COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 74250 MICHAEL O. LINDSEY : : ACCELERATED DOCKET Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION RUTH E. LINDSEY a.k.a. MOORE : : PER CURIAM Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : OCTOBER 1, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Domestic Relations Division : Case No. D-198252 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: JOHN G. READY Attorney at Law 500 Courthouse Square 310 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1021 BECKY BLAIR Attorney at Law 5885 Landerbrook Drive, #204 Cleveland, Ohio 44124 For defendant-appellant: MARY V. G. WALSH Attorney at Law 457 The Arcade 400 E. Superior Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 (Continued) APPEARANCES (Cont.) For minor children : HARRY N. BABCOCK Attorney at law 20525 Detroit Road -2- Rocky River, Ohio 44116 -3- PER CURIAM: This cause came on to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 25, the records from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and the briefs. Appellant appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to modify child support. Since the record indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. Appellant Ruth Lindsey, nka Moore, and appellee Michael Lindsey were married on November 10, 1983. The parties had two children born as issue of the marriage: Monica Lindsey (dob 7/16/84) and Michael R. Lindsey (dob 2/1/86). The parties were granted a divorce on December 14, 1989. On August 9, 1996, the parties entered into an agreement captioned Plan for Shared Parenting. The agreement designated both appellant and appellee as residential parents and legal custodians and provided for a schedule of shared parenting. The agreement further provided that appellee would pay to appellant the sum of $100 per month for the support of the children; the parties acknowledged that they were deviating from the standard child support computation sheet. On October 23, 1996, appellant filed a motion seeking, inter alia, to modify visitation and support. The lower court conducted a hearing on May 9, 1997 and, on May 29, 1997, issued an order increasing appellee's child support obligation by $100 per month to cover voice lessons, music lessons and any other activities the -4- minor child (sic) are involved with. The parties stipulated to the amount of unpaid medical bills, and appellee paid the outstand- ing amount immediately. Appellant thereafter appealed the trial court's ruling. The trial court's decision was subsequently reversed and remanded on the grounds that the lower court failed to comply with the mandatory guidelines set out in R.C. 3113.215 and Marker v. Grimm(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 139. See Lindsey v. Lindsey (Dec. 24, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 72774, unreported.1 Upon remand, the parties agreed that the lower court would rule on appellant's motion to modify child support based upon the transcript of the May 9, 1997 proceedings and written final argument briefs to be submitted by the parties, which would include a guideline worksheet prepared pursuant to R.C. 3113.215. The court denied appellant's motion to modify child support on March 3, 1998. Appellant timely filed her notice of appeal. Appellant's sole assignment of error contends: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT MODIFYING CHILD SUPPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDELINES AND STATUTORY MANDATES. The trial court's determination regarding the modification of a child support obligation is governed by an abuse of discretion standard. When reviewing a lower court's decision pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard, the court's role: 1 An additional assignment of error regarding visitation of the minor child, Michael, was also sustained but is not relevant to the instant appeal. -5- *** is to determine whether the trial judge's decision was an abuse of discretion, not whether it was the same decision we might have made. Wargo v. Price (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 65, 10 O.O.3d 116, 381 N.E.2d 943. Not only is our role limited to review, but the review itself has narrow limits: *** We have repeatedly held `[t]hat the term abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconsciona- ble.' Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 19 OBR 123, 126, 482 N.E.2d 1248, 1252. Wilmington Steel Products, Inc. v. Cleve. Elec. Illum. Co. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 120, 122. A trial court has the obligation to test any proposal of the parents to see if it meets the Child Support Guidelines under the Marker standard even if the parties agree between themselves to a different amount or agree that only one party shall assume all support. Depalmo v. Depalmo (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 535, citing Martin v. Martin (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 110. The court reasoned: The law favors settlements. However, the dif- ficult issue of child support may result in agreements that are suspect. In custody bat- tles, choices are made, and compromises as to child support may be reached for the sake of peace or as a result of unequal bargaining power or economic pressures. The compromises may be in the best interests of the parents but not of the child. Thus, the legislature has assigned the court to act as the child's watchdog in the matter of support. Id. Additionally, R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(i) provides that when both parents jointly make a request for shared parenting and also jointly file the shared parenting plan, the court shall review the -6- parents' plan to determine if it is in the best interest of the children. This court's review of the entire record indicates that the agreed-upon amount of child support in the shared parenting plan entered into by the parties did not comply with the worksheets the parties were required to submit pursuant to R.C. 3113.215. How- ever, appellant voluntarily assented to its terms and acknowledged that the agreement deviated from the child support computation provided by the statute. Moreover, appellant failed to timely request that the lower court comply with its obligations to ascertain the fairness of the agreement, and appellant's time to enforce the trial court's responsibility has passed. Appellan t filed her motion to modify child support two and one-half months following her assent to the shared parenting agreement. Her motion stated merely that since that order, there has been a substantial change of circumstances ***. The record is void of any evidence to support her unexplained allegation. This court will not sanction the use of a motion to modify child support as a means of escaping from a provision of a valid agreement signed by both appellant and appellee. Appellant should not be permitted to use a motion to modify child support to allow her to pick and choose from the terms of the agreement to which she voluntarily acquiesced, i.e. to maintain the provisions of the agreement that awarded her shared custody of the children but to revise those portions that provided for the amount of child support. Any dispute that appellant had with the agreement could -7- have been raised by matter of a direct appeal of the court's entry journalizing the agreement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motion to modify child support. Appellant's assignment of error is not well-taken. This cause is affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. __________________________________ TERRENCE O'DONNELL, PRESIDING JUDGE __________________________________ JOHN T. PATTON, JUDGE __________________________________ KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE -8- N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .