COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 78307 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION JAMIL STUDGIONS : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : MAY 31, 2001 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-386,366 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: WILLIAM D. MASON Cuyahoga County Prosecutor MICHAEL BEDNAR, Assistant Justice Center, Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: JAMES A. DRAPER Cuyahoga County Public Defender DARIN THOMPSON, Assistant 1200 West Third Street, N.W. 100 Lakeside Place Cleveland, Ohio 44ll3-1569 KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.: -2- Defendant-appellant Jamil Studgions appeals from his convic- tions after a jury trial of trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine, and possession of criminal tools. Although appellant asserts his convictions are not based upon the weight of the evidence, this court disagrees; therefore, appellant's convictions are affirmed. Appellant`s convictions result from an incident that occurred on the night of November 12, 1999. Several members of the Cleveland Police Department's Fourth District Vice Unit had set up a buy-bust operation 1in the area of East 128th Street and Kinsman Avenue. To facilitate this operation, Detective Philmore Evans first had obtained marked currency from the police station and Xeroxed it. He also engaged the services of a confidential informant, searched the informant to make sure he [didn't] have any drugs or contraband in his possession, confiscated money in the informant's possession, then issued to the informant $20 in marked currency. Evans finally proceeded, with the informant, to the location in an undercover vehicle. Short distances away, other police vehicles known as take-down cars awaited Evans' instructions. As Evans approached the area, he observed a man, later iden- tified as appellant, standing on the intersection's southeast corner, across the street from the Mount Pleasant Barbecue. 1Quotes indicate testimony given by a witness at appellant's trial. -3- Appellant was in the company of two other men, and he appeared to be flagging down vehicles. Evans stopped his undercover vehicle approximately 20 to 25 feet from appellant. The informant exited the vehicle, walked to appellant, engaged in a brief conversation, exchanged something with appellant, then returned. Once inside, the informant dis- played to Evans what appellant had provided. The item appeared to be a rock of crack cocaine; later laboratory analysis of the item confirmed this. Evans radioed the other members of his detail of what had taken place. He described appellant's appearance and clothing and ordered them to make an arrest. Detective Fred Mone responded to Evans' broadcast. Since Mone's police vehicle had been waiting at East 123rd Street and Kinsman Avenue, he arrived at appellant's location within [t]hirty seconds. Mone observed appellant on the southeast corner of the inter- section; appellant precisely matched Evans' description of the suspect. Mone and his partner thereupon arrested appellant. A pat-down search of appellant yielded a sum of money from one of his pockets. Included in the currency appellant had in his possession were the marked bills Evans had provided to the informant. Appellant subsequently was indicted on three counts as follows: (2) trafficking in crack cocaine, R.C. 2925.03(A); (2) -4- possession of crack cocaine, R.C. 2925.11(A); and (3) possession of criminal tools, R.C. 2923.24.2 Appellant's case proceeded to a jury trial. The parties first stipulated to the results of the laboratory analysis and also stipulated to the fact appellant, a day prior to the incident, had both received and cashed his payroll check. The state then presented the testimony of Evans and Mone. Following the trial court's denial of his motions for acquittal, appellant presented the testimony of a friend, Gwendolyn Johnson. Johnson stated appellant and his girlfriend had offered her a ride home but first had taken a long detour in order for appellant to obtain some barbecue. Johnson stated that upon their arrival near the Mount Pleasant Barbecue, appellant had emerged from their vehicle and simply was attempting to cross the street when the arrest suddenly occurred. Despite Johnson's testimony, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. The trial court ordered a presentence report prior to sentencing appellant to concurrent terms of incarceration of six months on each count. Appellant filed a timely appeal of his convictions. His sole assignment of error states: APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANI- FEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. Appellant argues the evidence presented by the state was not so compelling as to outweigh the testimony of his witness. On this 2The first two counts of the indictment indicated the amount of the drug as one gram or less. -5- basis, he contends his convictions should be reversed. This court disagrees. The test to be applied when reviewing a claim that a convic- tion is against the manifest weight of the evidence was stated by the court in State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172 at 175 as follows: There being sufficient evidence to support the conviction as a matter of law, we next con- sider the claim that the judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Here the test is much broader. The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibil- ity of witnesses and determines whether in re- solving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a mani- fest miscarriage of justice that the convic- tion must be reversed and a new trial ordered. *** See Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31, 38, 42, 72 L.Ed.2d 652, 102 S.Ct. 2211. (Emphasis added.) See, also, State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380 at 387. This court must be mindful, however, that the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are matters primarily for the trier of fact, and a reviewing court must not reverse a verdict where the trier of fact could reasonably conclude from substantial evidence that the state has proven the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, syllabus 1; State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169. Circumstantial evidence of guilt, moreover, is not subject to a standard of proof other than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259; State v. Tinch (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 111 at 122- 123. -6- Despite appellant's assertion in this case that the testimony of the police officers was not without flaws, a review of the record demonstrates their testimony was logical and consistent. According to the evidence they presented, appellant exchanged something with the informant; afterward, the informant had a rock of crack cocaine while appellant, in his pocket, had the marked money given by Evans to the informant prior to the operation. Appellant's witness Johnson, on the other hand, was less than credible. She testified that rather than driving Johnson directly to her home on the west side, appellant first had his girlfriend drive a much greater distance east simply in order for him to obtain some barbecue. Johnson could not state whether the three of them had passed other barbecue restaurants on their way to the intersection of East 128th Street and Kinsman Avenue. Finally, Johnson indicated appellant's girlfriend failed to protest the police officers' actions in arresting appellant but merely drove away from the scene. From the evidence presented, therefore, the jury was free to infer appellant possessed the rock of crack cocaine, then sold it to the informant for $20 in marked currency. Since it cannot be said the jury clearly lost its way in resolving any conflicts in the evidence, appellant's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Stovall (Jan. 22, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 72149, unreported; State v. Giles (May 2, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69367, unreported; State v. Moronta (Aug. 24, 1995), -7- Cuyahoga App. No. 67967, unreported; State v. Tschudy (May 24, 1995), Summit App. No. 16820, unreported. Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is overruled. Appellant's convictions are affirmed. -8- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON,J. and TERRENCE O'DONNELL,J. CONCUR PRESIDING JUDGE KENNETH A. ROCCO N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc. App.R. 22. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also, S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A)(1). .