COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 82639 ARLENE LAURICH-TROST, ETC. : ET AL. : : Plaintiffs-Appellees : : JOURNAL ENTRY : vs. : and : : OPINION DIETER WABNITZ, ET AL. : : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: November 26, 2003 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-347205 JUDGMENT: REVERSED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: ______________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellees: LEONARD S. GREENWALD Leonard S. Greenwald Co., L.P.A. 526 Superior Avenue, Suite 1030 Cleveland, Ohio 44114 For Defendant-Appellant: JAMES R. DOUGLASS Douglass & DeFoy 526 Superior Avenue, Suite 630 Cleveland, Ohio 44114 KENNETH J. FREEMAN Kenneth J. Freeman Co., L.P.A. 526 Superior Avenue, Suite 515 Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1903 -2- COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, P.J.: Defendant-appellant Dieter Wabnitz ("Wabnitz") appeals the trial court's order granting plaintiff-appellee Victor Laurich- Trost's motion for set-off and to enter judgment for the net amount. We find merit to the appeal and reverse. Victor Laurich-Trost and Arlene Laurich-Trost, administratrix of the estate of Alice Huusare, sued Wabnitz for breach of contract, fraud, and conversion in January 1998. Wabnitz filed a counterclaim, in which he also asserted a claim for conversion. The case proceeded to trial in November 1998. The jury returned verdicts against Wabnitz and in favor of Arlene Laurich- Trost in the amount of $18,750 and in favor of Victor Laurich-Trost in the amount of $81,950. The jury also returned a verdict in favor of Wabnitz and against the Laurich-Trosts in the amount of $20,000 on Wabnitz's counterclaim. Victor Laurich-Trost subsequently filed a motion to set off and enter judgment for net amount. However, before the court ruled on the motion, Wabnitz filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the Eastern District of Michigan, thereby staying the case and preventing the court from granting a set-off. Wabnitz listed the $20,000 judgment as an asset in the bankruptcy case and the Laurich-Trosts' judgments against him as debts. Because the amount the Laurich-Trosts owed him was less than the amount he owed them, the trustee found the judgment was a -3- worthless asset and valued the $20,000 judgment the Laurich-Trosts owed to Wabnitz at zero.1 The bankruptcy court ultimately issued a discharge of debtor order, discharging Wabnitz's debts including the Laurich-Trosts' judgments against him as a "no assets" case.2 Thereafter, Wabnitz filed a garnishment in the Cleveland Municipal Court, attempting to collect the $20,000 judgment he had obtained against the Laurich-Trosts. Victor Laurich-Trost asserts that he returned to the trial court seeking an order setting off the $20,000 judgment against Victor Laurich-Trost's $81,950 judgment against Wabnitz in an effort to avoid garnishment. The trial court granted the motion and entered final judgment against Wabnitz for the net amount of $61,950. Wabnitz appeals. In his sole assignment of error, Wabnitz argues the trial court erred when it granted Victor Laurich-Trost's motion for set- off and entered judgment against Wabnitz for the net amount of $61,950. We agree. Section 524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states, in pertinent part: "A discharge in a case under this title ­* * * 1 Victor Laurich-Trost provided a copy of the bankruptcy court's "Individual Estate Property Record and Report." Although it is not a certified copy, these facts are not disputed by the parties. 2Although the record does not contain a certified copy of the order discharging Wabnitz's debts, these facts are also undisputed by the parties. -4- (1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged * * * whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action , the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; * * *" (Emphasis added). 11 U.S.C. §524. In Thompson v. Mabor, Nugent Co. (Jan. 30, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 69126, this court held, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §524, that once a debt has been discharged, the creditor is enjoined from maintaining proceedings to either collect on the obligation or offset the debtor's obligation. "All debts of Mabor [the debtor], including any debt to him, were discharged in the federal bankruptcy proceedings." Id. (Emphasis added.) Thus, in the instant case, the trial court's order granting the set-off and entering final judgment against Wabnitz for the net amount of $61,950 violates 11 U.S.C. §524 because Victor Laurich-Trost's judgment against Wabnitz as well as Wabnitz's $20,000 judgment were discharged in bankruptcy. See, Laurich-Trost v. Coating Measurement Technologies (June 6, 2002), Cuyahoga App. No. 80116, at ¶ 56 (Wabnitz's individual liability for the underlying judgment was discharged in his personal bankruptcy). Accordingly, the sole assignment of error is sustained. Judgment reversed. -5- This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellees the costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J. and ANTHONY O. CALABRESE, JR., J. CONCUR PRESIDING JUDGE COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also, S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A)(1). .