COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 74262 TEDI L. LEJEUNE, ET AL., : : ACCELERATED DOCKET Plaintiff-Appellants : : vs. : JOURNAL ENTRY : : AND CROCKER SHELL FOOD MART & CAR : WASH, ET AL., : OPINION : Defendants-Appellees : PER CURIAM : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OCTOBER 22, 1998 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-327243 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellants: MICHAEL W. SANDWISCH P.O. Box 129 Port Clinton, Ohio 43452 For Defendants-Appellees: MARILLYN F. DAMELIO 323 Lakeside Avenue, West Suite 410 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PER CURIAM: This case came on for hearing upon the accelerated calendar of our court pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 25, the record from the court of common pleas, and the briefs of counsel. Contending that genuine issues of material fact exist, Tedi and Christopher LeJeune appeal from an order of summary judgment entered in favor of Crocker Shell Food Mart and Pinzone Armbruster for injuries Tedi sustained when she tripped and fell on a wheelchair access ramp at the Crocker Shell Food Mart. For the reasons which follow, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the common pleas court. Around noon on July 17, 1995, Tedi LeJeune and her husband and child visited the Crocker Shell Food Mart in Westlake, Ohio, owned by Pinzone Armbruster, to purchase some soft drinks. As Christopher LeJeune, her husband, parked the car, he extended the front of the car over a wheelchair access ramp. Tedi exited the passenger side of the vehicle and walked around the front of the car to a sidewalk, and as she walked in front of the car toward the entrance to the Food Mart, she tripped and fell on the ramp and broke her ankle. Appellants filed an action against Shell Food Mart, alleging negligence for failure to safely design and construct the ramp and failure to adequately warn of the slope of the ramp. Shell Food Mart moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty to warn invitees of the existence or condition of the ramp because it -3- constituted an open and obvious danger, and the court granted that motion. Appellants now appeal from this order and present the following assignment of error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES AS THE SAME WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT, AND THE LAW OF OHIO, WHEN VIEWING THE EVIDENCE MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS. Appellants claim the court erred by granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Shell Food Mart violated its duty of ordinary care in failing to either remove the ramp or place warnings around it. Shell Food Mart contends that the court properly granted summary judgment in its favor because the existence of the ramp is open and obvious and consequently, Shell Food Mart had no duty to warn of or guard against it, thus Shell is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The issue, then, is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in connection with Tedi LeJeune's injuries at the Crocker Shell Food Mart. Civ.R. 56(C) concerns summary judgment and provides in relevant part: Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. * * * A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence * * * that reasonable minds can -4- come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence * * * construed most strongly in the party's favor. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Morris v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 45; Harliss v. Willis Day Warehousing (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64. Thus, on its motion for summary judgment, Crocker Shell Food Mart must establish that after construing the evidence most favorably to the appellants, no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the appellants' claim. Since appellants allege negligence in connection with the design and construction of the ramp and failure to warn of the slope of the ramp, we necessarily consider the legal elements of that claim. To prevail in this case, appellants must establish negligence on the part of the Crocker Shell Food Mart by demonstrating four elements: an existing duty owed by Shell, a breach of that duty, proximate cause, and some resulting injury. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, Inc. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 82, 84. No genuine issue of fact exists that Tedi LeJeune became an invitee on the Shell Food Mart premises or that she injured herself when she tripped on the wheelchair accessibility ramp. The duty owed to a business invitee by the owner of a premises is to exercise ordinary care and to protect the invitee by maintaining -5- the premises in a safe condition. See Light v. Ohio University (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 66, at 68. Asserted by Shell in this case to its alleged negligence is the doctrine of open and obvious hazards which is a complete defense to a negligence claim and relieves the premises owner of any duty to warn or protect an invitee of an open and obvious danger on the property. It has been applied in cases involving hay lofts, loading docks, swimming pools, and natural bodies of water, among others, because by their nature and their design, although not defective, they present a dangerous situation or hazardous condition which invitees should reasonably perceive. It has also been applied in product liability cases, as for example in Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co. (C.A.5, 1992), 978 F.2d 1386, a case involving a forklift which lacked a mirror or backup warning device, in which the court reasoned by analogy and stated the following at 1394: For example, an ordinary kitchen knife is dangerous, simply because of its blade; but it is not unreasonably dangerous, because the ordinary consumer understands that the blade, due to its sharpness or point, can cause injury. In Simmers v. Bentley Construction Co. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, the court explained the open and obvious doctrine: The rule relieving a defendant from liability for harm resulting from open and obvious hazards is a legal doctrine that has developed in suits against property owners by a person injured when he comes on the property. The open and obvious doctrine states that an owner or occupier of property owes no duty to warn invitees entering the property of open and obvious dangers on the property. Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 45, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 203. The rationale -6- behind the doctrine is that the open and obvious nature of the hazard itself serves as a warning. Thus, the owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering the premises will discover those dangers and take appropriate measures to protect themselves. In Anderson v. Ruoff (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 601, the court stated at 605: The duty of ordinary care imposes on appellee the responsibility of keeping the premises free from dangers not discernible by a reasonably prudent person and to warn invitees of concealed dangers of which appellee knows or should know. [citations omitted]. The duty of ordinary care does not, however, impose a responsibility to protect against dangers that are so obvious and apparent that the invitee may reasonably be expected to discover them and protect against them. The characteristics of a wheelchair access ramp are such that it interrupts the grade of the sidewalk in order to accommodate those in need of special access, thereby creating a potentially dangerous condition for other invitees on the property not unlike dangers posed by swimming pools, haylofts, loading docks, and knives. Appellants do not allege any physical substantial defect in the wheelchair access ramp or claim that Crocker Shell Food Mart has been negligent in maintaining it. Rather appellants' claim is that the existence of the ramp itself creates an unreasonable hazard, thereby imposing a duty on the part of the premises owner to warn or protect invitees who encounter it in accessing the premises. Crocker Shell Food Mart, however, has no such duty in this case because by definition, a wheelchair ramp is constructed and designed in order to afford access to those unable to negotiate a curb between a parking lot and an elevated sidewalk adjacent to it. -7- The ramp is necessarily inclined to gradually meet this existing change in height. Although a wheelchair ramp may be dangerous because of its angle of incline, an invitee may reasonably be expected to recognize the need for caution and protect against the danger. For these reasons, appellants have failed to establish any duty on the part of the Crocker Shell Food Mart to warn or protect invitees from the open and obvious danger of the wheelchair access ramp, which is a necessary element of their negligence action. Hence, after construing all the evidence most strongly in favor of appellants, no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the Crocker Shell Food Mart is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in its favor. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -8- It is ordered that appellees recover of appellants costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. TERRENCE O'DONNELL, PRESIDING JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON, JUDGE KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .