COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 74715 STATE OF OHIO : ACCELERATED DOCKET : Plaintiff-appellee : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND -vs- : OPINION : SHANICE STRIBLING : PER CURIAM : Defendant-appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: DECEMBER 10, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Case No. CP-CR-357193 JUDGMENT: Affirmed DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: JAMES A. DRAPER, ESQ. PUBLIC DEFENDER 100 Lakeside Avenue 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: RONNI DUCOFF, ESQ. ASST. COUNTY PROSECUTOR 8th Floor, Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 PER CURIAM: Appellant, Shanice Stribling, is appealing the sentence she -2- received upon pleading guilty to one count of child endangering, R.C. 2919.22(B)(2), (E)(3). For the following reasons, we affirm. Appellant received the maximum sentence of eight years for the second degree felony offense. She had no prior criminal record. The following facts came to light at the sentencing hearing: Appellant began to discipline her eight year old son by yelling and shaking him. Appellant then retrieved a belt and her boyfriend to further punish her son. Both appellant and the boyfriend hit the child with the belt. The boyfriend severely beat the son, fracturing the son's arm. Afterwards, the son was made to stand on his tiptoes with his arms open. If the son moved his arms, he was beaten again. The child was not fed during this time. Appellant did not stop the boyfriend from beating and torturing her son. She did not call medical or law enforcement authorities, although the injuries were plainly visible. The defendant-appellant expressed to the court that she was afraid of her boyfriend, and her boyfriend had beaten her before. The judge stated that she was sickened by the fact that appellant would enlist this man, whom appellant was afraid of, to beat appellant's own son. The trial court found that both the boyfriend and appellant beat the child, and noted the age and size difference between appellant and her son. The judge stated, . . .I find that the seriousness of the offense, even though you are a first offender, is such that demands the maximum penalty according to law. Appellant's sole assignment of error states: -3- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE PURSUANT TO R.C. 2929.14(C) WHERE IT DID NOT FIND OR SET FORTH FACTORS SUPPORTING THAT THE APPELLANT COMMITTED THE WORST FORM OF THE OFFENSE OR THAT THE APPELLANT POSED THE GREATEST LIKELIHOOD OF COMMITTING FUTURE CRIMES. An appellate court may only reverse a sentence if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the sentence is not supported by the record or is contrary to law. R.C. 2953.08(G)(1)(a), (d). In this case, the maximum prison sentence could only be imposed if appellant was among the offenders who committed the worst forms of the offense, or who posed the greatest likelihood for committing future crimes. R.C. 2929.14(C). When the trial court imposes the maximum prison term, it shall state on the record the reasons for imposing the maximum sentence. R.C. 2929.19(B). To impose the maximum sentence, there must be a finding on the record that the offender committed one of the worst forms of the offense or posed the greatest likelihood of recidivism. See State v. Banks (Nov. 20, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 72121, unreported, State v. Beasley (June 11, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 72853, unreported. While the court need not use the exact language of the statute, it must be clear from the record that the trial court made the required findings. See Id., State v. Assad (June 11, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 72648, 72649, unreported, State v. Boss (Sept. 15, 1997), Clermont App. No. CA96-12-107, unreported, State v. Fincher (Oct. 14, 1997), Franklin App. No. 97 APA03-352, unreported. A review of the trial court's remarks at sentencing indicate that the judge found that the worst form of the offense had been -4- committed. While the better practice would be to explicitly state that the defendant committed the worst form of the offense, the record was sufficient to demonstrate that such a finding was made. Appellant also argues that the record can not support a finding that appellant committed the worst form of the offense. Appellant was convicted of recklessly torturing or cruelly abusing a child, resulting in serious physical harm. R.C. 2919.22(B)(2), (E)(3). The factors making the crime worse included: the defendant was the victim's mother, the victim was only eight years old, appellant enlisted her boyfriend to beat the child, the child's arm was fractured, the child was physically and mentally tortured, appellant did not intervene to stop the torture and did not call for medical help. The court could conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the worst form of the offense occurred. While even more serious physical harm could have been inflicted, the court must base its finding on all the relevant factors, not just one isolated factor such as the amount of physical harm. See Statev. Garrad (Dec. 24, 1997), Wayne App. No. 97CA0032, unreported. We can not find that by clear and convincing evidence the maximum sentence was not supported by the record or that the sentence was contrary to law. Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is overruled. The decision of the trial court is affirmed. -5- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES M. PORTER, PRESIDING JUDGE ANN DYKE, JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE ENDFIELD N.B.This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App. R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App. R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .