COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73936 STATE OF OHIO ACCELERATED DOCKET Plaintiff-appellant JOURNAL ENTRY vs. AND RYAN D. BRADFORD OPINION Defendant-appellee PER CURIAM DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JULY 9, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court, Case No. CR-261132 JUDGMENT: Reversed, Vacated and Remanded. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: For defendant-appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES DOMINIC J. VANNUCCI Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 22649 Lorain Road Fairview Park, Ohio 44126 ARTHUR A. ELKINS Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PER CURIAM: This cause came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 25, the records from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and the briefs of counsel. This is a timely appeal from the order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas granting defendant-appellee Ryan Bradford's application to seal the record of his convictions for theft and forgery. On October 19, 1990, Bradford, a K-Mart employee, took a credit card that a customer had forgotten. The next day, Bradford went on a shopping spree with the misappropriated credit card. Over the course of seven hours, he made seven purchases at four separate stores, including the K-Mart where he obtained the credit card. Bradford was indicted on seven counts of forgery, seven counts of uttering, and two counts of theft. He pled guilty to six counts of forgery1 and two counts of theft; the remaining counts were nolled. He was given a suspended sentence of one year on each count, to be served concurrently, and was placed on probation for two years. Bradford successfully completed his probation, and since then has not committed any further offenses. In 1996, the trial court granted Bradford's application pursuant to R.C. 2953.32, to seal his conviction. Appealing this expungement, the state presents the following assignment of error: 1 These six instances of forgery occurred at only three stores. -3- THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO SEAL APPELLEE'S RECORD OF CONVICTION BECAUSE APPELLEE WAS NOT A FIRST OFFENDER AS DEFINED BY R.C. 2953.31(A). This assignment is well-taken. Revised Code 2953.31(A), which governs the expungement or sealing of a record, states as follows: First offender means anyone who has been convicted of an offense in this state or any other jurisdiction, and who has not been previously or subsequently convicted of the same or a different offense in this state or any other jurisdiction. When two or more convictions result from or are connected with the same act, or result from offenses committed at the same time, they shall be counted as one conviction. (Emphasis added.) It is well established that for purposes of expungement under R.C. 2953.31(A), offenses of a similar nature committed over a period of time do not become a single offense regardless of the similarity of criminal activity. State v. Saltzer (1985), 20 Ohio App.3d 277, 278, 485 N.E.2d 831, citing State v. Stujenske (Jan. 28, 1982), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 43669 and 43670, unreported. This court has previously held, for example, that three crimes committed in the same location on two consecutive days involving separate victims do not merge into a single offense for expungement purposes. State v. Iwanyckyj (October 14, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 65462, unreported. Similarly, when a man fraudulently reported his traveler's checks lost and used those same checks twenty-one days later to purchase goods at three different locations, he was not a first offender for purposes of expungement. State v. Alandi (Nov. 15, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 59735, unreported. See also State v. -4- Musson (Dec. 20, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 68817, unreported (two counts of trafficking in marijuana committed 22 days apart); State v. Burks (Aug. 22, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 59040, unreported (five counts of receiving stolen property by removing food stamps from the mail intended for different individuals and unlawful redemption, over the course of a month). Bradford committed theft on October 19, 1990. The next day, he forged six credit card slips in three different locations. It is clear that these separate acts committed in distinct locations do not merge into a single offense for expungement purposes. The First Appellate District has decided two cases with situations nearly identical to the case at bar. When a man forged three credit card slips in three separate locations within a twenty-four-hour period, he was not a first offender within the meaning of R.C. 2953.31. State v. Wheat (Sept. 26, 1984), Hamilton App. No. C-840005, unreported. Similarly, when a man attempted theft one day, and forgery the next, he was not a first offender. State v. Cresie (1993), 93 Ohio App.3d 67, 69. Bradford relies on State v. Penn (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 315, in which the Hamilton County Court ruled that defendant's conviction for two robberies committed within fifteen minutes of each other and at the same general location could be considered one conviction for expungement purposes. The decision in Penn, however, was limited solely to the facts of that case by State v. Hagstrom (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 388. In Hagstrom, the court ruled that when a man assaulted his girlfriend, and 45 minutes later in -5- a different location resisted arrest and assaulted police officers, he committed separate, unconnected offenses, and was therefore not entitled to expungement of his record. Similarly, in the case at bar Bradford committed separate offenses theft and forgery. These offenses were committed over the course of two days in three distinct locations. We find, therefore, that Bradford was not a first-time offender under R.C. 2953.31(A). Since he was not a first-time offender, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to seal his record of conviction. State v. Thomas (1979), 64 Ohio App.2d 141, 145, 18 O.O.3d 106, 108, 411 N.E.2d 845, 847-848; State v. May (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 664, 667. The state's sole assignment of error is well taken. Judgment of expungement reversed and vacated; the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. -6- This cause is reversed, vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is, therefore, ordered that appellant recover of appellee its costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES M. PORTER, PRESIDING JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .