COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 75136 : STATE OF OHIO EX REL. : PETITION FOR WRIT OF DAVID SLIMAN : MANDAMUS : Relator : MOTION NO. 5006 : -vs- : : STRONGSVILLE MAYOR'S COURT : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION : Respondent : : DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APRIL 15, 1999 JUDGMENT : WRIT DENIED. APPEARANCES: For Relator : DAVID SLIMAN, Pro Se 1710 Prospect Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 For Respondent : JOHN D. RYAN, Esq. 14650 Detroit Avenue, Suite 300 Lakewood, Ohio 44107 -2- JAMES M. PORTER, A.J.: On August 31, 1998, the relator, David Sliman, commenced this mandamus action against the respondent, the Strongsville Mayor's Court, to compel the respondent to vacate fines, amounting to approximately $1,475.00, in the underlying cases, Strongsville Mayor's Court Case Nos. 9200484, 9200485, 9200486, 9203233, 9203234, and 9203546. Mr. Sliman argues that pursuant to R.C. 2947.14, satisfaction of fine when an individual is unwilling to pay the fine, to R.C. 2929.41, multiple sentences, and to R.C. 2941.401, request for trial on pending charges, the respondent has the clear, legal duty to count the time spent in incarceration in another case toward satisfaction of the fines in the underlying cases. On October 30, 1998, the respondent moved to dismiss this action or in the alternative for summary judgment on the grounds of pleading deficiencies and res judicata. Mr. Sliman never filed a brief in opposition to this dispositive motion. For the following reasons this court grants the motion for summary judgment and denies the writ. As gleaned from the filed materials, in early 1992, Mr. Sliman was charged in Case No. 9200484 with operating a motor vehicle with illegal license plates, in Case No. 9200485 with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, and in Case No. 9200486 with presenting false information to a law enforcement officer. In each of these cases he pleaded guilty or no contest, and the trial court, inter alia, imposed fines and court costs, amounting to $671.00. In October 1992, Mr. Sliman was charged in Case No. -3- 9203233 with operating a motor vehicle with license plates belonging to another vehicle and in Case No. 9203234 with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. He pleaded guilty to these charges, and the court, inter alia, imposed fines and court costs amounting to $564.00. In late 1992, Mr. Sliman was charged in Case No. 9203546 with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. He pleaded no contest, and the court imposed fines and court costs amounting to $507.00.1 It is not disputed that Mr. Sliman has paid none of the amount owed. Mr. Sliman has been serving a felony prison term of three to ten years at the Grafton Correctional Institute as ordered by the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. However, Mr. Sliman has stated no other facts about this conviction; it is apparently unrelated to the underlying cases. Since 1992, Mr. Sliman has repeatedly attempted to vacate the fines in the underlying cases. On July 14, 1997, he filed a mandamus action in this court, State ex rel. David Sliman v. Strongsville Police Department, et al., Cuyahoga App. No. 72850, to compel the respondents to vacate the fines and costs. On September 5, 1997, Mr. Sliman moved to amend the complaint, and on September 19, 1997, this court granted that motion. The amended complaint named the Strongsville Mayor's Court as the respondent and sought to vacate the fines pursuant to the same argument made in the present case, i.e., the mayor's court must count the days of Mr. 1 In each of these cases, Mr. Sliman entered into a payment plan which increased court costs by $25.00. The respondent calculates that Mr. Sliman owes $1,742.00. -4- Sliman's r at thfelony imprisonment in satisfaction for the misdemeanofines e court dismissed Case No. 72850 for failure to prosecute. In early April 1998, Mr. Sliman moved the mayor's court to vacate the fines by arguing that his felony imprisonment should be counted toward satisfying the fines. It is not clear whether the mayor's court has ruled on that motion.2 R.C. 2947.14 provides in pertinent part as follows: (A) If a fine is imposed as a sentence or a part of a sentence, the court or magistrate that imposed the fine may order that the offender be committed to the jail or workhouse until the fine is paid *** , if the court or magistrate determines at a hearing that the offender is able, at that time, to pay the fine but refuses to do so. The hearing required by this section shall be conducted at the time of sentencing. *** (D) No person shall be ordered to be committed to a jail or workhouse or otherwise be held in custody in satisfaction of a fine imposed as the whole or a part of a sentence except as provided in this section. Any person imprisoned pursuant to this section shall receive credit upon the fine at the rate of thirty dollars per day or fraction of a day. If the unpaid fine is less than thirty dollars, the person shall be imprisoned one day. R.C. 2929.41 provides that any sentence of imprisonment, unless the sentencing court otherwise specifies, shall be served concurrently with any other sentence of imprisonment. In any case, a sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanor shall be served concurrently with 2 The specific relief Mr. Sliman requests in the present case is to issue the Writ of Mandamus compelling the Strongsville Mayor's Court to vacate the fines in the above referenced cases. (Demand clause of the complaint, pg. 3.) Mr. Sliman does not request that this court compel the mayor's court to rule on outstanding motions. Thus, this court limits its examination to the specifically requested relief, whether the law requires any misdemeanor fines to be satisfied by imprisonment for a felony at a rate of $30.00 a day. -5- a sentence of imprisonment for felony served in a state or federal correctional institution. R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2941.401 provides that if, during a term of imprisonment, any untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending against a prisoner in Ohio, he should be notified of such proceedings and have the opportunity to request an early disposition of such matters. If the prisoner properly requests a disposition, he shall be brought to trial on those matters within 180 days of his request. If the action is not tried within that time period, the courts lose jurisdiction over such matters which should then be dismissed. Mr. Sliman argues that these statutes must be interpreted in pari materia as follows: Because R.C. 2941.41(A) requires that misdemeanor sentences be served concurrently with felony sentences and because R.C. 2947.14 provides that misdemeanor fines may be satisfied at the rate of $30.00 for each day of imprisonment, his fines in the underlying cases must be satisfied by his felony imprisonment. Moreover, R.C. 2941.401 embodies the policy that a prisoner should not be forced to suffer consecutive imprisonments, if other charges are pending out there ; rather the prisoner has the right upon proper presentation to have those charges resolved while he is still in prison. To do otherwise would violate Ohio's policies that misdemeanor sentences must be served concurrently with felony sentences and that a prisoner must be allowed to resolve all pending matters against him while he is in prison. Therefore, by his notifying the mayor's court that he is currently -6- incarcerated for a felony, the court has the duty to count that imprisonment at the rate of $30.00 per day toward the satisfaction of the fines in the underlying cases. Mr. Sliman finishes his argument by asserting that mandamus is the proper remedy because clear legal rights and duties are involved. However, his argument is not persuasive. The requisites for mandamus are well established: (1) the relator must have a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondent must have a clear legal duty to perform the requested relief and (3) there must be no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 515 N.E.2d 914. Moreover, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which is to be exercised with caution and only when the right is clear. It should not issue in doubtful cases. State ex rel. Taylor v. Glasser (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 165, 364 N.E.2d 1; State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Commission (1953), 159 Ohio St. 581, 113 N.E.2d 14; State ex rel. Connole v. Cleveland Board of Education (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 43, 621 N.E.2d 850; and State ex rel. Dayton-Oakwood Press v. Dissinger (1940), 32 Ohio Law Abs. 308. It is doubtful, at the very least, that the cited statutes apply. R.C. 2947.14 has very specific conditions. First, the offender must be able to pay the fine, but refuses to do so. Second, the court that imposed the fine, i.e., in this case the mayor's court, must make a determination to that effect. That hearing should be held at time of the sentencing. Finally, in order to receive the $30.00 per day credit , the offender must be -7- imprisoned pursuant to R.C. 2947.14. In the present case none of those conditions have been fulfilled. Mr. Sliman states that he is unable, not unwilling, to pay the fine because he is imprisoned. There is no indication that the mayor's court ever conducted the required hearing to determine Mr. Sliman's ability and willful refusal to pay the fine, much less make that determination. It also appears that the time for such a hearing has passed. Furthermore, Mr. Sliman's current incarceration is due to a felony conviction, not an order pursuant to R.C. 2947.14(D). In State v. James (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 679, 666 N.E.2d 1185, Mr. James had spent 179 days in juvenile detention and 31 days in jail; he was convicted of assault, and the trial court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 180 days and $1,000.00 fine. Mr. James then sought to have the days he was confined in excess of his sentence applied to his fine pursuant to R.C. 2947.14. The court of appeals rejected this argument, because subsection (D) permitted the credit only if the imprisonment was pursuant to this section. A prisoner is not entitled to the credit unless [he] was explicitly imprisoned for the purpose of satisfying his fine ***. 106 Ohio App.3d at 690. Because Mr. James was not imprisoned explicitly to satisfy his fine, he was not entitled to the credit. This court echoed the James ruling in City of Cleveland v. Anderson (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 63, 67, 611 N.E.2d 439: It is likewise clear from the plain language of R.C. 2947.14(D) that no person shall be committed to a jail or workhouse in satisfaction of a fine -8- except as provided in R.C. 2947.14. Because Mr. Sliman's current incarcerationis not explicitly pursuant to R.C. 2947.14, there is no clear legal, right to have his fine satisfied by the imprisonment. Similarly, the other statutes are not applicable. R.C. 2941.401 applies to untried indictments, informations and complaints. In the present case the underlying cases have been fully resolved; Mr. Sliman has been convicted and sentenced. Thus, this statute is irrelevant. State ex rel. James v. Probation Department of Cuyahoga County (March 18, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 75068, unreported. R.C. 2929.41(A) applies to a sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanor. The present case and the underlying cases do not concern sentences of imprisonment for misdemeanors, but fines. Mr. Sliman cleverly cites State v. Sparks (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 400, 590 N.E.2d 1294, for the proposition that R.C. 2947.14 may be read in pari materia with other statutes to obtain the $30.00 per day credit. In Sparks, the defendant was in pre-trial custody for approximately a month. He pleaded guilty to two minor misdemeanors and sentenced to $100.00 fine. The court of appeals held that the Equal Protection Clause, R.C. 2949.08, reduction of sentence for prior confinement, and R.C. 2947.14, should be read in pari materia, so that any pretrial confinement on charges which ultimately are resolved in convictions for minor misdemeanors must be credited against any fine or costs. As Mr. Sliman concedes, Sparks is distinguishable. It -9- concerns minor misdemeanors, punishable only by fines, R.C. 2948.08, and pretrial confinement on the relevant charges, not felony incarceration on an unrelated case. In weighing Sparks and Mr. Sliman's arguments against the plain language of R.C. 2947.14, R.C. 2941.401, R.C. 2929.41, and James and Anderson, this court is not convinced that a clear legal duty and right exist to credit the time spent in felony imprisonment on an unrelated case to fines for misdemeanors at the rate of $30.00 per day when the requisites of R.C. 2947.14 have not been fulfilled. Accordingly, this court declines to issue the writ of mandamus as requested. Additionally, the mayor's court is correct in arguing that procedural deficiencies also defeat Mr. Sliman's claim. Civil Rule 10(A) requires the complaint in the title of the action to include the addresses of all the parties. Mr. Sliman failed to do that. Such a deficiency alone warrants dismissal. State ex rel. Hairston v. City of Cleveland Chief of Police (July 2, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 74685, unreported; State ex rel. Simms v. Sutula (Aug. 21, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 72896, unreported and State ex rel. Calloway v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (Aug. 21, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 71652, unreported. Res Judicata also bars the present case. In Case No. 72850 Mr. Sliman raised the identical claim concerning satisfying his fine by using his time in felony imprisonment as credit pursuant to R.C. 2947.14. This court's dismissal of Case No. 72850 for want of prosecution was an adjudication on the merits and now bars Mr. Sliman from raising that claim again. State ex rel. SuperAmerica -10- Group v. Licking County Board of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 182, 685 N.E.2d 507 and Rice v. City of Westlake (June 15, 1989), Cuyahoga App. No. 55424, unreported. Accordingly, the respondent's motion for summary judgment is granted, and this court denies the application for a writ of mandamus. Costs assessed against relator. ANN DYKE, J., CONCURS .