be a 'top-down' procedure as it could not have resulted otherwise in effective life forms of gradually increasing complexity. Summarizing the various observations from the evolutionary analyses, we could state in this respect that: there exists at least some justification for our postulate that the DNA 'life form design repository' is built up gradually during evolution in phylogenesis and is 'unravelled' gradually and top-down during ontogenesis. ontogenesis and phylogenesis are therefore indeed both determined by the (same) DNA design classification but still may differ because of the following facts: in phylogenesis the DNA classification is being built up in time; new additions to the design classification may block or modify certain characteristics of the 'older' design instructions, in ontogenesis all evolutionary developments are in principle active. However, their activation during ontogenesis need not take place in the same order, or not completely, as was the case during phylogenesis, as the execution activation is a network procedure within the design classification, that may connect a 'distant-', and therefore/possibly an evolutionarily more 'recent', design classification as the next follow up instruction, 'forgetting' or 'blocking' some of the older design instructions. The modelling leads therefore to the conclusion that Haeckel's, famous but generally rejected, 'recapitulation law' is: indeed at fault, if applied to the complete physical ontogenesis procedure, but is: in principle correct as far as the DNA design classification is concerned. However the execution of that design during ontogenesis 'hides' that recapitulation aspect. Points of view and results of analyses in literature on this recapitulation issue, as expressed e.g. in Ridley (1996), are in agreement, or at least not in contradiction, with the above observations. In defining that design classification we followed the following analysis: 1 Evolution is not entirely chaotic. There is an ordering principle involved as well, namely the selection criterion 'Survival of the Fittest' 2 A major modelling problem is therefore: 'What is the result of this ordering principle for the build-up procedure for the 'life form design', as it will become stored in DNA? 3 This, very important, aspect was discussed at length in the research effort. Below I will try to sketch a very short summary. 4 The test in the (hostile) environment, i.e. the struggle for life, will determine whether or not any adaptation is favourable for that survival. This aspect must furnish the unifying concept that will transform the results of the successful trials of the tinkering procedure of evolution into a 'neat' information handling architecture. 5 The evolutionary analyses show that the evolutionary tinkerer made, via the survival test, successive adaptations in the transformation of sensory observations into motor acts, leading to a continuous improvement, at least for successful adaptations, in some virtual image, created in the brain, that 'mirrored' the observed environment and the individual's, and other's, position and (intended) actions in that environment. This is the major, in fact the only, 'design strategy' of evolution. 6 This gradually improved 'mirroring' of outside reality in some representation/image in the brain is an absolute necessity for coping in a favourable way with any challenge that the environment may pose to the individual. It is therefore no wonder that evolution's 'trial and error' resulted in such a virtual image representation. 7 This virtual image is shown to have evolved, in successive life forms, from simple, reflex-like, structures, via separate egocentric- and allocentric images into a viewpoint independent true virtual image, that became in Homo sapiens and, later, in Homo sapiens sapiens further extended into purely abstract representations, that have lost any direct relationship with material outside reality, but nevertheless were extremely important for survival via tool use conceptions, planning, foresight, recalls from expanding know-how- and experience databases, etc. 8 The successfullness of these adaptations is judged by the primary selection criterion in evolution: 'Does the modification/extension result in less fertile offspring?' If yes, the modification will disappear; otherwise it will remain and contribute to the multiple variations in life forms, and if successful, will become even dominant. It results in the evolutionary arbitration strategy that: a gives, in general, preference to social instinct norms above individual instincts (care for the individual), at least within the individual's social group (take primarily care of the weaker members of the social group, such as children, older and handicapped), and: b avoids, if possible, unnecessary deadly (dangerous) struggle. This strategy promotes the number of fertile offspring. 9 These observations justify the statement that evolution constructed not only some hierarchic structure but applied that structure also to one well-defined information entity, the virtual image and the response to the challenge(s) it contained. The struggle for survival ensured that this information entity, and the resulting response, retained its well-defined character as a gradually improving 'mirroring' of outside reality and of the individual's, and other's, position in that environment. 10 The same struggle for survival ensured that the response to the challenges, as comprised in the virtual image, were also favourable for that survival. 11 We found further that this virtual image was gradually built up by evolution via a strict 'top- down' procedure. The modelling procedure involves therefore the gradual upgrading of the virtual image in successive life forms and an analysis, with several, unavoidably somewhat speculative, assumptions, on the implementation of that virtual image in the neural structure. We keep away, as far as possible, from (sub)cellular levels in order to avoid that we don't 'see the forest anymore through the trees'; information handling is the primary issue. However, we should show also how the link is made between modelling the virtual image handling and at least the neuronal information handling. We came to the conclusion in our research that we can define this link for a small number of standard neuronal assemblies from which the whole brain structure is constructed by evolution. An important aspect of this link is the following set of modelling statements: 1 The brain comprises some 1012 neurons. 2 Each neuron is, on average, connected to some 10,000 other neurons, mostly in the immediate vicinity. 3 The cortex is organized in columnar entities of 0.75 mm diameter, containing somewhat more than 10,000 neurons. The cerebellum is likewise organized in 'stripes'. 4 The modelling procedure states / assumes / speculates, as the result of a detailed analysis, that each columnar entity represents the neural equivalent of a standard Hopfield network, as studied and defined in AI. Each Hopfield network comprises n nodal points, each one connected to all other ones. This is a structure remarkably similar to the columnar entity. For cerebellar stripes similar equivalencies are found. 5 Following the design data as derived in AI for such a BHN (basic Hopfield network), it is found that each BHN can store 1400 vectors of 9000 bits each. 6 Together with a found 'chopping time' of 200 msec., that 'chops' the continuous sensory info- flow into 'chunks' at these time intervals, this leads to the conclusion / assumption that in the primary sensory cortex these BHN memory units function as 'shift registers' of the FIFO type (first in first out), storing a 'short film' of most recent observations of environmental events of some 1400 x 0.2 sec = 5 minutes duration. This information system is therefore 'conscious' of the most recent events, enabling it to pursue a course with a certain goal, such as chasing a prey, following a debate, etc. 7 A further analysis leads to the modelling statement that a large number of these BHN's (the cortex contains some 150,000 per brain half) is organied in some hierarchic structure, that store together the information items of the virtual image. 8 Once you have reached this stage, you can then model the virtual image handling processes by referring only to storage- and recall facilities of these BHN's and its superstructures. One can 'forget' then all more detailed information handling at neuronal level in the same way as a programmer does; he/she also considers only his programs and files and does not bother to consider the much more detailed instructions at processor level or in read/write operations on disc. The evolutionary process is further critically dependent on unpredictable and largely unknowable environmental conditions at those early periods of several 100 million years ago. I formulated this 'modelling design problem' as follows: 'Man', and in fact every presently living entity is the result of a chaotic procedure, called evolution. If we could repeat that procedure, the result (i.e. Homo sapiens sapiens) might very well be quite different'. My statement that modelling of the present brain is only possible by modelling its evolutionary emergence is therefore in itself true but should be 'upgraded' by stating also that the present characteristics of Man's brain should be considered as well as 'aiming point' in the evolutionary modelling, in case more than one possible modelling extension presents itself. In this aspect of the modelling procedure we make use of the various available 'aiming points', as these can be derived, not only from Homo sapiens sapiens but also from much older life forms. A publication like that of Winson, 1990; 'The meaning of dreams'; Scientific American November 1990 pages 42 through 48; See also: Scientific American, volume 276, special issue, 1997, pages 58 through 67, has played an important role in this 'aiming procedure'. We found that this gradual neural implementation procedure can also be characterized by a hierarchic and recursive development procedure. As a result, the immense complexity of the brain becomes much easier to describe and understand. It is (afterwards) no wonder that evolution concluded that the neural emergence procedure should be a simple recursive process; seen from a control viewpoint for this 'design information' handling task, it could not have been differently. Architecture of the Brain In defining the modelling environment we conclude that: 1 The brain's network can be discriminated into: a a consciously operating, maze structured, feed forward / backward network, that operates more or less as an ethernet type LAN (local area network) with probably some simpler equivalent of ethernet's csma-cd transfer protocol, b an unconsciously operating network of highly interlinked, Hopfield type, memory storage units, that lead to extensive abstracting-(bird>wing>feather>etc) and prototyping (dove + eagle > bird etc) relationships. 2 The cooperation between these two, interconnected, network structures models (we think correctly) the two learning environments, as defined by McClelland (1987/1994/1995) as: a 'focussed learning', a fast but simple storage procedure, b 'interleaved learning' a 10 times slower but much more advanced learning procedure, that creates the above mentioned information network of abstracting- and prototyping relationships. 3 An important role is stated to be fulfilled by the hippocampal region. Our modelling presents a possible implementation for Edelman's 'phasic re-entry'- procedure in the cortex, that creates the recursive abstracting- and prototyping procedures. The hippocampal region controls this proces in both awake and asleep states; it leads to two types of memory storages: a one representing the storage of life experiences. It models the phenomenon of remembering; one not only knows the facts but also when, where, how and why this knowledge was acquired. The storage location is probably in the lower temporal lobe; Wilder Penfield demonstrated this already in many experiments in the 1940's (Penfield, 1959), b one representing the storage of know-how. It models the phenomenon of knowing; one knows the fact but not when, where, why and how it was acquired. The storage location is probably in the prefrontal cortex. The resulting modelling can be seen as the additional info, that is at present lacking in the genome project. After all, the genome project has discovered the existence of a very big book, written in 3 character words (the triplets), each built up from only four different characters (A, C, T, G) and written in a language we do not know. It is a very difficult version of the 'Rosetta Stone Problem'. The resulting modelling can be seen as a first step in unravelling the language problem for that Rosetta Stone. Available Documentation For those of you who are willing / interested to go into more detail in making comments, I have prepared therefore the following files, that I will send as attached files to interested respondents; just send me an email: 1 Syscomm04bionet19.2.wpd. It is a WordPerfect7 file of the first six chapters of 'Biography of Man', which is mentioned in my website as the integrated summary of the modelling procedure. It refers for many details to a serie of underlying documents, namely parts I through VI, VIII through X in the series 'The Information System Man'. It comprises the 'heart' of the modelling environment; the other chapters discuss consequences of the modelling environment for a number of subject areas, such as: language (still rudimentary), psychology, psychiatry, politics, crime, law and AI. I must stress however that these applications to the functionality of the present case of Homo sapiens sapiens has functioned also as inspiration for the evolutionary analyses. We mentioned above that my statement, that modelling of the present brain is only possible by modelling its evolutionary emergence, is in itself true but should be 'upgraded' by stating also that the present characteristics of Man's brain should be considered as well as 'aiming point' in the evolutionary modelling, in case more than one possible modelling extension presents itself. As a result the various parts I through XI of the series 'The information system Man' were compiled largely in parallel. The additional chapters and the various underlying parts I through XI comprise therefore also (often more detailed) modelling information. However the abovementioned file comprises already some 450 pages text; one has to limit oneself to digestable 'consumption' efforts! 2 BLOSBFIGGRAF.wpd It comprises the newer figures to which the text of 'Biography of Man' refers. It is an MSWord97 file 3 BLOSBFIG.tot It comprises the majority (some 90) figures and illustrations for 'Biography of Man'. As this research project started some 15 years ago, it is in an older (16 bits) version (5.1) of WordPerfect, that can not be converted to a newer version. If someone has trouble in printing this file, let him send me an email with his postal address; I will send him/her a printed copy. 4 BLOSBLiterature.doc. It is an MSWord7 file of all literature references. 5 BLOSBTerminology.doc. It is also an MSWord7 file; it comprises the terminology as used in the modelling definition. It mentions definitions for notions that have in daily use often a less sharply defined meaning. An example is e.g. the notion 'consciousness', which is often heatedly debated without any definition; it results often in endless and (according to me) senseless discussions. In my terminology it has a very well defined meaning as a specific characteristic of an information handling system. Specific Questions The aim of the modelling procedure is to define a model for the real life entity 'Man', seen as an information handling system, that is reasonably isomorph with the characteristics of that real life entity. My own opinion about the result of this modelling effort is that it would be a miracle if more than 50% of the modelling statements were later found to be 100% true; for the remaining 50% of the modelling statements I expect that some need for modification, update or even reject is quite possible as a result of confrontation with other 'knowledge carriers'. I wellcome of course any critical comment; I hope the scientific community will say: 'At long last we have an (nearly) all embracing theory for the functioning of the human CNS (brain + spinal cord). Let us 'tear it to pieces' in order to see: Where is it correct, where is it wrong and where has it to be upgraded/modified etc.' >From my point of view I am especially interested in critical comments on the following modelling issues: * Can the experimental results of Singer (1995) for the neocortex, of Winson (1990) and Isaacson et al (1975) for the hippocampus and of Usrey (1999) and Pauluis (2001) for other brain entities as thalamus and basal ganglia indeed be interpreted as justification for the modelling statement that (a group of at maximum 8) sensory observations is/are transferred blockwise over the brain's feed forward / backward network in 200 msec intervals, each separate sensory observation taking some 25 msec within the 'block' of 200 msec? * Can it indeed be inferred from the analyses in 'Biography of Man' on the emergence of single- and multicell life forms in evolution that this transfer procedure could be a simplified version of the ethernet cs-ma-cd protocol? * Can the statements by Miall et al (1996) and by Whiting (1984) indeed be interpreted to mean that the activity urge component of the awareness item, as recalled by the brain from memory, is specified as the intended, future, goal to be attained and not as a specific action? * Can the experimental results of Cools et al. (1981&1984) and others indeed be interpreted, as done in section 5/4/0 of Walle (2000-1), to mean that arbitration / mediation between some awareness items with conflicting output urges takes place in the form of an if . . , then . . , else . .statement with and/or additions, that unifies these separate, and possibly conflicting, awareness items into one more global statement, transferred in parallel as a 200 msec information block, in which the original awareness items function as arguments in that if . . , then . . , else . .statement? * Is it indeed justified to model the brain's memory storage procedure via: * A first short term (days to weeks) storage of all, complete, awareness items in one segment of the hippocampus, * A transformation of this short term storage during REM sleep into a condensed storage of most important items in another segment of the hippocampus with a much larger storage period of several months, * A continuous re-insertion, by the hippocampus, of stored awareness items into the stream of circulating awareness items, leading to a continuous abstracting and globalizing / prototyping procedure, that is used to update the 'information sieve assemblies', in temporal-, parietal- and prefrontal cortices, via McClelland's 'interleaved learning'? * Can it indeed be justified from the evolutionary analyses of Walle (2000-1) that three separate mediation / arbitration procedures are active in parallel in the brain; one centered in the superior colliculus according to the results of Cools et al (1981&1984), which constructs an if . . , then . . , else . .statement from a number of awareness items, one in the prefrontal Broca area (indicated as B4) and the third one in another section of the prefrontal cortex (indicated as E4)? Is it a reasonable assumption that the two prefrontally based arbitration centers construct more global, prototyped, derivations of the corresponding arguments from conflicting, parallel, if . . , then . . , else . .statements; the resulting lower number of prototyped awareness items being arbitrated again in the superior colliculus into one, or a smaller number of, higher level, if . . , then . . , else . .statement(s)? * If the above modelling structures are indeed, more or less, confirmed by this further analysis, does this indeed justify the modelling explanation for the phenomenon of infantile amnesia as presented in section 7/1/3 in Walle (2000-1)? * Do the available neuro-anatomic data indeed justify the modelling postulate that the block transfer over the feed forward / backward network takes place largely in parallel, as discussed in section 6.6 of Walle (2000-1)? Is in these, in parallel operating, transfer sections the above mentioned block transfer period of 200 msec then indeed reduced to 25 msec.? * Does this, in combination with the above mentioned statement on the output urge representation as a goal to be achieved, justify the discrimination of the brain's information handling in: * A deep structure component in the higher brain regions, handled in parallel and on the basis of a goal to be attained and: * A surface structure component in lower brain regions and especially in brain stem and spinal cord, in which: * Information transfer takes place largely serially and: * The goal to be attained is translated into a specific series of actions? * If the previous statement is found to be (predominantly) true; what is the correct relationship with the notions deep- and surface structure in language science? * Does this further analysis indeed justify the various statements in Walle (2000-1), especially in sections 5/5/7, 6/5, 6/6 and in chapter 10, on the common deep structure of very diverse human activities, such as represented by language-, music- and physical skill execution? * Can the above mentioned set of transfer- and manipulation procedures around sets of awareness items indeed explain the existence in Man of a universal, genetically inbred, language acquisition facility, as proposed by Chomsky (See also Pinker (1997); the language instinct)? Can the analyses in section 6/5 of Walle (2000-1) on the gradual integration of incomplete awareness items into complete ones be re-interpreted as part of the inbred language instinct facility, along the lines as given in section 6/5? * If the previous statement on the deep- and surface structures is found to be (predominantly) true, does this mean that the human lexicon, especially for multi-linguals, has to be assumed to be located in the lower brain / CNS entities as brain stem and spinal cord and not in the cortex? If yes, does this mean that the 'lexicon' for deep structure awareness item components in the higher brain regions is represented by some universal language for items in goals to be attained? Does this mean also that any true (multi-lingual) lexicon for language terms is represented by the translation routines in brain stem / spinal cord from parallel deep structure items into sequential surface structure output strings; the choice for a certain output language, and therefore the specific translation routine, being then represented by some parameter specified in the involved awareness item? Does this explain the ease by which multi-linguals can switch between languages in the course of a discussion? * Do the research results enable a confirmation / update / (partial)reject to be made of the modelling of human behavioral characteristics as expressed in chapter 6 and in figures 33 and 37 in Walle (2000-1)? Can these judgments be formulated into the specification of a more refined research effort, aimed specifically at a final modelling of these human behavioral characteristics, both functionally and implementationally? Other data are to be found in my website: www.novoware.tk I look forward to your comments. Regards, Frans van der Walle fw.novoware@planet.nl Literature Churchland, 1988 ; Patricia Smith Churchland; Neurophilosophy; toward a unified science of the mind-brain; 1988, A Bradford Book, MIT Press; Cambridge Massachusetts; London, England; ISBN-0-262-03116-7 Edelman, 1975; Gerald M Edelman; The remembered present; Basic books Inc. publishers; New York; ISBN 0-465-06910-X Edelman,1989; Gerald M Edelman; Neural darwinism; the theory of neuronal group selection; Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989; ISBN 0-19-286089-5 Edelman et al, 1979; Gerald M Edelman and Vernon B Mountcastle; 'The mindful brain'; MIT Mass., 1979; ISBN 0-262-05020-X Freud, 1961; Sigmund Freud; 'Moses and Monotheism'; Vintage books; New-York; 1961 Freud, 1983; Sigmund Freud; "Abriss der Psychoanalyse"; Gesammelte Werke; Schriften aus dem Nachlasz; S Fischer Verlag; Frankfurt am Main; 1983. ISBN-3-10-022718-2; pages 67 through 138. Lawrence, 1992; Peter A Lawrence.; "The making of a fly"; Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1992. Litman, 1996; Gary W Litman; 'Sharks and the origin of vertebrate immunity'; Scientific American, november 1996, pages 47-51.http://home.planet.nl/~novoware McClelland et al,1987; James L McClelland and David E Rumelhart; 'Parallel distributed processing; explorations in the microstructure of cognition'; volume 2, psychological and biological models. A Bradford book; MIT, 1987. ISBN 0-262-13218-4 McClelland, 1994; 'The organization of memory: a parallel distributing processing perspective'; pages 570 through 579 in: Rev. Neurol. (Paris), 150, 8-9, 1994 McClelland et al,1995; James L McClelland, Bruce L McNaughton and Randall C O'Reilly 'Why there are complex learning systems in the hippocampus and neocortex: Insights from the successes and failures of connectionist models of learning and memory'; Psychological Review, 1995, vol. 102, no 3, pages 419 through 457. Penfield et al., 1959; Wilder Penfield and Lamar Roberts; 'Speech and brain-mechanisms' Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Yersey, 1959 Ridley, 1996; Mark Ridley; 'Evolution'; Blackwell Science Inc. 1996; ISBN 0-86542-495-0 Vygotsky, 1934/1986; Lev Vygotsky, 'Thought and language'; revised and edited by Alex Kozulin; MIT Press, 1986; ISBN 0-262-22029-6 Walle, 2000-1; Frans van der Walle; 'Biography of 'Man', a modelling of human evolution, ISBN 90-804142-2-0, Novoware publishing company, Oss, the Netherlands, 2000; email fw.novoware@planet.nl; http://home.planet.nl/~novoware or: http://www.novoware.tk. .