COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73535 JENNIFER ADKINS, : : Plaintiff-Appellant : JOURNAL ENTRY : and vs. : OPINION : FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OHIO, : ET AL., : : Defendants-Appellees : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : OCTOBER 29, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. 314073 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: W. Craig Bashein Anthony P. Soughan BASHEIN & BASHEIN 1200 Illuminating Building 55 Public Square Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Paul W. Flowers PAUL W. FLOWERS CO., L.P.A. Burgess Building, Suite 400 1406 West Sixth Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- For defendant-appellee, George H. Rosin First National Bank of Ohio: BUCKINGHAM, DOOLITTLE & BURROUGHS 50 S. Main Street P.O. Box 1500 Akron, Ohio 44309 For defendant-appellee, Mary Ann Rini Bureau of Workers' Assistant Attorney General Compensation: State Office Building, 12th Floor 615 West Superior Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1899 -3- NAHRA, J.: Appellant, Jennifer Adkins, appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee, First National Bank of Ohio, on her appeal of the Industrial Commission of Ohio's decision that she was ineligible to participate in the Workers' Compensation system for injuries sustained while employed by appellee as a bank teller. Appellant was injured while exiting a fast-food restaurant after picking up lunch for a co-worker and a bank officer. She slipped and fell in the doorway, sustaining injuries to her back. Appellant's sole assignment of error reads: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE APPELLANT AFFIRMATIVELY DEMONSTRATED THAT GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST. To support her argument, appellant asserts that her injuries were sustained in the course of and arising out of her employment because she was instructed to go to the restaurant in which she was injured by her supervisor, that she was not on a frolic of her own, and that appellee derived a benefit from having its employees eat lunch on the premises. An appellate court's power to review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment is conducted de novo. Brown v. Scioto Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1158. A court may grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R.56 when it determines that: (1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary -4- judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 369 N.E.2d 267, 274. To collect benefits under the Workers' Compensation, an employee's injury must be received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. R.C. 4123.01(C). In Lord v. Daugherty (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 441, 423 N.E.2d 96, syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held: Whether there is a sufficient causal connection between an employee's injury and his employment to justify the right to participate in the Worker's Compensation Fund depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, including, (1) the proximity of the scene of the accident to the place of employment, (2) the degree of control the employer had over the scene of the accident, and (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured employee's presence at the scene of the accident. In this case, appellant was on her lunch hour. She claims that because she was directed to pick-up lunch by her supervisor, Jennifer Blankenship, and because appellee benefitted from having its employees eat lunch on the premises she was acting in the course of employment. At deposition, appellant testified as follows: Q. Okay. Could we just go back? You were sitting back where? A. I was sitting behind the counter. Q. At your teller location? A. Yeah, at the teller location. And Jennifer, you know, said it was time for me to go to lunch. Q. Did she actually come over and tell you it was time to go to lunch? -5- A. No. She was sitting behind her desk, and it isn't that far from the counter. She said it was time for me to go to lunch. And she asked me -- oh, she asked me where I was going for lunch. And I said McDonald's. And she said, you know, go -- go to Kentucky Fried Chicken. I want Kentucky Fried Chicken. And I said -- do you want to know that? Q. No. I asked you what happened. Go Ahead. A. Anyways, she said go to Kentucky Fried Chicken. I said no, I'm going to McDonald's. And then Helen Kamp, you know, she said I want Kentucky Fried Chicken too. Q. Who's Helen Kamp? A. She was one of the tellers, but she was being trained to work by the company too. Q. So she was one of your coworkers? A. She was a coworker of mine. And she said she wanted Kentucky Fried Chicken too. I said, okay, you know, and I proceeded to leave. Oh, I asked Kim Dotson if she'd like any chicken. I asked her did she want anything from Kentucky Fried Chicken and she said no. No thank you. Appellants's contention that she was directed by her supervisor to go to Kentucky Fried Chicken is belied by her testimony. She said no to her supervisor's request to go to that restaurant, but then decided to go only after her coworker also asked her to go. Under Lord, supra, appellant must show that there is evidence of a sufficient causal connection between her offsight injury and her employment. In light of appellant's testimony cited, supra, it is evident that appellant was not compelled to pick lunch up for others at the bank as a requirement of her employment. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine appellant's evidence under the factors announced in Lord, supra. Appellant's injury occurred over a mile from her site of employment at a site which was neither selected by nor under any -6- control of appellee. Even if appellee received a benefit from appellant's acts in bringing lunch back to her fellow employees, this benefit does not alone provide evidence of a sufficient causal connection between appellant's injury and employment. The trial court properly granted summary judgment for these reasons. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOSEPH J. NAHRA JUDGE BLACKMON, A.J., and O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R.22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .