COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73395 IN RE: ALBERT DARDEN : : JOURNAL ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : : AND : : OPINION : : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: SEPTEMBER 17, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Court Division, Case No. 9600262. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: _______________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellee: Stephanie Tubbs Jones Cuyahoga County Prosecutor John R. Mitchell Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-appellant: James A. Draper Cuyahoga County Public Defender Darin Thompson Assistant Public Defender 1200 West Third Street, N.W. 100 Lakeside Place Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1569 -2- SWEENEY, JAMES D., J.: Appellant Albert Darden appeals from the finding of delinquency entered by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, based upon a charge of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)1. The appellant was committed to the legal care and custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a period of one year. On Saturday, September 9, 1995, at approximately 12:30 p.m., the victim, Anthony Alvares, a U.S. Postal Service mail carrier, was delivering packages on his route in the Bellaire Road and Matherson Avenue area. His next stop was to have been at 12400 Matherson Avenue. At the time of the incident, Mr. Alvares was wearing his postal uniform, but driving his personal vehicle, a 1989 Hyundai Sonata. Because it was a hot day, both of the front windows were open. As he was driving approximately 8 or 10 miles per hour from Bellaire, near the curb, and approaching Matherson, two young men approached. The appellant jumped on Mr. Alvares' vehicle, placing his hands on the hood. Mr. Alvares stopped his vehicle in order not to hurt anyone. The appellant peeked into the car to see what was inside. Mr. Alvares testified that the appellant placed his head, shoulders, arms, and hands inside the vehicle. The appellant did not just look at the victim, but also looked towards the rear seat which held four or five visible packages (T. 9). 1This case occurred prior to July 1, 1996, and this court has used the statutes in effect at the time of the conduct committed by the appellant. -3- Mr. Alvares stated that he informed the appellant that he was a postal employee and, you shouldn't be doing this thing. It's a federal offense. (T. 9.) Mr. Alvares exited his vehicle. The appellant removed himself from the vehicle, walked around to the driver's side. The other young man was urging the appellant to beat the victim. The appellant threw a punch at Mr. Alvares, but Mr. Alvares successfully avoided it by pulling his head back. The punch was thrown hard, with a hard fist. Fortunately for Mr. Alvares, the police were cruising the area, heard his cries for help, intervened in the altercation, and placed the appellant in custody. On cross-examination, Mr. Alvares testified that the appellant did not verbally threaten him or even speak (T. 15). Mr. Alvares continued to explain to the appellant and the other young man that he was just doing his job and that he was a postal employee. At the close of cross, the appellant's counsel asked: Q. Okay. Did Mr. Darden, at any other time, walk up to your car and try to go to the back seat -- A. No. Q. to take a package? A. No. (T.17.) The court asked Mr. Alvares why he believed the appellant was trying to rob him, and Mr. Alvares answered Because he came in to my car looking at my packages in the back. (T. 19.) Cleveland Police Patrolman Robert Clark testified that he and Patrolman Zarlenga were working in the Bellaire - Matherson area -4- on September 9, 1995, and heard screams for help. Officer Clark stated that the victim was in the middle of several males, standing in a semi-circle, who were threatening to kill him. Officer Clark estimated that there were eight to twelve males surrounding Mr. Alvares and chanting. The victim was screaming and waiving his arms at the police. Officer Clark testified that the appellant seemed to be the primary aggressor. Once the officers were noticed by the crowd, it dispersed. The appellant ran northbound on Bellaire, the officers drove around the corner, picked the appellant up, and returned him to the scene. Mr. Alvares was physically shaken and visibly upset. The appellant asserts one assignment of error: MASTER DARDEN'S ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY FOR ROBBERY WAS IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WHERE HIS USE OF FORCE WAS NOT IN THE ATTEMPT TO COMMIT A THEFT OFFENSE OR FLIGHT IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT HE HAD TAKEN A SUBSTANTIAL STEP TOWARDS COMPLETION OF A THEFT OFFENSE. The appellant argues both that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that a theft was attempted and insufficient evidence to support a finding that the use of force was in furtherance of a theft offense. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the reasonable doubt standard of criminal law has constitutional stature and that juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In Re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358. -5- The Supreme Court, in State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, held that `sufficiency' is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law. In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Id. at 386. In State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the test to be used in determining questions on both the value of circumstantial evidence and on the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State. The court held at syllabus two: An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia [1979], 433 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, followed.) In R.C. 2911.02 the legislature has defined robbery as: (A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after such attempt or offense, shall use or threaten the immediate use of force against another. R.C. 2913.01(K) states that theft offense means any of several sections, including R.C. 2913.02. R.C. 2913.02 defines theft as: (A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services in any of the following ways: -6- (1) Without consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent; (2) Beyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent; (3) By deception; (4) By threat. In the case sub judice, the appellant forcefully stopped the victim's automobile by jumping on it and placing his hands on the hood. He then placed his head, neck, shoulders, arms and hands inside the vehicle. It is permissible to infer the appellant's intent from his conduct. This sequence of events, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient evidence upon which a rational finder of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of robbery proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant's assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. JAMES M. PORTER, P.J., and MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J., CONCUR. ______________________________ JAMES D. SWEENEY JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .