COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 74189 COMMSTEEL, INC. ACCELERATED DOCKET Plaintiff-appellant JOURNAL ENTRY vs. AND BENDER CONSTRUCTION, INC. OPINION Defendant-appellee PER CURIAM DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: DECEMBER 3, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court, Case No. CV-315486 JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: RONALD P. FRIEDBERG ANNE L. MEYERS & ASSOCIATES CO., L.P.A. 28601 Chagrin Boulevard Suite 500 Cleveland, Ohio 44122 For defendant-appellee: MARY L. KADERBEK 199 N. Leavitt Road, Suite 20 Amherst, Ohio 44001 -2- PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-appellant, Commsteel Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which denied its motion for prejudgment interest against defendant-appellee, Bender Construction. Plaintiff argues that because the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff on its contract claim, it was statutorily obligated to award prejudgment interest. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts follow. Defendant was the main contractor on a construction project at the USS Kobe Steel plant. Defendant hired plaintiff as a subcontractor to provide specified structural steel fabrication and erection. After the work was completed, plaintiff claimed defendant owed plaintiff the contract price of $32,354.84. When plaintiff filed a mechanics' lien against defendant, defendant counterclaimed arguing that the work was not done according to contract or industry standards. After the parties agreed to binding arbitration, the arbitration panel issued the following award on November 7, 1997: We find for plaintiff in the amount of $32,354.84 on the complaint; for the defendant on its counterclaim in the amount of $2,767.00. On November 20, 1997 the trial court confirmed this judgment (a net award of $29,587.84 to plaintiff). Thereafter, plaintiff moved for an award of prejudgment interest, dating back to March 20, 1994, the date the amount was originally due and payable to plaintiff. The trial court denied this motion, and plaintiff timely appealed raising one assignment of error, which states as follows: -3- I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. The payment of postjudgment interest in a cause of action sounding in contract is governed by R.C. 1343.03(A), which states in part as follows: ***[W]hen money becomes due and payable upon any bond, bill, note or other instrument of writing, *** and upon all judgments, decrees and orders of any judicial tribunal for the payment of money arising out of tortious conduct or a contract or other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at ten per cent per annum. To determine whether to award prejudgment interest under R.C. 1243.03(A), the only issue is whether the aggrieved party has been fully compensated. Royal Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Ohio State Univ. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 110. The Court stated as follows: An award of prejudgment interest encourages prompt settlement and discourages defendants from opposing and prolonging, between injury and judgment, legitimate claims. Further, prejudgment interest does not punish the party responsible for the underlying damages, *** but, rather, it acts as compensation and serves ultimately to make the aggrieved party whole. Indeed, to make the aggrieved party whole, the party should be compensated for the lapse of time between accrual of the claim and judgment. Royal at 117, citations omitted. In the case at bar, the arbitration panel determined that defendant owed $32,354.84 to plaintiff, less $2,767 awarded to defendant on its counterclaim, for a net award to plaintiff of $29,587.84. The trial court confirmed this judgment. Further, the record contains the affidavit of Donald J. Humphries, Sales manager for Commsteel, averring that Bender was to pay Commsteel on or before thirty days after the last invoice date, March 20, 1994. The record contains no dispute of this date. Nor -4- did Bender oppose Commsteel's Motion for Prejudgment Interest, in which the date is specified. Plaintiff argues that the award of prejudgment interest is automatic in contract cases. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the award of prejudgment interest is within the discretion of the trial court, which should consider the counterclaim and whether there was a good faith attempt to settle. In Royal Electric, however, the Supreme Court expressly said that if a defendant is found in breach of a contract the decision to allow or not allow prejudgment interest is not discretionary. The court further observed that R.C. 1343.03(A) does not use the good faith language. Section (C) of R.C. 1343.03 makes `good faith' a factor, but section (A) of the statute does not. Royal Electric at 115. Nor is the counterclaim relevant. As the Eleventh District Court of Appeals stated, Rather, the trial court is only to determine when interest commences to run, i.e., when the claim becomes `due and payable,' and to determine what legal rate of interest should be applied. Id. (Emphasis sic.) Klingle v. Graves Piano & Organ, Inc. (Nov. 22, 1996), Trumbull App. No. 95-T-5271, unreported. See also Foister v. Lowe (Mar. 15, 1998), Summitt App. Nos. CA97-06-054, CA97-06-055, unreported; Gosden Constr. Co. v. Gerstenslager (Nov. 5, 1997), Summitt App. Nos. 18383, 18385, unreported, United States Playing Card Co., v. The Bicycle Club (May 21, 1997), Hamilton App. No. C-960265, unreported. It is reversible error for a trial court not to award prejudgment interest on judgments rendered under R.C. 1343.03(A). -5- Accordingly, the trial court erred by not awarding prejudgment interest. Judgement reversed and remanded. -6- This cause is reversed and remanded. It is, therefore, ordered that appellant recover of appellee its costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE ANN DYKE, JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .