COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73761 STATE OF OHIO, CUYAHOGA CHILD : ACCELERATED CASE SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY : EX REL. WENDY DREWS : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : AND : OPINION -vs- : : RENE AMBROSI : PER CURIAM : Defendant-Appellee : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: SEPTEMBER 3, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, JUVENILE COURT DIVISION CASE NO. 9770465 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor DENNIS L. MORGAN (#0067280) Assistant Prosecuting Attorney P.O. Box 93894 Cleveland, Ohio 44101-5894 For Defendant-Appellee: SAM R. BRADLEY (#0038738) 215 Eighth Street Lorain, Ohio 44052 PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-appellant State of Ohio, Cuyahoga Child Support -2- Enforcement Agency ( CSEA ) appeals from the trial court's order granting defendant-appellee Rene Ambrosi summary judgment on CSEA's complaint for the establishment of paternity and related child support. CSEA assigns the following errors for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHEN THE LAW IN OHIO STATES THAT MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE NOT APPROPRIATE IN PATERNITY ACTIONS. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOLLOW OHIO REVISED CODE CHAPTER 3111 REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNITY, CURRENT CHILD SUPPORT, PAST CARE AND MATERNITY EXPENSES DUE THE STATE OF OHIO AND/OR THE RELATOR. Finding CSEA's appeal to lack merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. On November 2, 1991, the relator, Wendy Drews, gave birth to Jonathan Drews. Rene Ambrosi immediately acknowledged that he was Jonathan's father. Commencing November 5, 1991, Mr. Ambrosi voluntarily sent numerous money orders, usually for One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00), to Ms. Drews for Jonathan's support. These payments continued, on a monthly basis, through July 28, 1993. On August 16, 1993, Mr. Ambrosi acknowledged, pursuant to the administrative procedures of the United States Navy, that he was Jonathan's natural father. As part of this administrative process, Mr. Ambrosi authorized the Navy to withhold from his salary, and pay to Ms. Drews for Jonathan's support, One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per month. These payments were made from September 1993 -3- to July 1994. On February 2, 1995, Ms. Drews filed custody proceedings in juvenile court (Case No. 9502089). During these proceedings, the juvenile court issued an agreed judgment entry on the issues of custody, visitation and child support. The juvenile court also established the parent-child relationship between Mr. Ambrosi and Jonathan. Pursuant to the agreed journal entry, Mr. Ambrosi is under a court-ordered obligation to pay child support. Notwithstanding the child support she received from Mr. Ambrosi, Ms. Drews also applied for and received support for Jonathan from the Department of Human Services. On December 23, 1996, CSEA conducted an administrative hearing to determine the existence of a parent-child relationship between Mr. Ambrosi and Jonathan. The administrative hearing officer found that the parent-child relationship had already been established by the juvenile court in Case No. 9502089. Therefore, the hearing officer denied and dismissed the administrative proceedings. On February 13, 1997, CSEA filed a complaint in juvenile court to establish the parent-child relationship between Mr. Ambrosi and Jonathan. In its complaint, CSEA also requested that Mr. Ambrosi be ordered to pay: (1) birthing expenses; (2) a reasonable amount for the past, current and future support, including health insurance; and (3) reimbursement to CSEA for assistance it has provided to Ms. Drew for Jonathan's support. On April 15, 1997, Mr. Ambrosi filed a motion for summary judgment. In his motion, Mr. Ambrosi asserted that CSEA's claims -4- were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. On November 21, 1997, the trial court granted Mr. Ambrosi's motion for summary judgment. II. In its first assignment of error, CSEA contends that Civ.R. 56 does not apply to paternity actions filed pursuant to R.C. 3111 et seq.; therefore, CSEA argues that the trial court erred in granting Mr. Ambrosi's motion for summary judgment. In its brief CSEA cited DeSalvo v. Sukalski (1983), 8 Ohio App.3d 337, 338, where a Geauga County court held that Civ.R. 56 did not apply to paternity proceedings in juvenile court. However, DeSalvo related to bastardy proceedings prosecuted under the former provisions of R.C. Chapter 3111, and does not relate to the current provisions of that chapter which became effective on July 29, 1982. R.C. 3111.08 now specifically provides: An action brought pursuant to sections 3111.01 to 3111.19 of the Revised Code to declare the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship is a civil action and shall be governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure unless a different procedure is specifically provided by those sections. The provisions of R.C. 3111.01 et seq. do not specifically provide a different procedure that would supersede the application of Civ.R. 56. Other appellate courts have noted that nothing in the current version of R.C. Chapter 3111 is inconsistent with summary judgment, and have held that Civ.R. 56 applies to paternity proceedings in juvenile court. See Vezie v. Mayda (June 3, 1992), Lorain App. No. 91CA005191, unreported; Milum v. Saldusky (July 29, -5- 1986), Wyandot App. No. 16-85-2, unreported. We adopt the logic of these decisions, and hereby hold that a motion for summary judgment may lie in paternity proceedings in juvenile court. Accordingly, CSEA's first assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. III. In its second assignment of error, CSEA challenges the trial court's order granting Mr. Ambrosi's summary judgment based on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. CSEA's arguments are without merit. Summary judgment is appropriate where: (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds construing the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party could reach but one conclusion, which is adverse to the nonmoving party. See Civ.R. 56(C); Bostic v. Connor (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 144, 146. The doctrine of res judicata involves both claim preclusion and issue preclusion (traditionally known as collateral estoppel). See Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381. An existing final judgment or decree between the parties to litigation is conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been litigated. Id. Moreover, res judicata, whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion, applies to administrative proceedings that are "of a judicial nature and where the parties have had an ample opportunity to litigate the issues involved in the proceeding. -6- Id. The record shows that there was an administrative hearing to determine paternity, pursuant to R.C. 3111.22, on December 23, 1996. At that hearing, a CSEA administrative hearing officer found that the parent-child relationship between Mr. Ambrosi and Jonathan had already been established. As such, the hearing officer denied and dismissed the administrative proceedings on December 24, 1996. Pursuant to R.C. 3111.22(D)(1), effective at pertinent times, the administrative hearing officer's order became final when neither party brought an action in juvenile court within thirty days of the denial of the request for administrative determination of paternity. R.C. 3111.22(D)(1) stated: * * * [An action in juvenile court] shall be brought no later than thirty days after the date of the issuance of the administrative order determining the existence or nonexistence of a parent and child relationship. If neither the mother nor the alleged father files an action under sections 3111.01 to 3111.19 of the Revised Code in juvenile court within the thirty-day period, the administrative order determining a parent and child relationship is final. CSEA did not file the underlying lawsuit until February 13, 1997. Therefore, the administrative order, which was filed on December 24, 1996, was final and CSEA's complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Moreover, we note that the juvenile court could have granted summary judgment based upon the fact that CSEA's complaint was not timely filed within the thirty day period prescribed in R.C. 3111.22(D)(1). -7- As noted above, res judicata applies to administrative proceedings that are of a judicial nature and where the parties have had an ample opportunity to litigate the issues involved in the proceeding. Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 381. Proceedings of administrative agencies are considered judicial in nature if there is notice, a hearing and an opportunity for introduction of evidence. Cf. State ex rel Republic Steel Corp. v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission (1975), 44 Ohio St.3d 178, 184. R.C. 3111.22 provides for notice, hearing, and an opportunity to introduce evidence in administrative proceedings to determine paternity. The final order in the case sub judice, which was issued by CSEA's own administrative hearing officer on December 24, 1996, clearly provides that paternity had been established. Therefore, CSEA's complaint to determine paternity, filed pursuant to R.C. 3111.04, was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. In addition, CSEA's claims for birthing expenses, child support and reimbursement should have also been addressed during the administrative proceedings. As noted above, a final judgment or decree between the parties to litigation is conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been litigated. Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 381. R.C. 3111.22 provides the procedure for the administrative determination of paternity and child support. R.C. 3111.22(C)(4). As such, these claims are also barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Moreover, Mr. Ambrosi's child support obligation was -8- determined in a previously-filed custody action in juvenile court (Case No. 9502089). It is well-established that a court which obtains jurisdiction over and enters orders with regard to the custody and support of children retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. See Hardesty v. Hardesty (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 56, 58. Therefore, any modifications on the issue of child support must be pursued under the previously-filed juvenile court case. Accordingly, CSEA's second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -9- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOSEPH J. NAHRA, P.J. JAMES D. SWEENEY, JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .