COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 75327 IN RE: GIANNI GRAY, : A MINOR : : JOURNAL ENTRY Appellant : : AND : : OPINION : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: DECEMBER 23, 1999 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Juvenile Court Division, No. 98-04648. JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Gianni Gray, Appellant: Edward F. Cleary, Esq. 20800 Center Ridge Road No. 217 Rocky River, OH 44116 For State of Ohio: William D. Mason, Esq. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor John R. Mitchell, Esq. Assistant County Prosecutor Justice Center - Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: Appellant, Gianni Gray, appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, which found him delinquent and placed him in the custody of the Ohio Department of -2- Youth Services. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. On April 2, 1998, a delinquency complaint was filed in the Juvenile Court Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, alleging that appellant had broken several lights and a window in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Detention Center, in violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(2). On August 18, 1998, appellant appeared before a magistrate of the Juvenile Court for a hearing on several charges, including the vandalism charge. Appellant was accompanied by his guardian ad litem and his parole officer. Appellant's guardian ad litem informed the court that appellant was waiving his right to counsel and would admit to the charges. The magistrate then engaged in the following colloquy with appellant: COURT: So Gianni, you're going to be admitting then the vandalism and the theft charges and the menacing charges? APPELLANT: Yes, ma'am. COURT: Do you understand by admitting these charges, you're giving up your right to a trial? You're giving up your right to present evidence on your behalf and the right to challenge the State's case against you? APPELLANT: Yes, ma'am. COURT: Anybody promise you anything or threaten you to get you to admit these charges? APPELLANT: No, ma'am. COURT: Are you under the influence of drugs, alcohol or any other chemical substances? -3- APPELLANT: No, ma'am. COURT: All right. After questioning appellant regarding the facts surrounding each of the charges, the magistrate found appellant delinquent based upon his admissions. She ordered that he be committed to the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services and institutionalized in a secure facility for a minimum of six months and a maximum period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. On September 25, 1998, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The court denied appellant's motion on October 6, 1998. Appellant timely appealed, assigning two assignments of error for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE APPELLANT'S WAIVER OF COUNSEL WITHOUT ADDRESSING THE APPELLANT TO MAKE SURE IT WAS A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF COUNSEL. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE APPELLANT'S ADMISSION WHEN IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF JUVENILE RULE 29(D). In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Therefore, appellant requests that we reverse the adjudication of delinquency and remand for further proceedings. The state concedes that the record fails to reflect that appellant effectively waived his right to counsel prior to his admissions -4- before the trial court and likewise asks this court to reverse and remand. Rule 4(A) of the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides that every party shall have the right to be represented by counsel and every child, parent, custodian, or other person in loco parentis the right to appointed counsel if indigent. Juvenile Rule 29(B)(3) provides that the trial court must, prior to a hearing, inform unrepresented parties of their right to counsel and determine whether the parties are waiving their right to counsel. For a waiver to be effective, it must be clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' City of Cleveland Hts. v. Bonarrigo (June 19, 1975), Cuyahoga App. No. 32902, unreported, quoting Brookhart v. Janis (1966), 384 U.S. 1, 4. If the trial court was led to believe that [the] defendant was waiving his right to counsel, a complete set of reasons should have been spread on the record *** in order to establish that such a choice by defendant was being made understandingly and intelligently ***. Bonarrigo, supra, quoting State v. Wellman (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 162, 172. It is apparent from the excerpted colloquy that the trial court failed to inform appellant of his right to counsel and failed to make any inquiry whatsoever regarding whether appellant was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waiving his right to counsel. The trial court did not ask appellant any questions -5- whatsoever regarding his waiver or attempt in any way to determine whether appellant understood the effect of his waiver. Appellant's first assignment of error is therefore sustained. In his second assignment of error, appellant challenges the trial court's acceptance of his admission to the aforementioned charge on the basis that the trial court did not comply with Juvenile Rule 29(D). Having conceded the validity of appellant's first assignment of error, the state does not respond to appellant's second assignment of error. Juvenile Rule 29(D) governs the initial procedure upon an entry of an admission and provides: The court may refuse to accept an admission and shall not accept an admission without addressing the party personally and determining both of the following: (1) The party is making the admission voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the allegations and the consequences of the admissions; (2) The party understands that by entering an admission the party is waiving the right to challenge the witnesses and evidence against the party, to remain silent, and to introduce evidence at the adjudicatory hearing. In order to satisfy the requirements of this rule, the court must address the youth personally and conduct an on-the-record discussion to determine whether the admission is being entered knowingly and voluntarily. In re West (1998), 128 Ohio App.3d 356, 359, citing In re McKenzie (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 275, 277. An admission once made is reviewed for substantial compliance with these requirements. Id. Absent a showing of prejudice, if there -6- is substantial compliance with the rule, the plea is voluntarily and intelligently entered and will not be disturbed on appeal. Id. Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving. State v. Nero(1991), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108; In re Jenkins (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 177, 181. The test for prejudice is whether the plea would otherwise have been made. State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 93. The record in this case demonstrates that the trial court failed to even minimally comply with the requirements of Juvenile Rule 29(D). Although the trial court personally addressed appellant, there was no discussion of the nature of the charges pending against him or of the penalties associated with that offense. The trial court never informed appellant that an admission to the charge meant that he could be institutionalized for a minimum of six months and perhaps until his twenty-first birthday. Because the trial court's acceptance of appellant's admission did not comply with Juvenile Rule 29(D), it is not valid. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore sustained. -7- This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. It is, therefore, ordered that appellant recover from appellee his costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE JUDGE KARPINSKI, P.J. and ROCCO, J. CONCUR. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .