COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73950 IN RE: ANTHONY HOUSTON : : JOURNAL ENTRY A MINOR : : and : : OPINION : : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT NOVEMBER 25, 1998 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Juvenile Court Division Common Pleas Court Case No. 9705537 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCE: For Plaintiff-Appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor DARYL T. DENNIE, ESQ. Assistant County Prosecutor 8TH Floor Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: JEAN M. GALLAGHER, ESQ. Assistant Public Defender 100 Lakeside Place 1200 West Third Street, N.W. Cleveland, Ohio 44113 PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J.: Appellant Anthony Houston appeals the decision of the trial court convicting him of delinquency due to receiving stolen -2- property and sentencing him accordingly. Houston assigns the following two errors for our review: I. APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER ART. I, SECT. 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WERE VIOLATED AND HE WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED A DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WHEN THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT COMMITTED AN ACT THAT WOULD BE RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY IF COMMITTED BY AN ADULT. II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PUNISHED THE DEFENDANT FOR REFUSING TO ADMIT TO THE COMPLAINT AND FOR EXERCISING HIS RIGHT TO A TRIAL. Having reviewed the record and the legal arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. Two Cleveland Police officers spotted Houston driving a 1991 Buick Century occupied with four passengers. Detective Robert McCabe recognized Houston from prior arrests involving stolen cars. A check of the car's license plate revealed it had been stolen. When the police officers made a U-turn to follow the car, Houston drove away at a high rate of speed and parked the car in the backyard of a nearby house. Though the officers lost sight of the car, a resident of the house told them where it could be located. The officers were able to arrest the four passengers, but Houston had run away. The passengers all identified Houston as the driver of the car. Thereafter, the police arrested Houston. Houston was charged with delinquency in connection with receiving stolen property. The State's only witness was Officer McCabe who described his encounter with Houston. The defense -3- presented no evidence. The trial court found Houston to be delinquent. Houston was sentenced to custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a minimum of six months up to a maximum period not to exceed his attainment of twenty-one years of age. This appeal followed. In his first assignment of error, Houston argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the car was obtained through commission of a theft offense, as required to convict him for receiving stolen property, under R.C. 2913.51. Specifically,he argues the State failed to establish the identity of the car's owner, failed to establish that the car was stolen, and failed to show that Houston knew the vehicle had been obtained through theft. We disagree. Houston's argument that the State failed to establish that the car was stolen fails. The State presented evidence that the car was listed on a police print-out of stolen cars and that a police dispatcher confirmed it was stolen. Additionally, the State showed that Houston's act of running away upon seeing the police was consistent with knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. Houston's argument that the police dispatcher's report is inadmissible hearsay also fails. In support of his argument, he cites State v. Sims (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 56, 58 in which this court held that a conviction for a theft-related offense cannot stand where a necessary element of the crime is demonstrated solely by reference to hearsay information on a police computer print-out indicating that certain property was stolen. (Emphasis added.) We -4- reasoned that, due to errors in the recording, retention and retrieval of computer information, such a print-out is not reliable proof that an object is stolen. Id. Simsis factually different from the case before us. In Sims, the print-out was entered into evidence over Sims' objection. However, in the case before us, the print-out was not entered into evidence and Houston did not object to Detective McCabe's testimony about the print-out. Because he failed to object to testimony about the print-out, he waived any error in allowing such testimony. See State v. Wilson (1988), 47 Ohio App.3d 136, 140- 141. Even if we accept as true Houston's argument that testimony about the police dispatcher's report was hearsay, we conclude no evidence of plain error in its admission. In a bench trial, absent apparent evidence to the contrary, the trial court is presumed to have considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment. State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 357-358. Houston also argues that the identity of the vehicle's owner was not established. In this case, the police had information that the car was stolen. The State was under no obligation to present the testimony of the car's owner. See In re Jeremy Little (Feb. 25, 1998), Summit App. No. 18667, unreported. Finally, Houston argues the State failed to prove Houston knew the car was stolen. We disagree. Officer McCabe testified that Houston quickly drove away when the police car turned around to -5- follow him. Ohio courts have recognized that flight is evidence of consciousness of guilt and of guilt itself. State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 11; State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 27, certiorari denied (1997), 118 S.Ct. 143. Houston also attempted to conceal the car by parking it in the backyard of the nearby home of a person he did not know. Thereafter, Houston fled the scene on foot and was completely out of sight by the time the officers arrived. This evidence is strong circumstantial evidence that the car was stolen and that Houston was aware that it was stolen. See State v. Maddox (June 4, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 72765, unreported. Circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence. See State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 at syllabus. We conclude the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support Houston's conviction for receiving stolen property. Houston's first assignment of error is overruled. In his second assignment of error, Houston argues the trial court unfairly punished him for exercising his right to a trial by sentencing him to the maximum term of confinement. During the disposition hearing, the court made the following comments: He never admitted to the receiving of stolen property, auto. We found him delinquent at trial. Okay. So I'm saying, he's not honest, he didn't come forward and tell us that he did it. (Tr. 39-40.) Well, the bottom line is what I'm trying to get to is, you're a very dishonest person and -6- you're not about to change as I can see by the trial we had. (Tr. 43.) Houston argues the court's statement evidenced an intent to punish him for not admitting to the charge against him. We disagree. When determining the length of commitment for a delinquent juvenile, the trial court must consider the delinquent act as well as the juvenile's overall conduct and behavior, the juvenile's history, the remorse shown by the juvenile and other relevant societal factors. In re Caldwell (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 160. The record reveals that Houston had several prior arrests for being in receipt of stolen automobiles. During the disposition hearing, Houston told the court that he had a drug problem and asked to be placed in a drug treatment program rather than confined in a ODYS facility. Houston's mother noted that she had been unable to get him into a drug treatment program because she did not have insurance. Houston claimed his drug problem led to his criminal behavior. On the other hand, he denied committing the crime of receiving stolen property. Houston said he ran away when police approached because he feared being arrested on an outstanding warrant. In considering Houston's request for drug treatment, the court had to determine what role, if any, Houston's drug use had on his behavior and if Houston would be likely to benefit from drug treatment. The court could not reasonably conclude that drug treatment would help Houston control his criminal behavior when Houston continued to deny the crime. As discussed above, the trial court could properly consider -7- the level of remorse shown by Houston as well as his history. In this case, Houston admitted to several prior cases in receiving stolen automobiles. He admitted that he stayed home all day rather than attend school. His attorney admitted that Houston had not followed up on past recommendations for drug treatment. The court attempted to fashion a sentence that was most likely to help Houston. Furthermore, the sentence was authorized by R.C. 2151.355 (A)(4) which provides that a child who is adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that would be a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree if committed by an adult, may be committed to the custody of the department of youth services for an indefinite term of not less than six months and not more than the child's attainment of the age of twenty one years of age. Based upon the evidence presented, we conclude the trial court's sentence was not motivated by a desire to punish Houston for going to trial. Accordingly, we overrule Houston's second assignment of error. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. NAHRA, J., and O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .