COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 74414 CHARLES SMITH : ACCELERATED DOCKET : Plaintiff-appellee : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND -vs- : OPINION : YVONNE FLAGGS, ET AL. : PER CURIAM : Defendants-appellants: DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 29, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Lyndhurst Municipal Court Case No. 98 CVG 00343 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: KEITH R. KRAUS, ESQ. KRAUS & KRAUS 1050 Ohio Savings Plaza 1801 East Ninth Street Cleveland, Ohio 44114 For Defendants-Appellants: UCHE MGBARAHO, ESQ. 2000 Standard Building 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 PER CURIAM: Defendant Yvonne Flaggs appeals from the judgment of the -2- Lyndhurst Municipal Court which granted plaintiff Charles V. Smith restitution of property. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. On March 6, 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against defendant Yvonne Flaggs, individually and as custodian for her children, in order to obtain restitution of premises located at 6780 Seneca Road in Mayfield Village. Plaintiff alleged that defendant occupied the premises pursuant to an oral at-will tenancy which was terminated on January 29, 1998. Plaintiff further alleged that he served a three-day notice to vacate upon defendant in March 2, 1998. The matter proceeded to trial on March 31, 1998. Testifying as if upon cross-examination, Yvonne Flaggs admitted that plaintiff purchased the Seneca Road home with his own money and that it is titled in his name. She stated that he purchased it for her so that her children would have a stable home but, due to her many creditors, he did not want it titled in her name. Flaggs stated that she pays everything for the house, but plaintiff pays the taxes, insurance and water bills. Flaggs also admitted that she received a three-day notice to terminate the tenancy on March 2, 1998 but she continues to reside there. Plaintiff testified that he purchased the property as an investment after he obtained a settlement in a personal injury action stemming from a matter in which he sustained quadriplegia. Plaintiff testified that he agreed to let Flaggs live there if she paid the utilities, taxes, and insurance. He subsequently learned -3- that she had not paid the taxes and that a tax foreclosure action was commencing. He then decided to evict Flaggs from the home. Finally, plaintiff stated that he had given his father, Charles H. Smith, a durable power of attorney which gave his father authority over his real estate and other matters. Plaintiff testified that he revoked the durable power of attorney shortly after it was recorded. The trial court subsequently continued the matter so that plaintiff's counsel could produce the revocation of the durable power of attorney for the court. Thereafter, plaintiff demonstrated that the durable power of attorney was signed on September 4, 1996 but not filed until February 3, 1998. Plaintiff also presented evidence that he signed a revocation of the durable power of attorney on March 27, 1997, but he did not record this document until April 3, 1998. Plaintiff explained this delay by noting that the revocation could not be filed until the durable power of attorney was filed. See R.C. 1337.05. Proceeding to the defendant's case, Flaggs presented the testimony of Charles H. Smith. Smith stated that in 1996, he obtained a durable power of attorney which gave him authority over, inter alia, plaintiff's real property. Prior to the filing of this action, Smith was not notified that plaintiff intended to revoke the durable power of attorney. He admitted, however, that he did not make any transfers of the property or enter into any agreements with the durable power of attorney and that the signature on the revocation looks like plaintiff's signature. Finally, Flaggs -4- introduced a letter which Smythe, Cramer Realtors, had written to her and copied to plaintiff, captioned Congratulations on Your New Home. She did not produce a deed or other document meeting the requirements of the statute of frauds, however. On April 22, 1998, the trial court granted plaintiff restitution of the property. Flaggs subsequently posted a cash appeal bond and the trial court suspended execution of its judgment. Flaggs now appeals and assigns three errors for our review. Flaggs's first assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DOCUMENT INTO EVIDENCE WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION AND AUTHENTICATION. Within this assignment of error, Flaggs asserts that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the revocation of the durable power of attorney which was duly recorded. Generally, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 98. On review, this court considers whether the trial court abused its discretion and whether the complaining party has suffered material prejudice as a result. Id. Evid.R. 901(A) provides: "(A) General provision. The requirement of authen- tication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." In State v. Caldwell (Dec. 4, 1991), Summit App. No. 14720, unreported at 15-16, the court stated: -5- " *** The 'sufficient to support a finding' standard merely means that foundational evidence must be sufficient to constitute a rational basis for a jury decision that the primary evidence is what its proponent claims it to be. *** The proponent need not offer conclusive evidence as a foundation but must merely offer sufficient evidence to allow the question as to authen- ticity or genuineness to reach the jury. *** Both the judge and the jury participate in the determination as to authenticity. *** Once the judge determines that the threshold test of authentication has been met and submits the evidence to the jury, the jury may reject the authen- ticity of the evidence. *** As an example of authentication or identification conforming to Evid.R. 901, Evid.R. 901(B)(7) provides: Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by law be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept. Further, with regard to the authentication of handwriting by a non-expert witness, this court in Cutshall v. Green (May 6, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 62447, unreported, stated: The party attempting to authenticate handwriting through nonexpert opinion must establish that the nonexpert witness is sufficiently acquainted with the handwriting of the purported author to offer valid opinion as to its genuineness. Holtz v. Dick (1884), 42 Ohio St. 23. A nonexpert may compare a genuine sample of the person's handwriting with the handwriting in question if the nonexpert witness has first-hand knowledge of the purported author's handwriting. Bell v. Brewster (1887), 44 Ohio St. 690. Turning to the June and July, 1991 rent receipts, Landlord testified that she never signed rent receipts because of an injury to her hand and that she had authorized Evelyn Murphy to sign the name of Francis Wallin. Landlord identified the rent receipts for the months of June, 1990 through May, 1991 as those signed by Evelyn Murphy on her behalf. After comparing Evelyn Murphy's signature on the June, 1990 through May, 1991 receipts with the signature on the June and July, 1991 receipts, Landlord testified that the signature on the -6- receipts dated June 1, 1991 and July 1, 1991 appeared to be Evelyn Murphy's handwriting. This testimony by Landlord was sufficient to establish the authenticity of Evelyn Murphy's signature on the June and July, 1991 rent receipts. Based on all of the foregoing, we find that Tenant offered sufficient extrinsic proof to satisfy the requirement of authentication. Applying the foregoing to this matter, we note that plaintiff presented to the court a certified copy of the revocation of the durable power of attorney which demonstrated that this document was duly filed with the Cuyahoga County Recorder. In addition, Charles H. Smith reviewed this document and testified that plaintiff's signature appeared to be genuine. Accordingly, there is no indication that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing this document to be introduced into evidence. The first assignment of error is overruled. Flaggs's second assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS THIS ACTION ON THE BASIS THAT THE RECORDED REVOCATION OF THE GRANTED POWER OF ATTORNEY WAS DONE AFTER THE LAW SUIT WAS FILED AND NOT BEFORE. Herein, Flaggs insists that since plaintiff executed a durable power of attorney prior to initiating his complaint for forcible entry and detainer and did not record the revocation until after this lawsuit was filed, plaintiff was precluded from maintaining the action. According to Flaggs, Charles H. Smith is the only proper plaintiff since he is the holder of the durable power of attorney. In evaluating the merits of this assignment of error, it is -7- essential to consider that a power of attorney is a written instrument authorizing an agent to perform specific acts on the part of his principal. Testa v. Roberts (1988), 44 Ohio App.3d 161, 164; Fischer v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (Dec. 19, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 59694, unreported. The execution of a power of attorney is controlled by statute and all statutory requirements must be met. In re Guardianship of Ray (Sept. 16, 1991), Jackson App. No. 657, unreported. A durable power of attorney is a subclass of powers of attorney which are unaffected by the disability of the principal or lapse of time. R.C. 1337.09(A). It is also essential to consider that a power of attorney may be revoked by the principal. 1 Anderson's Ohio Probate Practice and Procedure (1998), Section 52.02. If the power of attorney is recorded, the revocation must likewise be recorded. R.C. 1337.05. Moreover, it is axiomatic that a power of attorney is to be construed strictly against any enlargement beyond the authority actually conferred. Roberts v. Davis (1940), 66 Ohio App. 527, 530. Having made these preliminary observations, we further note that the holder of a power of attorney may initiate forcible entry and detainer proceedings on behalf of his principal. See, e.g., Rzeszotarski v. Sanborn (June 7, 1996), Geauga App. No. 96-G-1906, unreported. Nonetheless, it is completely inconsistent with the fundamental principles of agency law to assert that an otherwise competent principal loses the capacity to enter into his own transactions simply because he has executed a durable power of -8- attorney. See, e.g.,Restatement of the Law 2d, Agency Section 119 which provides: Manner of Revocation or Renunciation. Authority created in any manner terminates when either party in any manner manifests to the other dissent to its continuance or, unless otherwise agreed, when the other has notice of dissent. See, also, Comment b, which provides: The principal may manifest his termination of consent by conduct which is inconsistent with its continuance, as where he indicates that the agent is to do an act different from that originally authorized, or where he retakes possession of goods which he authorized the agent to sell, or where he disposes of the subject matter or of his interest therein, or voluntarily causes its loss or destruction. Applying the foregoing, there is no basis upon which we may conclude that plaintiff's preparation of the durable power of attorney in this instance rendered him unable to independently pursue forcible entry and detainer proceedings. Further, the evidence of record demonstrates that the durable power of attorney was revoked shortly after it was prepared and before it was recorded. Since the recording of the document in turn triggered a requirement to record the revocation, the trial court properly determined that the late recording date of the revocation did not preclude plaintiff from obtaining judgment in this matter. The second assignment of error is without merit. Flaggs's third assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO BE NEUTRAL AND THUS PREJUDICED APPELLANT'S CASE. Within this assignment of error, Flaggs complains that the -9- trial court was biased in favor of plaintiff. The duty of a trial court to remain impartial was discussed in Mentor-on-the-Lake v. Giffin (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 441, 449. The court stated: A trial court's duty to maintain an appearance of impartiality [was discussed] in State v. Bayer (Mar. 24, 1995), Geauga App. No. 94-G-1853, unreported, 1995 WL 237094. This court noted: "[T]he judiciary must not only remain detached and neutral in any proceeding before it, but the court must also epitomize itself as the paragon of impartiality. " ' "It is of vital importance that the litigant should believe that he will have a fair trial." State, ex rel. Turner, v. Marshall (1931), 123 Ohio St. 586, 176 N.E. 454." *** Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' Offutt v. United States, [1954], 348 U.S. 11, 14 [75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11, 16]." ***'" Nonetheless, as this court has held, "A trial judge is presumed not to be biased or prejudiced, and the party alleging bias or prejudice must set forth evidence to overcome the presumption of integrity. State v. Wagner (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 88, 93, 608 N.E.2d 852, 855-856, citing State v. Richard (Dec. 5, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 61524, unreported, 1991 WL 261331. The existence of prejudice or bias against a party is a matter that is particularly within the know- ledge and reflection of each individual judge and is difficult to question unless the judge specifically ver- balizes personal bias or prejudice toward a party. In re Adoption of Reams (1989), 52 Ohio App.3d 52, 557 N.E.2d 159. A judge's rulings of law are legal issues subject to appeal, and are not by themselves evidence of bias or prejudice that will provide grounds for disqualification of the judge. In re Disqualification of Corts (1988), 47 Ohio St.3d 601, 546 N.E.2d 928. Okocha v. Fehrenbacher (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 309, 322. -10- In this instance, the primary complaint against the trial court focuses upon the rulings of law. These rulings, as discussed previously, were correct. Moreover, there is absolutely no evi- dence of partiality. Rather, the trial court patiently considered the positions advanced by both litigants before rendering judgment and, indeed, the trial court did not preclude Flaggs from raising her defense despite her failure to demonstrate any compliance with the statute of frauds. The third assignment of error is without merit. Affirmed. -11- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants his costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lyndhurst Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES M. PORTER, PRESIDING JUDGE ANN DYKE, JUDGE TIMOTHY E. MCMONAGLE, JUDGE N.B.This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App. R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App. R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A)(1). .