COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA No. 76680 ACCELERATED DOCKET SANDRA M. JOHNSON : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-appellant : : AND vs. : : OPINION WEISS FURS : : Defendant-appellee : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : FEBRUARY 24, 2000 OF DECISION : : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS : Civil appeal from : Rocky River Municipal Court : Case No. 98-CVI-1508 : JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: For defendant-appellee: JOSEPH H. BLACKWELL MARK A. ROPCHOCK Suite 595 REGINA M. MASSETTI 310 West Lakeside Avenue Suite 530 Cleveland, OH 44113-1021 113 St. Clair Avenue Cleveland, OH 44114-1272 JOHN T. PATTON, J.: This cause came on to be heard upon the accelerated calendar -2- pursuant to App. R. 11.1 and Loc. R. 25, the records from the Rocky River Municipal Court, oral arguments of counsel and the briefs. Plaintiff-appellant Sandra Johnson ( plaintiff ) appeals the decision of the Rocky River Municipal Court finding in favor of defendant-appellee Weiss Furs ( defendant ). The record reveals that on December 11, 1996, plaintiff purchased a fur coat from defendant for $3,849.95. The purchase was made pursuant to a sales promotion extended to Realty One employees, which is where plaintiff was employed. On April 20, 1997, defendant issued an appraisal certificate stating the appraised value of the coat was $6,000. Five months later, on October 1, 1997, plaintiff returned the coat to defendant to have the coat monogrammed. The coat was stolen from defendant's store during a burglary. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an insurance claim with her own insurance carrier and was paid $4,280 for the loss of the coat. On September 2, 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Rocky River Municipal Court ( court ) arguing she needed to be made whole as Allstate Insurance did not honor defendant's appraisal value of $6,000. A hearing on the matter was held; defendant did not appear. Nonetheless the magistrate found in favor of defendant. Plaintiff then sent a letter, pro se, to the court. In the letter, plaintiff stated she was appealing the magistrate's decision based on the fact that defendant did not appear for the hearing. On November 11, 1998, the court adopted the decision of the magistrate. On April 23, 1999, plaintiff sent a second letter -3- to the court asking why there was no response to her first letter. Three days later the court issued a judgment entry saying it did not receive the first letter but would refer the matter back to the magistrate to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. On June 3, 1999, the magistrate issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate confirmed the judgment in favor of defendant, finding [P]laintiff already recovered from her insurance company for the replacement value of the coat. Plaintiff filed objections to the findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court then overruled plaintiff's objections. Next, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied by the trial court. Plaintiff proceeded to timely file her notice of appeal from the court's order overruling her objections to the magistrate's report. On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court failed to consider her evidence of an admission against interest; i.e., defendant's own $6,000 appraisal value. In addition, plaintiff complains the trial court failed to recognize there was no privity of contract between her insurance carrier, Allstate, and defendant. As a result, the trial court erred by allowing defendant to claim the benefit of plaintiff's reimbursement by Allstate for the loss of her coat. Lastly, plaintiff claims defendant is liable for the full value of the coat since defendant does not qualify as a warehouseman under R.C. 1307. The question at issue is the measure of damages to be paid to plaintiff in light of her coat being lost, i.e., stolen. In -4- Hibbard v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 829, 834, citing Cooper v. Feeney (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 282, the court stated *** where property is totally destroyed, the trial court must measure damages as the reasonable market value of the property immediately before its destruction. The term "fair market value" is usually defined as that price which would be agreed upon between a willing seller and a willing buyer in a voluntary sale on the open market. Masheter v. Ohio Holding Co. (1973), 38 Ohio App.2d 49, 53. Moreover, the purpose of monetary compensatory damages is to put the injured party in the position that he or she would have been in, had the wrong complained of not occurred. Cooper v. Feeney, 34 Ohio App.3d 282, 284. In the present case we have three values for the coat: (1) plaintiff's purchase price of $3,849.95, (2) Allstate's replacement price of $4,280, and (3) the appraisal value of $6,000. As to what the market value of the coat is, the only evidence we have regarding an agreed price between a willing seller and buyer is the $3,849.95 purchase price between plaintiff and defendant. The appraisal value is just that: an appraisal or estimate of what a willing buyer and seller would be willing to pay. If plaintiff was certain that the $6,000 appraisal value was the market value, she could have had it insured for that much, thereby guaranteeing that upon loss or destruction she would receive $6,000 from her insurance carrier. In addition, since plaintiff's out-of-pocket cost was $3,849.95, her position, prior to the theft of her coat, was enhanced as Allstate paid her $4,280, a gain of $430.05. -5- Regarding plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred in affording her the benefit of the insurance company because there was no privity of contract between her and defendant's insurer, we find it unpersuasive. Plaintiff recovered from her own insurance carrier, Allstate, not from defendant's insurance carrier, so her argument is inapplicable. Lastly, plaintiff argues defendant is liable for the full amount of the coat because it qualifies as a warehouseman under R.C. 1307. The common-law duty of care has been codified in R.C. 1307.09(A), which states: A warehouseman is liable for damages for loss of or injury to the goods caused by his failure to exercise such care in regard to them as a reasonably careful man would exercise under like circumstances but unless otherwise agreed he is not liable for damages which could not have been avoided by the exercise of such care. The common-law duty to redeliver bailed property, and excuses for failure to do so, are codified in R.C. 1307.27(A), which states, in part: (A) The bailee must deliver the goods * * * unless and to the extent that the bailee establishes any of the following: " * * * "(2) damage to or delay, loss, or destruction of the goods for which the bailee is not liable * * *." "Warehousemen" is defined in R.C. 1307.01(A)(8) as: * * * a person engaged in the business of storing of goods * * *," and "goods" is defined in R.C. 1307.01(A)(6) as: "* * * all things -6- which are treated as removable for the purposes of a contract of storage or transportation." However, a bailee, such as defendant, is excused for loss of the goods by theft or fire if the goods have been lost without fault or lack of due care on the part of the bailee. See Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine (1944), 144 Ohio St. 275. The record is devoid of a finding that defendant failed to exhibit due care or was at fault for the burglary of plaintiff's coat. Therefore, it is excused from the liability imposed by R.C. 1307. Based on the above analysis, we find the court did not err in finding for defendant. Accordingly, plaintiff's sole assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Rocky River Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J., CONCURS. ANN DYKE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY. JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .