COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73764 ROSALYN M. HEINZ : : JOURNAL ENTRY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT : : AND v. : : OPINION FAIRVIEW PARK CITY SCHOOL : DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION : : and : : ADMINISTRATOR, OHIO BUREAU OF : EMPLOYMENT SERVICES : : DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: DECEMBER 10, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-335047. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellant: GEORGE W. PALDA, Esq., 55 Public Square, Suite 2121, Cleveland, Ohio, 44113. For Defendant-appellee, Fairview Park City School District, Board of Education: DANIEL J. TELZROW, Treasurer, 20770 Lorain Road, Fairview Park, Ohio, 44126. For Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services: BETTY D. MONTGOMERY, Ohio Attorney General; CHARLETT BUNDY, Assistant Attorney General, State Office Building, 12th Floor, 615 West Superior Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, 44113-1899. -2- SWEENEY, JAMES D., J.: Plaintiff-appellant-claimant Rosalyn M. Heinz appeals from the order of the trial court which affirmed the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review's ( Board of Review ) decision denying her unemployment benefits. For the reasons adduced below, we affirm. A review of the record on appeal indicates that appellant worked for the defendant-appellee Fairview Park City School District Board of Education ( Board ) as an administrative secretary from 1986 until October 12, 1994. Appellant claimed that she did not quit her position, but was constructively discharged in that she left her employment due to being discriminated against because she was a female. The discrimination allegedly consisted of her not being paid commensurate with her duties at a rate which was lower than male managers who had similar job duties and workload. Appellant filed her application for unemployment benefits on April 12, 1995. This initial application was allowed by the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services ( OBES ) on May 8, 1995. Thereafter, on May 30, 1995, the defendant-appellee Board filed for reconsideration of that determination. On June 27, 1995, the Administrator of OBES affirmed the determination of May 8, 1995, allowing benefits, thereby denying the relief sought in reconsideration. See R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). On July 7, 1995, defendant-appellee Board filed its appeal of the reconsideration ruling with the Board of Review arguing that appellant abandoned her employment without just cause and the OBES -3- determination of May 8, 1995 was issued prematurely.1 The Board of Review scheduled a hearing for September 11, 1995, but this hearing was postponed at the request of the claimant due to family medical reasons. The Board of Review then rescheduled the hearing to September 28, 1995, with notice to the claimant. On September 28, 1995, the Board of Review conducted the hearing at which time claimant did not appear but the Board did appear. At this hearing, the Board presented two witnesses, Tom Kairis and Nancy Colby. Mr. Kairis testified generally that Ms. Heinz, who was his secretary, felt underappreciated and had been spreading false rumors that he had been having an adulterous affair. Mr. Kairis also testified that he had no knowledge of anyone harassing Ms. Heinz. Mr. Kairis also stated that when he came to be Ms. Heinz' supervisor at the beginning of the 1993- 1994 school year, he restricted the amount of overtime she had become accustomed to performing, reducing her 1992-1993 school year overtime earnings of approximately $9,500 to no more than $2,000 overtime per year.2 To help her workload, Mr. Kairis adjusted Ms. Heinz' work duties through modification and/or reassignment.Mr. Kairis stated that Ms. Colby has had no problem performing the workload assigned to her during normal business hours and has rarely used overtime. Finally, Mr. Kairis stated 1The argument based upon the decision being premature is premised on the Board's contention that it had until May 11, 1995, with which to respond to the application for benefits. The Board assumed that, at the very least, it had twenty-one business days from the date appellant filed the application for benefits on April 12, 1995, to file a response to the initial application for benefits. Yet, the Board received the May 8, 1995 determination of benefits decision on May 10, 1995. 2Ms. Heinz earned approximately $24,000 per year in regular salary. -4- that he and Ms. Heinz were scheduled to have a talk with the Superintendent on the afternoon of June 22, 1994, concerning these problems, but Ms. Heinz, at the last minute, would not appear at the meeting. Ms. Colby testified that she was hired to replace Ms. Heinz after Ms. Heinz had quit. Ms. Colby corroborated the testimony of Mr. Kairis and the fact that Ms. Heinz had spread rumors of Mr. Kairis' infidelity. Also, Ms. Colby stated that Ms. Heinz was very anxious over the planned meeting with the Superintendent and was also distressed over the fact that her second ex-husband was remarrying and that her son, who was a junior in high school, had decided that he wanted to go live with his father, Ms. Heinz' first ex-husband. On October 4, 1995, the Board of Review reversed the Administrator's decision on reconsideration thereby disallowing the claim for benefits. On October 16, 1995, claimant filed an application to institute further appeal. The Board filed a response to further review on November 9, 1995. Claimant also filed a number of letters and other documentary evidence with the Board of Review. On December 12, 1995, the Board of Review disallowed further appeal. On January 11, 1996, claimant filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. See R.C. 4141.28(O). On September 24, 1996, the trial court reversed the Board of Review decision and remanded it back to the Board of Review for a new evidentiary hearing. On October 30, 1996, the Board of Review scheduled the evidentiary hearing for November 13, 1996, with notice to claimant. -5- On the date of hearing, November 13, 1996, claimant failed to appear. Therefore, by order dated November 13, 1996, the Board of Review dismissed the claimant's appeal pursuant to R.C. 4141.28(J)(2). By letter dated November 22, 1996, claimant applied to the Board of Review to vacate the dismissal of the appeal and reinstate the matter for hearing. On January 28, 1997, the Board of Review denied the application to vacate the dismissal. By letter dated January 30, 1997, claimant filed with the Board of Review a request for hearing on whether claimant had demonstrated good cause for failing to appear at the hearing of November 13, 1996. Subsequent to telephonic hearing on February 26, 1997, the Board of Review determined that claimant had demonstrated good cause for failing to appear at the subject hearing, vacated the order of dismissal and reinstated the appeal. On March 21, 1997, the Board of Review commenced a new evidentiary hearing. The Board did not appear at this hearing. The claimant appeared and testified on her own behalf repeating her allegations of physical and emotional harassment and stress in her job from being overworked, and denied spreading any rumors concerning Mr. Kairis' sex life. The claimant also testified that she last worked in the school office on June 22, 1994, having not returned from lunch that day. Claimant produced a letter from a doctor, dated June 24, 1994 (two days after claimant walked off the job), which stated succinctly, [T]o whom it may concern, Rosalyn Heinz is a longstanding patient in this office. Due to severe stress, I have advised Mrs. Heinz not work until further notice -6- from this office. The claimant testified that she never felt well enough to return to work. On April 22, 1997, the Board of Review issued its determination that claimant had quit her employment without just cause, reasoning that: (1) claimant did not act reasonably in walking off the job in the middle of the work day and not returning in response to the anticipated meeting with the Superintendent, which meeting she did not wish to attend for fear of being disciplined for having spread false rumors about her supervisor; (2) while being medically treated for stress, the medical treatment did not advocate her quitting her job, so her decision to terminate her employment in the middle of a work day was not reasonably based on stress; and, (3) her concern over her workload and lack of available overtime pay could have been documented by her since she completed her own time sheets and any disputes addressed through normal administrative channels, so she did not act reasonably in abruptly quitting without notice to her employer. Thus, the Board of Review affirmed the October 4, 1995 determination. On May 22, 1997, claimant filed her notice of appeal in the trial court from the Board of Review's decision of April 22, 1997. See R.C. 4141.28(O)(1). On December 2, 1997, the trial court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review's determination. See Journal Vol. 2156, pages 110-116. This timely appeal followed presenting three assignments of error for review. Oral appellate argument has been waived by the parties. I THE RELEVANT STATUTE AND THE DOCTRINE OF LAW OF THE CASE REQUIRED THAT THE OCTOBER 4, 1995 HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION BE VACATED; WHERE -7- THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW'S APRIL 22, 1997 DECISION SPECIFICALLY REFERENCED AND AFFIRMED THE HEARING OFFICER'S OCTOBER 4, 1995 DECISION AND WAS BASED IN PART UPON THE HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION OF OCTOBER 4, 1995, AND WHERE THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THE CASE WAS AFFECTED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT'S CLAIM, THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DECISION IS UNLAWFUL AND UNREASONABLE. In this assignment, appellant argues that the Board of Review committed error in utilizing the employer's evidence from the September 28, 1995 hearing during the March 21, 1997 hearing and the Board of Review order of April 22, 1997. Appellant argues that this earlier hearing evidence should not have been considered because the trial court, on September 24, 1996, reversed and remanded the Board of Review order which made use of the earlier testimony and ordered a new evidentiary hearing be conducted by the administrative agency. Reviewing the Board of Review's order of April 22, 1997, we note that the order makes only two references to the Board of Review order of October 4, 1995 (which order was based on the earlier testimony of the employer): (1) while detailing the sterile procedural history of the claim for benefits; and, (2) in the decision section of the order where it is stated, [T]he Hearing Officer's decision, mailed October 4, 1995, is affirmed. The findings of fact section and the reasoning section in the Board of Review order of April 22, 1997, makes no use of, or reference to, the earlier testimony of the employer. Instead, the substantive area of the Board of Review order of April 22, 1997 is based upon the testimony of the claimant which was elicited during the evidentiary hearing conducted on March 21, 1997. Error by the -8- Board of Review in having substantively utilized the prior hearing's evidence is not demonstrated in the record. Assignment overruled. II WHERE THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DECISION WAS BASED UPON EVIDENCE TAKEN AT A SEPTEMBER 28, 1995 HEARING NOT ATTENDED BY THE CLAIMANT- APPELLANT FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN AND WHERE THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PREVIOUSLY HAD DIRECTED, IN AN UNAPPEALED FINAL JUDGMENT, BASED ON THE FINDING OF GOOD CAUSE SHOWN BY CLAIMANT, THAT A NEW HEARING BE HELD, THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S RELIANCE IN ITS DECISION UPON EVIDENCE TAKEN AT THE EX PARTE SEPTEMBER 28, 1995 HEARING VIOLATED CLAIMANT'S DUE PROCESS AND STATUTORY RIGHTS. In this assignment, appellant again argues that the Board of Review's order of April 22, 1997, improperly relied upon evidence elicited from the evidentiary hearing of September 28, 1995, in denying claimant the opportunity to obtain unemployment benefits. Based on the previous assignment which concluded that the Board of Review did not utilize the evidence from the September 28, 1995, hearing in its deliberations in 1997, this assignment is equally without merit. The second assignment of error is overruled. III THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS TO APPELLANT WAS UNLAWFUL, UNREASONABLE AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. In this final assignment, appellant argues that: (1) the Board of Review in 1997 improperly relied upon the evidence elicited at the evidentiary hearing of September 28, 1995; (2) the Board of Review's determination is not supported by the manifest weight of -9- the evidence; and, (3) the trial court improperly relied upon that same improper evidence in its final order which formed the order appealed from in the notice of appeal sub judice. Because this is an unemployment compensation administrative appeal, this court now must also review the entire record, giving no deference to the trial court's finding. Tzangas v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 653 N.E.2d 1207. We will not reverse unless the decision of the Board of Review is found to be unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. R.C. 4141.28(O)(1); Tzangas, supra. Under the unemployment statutes, an employee who has been discharged for just cause in connection with his or her work is ineligible for unemployment compensation. R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). Just cause is defined as, `that which, to an ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.' Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, citing Peyton v. Sun T.V. (1975), 44 Ohio App.2d 10, 12. Where the employee's acts are detrimental to the employer's best interest, just cause for discharge exists. Stephens v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (June 2, 1980), Cuyahoga App. No. 41369, unreported. Excluding the evidence submitted at the evidentiary hearing on September 28, 1995, the record before us indicates that the claimant was fearful of a meeting with the Superintendent on the afternoon of June 22, 1994, so she never returned from lunch, abandoning her post and duties prior to that meeting without any advance notice or explanation to her employer. The record also indicates that claimant produced a doctor's letter two days after -10- quitting her post in which it details very briefly that she was being treated for stress and that the doctor advised her to not return to work absent the doctor's order. Finally, the record indicates that claimant was dissatisfied with her workload, salary, and severe curtailment of overtime use, which also allegedly contributed to claimant's stress levels. We conclude that the decision of the Board of Review is not unreasonable, unlawful or against the manifest weight of the evidence. The act of claimant in unilaterally abandoning her duties on the afternoon of June 22, 1994, without any notice to her employer was patently against the best interests of her employer. Also, dissatisfaction with one's work duties or wages does not constitute just cause for quitting unless the additional duties given the employee are beyond the employee's work capacity and generate a reasonable belief that a failure to perform such additional duties would result in the employee's discharge. Fabian v. Admr., Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (November 24, 1997), Jefferson App. No. 87-J-5, unreported, 1987 WL 20362, citing Beljan v. Bd. of Review (August 19, 1986), Mahoning App. No. 85 C.A. 105, unreported, 1986 WL 8925, which distinguishes Krzyston v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 109, syllabus. In the case sub judice, there was no indication that claimant's failure to perform her duties would result in her discharge. Accordingly, we conclude that the Board of Review and the trial court did not err in determining that claimant quit her employment without just cause. The third assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -11- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, A.J., and JOHN T. PATTON, J., CONCUR. ______________________________ JAMES D. SWEENEY JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .