COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73949 IN RE: CRYSTAL & BRANDON : WADDELL : : ACCELERATED DOCKET : : JOURNAL ENTRY : : AND : : OPINION : : PER CURIAM DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 8, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Probate Court Division Case No. 1146036 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Appellant: DENNIS WADDELL, Pro Se Inmate No. 310-779 Lorain Correctional Inst. 2075 S. Avon-Belden Road Gafton, Ohio 44044 For Appellees: RICHARD A. GOULDER, ESQ. 15887 Snow Road, Suite 301 Brookpark, Ohio 44142 -2- PER CURIAM: This is an accelerated appeal under App.R. 11.1. App.R. 11.1 allows for our decision to be in brief, conclusory form. Consequently, this opinion will not contain a comprehensive exposition of our reasons for affirming the trial court's decision. See Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158. In this accelerated appeal, appellant Dennis R. Waddell appeals the trial court's granting of his ex-wife's petition to change the surnames of his two minor children from Waddell to Bane. He assigns the following error for our review: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND OR [sic] ERRED WHEN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR NAME CHANGE (MINORS') WITHOUT FIRST CONDUCTION [sic] A HEARING BASED UPON APPELLANT' OBJECTIONS'S TO MAGISTRATES (sic) REPORT WHICH PROVIDED THE COURT WITH SUFFICIENT FACTS AND EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN TO TO [sic] THE TRIAL COURT WAS FALSE INFORMATION; WHICH COULD CONSTITUTE A CRIMINAL ACT BY THE (MINOR) CHILDRENS' [sic] MOTHER AND/OR COUNSEL. The issue in this assigned error is whether the trial court is required to hold a hearing before it rules on objections to a magistrate's report. Civ.R. 53 does not require a trial court to hold a hearing on the objections to a referee's report. Civ.R. 53(E)(2) states that upon consideration of objections to the report, the trial court may inter alia, hear additional evidence or hear the matter itself. Shaffer v. West Farrington (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 579, 583. (Emphasis added.) Here, the trial court adopted the magistrate's report after it considered appellant's -3- objections. This process is expressly permitted by the rule. Id. at 583. Appellant's assigned error lacks merit. Additionally, appellant argues in his brief that the magistrate abused its discretion when it found that it was in the best interest of the children to change their surname to Bane. Principally, he argues that he was not estranged from his children; that they visited him in the Lorain Correctional Institution; and that the non-support criterion is not the sole basis for a name change. Appellant essentially attacks the credibility of the petition and his ex-wife's testimony. The magistrate found that since the divorce appellant has had very little contact with his children; that he has paid no support; that Debra Bane is the residential parent whose maiden name was restored during the divorce; that appellant was ordered to pay support; and that appellant was convicted of felonious assault against Debra Bane and was serving a sentence of six to fifteen years. The magistrate concluded it was in the best interest of the children to have their mother's surname. The trial court agreed and we affirm the trial court's ruling. Historically,Ohio has taken the position that neither parent has a greater right to have his or her child bear his or her surname. The issue is what is in the best interest of the child. Bobo v. Jewel (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 330. The best interest of the child standard probes the question which name will present the least amount of embarrassment, inconvenience, or confusion for the children. The objecting parent's conduct is a factor in that -4- determination. See In re Crisafi (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 577 and In re Newcomb (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 107. In light of the best interest of the child standard as applied to these facts, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Probate Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be jounalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the .