COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 74749 S/O, EX REL. DARRELL TABOR : : PETITION FOR WRIT OF Petitioner : HAPEAS CORPUS : vs. : : MOTION NO. 96285 THE HONORABLE JANET BURNSIDE : : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION Respondent : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: July 30, 1998 JUDGMENT: WRIT DISMISSED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Petitioner: JAMES A. DRAPER, ESQ. Cuyahoga County Public Defender VALERIE R. ARBIE, ESQ. Assistant Public Defender 100 Lakeside Place 1200 West Third Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For respondent: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor L. CHRISTOPHER FREY Assistant County Prosecutor 8th Floor Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J., On June 23, 1998, the petitioner, Darrell Tabor, commenced this habeas corpus action against the respondent, Judge Janet Burnside, to compel the judge to discharge him from an unlawful restraint of his liberty, i.e., requiring him to reside in Cuyahoga County during the term of his community control sanction. Sua sponte, for the following reasons, this court dismisses this habeas corpus action. In November 1997, Darrell Tabor moved to Columbus and obtained employment. In December 1997, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted him for possession of cocaine, a fifth degree felony. In May 1998 he pleaded guilty to the charge. The respondent in mid- June 1998 sentenced him to one year of community control under the supervision of the Cuyahoga County Adult Probation Department. The judge also ordered him to reside within Cuyahoga County and not leave without the court's permission. Immediately, Mr. Tabor moved the court to reconsider the sentence. He requested pursuant to R.C. 2929.15(A)(2)(a) that his probation be transferred to Columbus, or in the alternative, that he be allowed to live in Columbus and report to Cuyahoga County. He argued that forcing him to live in Cuyahoga County would cost him his job and his home and make him dependent on social services. The respondent denied these requests, but permitted him to return to Columbus in order to organize his affairs so that he could return to Cuyahoga County to complete the sentence. He is to report to the probation department no later than July 6, 1998. -3- Mr. Tabor then filed this habeas corpus action. He reargued that requiring him to reside in Cuyahoga County unlawfully and unreasonably restrains his liberty. Habeas corpus is appropriate because it is always available to contest unlawful restraints on liberty, and other remedies, such as appeal, are not available or appropriate because of the immediacy of his crisis. However, these arguments are not persuasive. R.C. 2705.05 provides that if a person is alleged to be restrained of his liberty by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and the court had jurisdiction to issue the judgment or order, then the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed. In the present case, the respondent had the jurisdiction to issue the order. Common pleas courts may order community control sanctions, and pursuant to R.C. 2929.15(A)(2)(a) the department of probation in the county that serves the court shall ordinarily supervise the sanction. Moreover, R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) provides: The court may impose any other conditions of release under a community control sanctions that the court considers appropriate. Thus, because the respondent had the jurisdiction, the authority to make the order, habeas corpus does not lie. Freshour v. Tate (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 410, 582 N.E.2d 1301 and State ex rel. Tran v. McMackin (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 165, 580 N.E.2d 782. Moreover, sentencing errors are not jurisdictional and are not cognizable in habeas corpus. State ex rel. Massie v. Rogers (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 449, 449-450, 674 N.E.2d 1383 and Walker v. Maxwell (1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 136, 205 N.E.2d 394. -4- Moreover, [a] writ of habeas corpus will ordinarily be denied where there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In re Hunt (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 378, 348 N.E.2d 727, paragraph two of the syllabus; State ex rel. Tucker v. Rogers (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 36, 607 N.E.2d 461. In the present case appeal provides an adequate remedy at law. Furthermore, the effects of the sentence, especially the relevant condition, may be limited by a motion for stay pursuant to App.R. 7 and 8 and Local Rule 15. State ex rel. Frazer v. Administrator/Director Juvenile Court Detention Home (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 245, 668 N.E.2d 546; In re Tamburello (June 21, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 69147, unreported. An appeal does not become an inadequate remedy because of potential delay, inconvenience and additional expense. State ex rel. Casey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 429, 575 N.E.2d 181. Even the cases cited by petitioner, State v. Maynard (1988), 47 Ohio App.3d 76, State v. Livingston (1976), 53 Ohio App.2d 195 and State v. Friend (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 241, support the proposition that appeal is the proper remedy for contesting conditions of probation; the procedural posture of each of those cases is direct appeal, not habeas corpus. Accordingly, this petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed. Costs assessed against petitioner. TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J., and LEO M. SPELLACY,J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE .