COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73396 CITY OF BRECKSVILLE : : JOURNAL ENTRY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : : AND v. : : OPINION ALOJZ KURINCIC : : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: DECEMBER 10, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Garfield Heights Municipal Municipal Court, No. 97-CRB-04413. JUDGMENT: Dismissed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: Roger A. Wadsworth, Esq. Prosecutor, City of Brecksville Sergio I. DiGeronimo, Esq. 8927 Brecksville Road Brecksville, OH 44141 For Defendant-Appellant: Joseph G. Stafford, Esq. John J. Dyer, III, Esq. Joseph G. Stafford & Associates Co., L.P.A. 380 Lakeside Place 323 Lakeside Avenue West Cleveland, OH 44113 -2- TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, P.J.: Defendant-appellant AlojzKurincic appeals part of an order by the Garfield Heights Municipal Court granting his motion to dismiss. Specifically, appellant appeals the trial court's determination that there was probable cause for a Complaint to issue against appellant for violation of R.C. 2919(A)(1) and for appellant's subsequent arrest. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss this appeal as moot. The record reflects that appellant and Ludmilla L. Kurincic, n/k/a Ludmilla Matia, were divorced in June 1995. On June 14, 1995, the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court issued an order adopting appellant and Matia's agreement regarding the allocation of parental rights regarding their minor children. The agreement provides, in pertinent part: Father and Mother shall at all times have reasonable access to the children, notwithstanding that at any time the children may be living with one or the other of them. With reference to vacations, Father and Mother each agree to communicate in advance and cooperate with each other to make them as satisfying, relaxed and happy for the children as possible. Father and Mother shall cooperate with each other in permitting each other to take the children on short weekend trips and other vacations. With respect to the children's birthdays, the agreement provides: The child's birthday shall always be spent with the mother in the even-numbered years, and shall always be spent with the father in the odd-numbered years. The non-residential parent must provide one week's notice of his/her intent to have visitation for a birthday. If the parties cannot agree, the time is 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. for a child not in school on the birthday, and 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. for a child in school on the birthday ****. -3- The agreement also provides that appellant shall have visitation with Arcadia, appellant and Matia's youngest daughter, every other Saturday from 10 o'clock a.m. to 4 o'clock p.m. and the children will always spend Father's Day with appellant. On Saturday, June 14, 1997, at 10:00 a.m., appellant picked up Arcadia from Matia's home for a visit. June 14th is Arcadia's birthday. Approximately one hour later, appellant telephoned Matia and left a message on her answering machine that he was at Cedar Point with Arcadia and Alexandra, another daughter, and would not be returning Arcadia until 4:00 p.m. Sunday afternoon. When Matia picked up the telephone to object, he hung up. Appellant then called the Brecksville Police Department to advise them that he would be keeping Arcadia overnight. He told them that he had advised Matia one week earlier that he would be keeping Arcadia overnight. When the dispatcher put appellant on hold to connect the call to a sergeant, appellant hung up. Shortly thereafter, Matia called the Brecksville Police Department to advise them of the situation. Matia denied that appellant had called her a week earlier to ask permission to keep Arcadia overnight, and explained that she had planned a birthday party for Arcadia that day at 4:00 p.m. At approximately 5:30 p.m., Matia went to the police station to report that appellant had not returned Arcadia as required by the agreement and that she wished to press charges against him. A Complaint for Interference With Custody in violation of R.C. 2919.23(A)(1), a first-degree -4- misdemeanor, was issued against appellant. R.C. 2919.23(A)(1) provides: (A) No person, knowing the person is without privilege to do so or being reckless in that regard, shall entice, take, keep, or harbor *** from the parent, guardian, or custodian of the person ***: (1) A child under the age of eighteen ****. On Sunday, June 15, 1997, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Matia called the Brecksville Police Department to advise them that appellant was at his residence. Three police officers went to appellant's residence, where they informed him of the pending charge against him. Appellant accused the officers of discriminating against him, but agreed to return Arcadia to Matia's house and then come to the Brecksville police station, where he was again advised of the charge against him. Appellant complained that the Brecksville Police Department was one-sided in its handling of the situation and threatened to sue. He was booked and then released on personal recognizance. The case was set for trial on August 6, 1997. On July 31, 1997, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charge against him, arguing that either party to the parental rights agreement had the right to notify the other party of a vacation with the children and to exercise this right in a unilateral manner. Appellant argued that pursuant to the agreement, he had the right to vacation time with his daughter on June 14, 1997 and, therefore, R.C. 2919.23(a)(1) did not apply to him. Appellant attached a copy of the agreement to his motion. Appellee filed a brief opposing the motion to dismiss. -5- On September 19, 1997, the trial court granted appellant's motion to dismiss and journalized the following entry: On due consideration of Defendant's motion to dismiss the Court finds probable cause for the issuance of the complaint herein and the arrest of Defendant. However on the facts presented herein by motion and brief with exhibits the Court finds judicial economy dictates that this matter be decided at the Domestic Relations Proceeding. Said Court has personal knowledge of the facts herein, together with juisdiction (sic) over all the parties necessary to a complete and final dispostion (sic) of the issues involved and to enforce and interpret its' (sic) own orders. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. Defendant is hereby discharged and costs are suspended. Appellant timely appealed, presenting the following assignment of error for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST OF ALOJZ KURINCIC ON JUNE 15, 1997. Appellant does not appeal the judgment of the trial court granting his motion to dismiss. Rather, appellant appeals only that portion of the trial court's order finding probable cause for the issuance of a complaint against appellant and his subsequent arrest. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding probable cause because it did not take any testimony or consider any evidence to reach this conclusion. Plaintiff-appellee responds that appellant's appeal is moot because the entire criminal matter was dismissed, appellant was discharged and costs were suspended. We agree. A case is moot if it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved are academic or nonexistent. State ex rel. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Coniglio -6- (1993), 82 Ohio App.3d 52, 54, citing County of Los Angeles v. Davis (1979), 440 U.S. 625, 631. A moot case involve[s] no actual, genuine, live controversy, the decision of which can definitely affect existing legal relations. Culver v. City of Warren (1948), 84 Ohio App. 373, paragraph six of the syllabus. Here, the trial court granted appellant the relief sought in his motion to dismiss: it dismissed the charge against him, discharged him and suspended the costs. Accordingly, whether or not the trial court properly found probable cause is merely an academic issue. A decision regarding this issue would not have any legal effect because there is no longer any justiciable dispute. The issue, therefore, is moot. It is not the duty or the responsibility of the court to answer moot questions. State v. Boysaw (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 173, 174. Therefore, we overrule appellant's assignment of error and dismiss his appeal. -7- This appeal is dismissed. It is, therefore, considered that said appellee recover of said appellant its costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Garfield Heights Municipal Court directing said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE PRESIDING JUDGE PATTON, J. and SPELLACY, J., CONCUR. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's .